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Abstract
This year’s edition of Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the World Economy is divided into seven chapters.
Chapter I contains an analysis of recent trends in the 
main industrialized and emerging economies and reviews 
the possible impact of the financial crisis that began 
in the United States on the world economy and on the 
economic and trade performance of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. The effect of the crisis on the prices of 
commodities (especially food and oil) and the implications 
for growth, inflation and the region’s external sector are 
also examined. Lastly, the chapter looks at the region’s 
trade figures for 2007 and projections for 2008. 
Chapter II describes recent developments in the Doha 
Round, including documents disseminated in July 2008 on 
negotiations relating to agriculture and non-agricultural 
market access. It also provides a summary of the main 
advances and obstacles emerging from those negotiations, 
with emphasis on the repercussions for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Chapter III discusses some new trade-related topics: 
(i) new security requirements for freight transport; (ii) the 
development and legal status of private quality standards; 
(iii) the state of play in discussions on trade and labour rules; 
and (iv) the debate on the links between climate change, 
trade and the multilateral trading system. It is argued that 
these and other issues will be on the international agenda 
for the next few years and that the region must begin to 
form unified positions on such topics.
Chapter IV examines recent progress in regional 
integration and the main initiatives under way in the 
region’s integration schemes (the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community, the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) and the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)). The chapter also 
analyses: (i) Mexico’s active policy aimed at strengthening 
its trade and infrastructure links with Central America; 
(ii) the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative; (iii) the 
South American Community of Nations (UNASUR); and 
(iv) the hosting by Brazil in December 2008 of a Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of Latin America 
and the Caribbean on the subject of regional integration 
schemes. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
links between investment and services as an instrument 
of de facto integration. 
Chapter V reports on the status of negotiations 
for the adoption of an association agreement between 
the European Union and each of the above-mentioned 
subregional integration schemes. In each case, there is a 
description of the negotiation process, controversial issues 
and the main challenges. It is noted that, since there is 
a similar framework for all these negotiations (covering 
Caribbean and Central American countries, the Andean 
Community, MERCOSUR, Mexico and Chile), they 
may generate important synergies for the subsequent 
convergence of trade and investment rules among the 
region’s integration schemes. 
Chapter VI presents an in-depth analysis of trade 
and investment relations between the Latin American and 
Caribbean region and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as 
within the latter. It is established that: (i) biregional trade 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)12
remains inter-industrial in nature, despite the emergence 
of some new export commodities and high-technology 
manufactures; (ii) so far, efforts to forge closer links between 
the Latin America and Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific 
regions have been undertaken by individual countries 
on a somewhat sporadic basis; and (iii) there needs to 
be a more coordinated strategy among countries, so as 
to strengthen the nexus between trade and investment 
and to reinforce production and trade linkages through 
various types of public-private alliances (including free 
trade agreements).
The subject of chapter VII is the foresight analyses 
carried out by some countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with a 
view to strengthening innovation, competitiveness and export 
diversification. Despite the importance of such exercises 
for building consensus around strategic development 
guidelines, they are not frequently used in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Advances achieved in other parts of the 
world could therefore encourage the countries of the region 
to use such exercises as an effective tool for promoting 
competitiveness, innovation and export development. 
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Executive summary
Global economic trends and Latin American and 
Caribbean trade flows
In 2003-2007, world economic activity was at its 
most vibrant in 40 years, with high growth rates, low 
inflation, low interest rates, fluid financing and buoyant 
international trade. The major emerging countries 
(Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China —the 
so-called “BRIC” group) accounted for almost half of 
world economic growth. This favourable international 
context, combined with improvements in the region’s 
macroeconomic policies, enabled the Latin American 
and Caribbean region to achieve its best economic 
performance in 40 years. An important factor in this 
positive regional performance was high world demand 
for energy, food and other commodities, which boosted 
the region’s exports.
Figure 1
CONTRIBUTION OF SELECTED REGIONS TO WORLD GROWTH
(Percentages of annual world growth)
China
United States + European Union











1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database.
Note:  Gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (PPP).
The year 2008 will be a landmark in the economic 
history of globalization.1 This year has broken the upward 
phase of the cycle with powerful interrelated shocks, which 
have their origins in the five years running up to 2008: 
(i) the subprime mortgage crisis, which started in the
1
 The world financial debacle triggered by the subprime crisis 
in the United States, following decades in which emphasis had 
been placed on deregulation, has, once again, set off the debate 
on the deficiencies of the regulatory framework for international 
finance (just as occurred after the “Asian crisis”). Having led 
 the bail-out of European banks by deciding that his government 
would assume an active role as a shareholder, the Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, stated that it seemed 
that the time had come to rethink the world’s financial system 
in the global era. 
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United States in 2007 and threatens to throw that country 
and the world economy into recession; (ii) the weakening 
dollar during the first half of the year and steady demand 
from emerging economies, which have caused oil and 
food prices to soar and increased speculative movements 
and volatility in those markets, thereby putting inflation 
back on the agenda of global concerns; and (iii) the 
domino effect of the subprime mortgage crisis, which 
has triggered a series of bankruptcies and shake-ups in 
the financial industry in the United States and Europe. In 
late September, these repercussions toppled the United 
States investment banking sector, which had led the way in 
engineering the recent financial innovations of the global 
economy, and the threat of an international financial crisis 
loomed. Fears of recession have since led to a fall in raw 
material prices, especially those of oil, copper and other 
commodities of interest to the region.
In short, the subprime mortgage crisis is the aftermath 
of a real estate bubble in the United States which, when it 
burst, sent ripples through financial institutions that had 
large quantities of assets backed by such mortgages. The 
losses incurred by these operations raised these institutions’ 
levels of indebtedness and reduced their capital, thereby 
limiting their capacity to meet the credit needs of the 
economy. Faced with this situation, they proceeded to 
sell off assets, intensifying the fall in the price of such 
assets and consequently exacerbating their own debt and 
capital problems. This downward spiral triggered a loss of 
confidence among the banks themselves, which sparked a 
credit crunch and set the stage for the failure of financial 
giants that had imprudently saddled themselves with 
excessively risky operations and short-term financing. 
At this point, it became absolutely indispensable for 
the State to step in to restore confidence and normalize 
financial flows.
The crisis has reverberated through financial markets 
in the United States and Europe, creating solvency and 
liquidity problems and causing turmoil in credit markets 
worldwide. Authorities in industrialized economies have 
responded —with varying degrees of timeliness and 
coverage— by providing liquidity and recapitalizing 
financial institutions in need of assistance. Notwithstanding 
the enormous efforts that have been made, volatility 
remains high, fuelled, on the one hand, by uncertainty 
about the duration and intensity of the financial crisis, 
and, on the other, by questions as to how the measures 
will be implemented and how the costs will be divided 
up among the different stakeholders.
Regardless of exactly how the crisis is eventually 
resolved, it is already having a serious impact on the real 
economy in the industrialized countries, and lower growth 
and job-creation figures are being forecast for the rest of 
2008 and for 2009 in those economies. This situation, whose 
duration and intensity are still impossible to predict, has 
started to filter through to the Latin American economies 
and will have deeper repercussions in 2009. In particular, a 
fall in external demand and in unilateral current transfers is 
to be expected, which would reduce inflows to the region. 
This drastic change in external conditions will have an 
adverse effect on growth and employment in the region 
and, thus, on the number of people living in poverty in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
According to information available as of early October 
2008, the European banking system has also suffered. 
This has further undermined confidence in the financial 
and stock markets and, in some cases, has generated 
panic situations to which some of the major emerging 
economies are exposed to as well. Despite massive 
injections of liquidity in the United States and Europe, 
interbank interest rates remain at a record high, and there 
is a serious danger of defaults along the payment chain 
in the United States. If this unfortunate situation were to 
arise, the economies of the United States and the European 
Union would face a much more dramatic slowdown and 
perhaps even a recession in late 2008 and for much of 
2009. This would drive down growth projections sharply 
for 2009 and 2010 for the world economy, including 
developing economies. 
Current events are therefore interlinked, and they are 
increasing the level of uncertainty and volatility in financial 
systems, sapping confidence and shrinking credit in the 
major economies. The effects on production, investment, 
employment and trade will be felt more keenly in 2009. 
The present financial crisis is the most serious event of 
its kind to take place in the United States since the Great 
Depression, and although the world is now better prepared 
to cope with its effects, it will nonetheless leave a deep 
mark on the global economy, as is only to be expected 
when such a severe crisis occurs in what is not only the 
most dynamic sector of the world’s largest economy but 
also the one that has the most far-reaching ramifications 
for other economic activities in the United States and the 
wider world economy. With the bailout of Bear Stearns by 
JP Morgan Chase, the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank 
of America, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 
change of status of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
to regulated bank holding companies, in the space of just 
six months the five leading investment banks in the United 
States have disappeared. These events, in addition to the 
bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the country’s 
main mortgage lenders) by the United States Treasury 
and the rescue of the nation’s biggest insurance company, 
American International Group Inc. (AIG), and Washington 
Mutual (a major commercial bank), demonstrate that this 
is a systemic crisis with serious ramifications not only for 
world finance but also for the real economy. 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 1
Given the off-balance-sheet operations conducted by 
these investment banks, it is still difficult to predict the 
depth and duration of the crisis. The bursting of the real 
estate bubble therefore needs to come full circle, so that 
the prices of all “toxic” assets can return to sustainable 
levels. Only then will the scale of the losses be known, 
and the financial sector can begin to put its accounts in 
order and recapitalize. These processes will take time, and 
this is why the rescue package proposed by the United 
States authorities to restore confidence in the system 
amounts to some US$ 700 billion. As of mid-October 
2008, implementation of the financial “megaplan” was a 
matter of urgency, as was an announcement of the plan’s 
operational details so that “toxic” assets could be isolated 
and liquidity could be provided to distressed financial 
institutions in order to restore confidence among banks 
and normalize financial flows. In early October, the main 
financial challenge in the United States was to ensure 
continuity in the chain of payments in order to enable 
well-managed financial agencies and enterprises to avoid 
bankruptcy and thus avert severe impacts on employment 
and production activity. 
The massive rescue package finally approved 
by the United States Congress did not succeed in 
restoring confidence in the world’s financial and stock 
markets. Whether this was due to design failings or 
problems of implementation, the inadequacy of this 
response became evident when the United Kingdom 
announced its own rescue package. The overall matrix 
of that package was endorsed a few days later by the 
other European governments, which coordinated their 
operations to lower interest rates and throw a lifeline 
to the European financial system. The impact of the 
coordinated European action, following a few weeks of 
vacillation, was dramatic, reviving financial and stock 
markets and reducing interbank rates. The markets 
rewarded the idea of a coordinated global effort to deal 
with a global, systemic problem.
In essence, the rescue package proposed by Prime 
Minister Brown was broader, deeper and swifter than that 
of the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve. Its 
main components were: (i) an injection of liquidity into 
the financial system; (ii) an equity injection consisting 
of the recapitalization of weakened financial institutions 
in exchange for a government stake; (iii) guarantees for 
interbank debt; (iv) insurance for bank deposits; and 
(v) public purchase of subprime assets. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the total amount of 
liquidity —some US$ 3.1 trillion— which central banks 
and other government agencies have recently injected 
into the banking system. By mid-October, the US$ 700 
billion rescue package announced by the United States and 
the European countries’ firm resolution to take decisive, 
coordinated action on the basis of the matrix proposed by 
the Government of the United Kingdom, had generated 
commitments totalling US$ 2 trillion. The markets 
responded positively and many stock markets recovered 
ground lost since the start of the crisis.
Table 1
LIQUIDITY INJECTIONS AND RESCUE PACKAGES ANNOUNCED 




(as at 20 October)
Rescue packages
(as at 14 October)
Rescue packages
(as at 20 October)
United States 1.38 0.7 b 4.3 e
European Union 1.2 2.41 c 2.42 f
1 euro zone 
countries 1.1 1.4 
c 1. f
United 
Kingdom 0.4 0.87 
c 0.87 c
Japan 0.11 … …
Other 0.0 d … …
Total 3.17 3.11 .72
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial Stability 
Report, October 2008; and international financial press reports (New York 
Times, ABC, The Guardian, Estrategia, BBC News, among others).
a  Refers to the liquidity supplied by the United States Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank and other central banks through repurchase agreements (repos) and 
short-term (less than 0-day) loans. The amounts spent by governments to purchase 
equity in banks are also included.
b
  First United States rescue package. 
c  Includes guarantee commitments for inter-bank loans, bank deposit insurance and 
public purchase of subprime assets by the Governments of France, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Spain. 
d  Includes injections of liquidity in Australia and Sweden. 
e  Includes the announcement by the United States Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation that it would insure the deposits of subordinate banks up to US$ 1. 
trillion, non-interest-bearing deposits up to US$ 00 billion and commercial paper 
up to US$ 1. trillion. The three commitments add up to US$ 3. trillion.
f
  Includes the intervention by the Government of the Netherlands in the bailout of ING.
In adopting their rescue model, the United States 
authorities had rejected the idea of having the State acquire 
equity in the banking system, probably for ideological 
reasons, and had instead placed emphasis on government 
purchase of “toxic” assets through mortgage securitization. 
This, however, did not manage to restore confidence in 
financial markets. Given the success of the European rescue 
programme and the coordinated interest-rate measure, the 
United States followed suit, reinforcing the improvement 
in financial expectations worldwide. The United States 
authorities announced that US$ 250 billion of the rescue 
package approved by Congress would be used to purchase 
equity in large and small banks. In the days that followed, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced 
that it would guarantee deposits in subordinate banks, 
non-interest-bearing current accounts and commercial 
paper amounting to approximately US$ 3.6 trillion. These 
guarantees, plus the US$ 700 billion bailout package, 
bring the total United States rescue programme to US$ 4.3 
trillion (see table 1).
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It is not yet possible to ascertain whether these 
measures will be sufficient to resolve the crisis. They 
are certainly a step in the right direction, however, and 
the more alarming problems that were looming at the 
beginning of October, that is, widespread panic on financial 
markets and the threat of a break in the payment chain, 
seem to have abated. 
It is precisely the positive characteristics of the cycle 
(high growth, low interest rates and low inflation) that 
increased risk-seeking and made financial innovation, 
securitization and off-balance-sheet operations seem more 
attractive. Overconfidence in the market and deregulation 
were responsible for the rest, creating a climate that 
encouraged fraud and set off the worst financial crisis since 
the 1930s. Just as the external debt crisis in Latin America 
and the Caribbean led to more sensible economies policies 
(following the lost decade and some painful adjustments), 
the current financial crisis in the United States could result 
in a rethinking of financial regulation in terms of risk 
management and levels of capitalization and leverage, as 
well as stronger economic policy incentives for saving 
(to deter excessive public and private borrowing in that 
country’s economy). 
The repercussions of the financial crisis will be even 
more keenly felt in 2009, as they manifest themselves 
in economic activity and employment levels. The world 
economy will therefore grow less in 2009 than in 2008. 
Depending on the results of the financial rescue package 
in the United States and the effectiveness of the support 
measures introduced in Europe, the situation could even 
give rise to a significant recession, unless the crisis is 
prevented from spreading to real economic activity via a 
serious credit crunch. For the time being, the slowdown is 
concentrated in the main advanced economies, although 
Asian and other emerging economies will also be affected, 
albeit to a lesser degree. The United States economy has 
been grappling with strong recessionary pressures since 
late 2007, but buoyant net exports, which have been 
boosted by the weak dollar, have averted a worse slump 
in the economy as a whole. Japan and the European 
Union are being severely hurt by the crisis in the United 
States, and their performance, in terms of both domestic 
and external demand, has taken a considerable turn for 
the worse as they seem to be headed towards a virtual 
recession in late 2008. 
Up to mid-2008, emerging economies were maintaining 
high levels of growth despite the slowdown in advanced 
economies, which suggested that there was some degree 
of decoupling between the two groups. In the second 
quarter of 2008, new signs pointed to a more nuanced 
outlook, as the trading partners of developed countries 
began to be affected by the sharp drop in demand in the 
latter. Furthermore, the financial crisis has aggravated 
the liquidity squeeze in international markets, which 
has pushed up interest rates. This will have a further 
negative impact on growth in developing economies. So 
long as the financial crisis does not continue to worsen, 
most emerging countries will be better prepared than 
previously to weather external shocks, thanks to their 
substantial international reserves, orderly fiscal accounts 
and low external debt. Nevertheless, the scale of the crisis 
is so great that the entire global economy, including the 
emerging economies, will feel its impact.
The financial crisis and the slowdown in world growth 
have halted the upward trend in food and oil prices. These 
prices rose until mid-July 2008, in a context of growing 
demand for such commodities from China, India and other 
Asian countries, combined with tight and inelastic supply. 
In real terms, the price of oil was higher than it had been 
during the 1979 energy crisis, while metal prices have 
tripled or quadrupled since 2003. Food prices have also 
shot up since 2006. In the second half of 2008, commodity 
prices started to fall as a result of the financial panic, the 
threat of a global recession and the sharp slowdown in 
industrialized economies. Between July and mid-October, 
wheat and maize prices fell by 70%, oil prices by 55% 
and aluminium, copper, nickel and platinum prices by 
nearly 50%. Long-term trends still place these prices 
at relatively high levels and they will probably remain 
high as long as China and the other emerging economies 
remain buoyant. The financial shock has watered down the 
speculative component in price volatility, but structural 
supply and demand factors continue to push up the prices 
for these products, especially energy, minerals and metals. 
Everything points to these prices remaining relatively high 
but ceasing to exert inflationary pressure. 
The improvement in the trade balances of Mexico, 
South America and the region as a whole between 2004 
and 2006 was due mainly to high and rising commodity 
prices. In 2007, these trade balance worsened slightly, 
owing to the strong increase in import volumes and prices. 
In contrast, the rise in commodity prices had the opposite 
effect on Central America and the Caribbean, as they are 
net importers of oil and food. 
The projected fall in commodity prices in the final 
quarter of 2008 and in 2009 is bad news for developing 
countries that export raw materials, such as those of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. As already mentioned, 
however, those prices will probably remain above 2006 
and 2007 levels, which should bring some relief in terms 
of inflation and will be of benefit to the net oil-importing 
countries of Central America and the Caribbean (with the 
exception of Trinidad and Tobago). The years 2008 and 
2009 are expected to see a decline in export volumes, 
while imports will continue to rise. As a result of the 
worsening terms of trade and a drop in trade volumes, 
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the trade and current account balances will deteriorate in 
all subregions except Central America and the Caribbean. 
In 2009, the external sector will therefore no longer be a 
growth factor for the region.
Given this complex world scenario, the Latin American 
and Caribbean region has to deal with both immediate 
and long-term challenges. In the short run, the region’s 
governments must find a way to cope with international 
financial and economic turmoil at a time when they have 
less access to external financing, they must pay higher 
interest rates, local stock exchanges have been hit hard by 
world trends, capital is being shifted to safer destinations 
and into less risky assets, exports are lower, migrant 
remittances from industrialized countries in recession 
are declining and foreign direct investment is down. As 
a result, credit lines for exports and investment plans will 
be tighter, thereby limiting growth. 
If the crisis were to deepen beyond the situation 
observed in early October (when this summary went to 
press), then the avoidance of contagion from the financial 
crisis in industrialized economies would clearly become 
the highest priority. In that case, the region’s governments 
would have to ensure liquidity in the financial system 
(particularly credit lines in United States dollars) and 
reinforce prudent supervision of the soundness of the 
banks and financial institutions with the most (direct 
and indirect) links to international financing and risky 
operations. If such a negative scenario were to become 
more likely, with recession in the United States and the 
European Union and a severe liquidity squeeze, then a 
less stringent monetary policy would be justified. 
Figure 2
EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE


























































South America Mexico Central American Common
Market (CACM)
Caribbean (2+1)
Export prices Export volumes Import prices
Import volumes Trade balance - Percentages of GDP (right axis)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Note:  The increase in prices refers to the annual variation in the unit values of 
imports and exports. Growth in volume refers to the annual variation in the 
quantities exported. The trade balance is the weighted net result of growth rates. 
Caribbean “2 + 1” refers to Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
The higher cost of capital and the restriction of global 
financial and investment flows will continue for the rest 
of 2008 and 2009 and will be coupled with stronger 
inflationary pressures, and this situation, for the time being, 
calls for somewhat more monetary policies. Given these 
conditions, such pressures have to be eased through the 
use of appropriate monetary and fiscal policies, along with 
other social and production measures to support low-income 
groups. In any event, the world economic slowdown can 
be expected to reduce demand for commodities, especially 
food and energy, thereby gradually easing the disturbing 
inflationary pressures observed since the beginning of 2008. 
Curbing inflation should continue to be the aim as long 
as this remains the most pressing challenge. Achieving 
this objective may entail adapting policies to the scale of 
the inflationary pressure generated by external factors. As 
stated previously, all indications are that the international 
situation will cease to be a source of inflationary pressure 
in the rest of 2008 and in 2009. 
In order to deal with the foreseeable external shocks, 
governments should strengthen their countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies, maintain sound fiscal accounts 
and monitor external account trends in order to prevent the 
emergence of unsustainable disequilibria. Depending on 
how the financial crisis evolves, fast-acting expansionary 
policies will probably have to be devised, as a matter 
of urgency, in order to support liquidity in the financial 
system. This will call for financing and appropriate policy 
arrangements to avoid the creation of new disequilibria. 
In the medium term, the governments of countries that 
maintain favourable terms of trade should improve the 
management and use of additional income from above-
trend commodity prices by promoting activities that 
boost medium-term competitiveness, human resource 
development and export diversification. 
Although 2009 will be a tighter year for all the 
economies in Latin America and the Caribbean, the extent 
of the constraints will vary in each case, depending on each 
economy’s specific circumstances. The opportunities or 
constraints influencing each economy’s performance in 2009 
will be determined by a number of variables, including: 
(i) the solvency of its financial system; (ii) whether it 
is a net debtor or net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world; (iii) the sustainability of its fiscal accounts and 
the level of its public debt; (iv) the level of inflation and 
inflationary expectations; (v) the balance-of-payments 
current account balance; (vi) the relative importance of 
remittances and FDI as stable sources of current account 
financing; (vii) the degree of export diversification in terms 
of destination markets; and (viii) whether the country is a 
net exporter or net importer of food and energy. Beyond 
any national differences, the global situation is one that 
recommends fiscal caution, exchange-rate flexibility and 
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prudent supervision of the financial system’s performance 
in order to ensure its liquidity and to make sure that the 
terms, currencies and types of risk involved in financial 
operations match up. 
The current global financial crisis and the threat 
of recession in 2009 pose an enormous challenge in 
terms of the soundness of the economic reforms that the 
region’s countries have been making considerable efforts 
to implement in recent decades. Thanks essentially to 
these reforms, and notwithstanding the need to determine 
whether these reforms have effectively contributed to 
growth, equity and competitiveness, there is no doubt 
that the region is now better prepared to face this adverse 
situation. Although this crisis may well have a considerable 
impact, there is no doubt that, without such reforms, that 
impact would have been much greater. Now is the time to 
keep the reforms that are enabling countries to weather the 
financial storm with relatively limited damage firmly on 
track, with emphasis on: fiscal responsibility and control 
of inflation; trade openness and market diversification; 
and debt reduction and the build-up of international 
reserves. These are the assets that have prevented Latin 
America and the Caribbean from falling into a recession 
such as the one towards which the United States and the 
European Union appear to be heading. These same assets 
will also stimulate a rapid recovery once global financial 
flows return to normal. 
To sum up, it is difficult to see how the world 
economy could remain the same after 2008. Changes 
need to be made in terms of financial regulation, energy 
efficiency, the search for renewable energy sources and 
the provision of international funds to reduce hunger and 
increase the food supply in the poorest countries. In the 
first half of 2008, the combined effect of the energy crisis 
and soaring food prices not only triggered inflation in a 
number of countries within the region and elsewhere, but 
also posed serious threats to democratic governance in 
some developing nations. These concerns were expressed 
at many international summits, which highlighted the 
urgency of tackling the issues of governance associated 
with the globalization process. 
Indeed, once efforts to resolve the financial crisis are 
on the right track, the governance of globalization, with 
emphasis on redefining the modalities for regulation and 
prudential supervision of the financial system, should be 
the main item on the international agenda. In this regard, 
and against the backdrop of the current financial crisis, 
the main European leaders —Prime Minister Brown of 
the United Kingdom, Chancellor Merkel of Germany 
and President Sarkozy of France— are calling for an 
international summit to address the urgent reforms needed 
in the international financial system, including rules on 
greater transparency, the definition of global standards 
for cross-border regulation and supervision, and the 
establishment of crisis early warning systems. In a similar 
vein, proposals are being made to update institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
even the World Trade Organization in order to bring them 
into line with the new state of the global economy in the 
twenty-first century. The United Nations has expressed 
its full willingness to make its Headquarters in New York 
available for such a summit to facilitate this increasingly 
urgent process. Decades of economic reform are now 
threatened by volatility and a lack of governance in financial 
markets, as well as by shocks in energy and food prices 
that have been exacerbated by speculative operations. An 
international recession in 2009 would seriously jeopardize 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
This seems to be the right time for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to adopt a unified position on these 
issues, to speak with one voice in various international 
forums and to formulate proposals that will help to shape 
the global agenda. The Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of Latin America and the Caribbean on 
Integration and Development, due to be hosted by Brazil 
on 16 and 17 December 2008 in Salvador, Bahía, will be 
an excellent opportunity to do so.
The Doha Round: failure or temporary setback?
In 2008, the climate at the Doha Round deteriorated 
from reasonable optimism to a state of pervasive uncertainty, 
following the failure of the “mini-ministerial meeting” 
convened by the Director-General of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Pascal Lamy, in the final week of 
July. This round of negotiations is especially important 
because it is the first to take place in 15 years, i.e., since 
the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in December 1993. For 
developing countries, the Doha Round represents the 
possibility of reinstating the development dimension on 
the international trade agenda; hence the term “Doha 
Development Agenda”. 
The Doha Development Agenda originated out of 
a recognition that, although advances made in the new 
multilateral system were significant, they had not benefited 
all members in an equitable way. One of the problems 
was that developing countries needed support tools to deal 
with the complexity of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements, which is why there was interest in identifying 
problems of application in each agreement and assessing 
special and differential treatment for the developing 
countries concerned. The second aim of the Doha Round 
was negotiation in the traditional areas of market access 
for agricultural and non-agricultural products and trade 
in services, which would capture part of the liberalization 
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process that members have been implementing since the 
close of the Uruguay Round. A third aim was to continue 
the process of reforming agricultural trade by creating 
effective access opportunities, reducing the subsidies 
that distorted trade the most and agreeing to eliminate 
export subsidies applied by developed countries. Lastly, 
the Doha Round provides for improvements in the trade 
rules on antidumping duties, fishing subsidies and the 
link between trade rules and environmental agreements 
with a view to improving consistency between the former 
and the goals of sustainable development. 
The purpose of the “mini-ministerial meeting” was to 
consolidate the informal progress made on various negotiation 
topics during 2007 and 2008 and to provide a new political 
impetus to the most sensitive issues in relation to trade in 
agricultural and non-agricultural products. With regard 
to market access for agricultural products, for instance, 
the proposal was for a minimum average tariff reduction 
of 54% for developed countries and 36% for developing 
countries. Countries could designate a percentage of tariff 
lines as “sensitive products”, and developing countries 
could, in addition, designate “special products” and apply 
safeguards. Sensitive and special products were to be subject 
to smaller reductions, and certain special products would 
have been completely exempt.
In terms of total domestic support (production 
subsidies),2 the proposal on the table would oblige the 
European Union to reduce total subsidies by between 
75% and 85%. For the European Union (15 members), 
the estimated reduction would be from the existing level 
of € 110.3 billion to € 27.6 billion. The United States and 
Japan would have to reduce their subsidies by between 
66% and 73%. For the United States, this would mean a 
reduction from the current consolidated figure of US$ 48.2 
billion to between US$ 16.4 billion and US$ 13 billion. In 
the case of the most trade-distorting (amber box) subsidies, 
the proposals would translate into a reduction of 70% for 
the European Union, i.e., a drop from the current ceiling 
of € 67.16 billion to a new maximum of € 20.1 billion. 
For the United States, the reduction would be 60%, from 
the current ceiling of US$ 19.1 billion to around US$ 7.6 
billion. Although the objection raised to these proposals is 
that the United States would retain some margin for raising 
subsidies above current levels, these would nonetheless be 
lower than those applied in four of the last seven years.3 
Following the collapse of the negotiations in July 2008, 
if the current situation (no agreement) is compared with 
the commitments undertaken in the Uruguay Round (the
2
 This includes the most trade-distorting subsidies (amber box), 
subsidies decoupled from production (blue box) and de minimis 
(or minimum) subsidies. 
3
 The Economist, 2 to 8 August, 2008.
status quo), the European Union could now triple the most 
trade-distorting subsidies it applies without breaching its 
international commitments. Similarly, the United States 
could double its subsidies.
In terms of non-agricultural market access, it was 
suggested that bound tariff reductions should be introduced 
using a formula that distinguished between developed 
and developing countries. For developing countries, 
there would be three different rates, based on the degree 
of flexibility chosen. The larger the reductions (and the 
lower the rate), the greater degree of flexibility there 
would be (and vice versa). There would also be additional 
flexibility that could be used to exempt certain products 
or apply smaller reductions to them. There were also 
provisions for special modalities for the 32 least developed 
countries (which would be exempt from tariff reductions) 
and special arrangements for 31 small and vulnerable 
economies and for 12 developing countries with a low 
percentage of bound tariff lines.
The failure of the “mini-ministerial meeting” in July 
2008, which was marked by disagreements between China, 
India and the United States as well as less visible conflicts of 
interest among developing countries, is creating uncertainty 
about the capacity of the protagonists of the negotiations 
(beneficiaries of the process of globalization) to make the 
multilateral trading system more governable. This latest 
failure could be seen as a justification for regional policies 
and bilateral negotiations undertaken in a context where 
the positive complementarity between multilateralism and 
regionalism appears weaker than in the past. Multilateral 
trade rules are lagging behind regional ones, endangering 
the relevance of the multilateral system for its members 
and weakening its ability to tackle the challenges of an 
expanding membership. Once again, questions are being 
raised about the ability of WTO to handle the international 
agenda of the future, and unless negotiations are reopened 
very soon, the Doha Round and its pro-development agenda 
will be delayed until late 2009 or 2010 at the earliest.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, there are many 
viewpoints on developments in the Doha Round. There is 
consensus that industrialized nations have the scope to be 
more generous in their proposals regarding agricultural 
trade in terms of both access and reductions in distortions. 
No such consensus exists, however, about how the region 
can shape its proposals concerning non-agricultural and 
services market access in order to contribute to a good 
agreement in the Doha Round. There are also differences 
of opinion on the urgency of concluding the Round. Some 
countries would prefer no agreement to an unsatisfactory 
one. For others, what is on the table constitutes significant 
progress, particularly in view of the protectionist tendencies 
that may be triggered by the current financial crisis in 
industrialized economies.
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Figure 3
TRADE-DISTORTING AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, 1995-2007
(Billions of dollars and billions of euros)





































































Source: Sébastien Jean, Tim Josling and David Laborde, “Implications for the European Union of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities”, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), June 2008; David Blandford, David Laborde and Will Martin, “Implications for the United States of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural 
Modalities”, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), June 2008; Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Last Gasp for Doha? [online] http://blogs.cgdev.
org/globaldevelopment/2008/07/last_gasp_for_doha.php; and World Trade Organization (WTO), “Unofficial guide to the 10 July 2008 ‘revised draft modalities’”, 2008.
Note: The figures compare actual expenditure in 1-2007 with the proposed new limits on expenditure.
 Includes the most trade-distorting subsidies (those directly linked to prices and production), which are officially called Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and are 
also known as “amber box” subsidies. Also includes blue box subsidies, which are not linked to prices or production, and the de minimis category, which includes amber 
box support but in smaller quantities or the minimum allowed in relative terms (currently % of production for developed countries and 10% for developing countries). The 
three programmes together are equivalent to the concept of Overall Distorting Domestic Support (ODDS), as shown in the figures. The reforms proposed in the Doha Round 
include limiting blue box subsidies to 2.% of the value of production for the period 1-2000 and reducing de minimis subsidies to 2.% of the value of production. The 
Doha Round proposal also seeks to amend the Agriculture Agreement to include disciplines in these categories and to define a new concept of trade-distorting subsidies. 
 Both figures use the most conservative estimates of the possible results of the Doha Round according to current proposals. For the United States, results range from 
US$ 13 billion to US$ 1.4 billion. For the European Union, estimates vary between € 1. billion and € 27. billion.
It is in light of the above that the quality of the agreement 
and the urgency of concluding it must be assessed. Assuming 
a tight schedule and adopting an optimistic outlook, if the 
Doha Round is postponed, it could still be completed in 
2010 and approved by national parliaments in 2011, but 
even then its first benefits would not be felt until 2012. In 
this scenario, however, the Doha Development Agenda 
could easily be sidetracked by the impact of either the 
financial crisis in the United States and the European 
Union or new global problems such as energy or food 
crises or climate change. It is said that negotiations never 
fail, but are only postponed. However, it is also true that 
their political relevance is not eternal.
Although the July 2008 agreement was far from fully 
satisfactory to developing countries, it was nonetheless a step 
in the right direction: improved access to the agricultural 
markets of developed countries, elimination of subsidies 
for agricultural exports by 2013 and a reduction in bound 
levels of domestic support for agriculture. These bound 
commitments were almost double the effective levels, but 
this was because of the high prices of agricultural products in 
July 2008, which means that the support was less necessary. 
The idea is to bind domestic support at a ceiling rate so that, 
when prices fall, a glut in supply can be avoided. The level 
at which such support would be bound would be lower than 
that applied by the United States in four of the last seven 
years, and this restriction would be permanent. This remains 
pending while a detailed study is made of the costs, benefits 
and opportunities of the Doha Round. In this process, the 
Latin American and Caribbean region could strengthen its 
internal consensus so that it would be in a position to play a 
more prominent role in the Doha Round without losing sight 
of the synergic and facilitating effect these negotiations could 
have on other trade talks (such as those with the European 
Union) if the Doha Round were to be concluded soon. 
Globalization and new trends in international trade
In recent decades, the international economy has 
undergone sweeping changes, mainly in the form of 
advancing globalization, dramatic technological change 
and the emergence of strong new competitors such as 
China, India and the Asia-Pacific region in general. The 
implications of these three developments are varied and 
complex. For instance, there have been drastic changes in 
the world map of trade flows and competitive advantages, 
with new winners and losers emerging in terms of economic 
areas, countries, production sectors and enterprises. The 
most striking element is the stronger competitive presence 
of China, India and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as of 
emerging economies in general. Even though they have 
coincided with a strong upswing in the business cycle (2003-
2007), this complex reconfiguration of the world economy 
has not banished the dangers of traditional protectionism. 
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At the same time, the uncertainty associated with the new 
world economic order is hampering progress in multilateral 
negotiations (see chapter II). If the world economy slows 
in 2009 and 2010 as suggested by the available evidence, 
not only will the Doha Round become more problematic 
but, against the backdrop of an economic slowdown and a 
credit crunch in industrialized economies, the competitive 
challenges posed by emerging economies may trigger 
pressure for new forms of protectionism. 
In analysing these new trends in international 
trade, care must be taken to distinguish those that stem 
from technological change and new ways of organizing 
business activities from those that are based on efforts 
to preserve market share by establishing rules that, 
although not formally binding, do in practice influence the 
competitiveness of products and companies. In production, 
for instance, advances in information and communications 
technologies (ICT), telecommunications and transport are 
increasingly shifting the dividing line between tradable 
and non-tradable goods and between manufactures and 
services. This facilitates the management of global value 
chains based on a twenty-first century template for the 
organization of production. Although this template of 
industrial organization may not represent more than 15% 
or 20% of existing business enterprises, these are the 
leading companies that are setting international business 
standards and that are managing to have some of them 
incorporated into international trade rules. Innovations 
such as bar codes, online connections with suppliers and 
distributors, and new forms of online information sharing 
have facilitated flexible mechanisms for matching demand, 
thanks to processes such as outsourcing, offshoring and 
insourcing. This value chain incorporates logistics into the 
production function so that, in addition to production per 
se, the chain also encompasses research and development, 
design, distribution, marketing, financing, after-sales service 
and product recycling or disposal. These processes can 
now be regarded as structural trends in international trade, 
and innovation and competitiveness policies therefore 
need to adapt to that fact. 
Growing awareness of environmental issues and the 
importance of climate change and the increasing political 
influence of consumer groups (particularly in Europe) are 
also establishing new parameters in international trade. 
Energy conservation and environmental protection are 
becoming higher profile issues in corporate discussions 
concerning innovation and competitiveness. Furthermore, 
industrialized countries are introducing an increasing 
number of safety and traceability requirements for the 
production and international trade of foodstuffs.
The issues of security and trade have become 
extremely important to the international community since 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. This has resulted in the 
establishment of new requirements for freight transport, 
some of which have emerged from cooperation among 
countries via the World Customs Organization (WCO), 
while others have been created unilaterally. This will lead 
to a significant increase in trade costs as requirements for 
the inspection of all containers and certification of security 
methods throughout the export chain are introduced. 
Although meeting these requirements could bring 
benefits such as greater delivery speed and predictability, 
considerable investments would also be required, and 
there are doubts about how smaller countries and small 
and medium-sized exporters would be able to finance 
their implementation. 
The top private corporations have recently been 
playing a regulatory role in terms of product quality and 
the establishment of private-sector trade standards, which, 
although voluntary, can nonetheless influence countries’ 
competitiveness. These private standards include Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP), safety certificates, the 
criteria of the International Standards Organization (ISO) 
and quality certification. Chapter III goes on to discuss 
the current public-policy debate in the United States 
and the European Union regarding the links between 
trade and employment and between trade and climate 
change. The issue of climate change will definitely be 
prominent on the international agenda. The link between 
trade and measures to mitigate or remedy climate trends 
will become increasingly important, and the discussion 
therefore turns to the proposals made by Europe and the 
United States concerning trade measures designed to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions and border taxes aimed 
at levelling internal and external competitiveness. The 
analysis is not exhaustive, but instead focuses on those 
aspects that may have the most impact on the external 
trade of Latin America and the Caribbean. Attention is 
also devoted to the link between trade-related measures 
and WTO trade rules, with emphasis on the most relevant 
provisions and some potential conflicts.
All of these events may generate additional pressure 
in terms of the competitiveness of the region’s countries 
and may lead to the emergence of barriers that are not 
regulated by international trade disciplines. These trends 
do not necessarily translate into precise multilateral rules 
that define the playing field for the international economy 
of the twenty-first century. Here again, the multilateral 
trading system is failing to keep up with the rapid pace 
of technological change and the evolving structure of 
business stakeholders that are often more relevant to and 
hold more sway over trade issues than the governments 
of industrialized countries. This interaction, which could 
be described as encompassing technological and business 
developments, on the one hand, and, on the other, new 
issues and institutions, is highly complex as it combines 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)22
requirements arising from technological advances (such 
as quality certification) with business models that use 
technological change to attempt to limit competition 
and protect private business (as is the case with certain 
certification requirements linked to specific laboratories 
and enterprises).
There is a fine line between technological progress, 
the creation of new agencies and institutions, and 
protectionism, and it is one that can easily be crossed, 
particularly if developing countries do not focus on creating 
the technical capacity to distinguish between changes that 
they will have to adapt to and those that are merely new 
forms of private business that may limit competition or 
encourage protectionism.
Integration and trade initiatives
In 2007, intraregional trade once again posted 
double-digit growth, although the rate of expansion 
(around 19%) was slower than in previous years. During 
2008, intraregional exports continued to climb, thereby 
offsetting poor sales to the United States. All groups 
show an increase when compared with the first quarter 
of 2007 (see figure 4).
Figure 4
INTRAREGIONAL AND INTRA-SUBREGIONAL EXPORTS,
1990, 1998, 2007 AND JANUARY-MARCH 2008 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information.
a
 Total exports used to calculate the ratio include exports from the maquila sector and 
free-trade zones.
With considerable uncertainty prevailing in the 
international economy, especially with regard to exports 
to the United States by members of integration schemes, 
strenuous efforts were being made in 2007 and the first half 
of 2008 to move forward with community commitments 
on trade facilitation. One example is the adoption of 
a unified customs document and the harmonization 
of customs regimes within the Andean Community. 
Similarly, the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
approved and updated a series of technical regulations on 
standardization measures, metrology and authorization 
processes, as well as sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and procedures. Similar advances have been made in the 
context of MERCOSUR. 
Efforts are also being made to promote trade strategies 
aimed at increasing regional interdependencies. Examples 
include the re-launch of the South American Community of 
Nations (UNASUR) and the Meso-American Integration and 
Development Project (Meso-America Project), formerly the 
Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), as well as efforts by countries 
that make up the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative to 
generate synergies in trade relations with countries of the 
Asia-Pacific region (especially China, India and members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)). 
Lastly, countries of the Caribbean (in 2007) and of Central 
America and the Andean Community (in 2008) have been 
involved in trade negotiations with the European Union.
In recent years, the international expansion of certain 
companies has resulted in an increase in foreign investment, 
especially from Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Trans-Latins 
have become an increasingly significant phenomenon 
and currently account for around 8% of inflows of FDI 
to Latin America and the Caribbean, especially in the 
sectors of natural resources and natural-resource-based 
manufactures, food and beverages, commerce and services 
(with this last sector representing approximately half of the 
total). However, for Central America and the Dominican 
Republic, trans-Latins represent 20% of total FDI, or 
almost 40% if United States investment is removed from 
the equation. It is interesting to note that, in the case of 
services, FDI is the principal means for suppliers to offer 
services abroad. América Móvil (Telmex) and the retailer 
Cencosud of Chile are two examples.
Although this growing internationalization is one 
of the most noteworthy features of economic events 
in the region, unfortunately it has not been linked with 
integration decisions. Any effort to deepen integration 
should seek to strengthen links with the regional actors 
in the internationalization process; this would reinforce 
both the expansion of the companies involved and the 
relevance and effectiveness of the integration process. 
Generally speaking, this process has not resulted from 
specific public policies or measures arising from integration 
commitments. Initiatives could be undertaken within the 
framework of trade agreements and trade facilitation 
measures to strengthen this vital de facto integration 
process. In addition to increasing the credibility of dispute 
settlement mechanisms, steps could be taken to promote 
the convergence of regulatory frameworks in the services 
sector and perhaps to update trade agreements in order to 
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deepen their coverage of trade in services. Trade facilitation 
measures include investment in logistics and infrastructure 
and the harmonization of regulations, as well as mobility 
of technical and professional workers and the gradual 
harmonization of tax and financial procedures.
In many countries, the current integration process is 
coupled with more ambitious, broader and deeper approaches 
to liberalization than in the past. This is reflected in aspects 
of trade that either featured only partially in previous 
integration models (as with investment) or not at all (as in 
the case of services). One of the most radical changes in 
approaches to integration is that several Latin American 
and Caribbean countries have sought to conclude trade 
agreements with their main trading partners (especially 
the United States, the European Union and, more recently, 
the Asia-Pacific region). 
It is well known that the past decade has seen rapid 
changes in technology and in the world economy, as well 
as the emergence of new competitors and markets (China 
and India, along with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region). 
This has dramatically altered the world map of trade 
flows, comparative advantages and investment location 
decisions, and it will no doubt continue to do so. It is in 
this global context of new opportunities and challenges that 
the progress made in terms of integration falls short of the 
mark, particularly in South America. Indeed, integration 
schemes do not figure in major business decisions, and 
integration is not high up on the countries’ political 
agendas; when it does appear, it amounts to little more than 
statements of intention. Against that backdrop, it should 
come as no surprise that the range of possible avenues for 
integration into the world economy are increasing. By the 
same token, sharp structural and policy differences are 
to be found across the countries of the region. Structural 
differences exist in terms of size, production structures, 
export capacities, comparative advantages, structure of 
main destination markets and degree of complementarity 
with or substitution of the main agricultural products of 
industrialized economies that heavily subsidize exports 
or support domestic producers. Policy differences have 
to do with the role that each country aspires to play in the 
regional and world economy, the strength of its economy 
and institutions and, hence, its bargaining power and 
alliance structure —all of which is reflected in trade 
policy and trade negotiations. 
The different visions that have emerged therefore need 
to be acknowledge and reconciled in order to preserve 
the objective of integration. Integration has to be built 
up from these diverse realities with a view to making an 
expanded regional market more attractive. The time is ripe 
to update the notion of “open regionalism” by reinforcing 
the complementarity between integration into the world 
economy and subregional or regional integration schemes. 
This would not only broaden access to the main markets 
for labour- and natural-resource-intensive products, but 
would also encourage the development of technology- and 
knowledge-intensive activities, including the incorporation 
of value added in natural-resource-based products. 
Integration schemes involve elements of development 
and policy coordination that are not present in free trade 
agreements concluded with partners outside the region. 
Therein lies the superiority of integration, but the serious 
political and technical efforts that this process requires 
have thus far not materialized. Of course, integration is 
about more than just trade, and more attention must indeed 
be paid to the social dimension (especially in a continent 
blighted by social inequality). However, this must not be 
done at the cost of delaying or compromising the economic 
and trade aspects of integration, but should rather reinforce 
the complementary nature of its commercial and social 
dimensions. With this in mind, efforts should be redoubled 
to build subregional value chains that enable members to 
export to third markets, and measures should be introduced 
to encourage the inclusion of less developed countries in 
those chains. This would represent an appropriate form of 
“open regionalism” that combines growth, the quest for 
third markets and social cohesion and in which structural 
support for reducing inequality among member countries 
promotes the development of competitive export supply 
in the less developed nations. 
Viewed from this perspective, the summit meeting 
of heads of State and government on regional integration 
which will be hosted by Brazil in December 2008 offers an 
ideal opportunity to discuss these issues and agree upon an 
agenda for renewing and deepening regional integration. 
Association agreements between the European Union 
and Latin America and the Caribbean: from preferences 
to reciprocity
Forging stronger economic and commercial ties with 
the European Union is an item of key importance on the 
regional agenda. This chapter focuses on the fact that 
Europe’s importance as a trading partner of Latin America 
and the Caribbean has declined as the region’s trade with 
the United States has expanded and as the Asia-Pacific 
region has become an increasingly significant export 
market and source of imports for the region.
These negotiations are important for the Latin 
American and Caribbean region, especially in view, on 
the one hand, of the recent failure of the Doha Round 
and, on the other, of the need to deepen its own regional 
integration. A possible association agreement between the 
European Union and each regional integration scheme 
(MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean 
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Community (CARICOM)) could act as a catalyst for the 
convergence of the various trade agreements that exist among 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. The European 
Union promotes agreements that cover the three pillars of 
trade, cooperation and political dialogue. The aim of all 
the ongoing negotiations is the creation of a free trade area 
supplemented by a series of trade clauses and cooperation 
initiatives. The accompanying political dialogue tends to 
focus on aspects relating to democracy, human rights and 
efforts to combat corruption and drugs.
In late 2007, the Caribbean countries successfully 
completed negotiations for an association agreement with 
the European Union, while the Central American and the 
members of the Andean Community each embarked upon 
negotiations for similar agreements. The negotiation process 
with MERCOSUR, which began eight years ago, is at a 
standstill. In mid-2008, the European Commission announced 
its intention to negotiate a strategic partnership with Mexico 
that could take economic relations to a new level. This is 
in addition to the strategic partnership agreement that the 
European Union signed with Brazil at the first European 
Union-Brazil Summit, held in Lisbon in July 2007. 
If and when all these negotiation processes are brought 
to a successful conclusion, 13 economies of Latin America 
will have association agreements with the European Union 
(the number could rise to 18 if MERCOSUR reaches an 
agreement which includes the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela). The agreements between the European Union 
and Mexico (2000) and Chile (2002) are in full swing. 
While Chile has managed to increase and diversify its 
exports as a result, the trade benefits for Mexico are less 
obvious (given its large and widening trade deficit with 
the European Union). The opportunity for reconfiguring 
its relations with the European Union through a strategic 
partnership could provide Mexico with a promising avenue 
for diversifying trade and attracting investment. 
Caribbean exports to the European Union are 
concentrated in services and a few agricultural products 
(sugar and bananas). Until now, trade relations have been 
based on the preferences granted by the European Union 
to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The 
economic association agreement that was concluded in 
December 2007 (although not yet officially approved by the 
Caribbean countries) is a comprehensive accord that provides 
for the gradual removal of tariffs and the liberalization of 
services. The commitments of the Caribbean Forum of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) 
in the areas of services and investment go much further 
than the offers made by developing countries under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). However, 
the European Union has offered limited concessions in 
terms of what is contained in GATS. The total benefits 
for CARIFORUM countries will become clearer once the 
crucial provisions (such as the one concerning temporary 
work permits for professionals in European Union 
countries) have been implemented. Putting an agreement 
of such depth and scope into operation will not be easy in 
countries with limited institutional capacity. Furthermore, 
participating countries will have to face the fiscal impact 
of tariff reduction. The main challenge, however, will be 
to diversify from sugar and bananas to other production 
and service sectors.
Central America, for its part, receives the lion’s share 
of the assistance which the European Union provides to the 
region. This aid is mainly focused on rural development, 
disaster prevention and reconstruction, social cohesion and 
regional integration, as well as on various programmes 
aimed at strengthening democracy and human rights. 
Agricultural products constitute the subregion’s main 
exports to the European Union, and it is in this area that the 
negotiations will be most difficult (especially with regard to 
bananas). The challenge for Central America is to convert 
and expand the current Generalized System of Preferences, 
plus unilateral preferences, into more permanent market 
access for strategic goods. The parties have agreed that 
negotiations should be completed by mid-2009, and the trade 
talks are on schedule. These negotiations will nonetheless 
be difficult in areas that are important to Central America, 
such as exports of banana and other tropical fruit. 
In the Andean Community, the effort to combat 
illegal drugs is one of the main topics of the dialogue on 
politics and cooperation. The Andean Community exports 
mainly agricultural and mining products to the European 
market. The European Union has suspended negotiations, 
citing the lack of a common position within the Andean 
Community as the main reason. There are significant 
differences between the negotiating positions of Peru and 
Colombia, on the one hand, and Bolivia and Ecuador, on 
the other. Bolivia has stated that it will exclude itself from 
certain sections of any free trade agreement. The position 
of the European Union is that negotiations should be 
carried out at the level of groupings and that agreements 
should be as comprehensive as possible. It would appear 
that, in order for these negotiations to move forward, a 
greater degree of flexibility needs to be introduced so 
that countries in differing situations can choose different 
coverage options. In terms of merchandise trade, the 
long-standing dispute about bananas also poses a major 
challenge in these negotiations.
Although it has been eight years since negotiations 
between MERCOSUR and the European Union were 
formally opened, there is no sign of an agreement being 
reached in the next few years. Talks have been hampered 
by disagreements on the European Union’s agricultural 
subsidies and access to MERCOSUR markets for 
manufactures and services. There is every indication that 
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the deadlock could be broken once an overall agreement 
is reached on agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round.
There are several quite complex issues under discussion. 
For Central America, the sticking point is market access for 
the subregion’s textiles and agricultural products, as well 
as the European demand for ratification of the Statutes of 
Rome of the International Criminal Court. The Andean 
Community needs to arrive at a common negotiating 
position, at least on the main issues being considered. If 
this is not achieved, bilateral negotiations (as requested 
by Colombia and Peru) cannot be ruled out as a way of 
overcoming the current standstill. Another requirement 
is the solution of the long-running controversy with the 
European Union over banana exports, a crucial issue for 
Central America (and Colombia and Ecuador). In this 
respect, the agreement on bananas that the European Union 
had accepted in Geneva in order to unblock negotiations 
in Doha in late June 2008 paved the way for more rapid 
progress in negotiations with Central America and the 
Andean Community. In contrast, the way in which the 
European Union is tying that agreement to a final agreement 
in Doha is an obstacle to those same negotiations. For 
MERCOSUR, agricultural market access and the Singapore 
issues are the main stumbling blocks.
The association with the European Union could act as a 
catalyst for regional integration. Indeed, the European Union 
prefers to negotiate with subregional or regional groups and 
offers cooperation to strengthen integration schemes. No less 
importantly, the fact that a large number of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries will probably have a similar and 
wide-ranging trade agreement with the European Union 
offers a real opportunity for the convergence of intraregional 
trade agreements, thereby facilitating the standardization of 
regional rules and disciplines in various chapters of those 
agreements. There will be intense negotiations between 
the European Union and Central America throughout 2008 
and 2009, and an agreement does appear to be in sight. 
Negotiations with the countries of the Andean Community 
will be more difficult unless a more flexible approach is 
adopted. Progress with MERCOSUR will depend on the 
outcome of the Doha Round. Agricultural market access 
is the top priority in the negotiations being pursued with 
these three subregional integration schemes.
The Latin American and Caribbean and Asia-Pacific regions 
in search of closer trade and investment relations
In the last seven years, the Asia-Pacific region has 
increased its share of the world economy. In terms of output 
measured in constant prices and purchasing power parity 
(PPP), the economy of the region as a whole represented 
20.5% and 28.0% of world GDP, respectively, in 2007, 
compared with 6.4% and 8.3% for Latin America and 
the Caribbean. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 
just over 36% of the 4.9% growth in the world economy 
during 2007.
The Asia-Pacific region plays a major and growing 
role in world trade, representing 28% of world merchandise 
exports and 23% of commercial service exports (compared 
with 5.7% and 3.3%, respectively, for Latin America and 
the Caribbean). The merchandise exports of ASEAN 
amounted to US$ 863 billion, exceeding the total for all 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of services, 
China, India and Singapore have become major exporters, 
especially of “other services” (i.e., services other than the 
traditional sectors of transport and travel).
In 1980-2006, the stock of FDI received by Asian 
countries amounted to US$ 1.2 billion (10% of worldwide 
stocks). Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other 
hand, received just under 8% of world FDI. Thus, among 
developing regions, Asia has outpaced Latin America and 
the Caribbean in this respect.
The Asia-Pacific region plays an increasingly important 
part in maintaining global economic equilibria. In terms of 
the world current account, the combined US$ 727 billion 
surplus of China, Japan, the newly industrialized Asian 
economies and ASEAN practically covered the US$ 740 
billion deficit of the United States. What is more, emerging 
Asian economies and Japan have almost 60% of the world’s 
international reserves. It is estimated that the Asia-Pacific 
region holds 53% of United States Treasury bonds. As a 
result, any indication of what Asia-Pacific (and China in 
particular) may do with its huge reserves has immediate 
repercussions on global financial markets.
For some countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Asia-Pacific region represents a massive 
market: nearly 36% of Chile’s exports go to that region; 
the figure for Dominica is 31%; for Cuba, 29%; Peru, 24%; 
Costa Rica, 24%; Brazil, 18%; Bahamas, 17%; Argentina, 
16%; Uruguay, 12%; and Bolivia, 12%. Most of these 
exports are from South America, while Central America 
and Mexico account for a smaller proportion. For many 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Asia-Pacific 
region remains a relatively untapped market.
The Asia-Pacific region is a much more important 
trading partner in imports than in exports, which means 
that the Latin American and Caribbean region has a 
growing trade deficit with it. Of total Latin American and 
Caribbean imports, a larger proportion originates from 
the Asia-Pacific region than from the European Union, 
with China displacing Japan as the main destination and 
origin. For some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay, ASEAN has become a major trading 
partner. However, for China, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and ASEAN, the Latin American and Caribbean region 
accounts for no more than 4% of imports and exports. 
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As pointed out in recent editions of Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the World Economy, the region’s 
exports to the Asia-Pacific region are largely in the form 
of inter-industry trade, contrasting with the intra-industry 
focus in Asia, which is embarking on a considerable 
de facto vertical and horizontal integration process. In 
recent years, however, the inter-industrial trade structure 
has been taking on certain aspects of intra-industry trade 
associated not only with new commodities but also some 
high-technology manufactures. The Grubel-Lloyd index 
shows that Mexico is increasing its level of trade with 
the Asia-Pacific region, while Brazil and Costa Rica are 
beginning to engage in trade of a more intra-industrial nature 
with the region. Nonetheless, the low level of vertical and 
horizontal intra-industry trade continues to act as a major 
limitation on biregional trade and mutual investment.
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF THE ASIA-
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates based on official national figures.
To promote biregional trade, a two-pronged strategy 
is called for that would be directed towards: (i) making 
the most of the present surge in demand from Asia for 
commodities by incorporating knowledge, technology 
and value added; and (ii) becoming better integrated 
into Asian production and marketing networks for intra-
industry trade and investment.
Intra-Asian trade and FDI are both concentrated in 
manufactures. An analysis by destination and origin of 
the trade and FDI of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and ASEAN shows that their own region is becoming 
increasingly important. It is vital for the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to become part of the regional process 
of productive integration that is under way in Asia.
This is confirmed by the high values of the Grubel-
Lloyd index for Asian countries. The Latin American and 
Caribbean region has not been a preferred destination for 
FDI from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Much 
of what investment there is goes to tax havens such as the 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. The Latin 
American and Caribbean region receives little investment in 
manufacturing, with most of the inflows being concentrated 
in various service sectors. Even in natural resource sectors 
(except mining), the Latin American and Caribbean region has 
not been a favoured destination for Asian investment.
De facto integration in Asia has been further intensified 
by intra-industrial and intra-firm trade. This can be observed 
in the fragmentation (slicing up) of value chains, especially 
in machinery sectors. This creates an increasingly close 
trade-investment nexus in which China serves as an export 
platform for neighbouring countries.
The proliferation of trade agreements in Asia-Pacific 
indicates that the region has entered a second stage of 
economic integration in which it is seeking a greater 
synergy between the de facto and de jure dimensions of this 
process. A network of trade agreements is being created 
around ASEAN which includes ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus 
China, the Republic of Korea and Japan) and ASEAN+6 
(ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India and New Zealand). This 
de jure integration process may place Latin America and 
the Caribbean at a disadvantage.
Approaches to the Asia-Pacific region have thus far 
been undertaken by individual countries on a somewhat 
sporadic basis by means of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs). A more coordinated strategy is needed among 
countries or country groupings for the establishment of 
closer ties with this region. Such a strategy should focus 
on reinforcing the nexus between trade and investment 
and on strengthening production and technological 
linkages through various types of public-private alliances 
(including FTAs when such an option is deemed feasible 
and recommendable). It is important to link this strategic 
partnership with regional integration, to seek greater 
externalities and to move forward with enhanced legal 
certainty and macroeconomic stability, as well as forging 
more unified markets by streamlining and/or harmonizing 
trade rules (dispute settlement mechanisms, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, 
accumulation of origin). Such advances in the regional 
integration agenda can be expected to increase the region’s 
negotiating capacity vis-à-vis Asia-Pacific and broaden the 
scale and variety of business ties between Latin American 
and Caribbean firms and their Asia-Pacific counterparts. 
Prospective analysis: a tool for strengthening 
international integration
Foresight studies have become an important consensus-
building tool, particularly as regards the core components 
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of strategies for strengthening countries’ positions 
within the international economy and promoting export 
development. This kind of exercise is not common today 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and progress made in 
this area by other countries and continents may thus serve 
as a stimulus for studies of this sort in the region.
Numerous analytical approaches to the preparation 
of prospective studies can be found in the literature. The 
scope of such studies has been growing in complexity over 
the last few decades, however, and the focus has shifted 
to decision-making in the present. The participation of 
multiple stakeholders (scientists, business people, other 
professionals, public authorities) helps create conditions 
conducive to planning and to well thought-out, systematic 
and participatory approaches to the creation of long-term 
development strategies geared towards improving a 
country’s position in the international economy.
In a number of OECD countries, this type of long-term 
perspective is embodied in export development strategies 
having four strategic pillars around which programmes and 
polices are structured: attraction of foreign investment; export 
promotion and diversification; linkage and internationalization 
of SMEs; and innovation. These foresight exercises have 
helped to build consensus in priority-setting and in decision-
making around these strategic pillars. 
Although at first prospective studies focused on 
technology, they have since been expanding in scope to 
include other fields, such as sectoral strategies, and even 
broader development issues, such as sustainable growth. 
Prospective analysis is evolving through the convergence 
of trends in public policy analysis, strategic planning and 
future studies. This process therefore brings together the 
main agents of change in order to develop a strategic 
outlook based on advance intelligence. 
Between the late 1940s, when future studies were first 
undertaken, and the present day, when prospective exercises 
have become a public policy instrument, the methodology used 
for this purpose has expanded enormously. Prospective studies 
are now conducted in many different ways depending, for 
the most part, on the characteristics of each country and each 
exercise, but the available methodologies are the same.
One key element in the latest studies has been the 
high degree of participation by stakeholders. Experience 
indicates that a policy’s effectiveness depends on the 
involvement of the widest possible range of stakeholders, 
and that this is just as important as the expertise of those 
in charge of its implementation. The form that stakeholder 
participation takes depends on the type of exercise 
involved and the type of methodology used. An analysis 
of experiences in this regard points up the existence of 
distinct phases, each of which elicits differing degrees of 
interest and participation. If the exercise is at a diagnostic 
or exploratory stage, the level of participation may be 
lower owing to the specificity of the issues that are being 
addressed. During the decision-making stage, the range of 
stakeholders involved will tend to be wider. In contrast, at 
the implementation and coordination stage, the number of 
participating stakeholders will decrease considerably.
Although there are numerous research institutes 
and centres in the world that undertake future analysis 
exercises, governments are the ones that have taken the 
initiative in the use of prospective analyses as a decision-
making and strategy-definition tool.
Foresight analysis is also being conducted in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, but, except in a few countries, 
governments have not systematically applied this practice 
at the national, subnational or sectoral level. In most cases, 
these exercises have been carried out only sporadically, 
and the capacity to adapt them in a creative way to the 
conditions found in the countries of the region has yet to 
be developed sufficiently.
Prospective studies help to build consensus and to 
determine strategic courses of action for overcoming obstacles 
to competitiveness. Energy policy provides one example. 
Such analyses are not widespread in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, but some interesting cases can be found in 
Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The study 
carried out by the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE) is also a point of reference in this respect.
The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) has been promoting a sectoral form 
of prospective analysis in the region. In 2005, an analysis 
of the future of the South American fishing industry was 
carried out which covered Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru. The corresponding chapter describes foresight analyses 
at the sectoral level that may help to detect potentials in 
new sectors as well as to define the future of an industry 
in crisis and to identify possible options.
The types of prospective exercises outlined in this 
chapter can be used to help strengthen public-private 
partnerships. Experience shows that such studies, by 
identifying the priorities and strategic guidelines that 
need to be taken into account in the present, are useful 
in building consensus as to how to construct a desirable 
future that is achievable in the long run.
Some foresight studies have been undertaken in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, but they have not influenced 
policy. Changes in administrations also reduce the continuity 
of recommended actions. A consensus as to how obstacles 
to competitiveness or future challenges should be addressed 
greatly reinforces support for the policies that are adopted 
and increases their sustainability and ability to withstand 
changes in government administrations. This is of fundamental 
importance for the implementation of State policies underpinned 
by long-term strategies. Prospective studies are a useful tool 
for countries striving to meet this challenge. 
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Chapter I
Trends in the global economy and 
developments in Latin American  
and Caribbean trade
Introduction
After expanding rapidly for five years, the global economy has slowed down substantially in 
2008. Between 2003 and 2007, world output increased at an impressive rate of more than 5% 
in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) (4% in terms of the weighted nominal exchange 
rate), and the volume of world trade in goods expanded at an even higher rate of 7% per year. 
Economic growth was concentrated in emerging markets where high financial returns and strong 
export performances encouraged high levels of foreign and domestic investment. This five-
year period, which ended in 2007, was also exceptional for Latin America and the Caribbean 
in several respects.

 First, 2007 was the fifth consecutive year of per capita GDP 
growth of over 3%. A similar period of growth in the region 
occurred some 40 years ago. Second, the region has reduced 
its external vulnerability, as illustrated by primary fiscal and 
current account surpluses, the decline in external debt and the 
increase in reserves. Third, foreign direct investment in the 
 
The global slowdown in 2008 is mainly due to the major 
financial crisis that originated in the United States and has 
spread to Europe and Japan. The financial crisis is pushing 
these three major advanced economies into recession. 
In the third quarter of 2008, the United States posted 
negative growth owing to a sharp drop in consumption. 
This raised concern, although until the second quarter 
of 2008 the United States continued to post positive 
growth thanks to dynamic net exports. Net exports have 
grown at high rates in part thanks to a weakening dollar, 
 region reached an all-time high in 2007. Fourth, exports have 
been very dynamic, in part, because of soaring commodity prices. 
Last but not least, social indicators reveal marked improvements 
during this five-year period, in poverty-reduction, education, 
health care and labour markets (ECLAC, 2008a; Machinea and 
Kacef, 2008).
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which has counterbalanced the meagre growth of the 
domestic economy.2 Other factors currently hampering 
global growth include the unwinding of housing market 
bubbles in several large economies, soaring commodity 
prices (despite a slight drop at the end of 2008) and the 
liquidity problems in the global financial markets.
However, the deceleration of world economic growth 
has so far been mild due to the vigorous performance of 
large emerging markets, the so-called “BRICs” (Brazil, 
the Russian Federation, India and China). Nowadays, the 
BRICs and emerging economies in general account for the 
bulk of global GDP growth and a significant proportion 
of international trade. In 2007, the BRICs accounted for 
42% of the world population and 22% of world GDP (in 
PPP terms). These four countries were responsible for 
almost half of the increase in global GDP between 2000 
and 2007. Between 990 and 2007, their share in world 
exports rose from 5% to 4%, while their participation in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows almost quadrupled. 
The BRICs (mainly China) also accumulated large foreign 
exchange reserves thanks to their enormous trade surpluses, 
as shown by their increasing share in global reserves
2
 The United States economy grew by -0.2% and 0.9%, with 
net exports contributing 0.9 and 0.8 percentage points to this 
growth, respectively, in the last quarter of 2007 and first quarter 
of 2008. In the second quarter of 2008, net exports contributed 
2.9 percentage points to overall GDP growth of 2.8%. The latest
(see table I.). China, together with the world’s major 
oil producers (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates), has placed a significant portion of these 
reserves in sovereign wealth funds, which, according to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, total over 
US$ 3 trillion and are expected to reach US$ 2 trillion 
by 202 (Hudson Teslik, 2008; IMF, 2007). 
Another aspect of the rapid economic development 
of China, India and Asia is their increasing demand for 
energy and food, which has been a mixed blessing for the 
world economy. On the one hand, fast-growing demand 
explains most of the upsurge in global prices for these 
commodities. In turn, this has led to sharp increases in 
not only headline but also core inflation around the globe, 
in particular in emerging market economies. As a result, 
central banks in many countries acted to raise interest 
rates to stem inflation and inflationary expectations. 
On the other hand, commodity exporters have benefited 
considerably from rising Asian demand and high prices. 
Strong commercial ties with Asia have driven up exports 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and boosted GDP 
growth in the region.3
  data available indicate that in the third quarter, net exports 
contributed . percentage points to overall GDP growth of 
-0.3% (BEA, 2008).
3
 GDP growth has also been boosted by stable macroeconomic 
environments and prudent fiscal, monetary, and debt policies.
Table I.1
CHINA, BRAZIL, INDIA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND DEVELOPING ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES: SHARE IN WORLD AGGREGATES, 
1990, 2000 AND 2007, AND CONTRIBUTION TO VARIATIONS IN THOSE AGGREGATES, 1990-2000 AND 2000-2007
(Percentages)
China Brazil, India and the Russian Federation Other developing Asia-Pacific economies
Share Contribution 
to variation in 
1990-2000
Contribution 










to variation in 
1990-2000
Contribution 
to variation in 
2000-20071990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007
(a) Population 22 21 20 16 11 22 22 22 23 23 14 15 15 19 20
(b) GDP (PPP) 4 7 11 20 23 10 9 11 3 15 4 4 5 13 9
(c) Exports 2 4 9 6 13 3 3 5 4 6 3 4 4 13 9
(d) Inward FDI 2 3 6 1 3 5 4 0 2
(e) International 
      reserves
3 8 19 14 27 1 5 10 9 14 11 5 5 4
Petroleum products
(f) Consumption 3 7 12 26 35 12 10 11 -10 8 6 11 13 35 13
Imports
(g) Agricultural 
      materials 2 4 8 11 16 1 3 4 11 7 12 12 10 10 8
(h) Mining 2 7 23 36 32 3 4 6 10 8 9 12 10 28 9
(i) Raw energy 0 3 5 6 7 4 4 5 5 5 11 15 15 20 15
(j) Petroleum 
    products 0 3 6 7 8 4 4 5 5 5 12 16 16 22 16
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database]; British Petroleum and United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) for import data.
Note:  Columns 1-3 show the participation of each country or group of countries (China; Brazil, India and the Russian Federation; and other developing Asia-Pacific economies) 
in world aggregates in 1990, 2000 and 2007. Columns 4 and 5 give the contribution of each one to the variation in world aggregates.
 Details of world aggregates: (a) Total population; (b) World GDP in constant 2005 international dollars (GDP in PPP terms); (c) Global exports of goods and services in 
current dollars; (d) Net inflows of FDI in current dollars; (e) Gross international reserves is monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the reserve position of members 
in IMF and foreign exchange holdings in the hands of monetary authorities.
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It seems increasingly unlikely that the emerging 
markets are sufficiently decoupled from the advanced 
economies to remain unaffected by the sharp slowdown in 
those economies. For some time, emerging economies did 
succeed in maintaining economic growth at near potential 
levels despite the slowdown in industrialized countries, 
in part, because the rapidly-growing Asian region had 
intensified trade with other developing regions around 
the world. Therefore, despite modest growth in Europe, 
Japan and the United States, global growth retained 
most of its momentum. However, since mid-2008, it has 
become increasingly clear that the emerging markets 
are being affected by the financial crisis in the United 
States economy through many channels and that the 
“myth of decoupling has been exploded” (ADB, 2008). 
The first channel is international trade as the drop in 
import demand in the United States and other advanced 
countries is increasingly affecting export growth in the 
emerging economies. The second channel is the financial 
market since investors are losing confidence because of 
the financial crisis and, consequently, capital flows to 
emerging markets are drying up, interest rates have risen, 
and stock markets in these countries have come down. 
Nevertheless, Latin America and the Caribbean and most 
other emerging regions are better prepared to withstand this 
shock thanks to their abundant external reserves, primary 
fiscal surpluses and relatively low levels of external debt. 
As a result, although global growth is predicted to slow 
down in 2008 and 2009, the major emerging economies, 
in particular China, are expected to continue expanding 
at robust rates, albeit more slowly. 
As of mid-2008, the world is facing two major short-
term challenges: containing the risks associated with the 
financial crisis and coping with higher energy and food 
prices and other inflationary pressures. This chapter 
examines recent trends and their likely impact on trade 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also discusses 
possible policy responses in the face of deteriorating 
global growth prospects, high commodity prices and 
rising inflation.
A. Main developments in the financial markets
1. The United States financial crisis and its economic impact
The financial crisis stemming from the collapse in the 
real-estate market in the United States is the main event 
affecting global growth in 2008. In 2007, difficulties in 
credit markets started to impact the real sector of the United 
States economy as growth slowed. The crisis has its origins 
in a combination of low interest rates (in particular for 
mortgages), innovative debt instruments and the expectation 
of continuously rising housing prices (see box I.). Other 
factors that played a role are the lack of regulation that 
allowed the development of huge shadow markets with 
risky investments, the lack of restraint on the part of lenders 
and borrowers and misguided federal policies that failed to 
minimize the obvious risks to credit markets. The depth of 
the United States crisis and the degree of its transmission to 
industrialized and emerging economies will define global 
economic conditions over the next two years. 
From mid-2007 to the second half of 2008, the 
financial crisis steadily worsened. Around mid-2007, 
major financial institutions around the world started to 
announce poor financial results, with bad debts affecting 
their results and balance sheets. The British bank Northern 
Rock was nationalized after a run on its deposits. In 
January 2008, Bank of America bailed out a troubled 
mortgage lender (Countrywide Financial). In March, 
Deutsche Bank reported massive losses, and investment 
bank Bear Stearns was bought out by JP Morgan Chase, 
with the help of the Federal Reserve. In July, major 
problems arose in mortgage lending markets as lenders in 
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States began 
to fold or be bailed out by larger rivals. The United States 
mortgage lender IndyMac collapsed and was taken over 
by the Government.
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Box I.1
ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States subprime crisis has 
its origins in an explosive mix of cheap 
credit, innovative debt instruments and the 
expectation of continuously rising home prices. 
Low interest rates following the 2001 recession 
made home-buying a more attractive financial 
option. Banks and mortgage brokers also 
relied less on loan repayments as a source 
of income and the incentive for careful due 
diligence on mortgage applications was 
removed. Mortgages with features such 
as low initial interest rates and no down 
payment were offered to borrowers with little 
repayment capacity. By selling mortgage 
contracts to Wall Street, lenders were then 
able to earn fees while passing the risk on 
to the financial market.
Financial-sector demand for mortgage-
backed securities was insatiable. New 
mortgage-backed debt instruments (such as 
the infamous collateralized debt obligations 
or CDOs) allowed investors to participate in 
the booming housing sector and leverage it. 
These new assets consolidated mortgage 
types, such as subprime mortgages, into 
vehicles that relied on preferential payment 
schemes to differentiate buyers’ risk exposure. 
Investors could pay a premium for the right 
of preferential repayment, hoping that 
delinquency rates in the underlying mortgages 
would not affect them. Thus, sellers were 
able to create a pseudo-diversified financial 
instrument that leveraged some of the worst 
risks in the mortgage sector (Mollenkamp 
and Ng, 2007). Buyers of these securities 
had little information on the quality of the 
underlying mortgages. Ratings companies 
also failed to fully understand the risks, 
justifying high ratings with the guarantee of 
mortgage insurance companies (“monolines”) 
that were also exposed to mortgage-backed 
instruments.
The cycle became self-fulfilling, with 
greater demand for mortgage contracts 
leading to lower credit standards and lower 
interest rates, sustaining the demand for 
homes and causing a boom in real-estate 
prices. Regulators were unable, or unwilling, 
to keep pace with these developments (Ip, 
2007). This unsustainable model began to 
unravel as rising interest rates and excessive 
inventory burst the bubble of perpetually 
increasing home prices. From July 2006 
to July 2008, prices declined by 20% and 
buyers who had hoped to either refinance 
or sell their homes at higher prices found 
an illiquid market and unaffordable monthly 
payments. This led to a spike in default rates 
—initially among less-qualified borrowers 
(thus the origin of the term “subprime 
crisis”) but eventually encompassing even 
prime-rated securities— and a leveraged 
impact on the financial instruments backed 
by these mortgages. The obscure nature of 
the underlying risk of derivative contracts 
made their market worth suspect, leaving 
many highly exposed institutions with assets 
of unknown value and close to violating 
prudential requirements.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In September and October 2008, the financial crisis 
intensified rapidly. Early in September, the financial 
problems of mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac forced the Government to bail both of them out to 
avoid a collapse of the United States financial system. 
Shortly afterwards, investment bank Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy protection. Stock prices fell, which 
obliged credit agencies to lower their debt assessment of 
several financial institutions. Counterparties were forced 
to reduce their debt exposure to these organizations 
and reacted by calling in their loans. Bank of America 
agreed to take over Merrill Lynch. When American 
International Group Inc (AIG) proved unable to raise 
new capital, the Federal Reserve stepped in to rescue 
the company and took control of 80% of its assets. 
Similarly struggling with liquidity shortages, Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two remaining major 
independent investment banks in the United States, chose 
to become bank holding companies. This move enabled 
both firms to secure easier access to credit, at the price 
of stricter Government supervision and regulation, in 
order to survive the current crisis. This ended the era 
of American investment banking, which had lasted 75 
years and been characterized by massive risk-taking 
and its extraordinary potential for generating profits. 
By the end of September, the largest commercial bank 
failure ever witnessed in the United States occurred 
when Washington Mutual collapsed, and major banks 
in Europe began to run into difficulties as well.
The present crisis is the most costly economic event 
since the Great Depression in the United States (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008). Its origins fit into a familiar pattern of 
rapid increases in equity and housing prices (one of the 
leading crisis indicators in countries experiencing large 
capital inflows), as well as changes in real GDP growth, 
public debt, and current account deficits. Although there is 
some novelty in both the causes of the United States crisis 
and the policy response it has produced, it is reasonable 
to expect that the economic impact will be significant and 
will bring about a reduction of real per capita growth of 
two percentage points in the United States, the effects of 
which will be felt for at least two years.4 
The actions of regulators to contain the crisis have 
been unprecedented. First, the Federal Reserve increased 
credit availability to banks and financial institutions 
through new lines of credit and reduced interest rates, but 
this move was unable to solve the underlying problems 
of the financial system. Institutions were holding assets 
whose markets had suddenly disappeared and were 
in dire need of capital to sustain their balance sheets.5 
4
 If the impact is more severe and matches the experience of the 
five most catastrophic cases (Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden), the decline in growth could be greater than 5% and could 
last over three years.
5
 An institution’s use of the Federal Reserve Bank Discount Window 
is often seen as a sign of financial weakness and is therefore 
stigmatized. The Federal Reserve, recognizing this, arranged for 
more anonymous access to funds through new instruments. 
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In recognition of this, the Federal Reserve began to 
accept lower-quality assets as collateral, swapping a 
significant portion of its safe Treasury holdings for new 
debt instruments —some of which were guaranteed by 
mortgage-backed securities. The Federal Reserve then 
had to step in to guarantee the mortgage-related losses 
being incurred by financial institutions, and the United 
States Government committed at least US$ 25 billion to 
bail out Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.7 The Government 
also nationalized one of the country’s largest mortgage 
lenders, IndyMac, among others. The Federal Reserve 
meanwhile increased its existing currency swaps with 
other major central banks worldwide in an effort to infuse 
liquidity into the global financial system. 
At the end of September, when the crisis was spiralling 
out of control, the United States Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve put forward a US$ 700 billion bailout plan to 
purchase large amounts of troubled mortgage securities 
and other “toxic” assets from financial institutions. The 
total mortgage debt is estimated at US$ 2 trillion, with 
approximately 9% of loans either seriously delinquent or 
in foreclosure. Other aspects of the bailout plan include the 
Government’s acceptance of equity stakes in companies, 
restrictions on executive compensation packages (“golden 
parachutes”) for certain companies that sell assets to the 
Department of the Treasury, rules on future compensation in 
case the Government is unable to recover its payments, help 
for homeowners with delayed payments and the study of a 
possible regulatory overhaul of the United States financial 
sector. For example, there are strong demands to regulate the 
so-far unregulated US$ 2 trillion market for credit-default 
swaps amid concerns that they may drive down stocks.8 
Also, regulators probably will tighten controls on hedge 

 Prior to the onset of the credit crisis in August 2007, 87% of the 
Federal Reserve’s assets were Treasury securities. By mid-October, 
Treasury securities accounted for 27% of these assets, having 
been replaced by repurchase agreements, term auction facility 
instruments, and other loans. Impaired collateral held against these 
new instruments are reported as “other assets pledged” and was 




 The bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac marks an important 
regulatory shift as the authorities reversed their position of not 
guaranteeing the companies’ debts. The stakes are also much higher 
than in the case of Bear Stearns as the companies have debts of 
US$ .5 trillion and own or guarantee US$ 5 trillion in mortgages. 
They also have contracts worth US$ 2 trillion more to hedge the 
risks behind those mortgages.
8
 Speculators may use credit-default swaps to bet a company’s financial 
condition will worsen. The contracts pay holders face value for 
the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a company 
fail to repay its debt. The swaps’ value increases as perception of 
the company’s stability deteriorates. Speculators who buy swaps 
without owning the underlying debt may flood the market and drive 
down stocks (Bloomberg, 2008).
funds, private equity firms and investment banks by imposing 
stricter rules on capital requirements and limits on leverage. 
Since the announcement of this plan, the Treasury has opted 
to change the focus of the bailout plan and concentrate first 
on using US$ 250 billion to recapitalize the country’s largest 
banks by purchasing preferred and common stock. The plan 
follows the proposal by Britain’s Prime Minister, Gordon 
Brown, which announced a three-point plan to recapitalize 
banks in the United Kingdom, inject liquidity into financial 
markets, and provide government guarantees to the interbank 
lending market. This plan has since become the template 
for rescue packages in many other countries, including the 
United States, France, Germany and Austria.
It is highly uncertain whether the bailout package 
approved by the United States Congress will be sufficient 
to keep the financial system afloat and to save the United 
States economy from sinking into a deeper recession. In 
particular, there is enormous uncertainty about how the 
subprime mortgage crisis is affecting other credit segments, 
including prime mortgages, commercial real estate, unsecured 
consumer credit (credit cards, student loans and auto loans), 
industrial and commercial loans, corporate bonds and credit-
default swaps. It is also unclear how thousands of small 
and medium-sized United States banks will be affected by 
the current crisis. Furthermore, the credit crunch caused by 
the undercapitalization of the financial sector may push the 
housing market into a deeper crisis and cause more financial 
institutions to file for bankruptcy.
The impact on the private sector is expected to be 
considerable. According to IMF, banks and insurance 
companies had lost between US$ 40 billion and US$ 735 
billion by the end of September 2008, while losses for the 
entire global financial system may amount to US$ .3 trillion 
(IMF 2008e). An important part of these losses is directly 
related to residential loans (subprime and prime) and creates 
a significant solvency risk in many banks, which have been 
forced to raise capital and access various types of financing 
in order to remain within prudential regulations.
The crisis is also affecting investment and consumer 
spending. Economic growth slowed sharply in 2007 and 
contracted at an annualized rate of 0.2% in the fourth quarter 
of that year. Slow growth continued during the first half 
of 2008. As shown in figure I., the slowdown has so far 
been led by a reduction in private consumption and private 
investment caused mainly by a fall in residential investment, 
which has averaged a negative % annualized contribution 
every quarter since mid-200, contrasting with a positive 
0.3% average since the end of the 200 recession. In the third 
quarter, consumption shrank 3.% compared with the previous 
quarter, which translated into a 2.3% drop in GDP growth. 
In 2007, four fifths of the deceleration was concentrated 
in four sectors: finance and insurance, construction, real 
estate and rental, and mining (BEA, 2008). In mid-2007, 
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consumption in the United States started to weaken as a 
result of falling household wealth, stagnant real wages and 
tighter credit conditions. Efforts by policymakers to increase 
credit availability have not had much impact on consumer 
lending, as banks have used the additional funds to bolster 
balance sheets. A recent survey by the Federal Reserve on 
lending practices and demand showed that the number of 
banks reporting tighter credit standards was the highest 
since the survey began in 99, indicating significant risk 
aversion. At the same time, demand for consumer loans has 
dropped to historic lows, and banks have increased spreads 
over their cost of funds (Fed, 2008).
The economic crisis is curbing recent inflationary 
effects. Higher import prices have not yet been fully passed 
on to the domestic economy, and other macroeconomic 
indicators (such as payroll reports, consumer and business 
confidence, industrial production and durable goods orders) 
have also pointed to a bleaker outlook. In the meantime, 
the United States economy continues to benefit from strong 
export growth due to a weak dollar and the fact that other 
regions remain dynamic. Real exports were over 0% 
higher in the first half of 2008 than in the same period in 
2007, but import demand has weakened: real imports fell 
by .7% during the same period. In this context, the issue 
of decoupling is highly important as demand for United 
States exports also depends on the rest of the world’s 
economic performance.
Figure I.1
UNITED STATES: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
BY EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS








Personal consumption Domestic investment Net exports Government expenditures
2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008 (Q2)
2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008 (Q2) 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008 (Q2) 2001 - 2004 2005 - 2008 (Q2)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of United States Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2. The impact of weakening import demand in the United States 
 on global trade
A prolonged slowdown in the United States will not only 
threaten the economies of Latin America and Caribbean 
economies directly through lower import demand and a 
decline in remittances, but also indirectly through its impact 
on Asian economies and trade. On the one hand, the declining 
share of the United States as an export destination for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, combined with improvements 
in the region’s terms of trade and robust growth in Asia, 
helps to offset the direct impact of the economic slowdown. 
On the other hand, the effects of slower growth in the 
United States will be felt in Asia as lower demand for 
Asian exports will reverberate through the region’s large 
processing sector, eventually affecting Asian demand for 
Latin American and Caribbean exports. Given the increasing 
importance of trade for Latin America and the Caribbean 
—both relative to GDP and as a source of growth— the 
impact of the United States crisis on commercial activity 
warrants careful consideration.
Shifting global trade patterns should mitigate the direct 
impact of slowing United States demand for imports from 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The share of the United 
States in world imports declined from over 2% in 2000 to 
just over 4% in 2007. For exports from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the share directed to the United States fell 
from 0% to just 42% between 2000 and 2007. Mexican 
exports to the United States declined from nearly 90% of 
the total in 2000 to 7% in 2007 (see table I.2).
Table I.2
EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES AS A SHARE OF 
TOTAL EXPORTS, 1980-2007
(Percentages)
1980 1990 2000 2005 2007
Canada 61 75 87 82 79
European Union (27 countries) 5 7 9 8 7
Japan 24 32 30 23 20
South America 21 30 29 26 21
Caribbean 56 36 54 54 45
Central America 38 41 36 54 39
Mexico 65 69 89 86 76
ASEAN 16 19 19 14 12
Singapore 12 21 17 10 9
China 5 8 21 21 20
Republic of Korea 27 29 22 15 12
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
 = Denotes a decrease from the previous period. 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 35
The United States slowdown may also have an indirect 
impact on Latin American and Caribbean exports, as weakened 
import demand in the United States reduces export and 
income growth in other regions in the world, which may in 
turn depress their demand for Latin American and Caribbean 
products. The economic slowdown in the United States has 
already had an impact on that country’s imports from Asia 
and the European Union, although the depreciation of the 
yen against the dollar since 2005 has helped to sustain United 
States imports from Japan (see figure I.2). The average growth 
in the volume of United States imports from China for the 
period from January to August dropped from 4% in 2007 to 
.5% in 2008, and there is some evidence of slower Chinese 
demand for key Latin American and Caribbean products (see 
figure I.2). For the ASEAN region, the decline was from 
3.5% to -.9%. The growth of exports from the European 
Union to the United States has been slowing since December 
2007 and has averaged .4%, well below the figure of over 
7% recorded in the previous six months. 
Figure I.2
GROWTH OF UNITED STATES REAL IMPORTS FROM SELECTED 
COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, 2007 AND 2008 (JANUARY TO JULY)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
calculations based on United States International Trade Commission, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
As exports from Asia to the United States slow, Asian 
intraregional linkages via China’s processing trade are of 
particular importance to Latin America and the Caribbean 
(given the increasing weight of Asia in Latin American 
and Caribbean trade). Of the region’s total exports, the 
proportion which went to the Asia-Pacific region (including 
China) doubled between 2000 and 2007, from % to 2% 
(see table I.5 for country-specific shares). This increases the 
exposure of Latin America and the Caribbean to a decline in 
United States demand for Chinese exports. Falling Chinese 
demand for inputs from Asia would slow regional growth 
and eventually Asian import demand.9 
9
 See section C for more details on the importance of China’s 
performance to Latin America and the Caribbean.
The European Union, Japan, and the other industrialized 
economies will see a significant drop in their growth rates 
during 2008 and 2009 to levels below their medium-term 
averages. In the second quarter of 2008, GDP in the European 
Union contracted by an annualized rate of 0.2% relative to 
the previous quarter, and Japan saw its economy contract 
by 0.% in the same period. The World Economic Situation 
and Prospects projects decrease in real GDP growth rates 
as of mid-2008 for the advanced countries from 2.5% in 
2007 to 0.% in 2008 and 0.9% in 2009 (United Nations, 
2008). The euro area will experience a drop from 2.% to 
.% with significant downside risks. Housing prices in 
the European Union have mirrored developments in the 
United States, although the scale of financial leveraging 
of the housing sector in the United States has resulted in 
the impact being much greater there.0 
Other regions, including Asia and Latin America and 
the Caribbean, will also see lower growth rates than in 
recent years, but will remain at or near their medium-term 
performance. Within Asia, the difference between the growth 
of industrialized and emerging economies is also highly 
evident: Japan, which represents 42% of the region’s GDP, 
is expected to experience economic growth of just 0.2% in 
2008. Economic growth in China, which represents 3% of 
Asia’s GDP, will slow from .9% in 2007 to 9.7% in 2008 
(IMF, 2008e). Within Latin America and the Caribbean, 
individual countries’ prospects will depend a great deal on 
their commercial ties. Countries with greater dependence 
on the United States and the European Union, such as the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Mexico and a number of 
Central American and Caribbean countries, will face lower 
demand for their exports, which tend to consist of energy 
and manufactured products. Those countries that have more 
connections within the region and with other emerging 
markets, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
will benefit from their net exports of high-priced commodities 
and from robust intraregional economic activity. 
All in all, the Latin American and Caribbean region 
is relatively well placed to withstand a slowdown in the 
United States and the resulting direct and indirect effects 
on its exports. Economic activity in Asia, led by China, will 
decelerate but remain relatively dynamic, which will help 
offset some of the decline in export demand. In addition, 
improvements in the terms of trade of many countries in 
the region will help sustain balance-of-payment positions. 
The region also enjoys strong fiscal and debt positions 
that may discourage drastic shifts in financial flows.
0
 According to figures from the 2008 World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2008a), issues of residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) 
in the United States averaged nearly US$ 00 billion per month 
during 200 and early 2007 (with a peak of US$ 45 billion in June 
200). In Europe, 2-month average issues of similar instruments 
never surpassed US$ 30 billion. 
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3. Exchange rates
Since early 2002, the dollar has generally depreciated 
at a rate of between 2% and 9% per year, as measured 
by the broadest trade-weighted index. The evolution of 
the dollar against most of its main trading partners since 
its high in early 2002 has helped the United States to 
improve its trade balance by lowering the relative cost 
of its exports. Between November 2004 and May 2008, 
the yuan appreciated by 3% in real terms relative to the 
dollar, affected by the decision of Chinese regulators to 
increase the rate of appreciation and relative inflation rates 
between the United States and China. In June 2007, the yen 
reversed its depreciating trend that had begun in 2005; by 
May 2008 it had gained 2% against the dollar. The euro 
has also continued to rise against the dollar, gaining 23% 
since late 2005. In mid-2008, the dollar regained most of 
the nominal value it had lost during the year, following 
disappointing economic news in Europe and reports that 
the United States Government would provide support to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The large movements in 
foreign exchange markets mark a period of increased 
volatility as traders react to economic news and search 
for safe havens.
Figure I.3
REAL EXCHANGE RATES INDICES AND REAL DEPRECIATION RATES
(a) Real exchange rates against the (b) Trade-weighted real effective exchange rate (2007-2008) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics.
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Relative to the United States dollar, Latin American 
and Caribbean currencies have on average appreciated by 
less than those of Asian countries since the dollar began 
to fall in 2002, leading to improved competitiveness in the 
United States market over that period. A comparison of the 
relative exchange-rate movements of China’s main sources 
of imports in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean

 Available data for 8 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
show an average appreciation against the United States dollar of 2.5% 
from February 2002 to April 2008. Data on 3 Asian countries show 
an average appreciation of .3% during that time. Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and
 
in the last two years paints a different picture. Since 2005, 
Brazil and Chile have seen their currencies appreciate at 
a faster pace than those of their Asian competitors. The 
Republic of Korea has gained the most as the won has 
lost 25% of its nominal value against the yuan. As such, 
Asian exports to China are becoming more competitive 
than those from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
B. Recent trends in commodity markets
1. Recent price developments
For much of 2008, the world experienced an across-the-
board commodity price boom, which was both broad-based, 
encompassing all the major commodity groups —energy, 
metals, foodstuffs and agricultural commodities— and 
persistent, lasting longer and producing larger price hikes 
than earlier booms such as that of the early 970s.2
The price rises were particularly pronounced in 
the case of oil and other energy products. The price
of crude petroleum increased from approximately 
US$ 25 per barrel in 2002 to over US$ 00 for most of 
2008, reaching an unprecedented high of US$ 40 in 
June 2008. This surpassed the peak of the 979 energy 
crisis in both nominal and real terms. Coal prices have 
also jumped relative to the 2002 level, and the price of 
natural gas increased more gradually during the same 



























































































































































  Taiwan Province of China have experienced depreciations. Since 
2007 and mid-2008, the average rates of appreciation have been 
.8% and 5.9%, respectively.
2
 See IMF (2008a), box 5.2, for a comparative analysis.
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Figure I.4 (concluded)






















































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Commodity Price 
Statistics [online database].
a  Deflated by United States Consumer Price Index (excluding food).
The boom has also been seen in metals and ores, 
although current prices are still below those of the early 
970s. Between mid-2003 and mid-2008 the nominal 
price of aluminium doubled, the price of zinc tripled, and 
iron ore and copper prices increased four and five times, 
respectively. Even when adjusted for overall inflation, 
iron and copper prices have performed strongly, growing 
270% and 330% over the course of the past five years, 
respectively. The current deflated price of iron ore is at 
a historic high since 90, and the price of copper is at 
its highest since 974. 
As for agricultural commodities and foodstuffs, 
there has been a sharp and simultaneous upswing in all 
prices since early 200 (see figure I.4c). The prices of 
grains and oilseeds more than doubled between January 
200 and June 2008, although the prices came down 
slightly afterwards. The increase has been particularly 
steep in the case of wheat, with the price surpassing 
US$ 450 per ton in March 2008,3 a 50% increase over 
the course of two years. Wheat prices declined slightly 
through May and June and fell again in September, but 
the average for the first three quarters of 2008 remains 
almost three times higher than the 2000-2005 average. 
Although the recent price hike is dramatic relative to the 
levels of five years ago, from a historical perspective, the 
recent increase in food prices could be said to represent 
a recovery from the exceptionally low levels of 985-
2005. For most grains and oilseeds, the current prices 
are still far below those of the 970s and early 980s, 
allowing for overall inflation.
2. Commodity markets: real versus financial determinants
(a)	 Real	factors	affecting	commodity	prices
A number of common factors have brought about hikes 
in the prices of all commodities. In the last few years, the 
growth of demand has outpaced that of supply. Robust 
economic growth and rapid industrialization in China, India 
and other developing economies, in a context of inelastic 
supply in the short term, explain part of the price boom 
(see figure I.5).4 Developing countries overall accounted 
for 82% and 99% of the increase in demand for rice and 
wheat between 2000 and 2007, while consumption in the 
industrialized countries, in particular the United States, 
middle-per capita income economies performed strongly, averaging 
7% to 8% growth per year, with prospects for continued expansion, 
albeit at a slightly slower rate (United Nations, 2008).
3
 For United States hard red winter wheat (grade 2).
4
 In both 200 and 2007, while growth in Japan, the United States and 
the European Union economies was well below 3%, most low- and
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declined. Together, China and India account today for 
half of the world’s consumption of rice and one third of 
wheat and soybean oil consumption.
Demand from China has an even stronger impact on 
metal and oil consumption than on food markets, accounting 
for more than 00% of the increase in world demand for 
refined copper between 2000 and 2007 and three quarters 
of the increase in global consumption of refined aluminium 
and slab zinc. China’s share in worldwide consumption 
of steel products, refined aluminium, and refined copper 
increased from 2000 onwards, and its demand for oil and 
petroleum products grew almost six times faster than 
world demand in the same period, contributing 35% to 
the increase in global demand for these products.
Figure I.5
CONTRIBUTION OF CHINA AND INDIA TO THE VARIATION IN 
GLOBAL CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL 
COMMODITIES, PETROLEUM AND METALS, 
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Source: Agricultural commodities: United States Foreign Agricultural Service, official 
estimates of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); oil and 
metals: British Petroleum, International Iron and Steel Institute and World 
Bureau of Metal Statistics.
(i) Agricultural commodities
The interplay of numerous mutually reinforcing 
factors is perhaps most complex in agricultural markets. 
On the supply side, the last three years were characterized 
by negative yield shocks primarily caused by weather-
related production shortfalls: cereal yields fell by about 
one fifth in Canada and drought-stricken Australia between 
2005 and 2007 (OECD/FAO, 2008). Another factor is the 
soaring cost of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers, 
which doubled in price between October 200 and October 
2007.5 Higher transport costs have also impacted the 
cost of agricultural commodities. Ocean freight rates for 
5
 For example, ammonium sulphate and triple super phosphate (TSP) 
(see FAO, Food Outlook, various issues).
grain shipments from United States ports in the Gulf of 
Mexico to Europe have almost tripled. 
The supply response to the price boom has been 
slow in materializing, constrained not only by lags 
associated with planting and investment decisions, but 
also by government-imposed distortions that impede the 
transmission of price signals to domestic markets. These 
include price controls, consumption subsidies and export 
restrictions. Measures introduced in many countries to 
retain domestic supply and protect domestic consumers 
reduced supply on world markets and put further pressure 
on world prices. These include export restrictions, such 
as those on rice recently announced by India and Viet 
Nam, and increases in export taxes in Argentina and 
elsewhere.7
On the demand side, a sharp increase in the use of 
food grains for biofuel production (ethanol and biodiesel) 
was a major engine of demand growth between 2005 
and 2007. In that period, global biofuel consumption of 
wheat and coarse grains doubled, accounting for over 
half of the increase in total grain use. Policies adopted 
by the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European 
Union have stimulated the use of food grains for biofuels 
and led countries to switch to growing crops for biofuel 
production. The International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI, 2008) and World Bank (2008) find that 
increased biofuel production is largely to blame for higher 
agricultural prices.
In short, there has been a persistent gap between 
the growth rates of supply and demand. The markets 
are tight, and neither supply nor demand has been able 
to respond to price signals in the short run. In addition, 
the shocks to supply and demand took place in the 
context of record low stocks, which otherwise would 
have acted as a buffer and softened the impact of these 
shocks on prices. 
(ii) Energy products and metals
According to estimates by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2008), the current level of oil prices 
is high due to the combined effect of strong demand 
growth and limited supply expansion in recent years. 
While there has been some weakening of demand in the 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), global consumption has 
continued to expand, driven mainly by rising demand in 
non-OECD Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, 
oil production by the member States of the Organization 

 From US$ 28 to US$ 75 per ton (FAO, 2008b).
7
 An increase in the export tax on soybeans was rejected by the 
Argentine Senate on  July 2008. 
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of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been 
stalled at approximately 35 million barrels per day since 
2005, mainly because of the rising cost of oil exploration 
and development. Production has been hampered by a 
sharp increase in marginal costs since 2003, as well as 
limited access to low-cost oil reserves. There are also 
geopolitical concerns. Most oil is produced in politically 
fragile or even war-ridden zones such as Nigeria, where 
a number of oilfields have been closed down recently 
after attacks by militant groups. 
On the demand side, developing and emerging 
countries use relatively more energy to produce their 
output.8 The economies of China, India, the Russian 
Federation and other major players are concentrated in 
sectors with high energy requirements: mining, smelting, 
cement, iron and steel, meat and dairy products. These 
countries’ energy demand will therefore remain high in 
the near future. 
There is evidence that this strong demand is the 
main factor behind high mineral and metal prices, driven 
in particular by Chinese imports of copper and iron as 
described above. Per capita use of refined copper in China 
is about 3 kg, double the Latin American average and well 
above other developing and transition economies, except 
the Russian Federation (ICSG, 2007). 
Raw metals are characterized by highly inelastic 
supply, at least in the short term, since production is 
capital-intensive. It often takes -0 years to bring a new 
mine into production, requiring heavy investments in 
construction and machinery. At the same time, demand 
is also inelastic, since substitution among different 
metals is very limited, constraining a demand response 
to high prices. As the result of inelastic supply and 
demand, both periods of surplus supply and shortages 
are frequent, and the market experiences cycles with 
strong price swings.
8
 The indicator of energy intensity (GDP per kg of oil equivalent) is 
2. for the Russian Federation and 3. for China (2005), among the 
lowest in developing countries. The average energy intensity for 
high-income countries is .0 and the world average is 5.0 (World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, online database).
(b)	 The	 roles	 of	 exchange	 rates,	 interest	 rates	 and	
speculation	
Several analysts argue that prices increased not only 
because of rising demand and inelastic supply, as outlined 
above, but also owing to the real effective depreciation 
of the dollar, low interest rates and speculation. First, the 
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the dollar 
has indeed put upward pressure on commodity prices quoted 
in that currency (Bastourre, Carrera and Ibarlucia, 2007; FAO, 
2008c; UNCTAD, 2008). Following the real depreciation of 
the dollar from 2002 to April 2008 (except in 2005), and in 
the context of rising demand and low reserves, commodity 
producers have raised their prices to compensate for the 
loss of purchasing power. Second, expansionary monetary 
policies in numerous countries (such as China, India and 
the United States) with low nominal interest rates and 
negative real ones have stimulated economic growth and 
contributed to the growing demand and rising prices for 
commodities around the world.9 Moreover, low interest 
rates in the United States have weakened that country’s 
currency, with the aforementioned effect on dollar-quoted 
commodity prices.
Third, other analysts point to the increasing role of 
speculation in driving up commodity prices (Kregel, 2008; 
Masters, 2008; UNCTAD, 2008) although there is as yet no 
solid evidence to support this. Partly in response to the real 
depreciation of the United States dollar, the financial crisis 
and downward movements in equity and mortgage markets, 
many investors have turned to commodity-based index 
funds because their prices seem to be negatively correlated 
to other types of investment, such as equities and bonds. 
From 2002 to 2008, investments in commodity-based index 
funds increased from less than US$ 5 billion to more than 
US$ 20 billion (Commodity Futures Trading Commission). 
Nonetheless, there is no conclusive proof of the role of 
speculation in determining commodity prices.20
9
 Based on an analysis over the past 30 years, Merrill Lynch (2008) 
finds that a reduction of one percentage point in real interest rates 
results in a 7.5% increase in spot commodity prices. 
20
 Krugman (2008), Merrill Lynch (2008) and The Economist (2008) 
suggest speculation cannot be held responsible for the price spikes 
because not all commodity prices have increased (for example, 
nickel, sugar and lean hogs) in recent years; statistical tests suggest 
that the increase in index-linked commodity investments has not 
contributed to the increase in spot prices of commodities as diverse 
as maize, gold and oil; non-index-linked commodities have also 
seen dramatic price gains (including coal, rice, iron ore and steel); 
and there are few signs of inventory building (for example, in crude 
aluminium, oil, or wheat).
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3. Short-term commodity price prospects
biofuel production will continue to increase, albeit at a 
slower pace than in the last two years. 
Table I.3











2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Food
Maize 58.7 14.7 28.6 4.8
Wheat 43.9 -2.0 41.1 -2.8
Rice 107.5 -3.5 50.4 4
Soybeans 63.6 6.8 30.8 -3.6
Soybean oil 66.9 6.1 25 -5
Sugar 30.3 11.7 2.4 1.2
Grains 47.3 -1.3
Oilseeds 62.6 2.9     
Metals
Copper 9.1 -11.9 -1.8 -14.3
Aluminium 12.8 -7.5 2.3 -7.4
Iron ore 65.3 -14.3
Zinc -36.7 -10.7 -38.5 -10   
Crude petroleum
Crude West Texas 
Intermediate 
(WTI)
69.1 -8.3   60.1 9.2
Source:  The Economist Intelligence Unit, “World commodity forecast: food, feedstuffs 
and beverages”, July 2008; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook, Washington, D.C., April 2008; Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook 2008, Washington, D.C., United States 
Department of Energy.
Most analysts expect agricultural commodity prices 
to peak in 2008 and flatten or decrease slightly in the 
following years, although on average they will remain 
higher than during the decade prior to the boom. Table 
I.3 shows that, following strong growth in 2008, a decline 
in wheat prices in 2009 is widely expected. Overall, the 
consensus is that agricultural prices will remain higher 
than in 2005, but not as high as in 2007. 
Oil price projections made earlier this year placed an 
emphasis on the continued growth of global oil consumption, 
driven primarily by demand in developing countries 
and China in particular. However, in the second half of 
2008, slower than expected growth in world petroleum 
 United States exports half of all maize traded worldwide and, in 2005, 
it accounted for 40% of exports of soybeans in quantity terms (FAO 
Statistical Databases-FAOSTAT). Wheat yields will not be affected 
by the flood, as most of the wheat is grown in the Great Plains states 
(Kansas, Montana, North and South Dakota, Texas and others). 
There is much uncertainty regarding the future course of 
commodity prices. One scenario is that the commodity 
price boom continues, in which case, more weather-
related yield shocks occur, the use of cereals for biofuels 
expands, and oil production levels remain constant although 
geopolitical tensions trigger periodic supply disruptions. 
Another scenario is that prices begin to decline relative 
to 2008 levels. Under this scenario, growth in developing 
countries slows, there is a strong supply response in 
agriculture and, to some extent, in metals, oil extraction 
increases in OPEC and non-OPEC countries, and global 
demand for oil is curbed by recession fears, changed 
consumer behaviour and the introduction of alternative 
fuel technologies in OECD countries. A more realistic 
scenario lies somewhere between the two and is consistent 
with the price projections made by most agencies, as 
listed in table I.3. The consensus among international 
and government organizations (IMF, World Bank, OECD, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), International Energy Agency (IEA), United 
States Department of Agriculture) is that global demand 
for commodities will continue to be strong, driven by 
developing countries. This means that consumption of 
raw agricultural and metallic materials, as well as fuels, 
is unlikely to slow in the medium term. 
There are, however, factors that could positively 
affect supply capacity and loosen the market tightness 
observed during 2007 and 2008. In agricultural markets, 
supply response is picking up, in particular for grains, as 
planted areas are expanding and investment in agriculture 
is increasing both in the industrialized world and in 
developing economies. Thus, after peaking in early July, 
the price of soybeans had fallen 4% by mid-September. 
Wheat prices reached an all-time high of US$ 2 per bushel 
in mid-March, but dropped by over 70% to US$ 7 by 
mid-September, reverting to the level attained a year ago. 
Maize prices went down by 25% from a record of US$ 7 
per bushel in early July to approximately US$ 5.3 in mid-
September.2 On the other hand, it seems that agricultural 
yields will continue to be affected by adverse climate 
conditions, and this will contribute to supply instability. A 
recent example is the flooding in the Midwestern United 
States in June 2008.22 In addition, the use of cereals for 
2
 Data from Bloomberg.
22
 The Midwest was hit by the worst flooding in 5 years, Iowa being 
one of the states most seriously affected. Of around 0 million 
hectares of crop area in Iowa, % was under water, including 
80,000 hectares of soybeans and 530,000 hectares of maize. The
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demand became evident. Sluggish consumption in the 
OECD countries driven by a slowdown in the global 
economy23 and prospects for increased supplies from 
producers outside OPEC have put downward pressure 
on crude prices. So far, concerns regarding an economic 
downturn have overshadowed supply concerns: neither 
the disruption of Caspian export flows in August, nor 
the continued tensions between Russia and Georgia nor 
Hurricane Gustav raised oil prices (EIA, 2008c). As a 
result, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price 
dropped by one third from the peak of over US$ 40 per 
barrel in mid-July to slightly over US$ 90 per barrel in 
mid-September and fell to less than US$ 80 in mid-October. 
Highly sensitive to the exchange rate of the United States 
dollar and to developments in the financial markets, spot 
prices for oil have continued to trend downwards. 
The short- and medium-term prospects for oil prices 
are closely linked to expectations regarding the global 
economy. Weak economic activity and a steady supply 
of oil from OPEC countries would keep prices down. On 
the other hand, it is plausible that the current sluggishness 
of demand is temporary, and that global consumption 
will pick up towards the end of 2008 and drive up oil 
prices. Be that as it may, OPEC member countries are 
continuing to take steps to maintain oil prices within a
23
 Consumer behavior is also changing in these countries: There is 
an observed switch away from SUV and light trucks in the United 
States. Moreover, the big car makers are slowing production of 
these vehicles, replacing them with more energy efficient and 
environmentally friendly cars.
range of US$ 70-US$ 90 per barrel, since they consider 
that the minimum price for the final quarter of the year 
should be US$ 70 per barrel.
Although Chinese demand for metals grew strongly 
in 2007 (consumption increased by 43%, 35% and 3% 
for aluminium, copper and steel, respectively),24 Chinese 
imports of iron ore, copper and zinc slowed in the first 
half of 2008, a trend that is expected to continue through 
2008 and 2009. Slower growth in China and the end of 
Olympics-related investment are affecting demand. A 
global economic slowdown is expected to put a brake 
on global demand as well, especially in the construction, 
machinery and automotive industries, and this will ease 
price pressures. As a result, the rise in metal prices is 
expected to slow during the second half of 2008 and 
reverse in 2009. The prediction is therefore that some 
metal prices will decrease by 0% or more in 2009, with 
the overall index for base metals declining by 7.% (EIU, 
2008b). Some of these price drops have already begun to 
appear: copper prices, for example, fell 24% between the 
beginning of July, when they peaked, and mid-September. 
On the other hand, there are also signs that the supply of 
some metals will pick up: Chilean copper production, for 
example, is set to expand as various investment projects 
are under way in the mining sector.25
24
 Data from International Iron and Steel Institute and World Bureau 
of Metal Statistics.
25
 Projected investments in the mining sector grew threefold between 
2007 and 2008 from US$ 804 millions to US$ 2,43 millions 
(El Mercurio, 7 July 2008). Also, the state copper company, 
Codelco, has announced plans of US$ 5 billion expansion of 
the Andina mine, targeting an increase in extraction from 220 
thousand tons in 2007 to 800 thousand tons annually in the coming 
years (see Portal Minero [online] http://www.portalminero.com/ 
noti/noticias_ver_ch.php?codigo=429&fecha=07).
C. Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean: recent 
 performance and impact of global economic 
 conditions
1. General trends
In 2007, several changes took place in the dynamics of Latin 
American and Caribbean trade with respect to the boom period 
of 2004 to 200. Goods export growth fell back sharply, 
mostly because of reduced import demand from the United 
States, while import growth retained the momentum it had 
built up in the previous three years thanks to thriving domestic 
economies. The slowdown in export expansion was mainly 
due to smaller rises in volume: from 8% in 2004-200, the 
annual growth rate was down to only 3% in 2007 (figure I.). 
This slowdown in the growth of export volumes took place 
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in all the subregions, but was most evident in the Andean 
nations, Brazil and Mexico. Export price rises also dipped 
in most countries in 2007, with Chile being the most notable 
case. Other subregions experienced only minor increases in 
export prices. In contrast, export prices in Argentina, Paraguay 
and Uruguay rose faster in 2007. All in all, three quarters 
of export growth in 2007 was due to increasing prices and 
only one quarter to higher volumes.
Figure I.6
GOODS EXPORTS AND MERCHANDISE TRADE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES, 2004-2006 AND 2007
(a) Goods exports: volume and prices  (b) Merchandise trade and current account 
   balances as a percentage of GDP
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In 2007 import growth remained strong in relation to 
the previous three years, in keeping with buoyant domestic 
consumption and investment in the region, with volume 
rising more slowly but somewhat faster price rises. Growth 
in import volumes was very uneven across the region, with 
some countries (Brazil and the Central American countries) 
showing higher rates in 2007 than in 2004-200, and others 
lower ones (rest of MERCOSUR, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and Mexico). In both periods, import prices rose at 
about the same rate in all the countries.
The trade balance and current account weakened in 
2007, although the region as a whole remained in positive 
territory for the sixth year in a row. With respect to GDP, 
trade balances declined in all subregions and countries 
except Chile. Overall, the largest merchandise trade 
deficits were recorded in Central America, the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, where they reached more than 5% 
of GDP. Current account balances showed deteriorations 
similar to the merchandise trade accounts in all countries 
and subregions, again with the exception of Chile. The 
services trade balance also worsened in 2007 in relation 
to previous years, mainly owing to falling tourism revenue 
and a larger deficit on the transport account as a result of 
rising costs. Migrant workers’ remittances also increased 
by less than in previous years.
The improvements seen in the region’s trade balance 
from 2004 to 200 were related more to terms-of-trade 
gains than trading volumes, whereas the deterioration in 
2007 was explained in large part by trading volumes. This 
is illustrated in figure I.7, which shows a breakdown of the 
variations in the trade balance as a proportion of GDP.2 
The dash illustrates the total variation, with a positive 
number indicating that the trade balance improved in 
that year and a negative one showing that it deteriorated. 
The South American countries have experienced an 
average improvement of 32% in their terms of trade since 
2003. In contrast, the Central American and Caribbean 
countries have seen their terms of trade decline by an 
average of 7%, as the region imports most of its energy 
requirements and exports a large proportion of labour-
intensive manufactured products that compete against 
China for the United States market.
2
 For a formal breakdown of the trade balance, see Beynet and others 
(200) and Gianella and Chanteloup (200).
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Figure I.7
CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGES IN THE TRADE BALANCE, 
2004-2006 AND 2007
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of national accounts.
Note: Each dash represents the percentage point variation in the trade balance 
as a share of GDP. The variation has three components: (a) Initial position 
effect, showing how the trade balance would have changed if exports had 
grown at the same rate as imports in the current year, given the position of the 
trade balance in the previous year, (b) Net volume effect, illustrating the net 
contribution of real export and real import growth, and (c) terms of trade.
Between 2003 and 200, terms-of-trade improvements 
accelerated as many countries’ export baskets benefited 
from global increases in commodity prices.27 The 
change in relative prices was most significant in 200, 
when they added .3% to the region’s GDP in contrast
27
 Net gains from variations in the terms of trade are calculated on the 
basis of the change in the terms of trade between year  and year 0, 
multiplied by exports in year  at 2000 prices. This number is then 
divided by the GDP of year  at 2000 prices. An increase in this 
indicator shows that a country can buy more imports today than it 
could last year thanks to an improvement in the terms of trade.
with an average yearly gain of 0.8% between 2003 and 
2005. This trend was particularly marked in Chile and 
the Andean Community, which gained the equivalent of 
2.% and 5.% of their respective GDP from terms of 
trade improvements. The figures for Central America, 
which had seen average annual losses of 0.% of GDP 
in 2003-2005, worsened to a 0.7% loss in 200. Price 
increases tapered off in 2007, as did the gains and losses 
in all countries except Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico and Paraguay, which experienced greater gains 
that year (see table I.4).
Table I.4
NET GAINS OR LOSSES FROM VARIATIONS IN TERMS OF TRADE, 
1995-2002, 2003-2005, 2006 AND 2007
(Percentages of GDP, annual averages)
1995-2002 2003-2005 2006 2007
South America 0.1 0.9 2.2 0.8
MERCOSUR 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.4
Andean Community 0.6 3.4 5.1 2.1
Chile 0.3 4.1 12.6 2.1
Central America and Mexico 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2
Central American Common Market -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3
Costa Rica 0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.4
Mexico 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official data.
2. The slowdown in the United States: direct and indirect impacts 
 on the region’s exports
Import demand from several regions has slowed. Average 
growth in the volume of Latin American and Caribbean 
exports to the United States fell from a positive 7.5% in 
200 to a 2.% contraction in 2007. The fall was even 
sharper in the first quarter of 2008, when the region’s 
export volume declined by 8.2% relative to the first quarter 
of 2007 (see figure I.8).
Demand from the European Union is more stable for 
the region as a whole, though this is largely explained by the 
weight of South America in the region’s basket of exports. 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean have seen large 
fluctuations in the volume of their exports to Europe, while 
South America has seen steady growth in the last three years, 
averaging 5.7% per year since the second quarter of 2005.
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Figure I.8
VOLUME OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2005-2008
(Quarterly growth over previous year)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United States International Trade Commission and the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (EUROSTAT).
Import demand from developing economies has 
remained buoyant, growing in volume terms by an average 
of % each year since 2000 (IMF, 2008a). IMF forecasts 
point to annual growth rates of 2% and % in 2008 
and 2009, respectively, nearly double the rate of growth 
in global import volumes. Exports to these countries are 
expected to continue growing at a strong pace, though 
recent data for China’s imports of key Latin American 
and Caribbean exports, while not yet showing widespread 
effects from global economic events, do point to some 
weaknesses (see figure I.9).
Figure I.9
CHINA: GROWTH IN IMPORT VOLUMES OF SELECTED 
COMMODITIES
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ministry of Commerce of China.
Should United States demand for products from 
China remain weak, the slowdown in China’s exports 
would create problems for many countries in Asia. 
Approximately 20% of China’s total exports are sold 
to the United States, which is showing signs of lower 
demand (see figure I.2). Overall, Chinese export growth 
slowed slightly in the second quarter of 2008, although 
the country’s total import growth continues to accelerate 
owing to strong domestic demand. As of 200, over 50% 
of China’s exports come under the heading of processing 
trade, which drives the country’s large processing-trade 
imports (4% of total imports). As United States imports 
from China slow, Asian economies will see falls in export 
revenues and economic growth, and this will eventually 
impact on Asian imports from Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Growth in the volume of Brazil’s exports 
to China and to Asia-Pacific countries has slowed in 
the last year, showing a clear downward trend.28 The 
importance of the processing trade must be weighed 
against the decline of the United States as a destination for 
exports from the region. With the exception of Ecuador, 
Honduras and four Caribbean countries, revenues from 
exports to Asia-Pacific have increased relative to those 
going to other regions for all the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies (see table I.5). This shift increases 
the importance of the dynamic Asian continent for Latin 
American and Caribbean trade.
28
 The lack of high-frequency trade volume data broken down by 
trading partner prevents a fuller analysis of recent trends in Latin 
American and Caribbean exports to Asia.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)46
Table I.5
EXPORT SHARES BY MAIN DESTINATION, 2000 AND 2007
(Percentages of total exports)
Country/region
Latin America and 
the Caribbean China Asia-Pacific United States
European Union 
(27 countries)







Argentina 48 39 3 10 8 16 12 8 18 19
Bolivia 47 61 0 1 1 12 24 9 17 6
Brazil 25 25 2 10 12 18 24 15 28 24
Chile 22 16 5 15 29 36 18 13 25 24
Colombia 29 36 0 3 3 6 51 31 14 18
Ecuador 32 32 1 1 12 3 40 43 16 16
Paraguay 75 72 0 1 4 4 3 3 11 21
Peru 22 18 7 12 20 24 28 19 21 18
Uruguay 55 37 4 6 10 12 8 10 16 22








Costa Rica 19 25 0 14 3 24 38 25 21 24
El Salvador 28 39 0 0 1 3 24 48 11 6
Guatemala 36 41 0 1 3 4 59 42 10 6
Honduras 6 21 0 0 4 2 77 69 10 10
Nicaragua 23 22 0 0 1 2 41 63 20 7
Panama 20 19 0 0 3 6 50 21 19 50





Bahamas - 1 4 17 29 21 52 44
Barbados 0 0 2 2 5 12 20 17
Belize - - 3 8 52 28 38 35
Cuba 8 11 5 28 8 29 0 0 39 21
Dominican Republic 4 5 0 2 1 6 87 67 6 17
Dominica - 27 7 31 7 2 31 18
Grenada - 0 0 1 51 21 31 14
Guyana 1 2 4 5 25 17 30 33
Haiti 0 1 0 4 87 75 5 5
Jamaica 1 3 3 5 38 35 32 31
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0 1 0 68 61 23 20
Saint Lucia 0 0 1 0 18 26 55 48
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines - - 2 0 3 1 46 69
Suriname 0 0 5 1 25 9 29 21
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 1 2 47 59 14 9
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 16 18 1 6 6 12 60 42 12 15
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
  Indicates >10% increase.
  Indicates >10% decrease.
However, despite the declining importance of the 
United States market for the region as a whole, trade 
relationships within the Americas remain strong. The 
United States is still the single largest destination 
for the region’s exports and absorbs at least 20% of 
the exports of 9 countries in the region. In addition, 
54% of exports from Latin America and the Caribbean 
are primary products and natural resource-based 
manufactures, which in turn represent over 82% of the 
region’s exports to Asia-Pacific countries. As such, trade 
between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean is 
more vulnerable to variations in commodity prices. 
Trade with the United States and Europe and within 
the region is more balanced, with a greater share of 
high-, medium-, and low-technology manufactures (see 
chapter VI for more details).29
29
 Calculations by ECLAC based on COMTRADE data. 
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3. Impact of the commodity price boom on Latin American 
 and Caribbean exports
Latin America and the Caribbean is a major producer and 
exporter of commodities on a global scale. In 200, the 
region produced 44% of the world’s soybeans and 3% 
of global maize output. Its share in the production of zinc, 
aluminium and copper is also sizeable, at 28%, 22% and 9%, 
respectively, of the world total. The region is a net exporter 
of fuels, metals and agricultural products. Thus, although net 
commodity importers in the region (mostly in the Caribbean 
and Central America) are adversely affected by rising prices, 
the region as a whole gains from higher commodity prices 
in terms of export earnings and external balances. In total, 
agricultural commodities and fishery products, metals and 
oil represented 40.5% of exports in 200.30 The commodity 
price boom therefore has major implications for the region’s 
external position and growth. In terms of their contribution 
to GDP, commodity exports are most significant for the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana 
and Trinidad and Tobago (see figure I.0).
Figure I.10
EXPORTS OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS AND NATURAL-RESOURCE-
BASED MANUFACTURES a  BY COUNTRY, 2006
(Percentages of total exports and GDP)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), calculations 
on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE).
a
  Primary products are defined as unprocessed outputs of the agricultural, mining and 
energy sectors, such as cereals, oilseeds, metal ores, crude petroleum, coal and 
gas. Natural-resource-based manufactures include refined petroleum and petroleum 
products, processed agricultural and forestry products, such as flour and sugar, as 
well as basic metals and minerals such as copper, aluminum and zinc.
30
 The main agricultural commodities and fishery products (such as 
bananas, beef, coffee, maize, soybeans, soybean oil, sugar, wheat, 
and fish and shellfish) made up 7.% of the region’s total exports. 
Key metals and ores (iron and steel, zinc, aluminium and copper) 
represented 2.8%, and oil and petroleum products 20%.
The rise in commodity prices has had several 
consequences for exports from Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Monthly export earnings have grown rapidly 
in nominal terms since 2003, as shown in figure I.. 
Annual exports from the region were 7.3% higher in June 
2007-May 2008 than in the previous 2-month period. 
However, this development is due mostly to increases in 
prices rather than in volume. In real terms, annual exports 
grew by only .2% in the same period.3
Figure I.11


























































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information from the relevant countries.
a
  Excluding Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, for which the monthly data are incomplete.
A potential negative consequence of the commodity 
price boom would be greater reliance on commodities for 
exports and a slowdown in exports of manufactures, which 
have a higher value added content. From the mid-980s 
until 2000, the share of primary products in Latin American 
and Caribbean exports declined rapidly, reflecting a shift 
towards manufactures, greater export diversification, 
higher value added and greater technology content in 
exports. Between 990 and 2000 the share of primary 
goods in total export values declined from 49% to 28%. 
However, their nominal share increased from 28% in 2000 
to 3% in 200. This reversal is entirely due to the rising 
prices of commodities, in particular petroleum. From 2000 
3
 Nominal exports were deflated by the United States price index 
for imports from Latin America (2000=00) from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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to 200, the share of oil and petroleum products increased 
from % to 20% of all Latin American and Caribbean 
exports in value terms, while that of copper (including 
copper ore) expanded from 2.8% to .8%, and that of iron 
and steel (including iron ore) from 3.2% to 4.3%.
Rising commodity prices offer high returns on exports of 
primary products and natural-resource-based manufactures, 
which may undermine the progress made by the region 
in the previous 20 years in diversifying its export basket. 
The region’s commodity export boom in recent years is 
also closely linked to its growing commercial ties with 
China and other Asian economies, whose imports from 
Latin America and the Caribbean are highly commodity-
intensive. This fact could also contribute to a potential 
move away from export diversification.
However, there is no indication that commodities 
exports have increased as a share of total exports in real 
terms. The share of commodities in total exports expanded 
only marginally in real terms between 2000 and 2003, from 
27% to 28%, but then declined to 25% in 200. Despite 
rapid price increases in the last few years, in quantity 
terms primary exports grew at an average annual rate of 
4.% between 2000 and 200, compared with 5.% for 
other exports. In 200 primary export volumes actually 
declined, while other exports kept growing at almost 
0% (see figure I.2). Export volumes of agricultural 
commodities, especially maize, coffee and sugar, have 
increased since 2005, but metals exports from Latin 
America increased only slightly in 200 and then declined 
in 2007 (refined copper by 3.3%, aluminium by 4.% and 
zinc by 2.8%).32
Another concern regarding greater reliance on 
commodity exports is that export earnings could become 
more volatile.33 So far, however, this does not seem to 
be the case. Clearly, the impact of commodity prices on 
economies in the region depends on the relative weight of 
commodities in each country’s total exports. A few countries 
account for the bulk of exports of each commodity from 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Most grain exports 
are from Argentina and Brazil, the latter also being the 
largest exporter of coffee and sugar. Colombia exports 
almost all of the region’s coal and Bolivia accounts for 
half of the region’s natural gas exports. The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela dominates petroleum exports. Chile
32
 Data from WBMS (2008).
33
 The coefficient of variation relating to the values of monthly exports 
from the region remained unchanged between 2000 and 2007. The 
coefficient of variation relating to monthly export flows from Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the past two years (from March 200 
to March 2008), which is when most of the price increases took 
place, is still slightly lower than in the two previous years. During 
that period, there was increased volatility in Argentina and to a 
lesser degree in Central America and Jamaica.
accounts for three quarters of the region’s total copper 
exports. Brazil is the main exporter of iron and steel, 
as well as aluminium. Peru exports half of the region’s 
zinc. In this context, Argentina and Brazil are the main 
beneficiaries of the boom in agricultural prices, while 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru gain the most from metal and energy 
price increases. Analysis of the correlation between the 
commodity price index and export values by country 
supports this hypothesis.34
Figure I.12
ANNUAL GROWTH OF PRIMARY AND OTHER EXPORTS FROM 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of national statistics and the United Nations Commodity Trade Database 
(COMTRADE).
The effect of commodity price increases on the trade 
balance also depends on each country’s trade patterns. Net 
commodities exporters improve their external balances as 
commodity prices increase, while net importers will see 
deterioration. Accounting only for first-order effects, IMF 
finds that commodity price increases between 2005 and 
2007 improved trade balances relative to GDP by 9% in 
Chile, 7% in Peru, and % in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (IMF, 2008c). Argentina, Brazil and Colombia 
also benefited (with Argentina gaining most and Brazil 
least of the three). By contrast, the trade balances of the 
Central American countries were affected negatively.
34
 In 4 out of 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the 
correlation between export values and commodity prices was 
over 0.9, and in 2 countries it was above 0.8 (based on monthly 
data from January 2002 to March 2008). Exports from the major 
commodity exporters, such as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, 
were very closely correlated with the commodity price index. Only 
the Caribbean countries (except Trinidad and Tobago) and Panama 
showed correlation lower than 0., which is consistent with the 
lower share of commodities in their exports.
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Commodity prices also affect exports through 
transportation costs, which depend to a large extent on fuel 
prices. Higher transport costs have mixed effects on the 
competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean exports. 
Local products become more attractive compared to imports, 
favouring import substitution. Also, because of shorter distances, 
Latin American and Caribbean exports may become more 
attractive for the United States market compared to Asian 
exports. Conversely, high transport costs make the region’s 
products less attractive in more distant markets.
4. Inflationary implications of the commodity price boom
Apart from the effect on foreign trade, commodity prices 
affect Latin America and the Caribbean through the costs 
to consumers and producers of using these commodities 
as inputs. Rising commodity prices have raised the import 
bill for net importers of food and energy and the poverty 
impacts are potentially devastating.
Table I. shows that overall inflation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has increased.35 Moreover, low-income 
households spend a large proportion of their budgets on
35
 In the second half of 2008, inflationary pressures have started to ease 
as commodity prices have begun to stabilize or even decline.
food and are affected the most by commodity price increases. 
The commodity price boom therefore has important 
implications for poverty and inequality in the region (see box 
I.2). Thus, it is a major priority for the region to implement 
policies to attenuate the negative effects of the food and 
energy crisis. Inflation in Argentina, Bolivia and Nicaragua 
is also accelerating. The exact contribution of commodity 
prices to inflation is debatable, as other factors, such as 
monetary policy, may have a greater impact.
Table I.6
INFLATION RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
(Percentages)
Change in consumer price index from the previous year (end of period)
Country/Region
2006 2007 2008
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
United States 3.5 4.3 2.1 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.8 4.1 4.0 4.9
European Union 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 3.1 3.6 4.0
Asia
ASEAN 6.4 5.8 4.8 3.5 3.1 3.4 4.0 5.6 8.8
China 0.8 1.5 1.5 2.8 3.3 4.4 6.2 6.5 8.3 7.1
Japan -0.2 0.5 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 1.2 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.8 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.4 7.2 8.6 10.3 12.1
Argentina 11.1 11.0 10.4 9.8 9.1 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.8 9.3
Brazil 5.3 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.7 6.1
Chile 4.0 3.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.2 5.8 7.8 8.5 9.5
Mexico 3.4 3.2 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.2 5.3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 12.1 11.8 15.4 17.0 18.5 19.4 15.3 22.4 29.1 30.8
World 3.4 4.0 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.9 5.7 ...
Source: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Finance and Macroeconomic Surveillance Unit Database; International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial 
Statistics Database; official government statistics; and European Central Bank.
Note: Bold font denotes an increase from the previous year.
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Box I.2
POVERTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOOD CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The steep increase in food prices over the 
last two years has severe implications for 
poverty and indigence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean through its effect on 
consumption. Most worrisome is the growing 
expenditure on maize, wheat, rice and 
oilseeds. According to ECLAC calculations, 
the growing cost of food in Latin America 
and the Caribbean may increase the number 
of poor and indigent by over 10 million. 
Based on indigence projections for 2007, 
ECLAC estimates that a 15% rise in food 
prices, which was the average variation in 
the food price index in 2007, will increase 
indigence by almost three points from 
12.7% to 15.6%. This means that rising 
food prices will push another 15.7 million 
people into indigence. A similar number will 
also fall below the poverty line. However, if 
household incomes were to go up by 5%, 
close to the average inflation rate in the 
region, the number becoming indigent as 
a result of price increases would be nearly 
10 million, and a similar number would swell 
the ranks of the poor. While the data reveal 
the clearly negative effects of the rising cost 
of food on people’s welfare, they do not take 
into account the poverty impacts of rising 
fuel prices, which are pushing up the price 
of transportation and public utilities.
POVERTY AND INDIGENCE PROJECTIONS WITH REGARD TO FOOD PRICE INCREASES
(Percentages and millions of people)
2007 projection Assuming a 15% food price increase
Without a rise in income With a 5% rise in income
% Millions of people % Millions of people % Millions of people
Indigence 12.7 68.5 15.6 84.2 14.7 79.1
Poverty 35.1 189.5 37.9 204.5 37.0 199
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
D. Outlook for the global economy and for 
 Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Prospects for the global economy
The outlook of the world economy for the remainder 
of 2008 and 2009 looks increasingly grim. Economic 
growth projections have been revised downward for 2008 
(United Nations, 2008; IMF, 2008b), while for 2009 
most projections indicate an even weaker performance. 
The depth and duration of the financial crisis are very 
uncertain, even considering the bailout package approved 
by the United States government.
Economic growth in the United States, the European 
Union and Japan will decelerate further in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and in 2009. United States consumption 
is expected to contract in the context of more job losses, 
stagnant or falling wages and income from equity and 
other assets and tight credit, while investment may be 
cut further because of the credit crunch and weak overall 
growth prospects. United States export growth is also 
likely to weaken against a background of near or outright 
recession in the other G-7 economies, slowing growth in 
emerging markets, and a stabilizing dollar. The recession 
in Europe and Japan may also deepen, amid weak business 
and consumer sentiment, terms of trade losses, poor partner-
country growth, the impact of their strong currencies on 
net exports and the credit crunch. Financial institutions in 
these countries may also be more seriously hurt through 
their investments connected with the United States’ and 
some European countries’ housing markets.
Growth rates in China, India and other emerging 
economies will also decline from current levels but will 
remain robust, while those countries have to deal with 
increasing inflation. In China, to some extent, economic 
growth remains dynamic because swelling domestic 
demand is partly offsetting the slowing of net export 
growth. The Chinese authorities also stimulate growth 
through low nominal and negative real interest rates 
(although there have been some increases recently), 
controlled exchange rates and energy subsidies. Moreover, 
most emerging economies are well prepared to face the 
current international turbulence, with strong foreign-
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exchange reserves and low external debt. All in all, the 
robust performance of the key emerging markets will 
help sustain global growth despite the slowdown of the 
United States economy and deceleration of growth in 
other OECD markets.
The weakening of global demand, together with some 
easing of supply constraints, will continue to moderate 
commodity prices, although they are expected to remain 
high and volatile, partly because emerging markets will 
continue to expand and thus push up demand. Although 
interest rates and the real exchange rate of the United States 
dollar also affect prices, the most important drivers are real 
supply and demand. Oil prices are likely to remain high and 
volatile for some time. Agricultural commodity prices will 
peak in 2008 and probably flatten or decrease slightly in 
the coming years. Finally, the upward trend in metal prices 
will probably slow in the second part of 2008.
The main effect of rising food and energy prices is an 
increase in headline inflation worldwide, although more 
so in the emerging economies. Many analysts and central 
banks view the accelerating rate of inflation as a prime 
concern. Elevated food and fuel prices are starting to 
have “second-round effects”, meaning that price increases 
spread through the economy, for example in the form of 
wage demands. The most worrying sign is that people 
in various (mostly developing) countries expect higher 
inflation in the medium term. For several reasons, this 
acceleration of price increases may backfire on economic 
growth and contribute to poverty.3 However, in advanced 
countries, inflationary pressures are easing in the context 
of the slowdown in economic growth.
A number of policy actions are required to avoid 
a worsening of global growth prospects (IMF, 2008b; 
OECD/FAO, 2008; United Nations, 2008). To prevent the 
financial crisis from spreading worldwide and to avoid 
recession in the United States, some form of government 
rescue plan will be necessary. To avert similar problems 
in the future, banking and other financial regulation needs 
to be strengthened, in particular in the areas of trading 
derivatives, mortgage-backed securities and the extensive 
use of leveraged investments by banks. In the euro area, 
concerns over inflation have eased somewhat as the 
economy had slowed more than expected by mid-2008, 
a downturn which is expected to last several quarters.
In China and other emerging economies, the main 
concern is to hold down inflation and avoid overheating 
the economy. Possible measures include interest rate hikes, 
control of fiscal spending and more flexible exchange rate 
policies; for several emerging economies this will mean faster 
appreciation of their currencies against the United States 
dollar. In energy-exporting countries, energy consumption 
subsidies should be lowered and cooperation with other 
(advanced) countries should be expanded in order to spur 
oil exploration. Last but not least, protectionist measures 
must be avoided in the current complex economic context, 
as discussed in more detail below.
3
 Most of all, it creates uncertainty about the future purchasing power of 
money, and this reduces not only current production, but also saving 
and investment as people shorten their time horizons. Moreover, 
high inflation reduces a country’s international competitiveness 
unless offset by a depreciation of its currency. 
2. Projections for Latin American and Caribbean international trade
The financial crisis in the United States and the bleak 
outlook for the global economy will without doubt impact 
on Latin American and Caribbean international trade. 
In particular, growth in export volumes will slow, while 
imports are expected to keep their momentum in 2008. As 
most commodity prices (in particular oil and agricultural 
commodities) grew in 2008 relative to 2007, the region’s 
terms of trade have also improved, since it is a net commodity 
exporter. The net result will probably be a bigger trade 
surplus for 2008. A lot of uncertainty remains with regard 
to the evolution of commodity prices in the remainder of 
2008. A simulation of three different scenarios for the oil 
price for the second half of 2008 shows major effects on 
trade balances in the region (see box I.3). The expansion 
of the region’s exports is expected to slow because import 
growth has slipped, mostly in the United States and, to 
a lesser extent, in the European Union and Japan. Each 
country’s export growth will depend on those markets’ shares 
in its export basket and the degree to which it succeeds in 
redirecting its foreign sales to more dynamic markets, in 
particular China and other Asian countries, which is easier 
for standardized products such as commodities than for 
manufactures.37 Consequently, the Caribbean, Central 
America and Mexico will be worse affected than South 
America. This is illustrated by ECLAC projections, which 
show that the real export growth of Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama 
will decrease substantially in 2008 compared to 2007.
37
 Standardized products are easier to redirect to other markets than 
manufactures, as the latter are often produced according to technical 
standards which are specific to each destination market.
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Box I.3
OIL PRICE ASSUMPTIONS FOR SECOND HALF OF 2008 AND IMPACT ON TRADE BALANCE a
Despite the recent drop in the oil price from its 
peak of US$ 140 per barrel in July to slightly 
over US$ 70 in mid-October, most analysts 
agree that prices are likely to stabilize towards 
the end of 2008. As discussed in section 
B.3, the sluggish global demand observed 
in the past few months is anticipated to 
pick up, driven by persistent demand in the 
non-OECD countries. However, depending 
on the severity of the global economic 
slowdown triggered by the banking and 
financial sector meltdown in the United 
States, the demand for oil consumption could 
decline substantially, especially if spending 
on government infrastructure projects is 
affected. In these uncertain circumstances, 
it seems practical to assume a wide range 
of possible price fluctuations. As such, oil 
prices could continue dropping below the 
October levels or they could revert to the 
peak recorded in July. 
Therefore, three different scenarios for 
the oil price in the second half of 2008 are 
simulated to estimate the effect on the region’s 
trade balance: (i) a “neutral” scenario of 
US$ 120; (ii) a “low-price” scenario of US$ 80; 
and (iii) a “high-price” scenario of US$ 150. 
All other variables —other commodity prices 
and trade volumes— are held constant. 
Compared to 2006, trade balances would 
worsen for both net importers and Brazil in 
2008 under all three scenarios. However, for 
net oil exporters, the trade balance would 
improve under the US$ 120 and US$ 150 
scenarios. Under these two scenarios, the 
improvement of the trade balance of oil 
exporters would be bigger than the decline 
of the trade balance of oil importers, and 
therefore the region as a whole would gain. 
As Brazil’s net oil imports are close to zero, 
its trade balance is only slightly affected by 
changes in oil prices.
OIL PRICE SCENARIOS AND TRADE BALANCE, 2008








2002 2006 2008 - US$80 2008 - US$120 2008 - US$150
Net exporters Brazil Net importers Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Net oil exporters are Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Net oil importers are Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
a
 The three scenarios for the oil price in the second half of 2008 (80, 120 and 150 dollars) were defined in September 2008 and did not anticipate the sharp drop in the price 
per barrel in the ensuing months.
Commodity exporters in South America may 
experience divergent trends in 2008 (see table I.7). Some, 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, show a decline in 
export growth, each for different reasons. In Argentina, 
growth in export volumes may be dampened in 2008 
by export restrictions and domestic tensions. In Chile, 
export growth in 2008 will be lower than in 2007 despite 
substantial new investment in mining-sector expansion: 
one reason is that this investment will take time to mature 
as a result of a strike by copper workers under contract 
in April and May, and another is that non-traditional 
export growth seems to be hampered by an appreciated 
exchange rate. Brazilian exports are also expected to lose 
some momentum, in part owing to falling demand from 
the United States and exchange rate appreciation. On the 
other hand, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay have seen their 
export volumes expand in 2008. In Peru, this is thanks 
to new mining capacity coming on-stream in 2008. In 
Uruguay, favourable production trends and continued 
strong demand for agricultural products (such as cereals, 
beef, dairy products and wool) are keeping export growth 
dynamic. Moreover, strong demand from MERCOSUR 
(growing about 20% in volume terms in 2008) may offset 
a fall in demand from the United States.
In 2008, import growth is expected to remain robust 
in commodity-exporting countries, but will decelerate 
in the rest of the region. In the former group, import 
demand remains strong in the context of persistently 
high commodity prices and appreciated exchange rates. 
In the latter group, including most Central American 
countries and the Dominican Republic, economic growth 
will probably slacken and growth in demand for imports 
will likely fall, partly because of the effect of the United 
States slowdown.
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Table I.7
REAL GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES, 2006-2008
Exports Imports
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 7.3 8.9 5.1 15.4 20.7 19.3
Bolivia 11.3 3.1 7.4 5.2 4.4 12.0
Brazil 4.6 6.6 2.8 18.1 20.7 19.6
Chile 5.5 7.8 3.7 10.5 14.3 16.0
Colombia 9.4 7.5 11.6 17.3 16.4 18.0
Costa Rica 9.6 9.1 0.0 7.9 4.6 4.5
Ecuador 8.6 2.6 6.0 9.2 7.0 12.0
El Salvador 8.1 3.9 3.5 8.4 8.1 5.0
Guatemala 4.8 10.5 3.5 6.5 7.8 4.5
Haiti 3.1 -2.3 -6.0 4.6 -0.3 2.0
Honduras -0.4 3.6 3.0 3.8 8.0 4.0
Mexico 10.8 6.2 1.0 12.8 7.0 6.5
Nicaragua 12.5 9.6 4.5 5.5 14.2 5.0
Panama 11.1 14.0 5.5 7.7 12.5 6.5
Paraguay 14.6 9.6 9.6 16.5 10.8 10.8
Peru 0.8 6.2 9.8 13.1 21.3 23.9
Dominican Republic 0.7 2.4 1.0 8.2 11.7 4.0
Uruguay 8.0 9.7 11.0 17.6 10.3 18.0
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -4.5 -5.6 -3.2 31.1 33.6 8.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.1 6.2 2.8 14.3 13.2 11.8
Source:  2006 and 2007 from national sources, 2008 projections by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
3.	 Dealing	with	an	uncertain	global	outlook
Faced with uncertainty over global economic prospects 
and the direction of commodity prices, Latin America 
and the Caribbean needs to address both immediate and 
longer-term challenges. Overall, the information up to the 
end of October suggests that the economic slowdown and 
financial crisis in the United States will have a relatively 
modest impact on the Latin America and the Caribbean 
region in 2008, except for its exports. Compared to 
previous shocks in the United States economy and the 
world at large, Latin America and the Caribbean is much 
less vulnerable than in the past, with a current account 
surplus, sounder public finances, a lower level and better 
profiles of public and external debt, and larger international 
financial reserves (Machinea and Kacef, 2008).
Apart from trade and commodity prices, global 
trends will affect the region in at least two other ways. 
First, the economic slowdown in the United States will 
cause migrant workers residing there to reduce the amount 
of their remittances, an important source of finance for 
several countries in the region, particularly Mexico and 
Central America and some Caribbean countries. Second, 
the turmoil in financial markets across the globe is causing 
investors to shift their portfolios to lower-risk assets in a 
“flight to quality”, and this is increasing risk premiums for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Higher risk premiums 
make financing more expensive, although in the short term 
this should not pose a problem given that most countries 
in the region have small external borrowing requirements 
and abundant foreign reserves. As a result, the region’s 
economic growth is forecast to decline from 5.7% in 
2007 to 4.% in 2008 (ECLAC, 2008b) and probably 
around 3.% in 2009.
In this context, it is essential to maintain macroeconomic 
stability by reinforcing the countercyclical components of 
fiscal policy and closely monitoring trends in the external 
accounts, since the region’s economies face increasing 
risk premiums which are worsening external financing 
conditions. Governments should maintain their hard-won 
sound fiscal balances, which could be jeopardized by large 
subsidies on fuel consumption against a background of 
persistently high oil prices. Keeping inflation in check 
while maintaining sound fiscal balances and sustainable 
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external accounts will facilitate economic growth, reduce 
poverty and promote competitiveness. High inflation affects 
the lowest income groups disproportionately. Moreover, 
keeping inflation low may help Mexico and Central 
America to recover some of their lost competitiveness 
in the United States market relative to China and other 
Asian economies, as the latter experience double-digit 
inflation rates (Viet Nam has an annualized rate of 30%), 
which will soon translate into higher nominal wages and 
unit labour costs.
The main challenge with regard to commodity prices 
is to allow the export sector take full advantage of the 
boom while protecting the most vulnerable groups from 
the adverse effects of those prices on consumption and 
containing overall inflationary expectations. Policy actions 
should take into account the fact that the prices of oil and 
other commodities will not revert to pre-200 levels even 
if they decline slightly relative to 2008.
Latin America and the Caribbean is a net exporter of 
commodities, so the region stands to gain overall from the 
price boom. Some countries, in particular those of Southern 
Cone, have clearly benefited from the higher food prices. 
However, while most countries are net exporters of raw 
agricultural products, many are net importers of food 
and oil. The countries most dependent on food imports 
typically have the highest poverty rates. At the same time, 
on average, the poor spend a larger proportion of their 
budget on food and are therefore the worst affected by 
commodity price increases.
Many countries in the region have already taken 
steps to deal with the price increases in order to buffer the 
negative impact on consumption and poverty. The most 
widely used or proposed measures by the governments 
in the region include:
Quantitative export restrictions, as in the case of 
rice in Brazil and cereals and beef in Argentina 
and Bolivia;
Price controls and price agreements in certain 
food markets, as in Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, 
Mexico and Paraguay;
Reduction or elimination of import tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers; and
Bilateral agreements on food and grain imports, for 
example the arrangement concluded recently between 
Bolivia and Argentina (ECLAC, 2008b).
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO, 2008d), 4 countries of the 
region have adopted measures to compensate consumers 
for the loss of purchasing power, through food distribution 
programmes, income transfers or tax cuts. Twelve countries 





including input subsidies and public-private production 
agreements. Lastly,  countries have introduced trade 
measures and 9 have taken steps to control domestic prices 
directly. Protective trade measures, such as increasing 
export taxes, could, however, have an adverse effect on 
prices. While this measure curtails exports and boosts 
domestic supplies, it could also help to push up world 
prices as global supply shrinks, provided that the country 
has considerable market power for a certain good, as in 
the case of Argentine wheat exports.
To deal effectively with rising food prices in order 
to avoid inflationary pressures and impoverishment of 
the population, it is necessary to combine an immediate 
response (emergency food assistance and conditional 
income transfers) to protect the most vulnerable groups 
with longer-term measures to boost domestic productive 
capacity. A number of governments in the region have 
successfully negotiated agreements with producers to 
increase supplies, contain price rises or both in exchange 
for public support in the form of input subsidies, breaks 
in taxes and utilities payments, technical assistance and 
assistance with processing, packing, marketing and 
distribution. Subsidization and tariff protection of biofuel 
production also needs to be rethought, to take into account 
their impact on food security.
These measures should be complemented with efforts 
to minimize trade distortions. It is important to maintain 
open economies and avoid protectionist measures. It is 
unadvisable to impose quantitative export restrictions and 
export taxes because, by constraining supply, they place 
additional upward pressure on world prices and exacerbate 
global price volatility. Countries should facilitate imports 
by lowering or eliminating tariffs and reduce transaction 
costs, including those related to import financing. At the 
same time, governments need to undertake additional 
tax-reform measures to recoup at least part of the revenue 
lost through tariff reduction.
Removal of trade barriers should be accompanied by 
measures to facilitate trade. Red tape should be reduced 
in order to lower import and export costs, in particular 
by relaxing regulations that affect entrepreneurship and 
the development of SMEs. Further reforms are needed 
to improve the efficiency of customs, logistics, ports 
and transport.
With regard to energy, policy recommendations 
generally focus on improving energy security, boosting 
energy efficiency and diversifying sources of energy, in 
particular by increasing the use of renewables. The use 
of generalized energy subsidies as a means of coping 
with high oil and gas prices should as limited as possible. 
Insulating domestic prices from world price fluctuations 
impedes supply response, prevents consumers from 
switching from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 55
and discourages energy conservation. Moreover, these 
subsidies tend to be regressive as they favour higher-
income groups. Instead, such price distortions should be 
corrected and the countries should focus on removing 
barriers to greater use of renewable energy, encouraging 
investment and development of new technologies to speed 
the change and adopting appropriate urban infrastructure 
and land-use policies to curb the demand for fossil fuels 
for transportation (ECLAC, 2008c).
Another challenge for the longer term is to avoid 
a slowdown in the growth of non-commodity exports 
—which generally have a higher value added content— in 
a context of persistently high commodity prices and 
appreciated exchange rates. This can be done in several 
ways. First, maintain a competitive real exchange rate, to 
favour the development of new (non-commodity) exports. 
Various policies can contribute to this if the price hike is 
only temporary (Mulder, 200). Second, the government 
can use its resources to provide special incentives for the 
development of new goods or services. These measures 
can be financed (in part) with a special tax on the rents 
associated with rising commodity prices. However, it 
is important that this tax should not discourage private 
investment in these sectors. Also, decisions on where 
and how to invest are far from trivial, and should be 
coordinated with the private sector. Policy decisions are 
best guided by priorities set according to a development 
strategy defined by the public and private sectors 
jointly. Policies seem to be most effective when their 
implementation and impact are systematically assessed 
in the light of their established goals (see chapter VI 
and ECLAC, 2008a).
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Chapter II
Latin America and the Caribbean 
and the Doha Round of  
trade negotiations
Introduction
Points of view about the evolution of the Doha Round vary in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
It is generally agreed that the industrialized countries’ agricultural offers could be more 
generous in terms of market access and the reduction of trade distortions. Opinions differ, 
however, about what the region should contribute in order to achieve a good multilateral 
agreement, particularly in the area of non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services. 
Some maintain that, given how uneven the playing field is in globalization, developing 
countries should not have to give up anything in return for the long-overdue offer to open 
up the agricultural markets that the industrialized countries have now placed on the table. 
Such a position may reflect an accurate appreciation of the asymmetries of global trade and 
finance but is a politically unrealistic approach to adopt. Regardless of what may or may not 
seem fair, the industrialized countries are, for obvious reasons, hardly likely to approve a 
package within the Doha Round that only dismantles the protectionism their farmers enjoy 
without opening up any new trade opportunities in the manufacturing and services sectors. 
The region is thus facing a real negotiation, which means understanding the give-and-take that 
these processes entail and that the most important goal is to achieve a favourable outcome for 
developing countries. The question now is whether the world is anywhere near to obtaining 
that result and whether the political climate is ripe for it to happen. The momentum of the 
talks will not last for ever. Moreover, if they fail, it may prove tricky to resume them quickly, 
and the process could be stalled for a considerable period of time. 
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The sense of urgency about the need to conclude the 
Round has already waned. Some countries would rather 
not reach an agreement at all than accept a “bad” one. 
Others feel that the offers on the table do not represent 
real progress, especially now that the current financial 
crisis could heighten protectionist tendencies in the 
industrialized economies.
The agreement reached in July 2008 did not fully 
satisfy the developing countries, but it was headed in 
the right direction: access for agricultural goods to the 
developed countries’ markets was improved; subsidies 
for agricultural exports were eliminated by the end of 
2013; and the levels of domestic support for agriculture 
were lowered. The levels offered were almost twice as 
high as the ones being effectively applied now, but only 
because the high prices of agricultural products since 
July 2008 has rendered domestic support less necessary. 
The important point is to establish a maximum level 
for domestic support for when food prices come down 
again so as to avoid the oversupply of markets. The 
levels contemplated in the agreement were lower than 
those that the United States has applied in four of the 
last seven years. The restriction would, moreover, be 
permanent. The time has thus come to carefully weigh 
the costs, benefits and opportunities posed by the Doha 
Round of talks. Latin America and the Caribbean could 
consolidate consensus within the region with a view to 
playing a more prominent role in the Round, without 
losing sight of the synergy between those talks and other 
trade negotiations (such as those with the European 
Union), which could proceed more smoothly if the 
Doha Round were to be concluded soon.
The experience of the Doha Development Round has 
shown that, in the age of globalization, the interests of 
developing countries tend to vary according to how strongly 
they are integrated with the international economy. This 
means that, except in the agricultural talks, the interests 
of the developing countries have been highly divergent. 
Even in agriculture, the main points of coincidence 
have been about the need to eliminate export subsidies 
and reduce domestic support measures, while huge 
discrepancies have arisen regarding tariff cuts (market 
access) and special safeguards for developing countries. 
The divergent interests of the Caribbean countries, on 
the one side, and the Central American and Andean 
countries, on the other, in the banana controversy with 
the European Union reveals how these differences can 
play out in the region. 
This makes it difficult to assess the outcome of a 
negotiation process from the viewpoint of development 
as there is no common denominator that can benefit 
everyone. All trade negotiations involve costs and 
benefits. The Doha Development Round should try to 
minimize those costs and distribute them over time and 
among the members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in such a way that does not hamper economic 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. 
The Round should also harness the initiatives that could 
lead to the development of new and more dynamic export 
activities in the short term as a means of improving the 
distribution of costs and benefits within each economy. 
In the case of the least developed countries, which in 
Latin America and the Caribbean only refers to Haiti, 
many of the initiatives agreed to so far are working 
along these lines. In the case of the other developing 
countries, however, it is less clear how these matters 
could be coherently addressed. 
After a period of reflection, agreed to by the countries 
participating in the Doha Development Round negotiations, 
talks resumed in February 2007. In July and August 2007, 
the Chairs of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture and 
the Negotiating Group on NAMA presented documents 
that reflected the possible negotiation modalities for these 
subjects (ECLAC, 2007).1 Throughout the second semester 
of 2007, the Chairs of the other negotiating groups also 
presented documents on their areas.2 On 19 May 2008, 
new documents reflecting the status of the talks in the 
agriculture and NAMA were distributed. On 26 and 
28 May that same year, the Chairs of the Negotiating 
Group on Services and the Negotiating Group on Rules 
submitted reports on the status of their negotiations. A 
mini-ministerial meeting was held from 21 to 29 July 
2008, but ended in failure. 
The document presented by the Chair of the 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture on 10 July 2008 
moves the negotiations forward in two important ways: 
on the one hand, the number of issues awaiting policy 
decisions (bracketed text) is reduced; and on the other, 
the scope of the talks in areas in which no agreement 
has been reached is narrowed, and progress made so far 
is consolidated by confirming the proposals previously 
discussed (regarding export competition, for example). 
Some of this has been achieved, however, by establishing 
flexibility for WTO members to make smaller cuts than 
those agreed to in general, and this could reduce the 
gains made in the negotiations (ECLAC, 2007) (see 
table II.1).
1 In WTO negotiations, the modalities establish the general parameters 
(such as formulae or approaches for tariff reductions) of the definitive 
commitments.
2 Further information on the objectives of the Doha Round, the 
negotiating groups and the documents available so far can be 
obtained from the WTO website [online] at: http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm.
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Table II.1






























Special reductions for 45 small and vulnerable economies. The least developed countries (32) do not have to make 
reductions. Some exceptions for very recently-acceded members. 
Sensitive products: 4%, 6% or 8% of tariff lines for developed countries and 5.3% or 8% of tariff lines for developing 
countries. Tariff cuts of 1/3, ½ and 2/3 under the general formula for developed countries and developing countries. Tariff 
quotas for developed countries must represent new access opportunities equivalent to 4%-6% of domestic consumption 
in the case of a 2/3 reduction and less in the case of other reductions. For developing countries, the tariff quota expansion 
must be 2/3 of the volume for developed countries. Several deviations from this rule were proposed.
Special Products: developing countries can designate a maximum of 20% and a minimum of 8% of tariff lines as special 
products. In this case, 40% (8% of lines) may be exempted from cuts. In all other cases, there must be an average cut 
of 15% and a minimum cut of 12%.
Special Safeguard Mechanism: the possibility of protection for all developing country products is included, and possible 
application mechanisms are proposed. 
Tariff ceilings: these are not mentioned, but additional access commitments are established for cases in which over 4% 
of a developed country’s products are subject to tariffs of over 100%.
Export competition Export subsidies to be eliminated by the end of 2013 and reduced in value by 50% by 2010. Additional disciplines are 
established for export credit, trading companies and food aid.










Initial cuts of 33.3%, five-year implementation period and base established for reductions.
Amber Box (US$ billions)
Tier
<15






Initial cuts of 25%, five-year implementation period and base established for reductions
Maximum limits for products equivalent to those for 1995-2000 are established. De minimis is reduced by 50%-60% 
for developed countries from the current level of 5% of the value of production and by 2/3 for developing countries from 
the current limit of 10% of production value.
Blue Box
The current Blue Box causes some trade distortion. These measures consist of direct payments to farmers based on 
the number of heads of livestock they have or the area of land they cultivate, but under production-limiting schemes. 
The Agreement on Agriculture would be modified to include a new type of Blue Box based on payments that are not 
production-linked but based on the fixed amount of previous production. A maximum limit of 2.5% of the average value 
of agricultural production in the base period is set, with caps for individual products.
Green Box The provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture would be modified to allow developing countries to implement more development programmes and to apply stricter criteria for developed countries.
Source: Word Trade Organization (WTO), Revised draft modalities for agriculture (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2), 19 May 2008; and “Unofficial guide to the revised draft modalities – Agriculture, 
19 May 2008” [online] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm.
Under these proposals in the area of agriculture, 
overall trade-distorting domestic support in the United 
States would drop from the current level of US$ 48 billion 
to between US$ 13 billion and US$ 16 billion (see table 
II.2). In the case of the European Union, such support 
would be lowered from 110 billion euros to 28 billion 
euros. The cuts in Japan could be greater given that 40% 
of the value of Japanese agricultural products is currently 
subsidized.3 The final outcome of the proposed market access 
commitments summarized in table II.1 will depend on the 
use and workings of the flexibilities that are established. 
3 See WTO, “Revised draft modalities for agriculture” [online] http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_10july08_e.htm. 
These are difficult to assess on the basis of the information 
currently available. The lowering of tariffs for sensitive 
products and the increase of quotas within the future 
tariff-quota scheme are two of the most notable provisions 
under consideration. Again, the lack of information makes 
it impossible to gauge the extent of the new level of access 
that these will create. In the case of the United States, the 
flexibilities will most likely be used for raw and refined 
sugar, industrial cheeses, butter and powdered milk. In the 
European Union, beef, pork, poultry, rice and sugar might 
be included in this category.4
4 Inside US Trade (2008a).
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Table II.2
SIMULATIONS OF PROPOSED DOMESTIC SUBSIDY CUTS
Overall trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS) Amber box(distorting programmes + measures)
Uruguay round Doha proposal Uruguay round Doha proposal
Euro zone € 110.3 billion € 27.6 billion € 67.2 billion € 20.1 billion
United States US$ 48.2 billion US$ 13 billion – US$ 16 billion US$ 19 billion US$ 7.6 billion
In the case of the European Union, the proposed modalities could mean the effective restriction of trade-distorting disbursements as of 2013 or 2014. 
In the case of the United States, the amount of domestic support would be reduced, but the country could still increase OTDS by US$ 4 billion and 
its Amber Box measures by US$ 1 billion. Limits might also be set for dairy products, sugar, cotton, corn, rice and other items. In both the European 
Union and the United States, there would be less room for Blue Box measures. 
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO); Sébastien Jean, Tim Josling and David Laborde, The Consequences for the European Union of the WTO Revised Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2008; and David Blandford, David Laborde and Will Martin, Implications of the February 2008 WTO 
DRAFT Agriculture Modalities for the United States, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2008.
Although it was an impasse regarding the special 
safeguard mechanism (SSM) for the agricultural products 
of developing countries that brought the negotiations 
to a standstill in July 2008, agreements were reached 
on several aspects of the SSM. One of these was the 
provision whereby developing countries could use the 
mechanism to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with 
import surges and prices falls. The least developed 
countries (as defined by the United Nations) and the 
small and vulnerable economies were to receive the 
most generous treatment in this regard.
The problem arose within the group of seven 
countries (Australia, Brazil, China, the United States, 
India, Japan and the European Union) that was negotiating 
the general terms of a proposal to be submitted to the 
other members of the WTO on the possibility of raising 
tariffs above the levels agreed to in the Uruguay Round 
(or at the time of accession in the case of countries that 
subsequently joined the WTO). The controversy arose 
between some members of the G-33 (net agricultural-
goods importers) and certain exporting countries. 
On the one hand, some countries maintained that the 
SSM should be freer and easier to use, with smaller 
triggers and larger tariff increases. On the other, 
certain members felt that the use of the SSM should 
be more restricted: there should be no tariff increases 
above pre-Doha Round levels, the mechanism should 
not be activated by normal fluctuations in prices or 
normal trade expansion, and it should be limited to the 
period of liberalization. In other words, the mechanism 
should not be a permanent one. One proposal that was
 See the explanation provided in WTO [online] http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric_ safeg_e.htm. This is the 
position of the countries of Latin America and South-East Asia, 
as well as other members of the Cairns Group and the United 
States.
discussed contemplated allowing tariffs to rise above 
pre-Doha levels but subject to constraints imposed by 
additional criteria, such as larger increases in imports 
for the mechanism to be triggered, limits on how high 
the tariff could rise above pre-Doha rates and limits 
on the percentage of products that could benefit from 
this flexibility. The impasse was about the size of these 
constraints. It should be borne in mind that this would 
be the third safeguard mechanism in the WTO. The first 
consists of the general safeguards that are applicable to 
all products and triggered by import surges. The second 
is set forth in the current Agreement on Agriculture and 
covers agricultural products tariffied in the Uruguay 
Round. The third is the mechanism under discussion 
in the Doha Round, which is to be used exclusively by 
developing countries.6 
The document presented by the Chair of the 
Negotiating Group on NAMA in July 2007 provoked a 
strong reaction among some developing countries that 
felt there was a lack of balance between the agricultural 
proposals and the high level of ambition presented in the 
NAMA document. There were at least three problems: 
(i) the level of precision and the thematic scope of 
the document left little room for negotiation; (ii) the 
proposed flexibilities did not moderate the substantial 
opening of the set of sectors subject to the so-called 
“Swiss-formula” tariff cuts; and (iii) the cuts involved 
in the proposed formula were tantamount to a tariff 
reduction (see table II.3).7
6 See the explanation provided in WTO [online] http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric safeg_e.htm.
7 
 See ECLAC (2008).
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Box II.1
THE UNITED STATES FARM BILL
The Director-General of the WTO stated 
that the passing of the 2008 version of 
the United States Farm Bill, which will 
guide agricultural policy up to 2012, “is not 
sending a great signal that the U.S. are 
serious about reducing their subsidies”. 
WTO members voiced similar concerns in 
the wake of the ninth Trade Policy Review 
of the United States, which took place on 
9 June 2008. 
The United States Farm Bill is subject 
to renewal every five years. It is a complex 
legal instrument due to the large number 
of issues it addresses and the interests 
it affects. It covers support programmes 
for commodities, especially wheat, rice, 
cotton, sugar, dairy goods, oilseed products 
and peanuts. These consist of direct 
payments, counter-cyclical payments 
and commodity marketing loans. It also 
establishes provisions for government 
purchases of agricultural goods, quota 
administration and trade barriers. Other 
titles of the bill refer to: land conservation; 
agricultural trade and food aid; nutrition; 
credit; rural development; research; energy; 
and miscellaneous programmes covering 
assistance, insurance, natural disasters, 
labelling and other issues. 
The largest objections to the new bill 
were that it did not dismantle the most 
trade-distorting support programmes, 
and this represented a lost opportunity to 
introduce changes that could have paved 
the way for an agreement in the Doha 
Development Round. 
In budgetary terms, the new bill will add 
between US$ 5 billion and US$ 6 billion to 
the total budget allocated to the agricultural 
sector, which will reach US$ 286 billion. 
White House press releases indicated 
that the budget increases topped US$ 20 
billion for the various programmes covered 
by the bill. The United States Congress 
reports, however, that the increase was 
only US$ 10 billion. The difference arises 
from the exclusion of certain programmes 
in the figure released by Congress, such 
as the fund for aiding farmers in times of 
natural disaster, which has been allocated 
US$ 4 billion, and other provisions that 
boost payments to the agricultural sector 
by approximately US$ 4.5 billion. 
Commodity support programmes will 
be allocated from about US$ 32 billion to 
US$ 35 billion (not all of these programmes 
are necessarily trade-distorting by WTO 
definitions). This is slightly less than the 
current level of support of US$ 36.5 billion. In 
some programmes, the eligibility requirements 
for farmers have been modified, tightened 
in some cases and relaxed in others, 
with the net impact remaining unclear. 
Products that previously did not benefit 
from certain programmes have also been 
incorporated. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from “CRS Report for Congress”, No. RS 22131, 1 April 2008 [online] http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080509.html; and “CRS Report for Congress”, No. RL 33934, 10 April 2008 [online] ww.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2008/05/ 
29/wtos_lamy_says_us_farm_bill_poor_trade_signal/.
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Argentina 19 30.6 11.6 10.4 7.4
26 30.6 13.8 10.4 8.4
Brazil 19 29.8 11.4 11.0 8.5
26 29.8 13.6 11.0 9.7
Chile 19 25.0 10.8 6.0 6.0
26 25.0 12.7 6.0 6.0
Colombia 19 35.4 12.4 11.3 9.1
26 35.4 15.0 11.3 10.2
Costa Rica 19 43.4 12.7 4.7 4.6
26 43.4 15.7 4.7 4.7
Mexico 19 34.9 12.2 12.2 9.1
26 34.9 14.8 12.2 10.2
Peru 19 30.0 11.6 9.2 8.1
26 30.0 13.9 9.2 8.1
Venezuela 19 33.7 12.1 11.6 9.2
(Bol. Rep. of) 26 33.7 14.6 11.6 10.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of simulations conducted by the WTO Secretariat [online] http://www.eclac.
org/comercio/noticias/documentosdetrabajo/8/32098/BAL-COM2007-I.pdf.
a
 Countries in the region that would have to apply the Swiss formula agreed to in the 
document. The simulation is made using the coefficients of 19 and 26, respectively. 
The exercise supposes that the countries do not use the flexibilities permitted under 
the formula, which consist of: (i) applying less than formula cuts to up to 10% of 
the tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that 
these tariff lines do not exceed 10% of the total value of a member’s imports; or (ii) 
keeping, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, or not applying formula cuts for up to 
5% of non-agricultural tariff lines provided they do not exceed 5% of the total value 
of a member’s non-agricultural imports. The countries not included could make use 
of other flexibilities contemplated in the document presented by the Chair. Eighteen 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are considered small and vulnerable 
economies.
Consequently, the new proposal presented on 19 May 
2008 focussed on defining new flexibilities for the developing 
countries that would have to apply the Swiss tariff reduction 
formula in full. These included the possibility of applying 
three coefficients. The lower the coefficient used (i.e. the 
greater the tariff cut), the greater the flexibility, and vice 
versa. The application of this formula would substantially 
reduce the gap between bound and applied tariffs, which 
would make trade far more predictable.
An important number of additional flexibilities are 
included in the proposal, especially regarding tariff lines 
that could be excepted from tariff reductions or subject 
only to smaller cuts. Special modalities are contemplated 
for the other developing country members (of which there 
are approximately 7) that would not apply the Swiss 
formula in full. The 32 least developed countries would 
be exempt from making tariff reductions, and special 
provisions would apply to the 31 small and vulnerable 
economies (18 of which are in Latin America and the 
Caribbean) that represent less than 1% of world trade 
and for the 12 developing countries that have a low 
percentage of bound tariffs. Their contribution to market 
access would be made through the significant increase in 
bound tariffs. Moreover, the treatment of certain specific 
cases was under negotiation. Finally, special modalities 
were contemplated for the 16 recently acceded members.8 
8 See WTO, “Revised draft modalities for agriculture” [online] http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_may08_e.doc. 
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Under the proposals, the maximum tariffs applied by the 
developed countries were to reach between 7% and 9%, 
and the average tariff for non-agricultural goods were to 
be below 3%. Average tariffs in the developing countries 
that had to apply the formula would range between 11% 
and 1% (and higher in some cases) depending on the 
flexibilities and coefficients used.
Opposition to the NAMA proposals has been headed 
by the NAMA-11 group, which includes Argentina, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Brazil. Argentina 
in particular has criticized the proposals vehemently and 
highlighted the imbalance between the outcomes of the 
agricultural and the non-agricultural goods negotiations (Inside 
US Trade, 2008a and Bridges Daily Update, 2008).
There are other areas in which the Doha Development 
Round has yet to produce concrete results. These include 
the negotiations on services and the negotiations on 
antidumping measures. Little headway has been made in 
the services negotiations despite plurilateral talks being 
held, and the differences regarding the proposed level of 
ambition remain marked. The developed countries are 
seeking at least a commitment from developing countries to 
bind current levels of market access and national treatment, 
a proposal that developing countries are likely to resist 
(Inside US Trade, 2007a). The developed countries have 
also proposed the liberalization of environmental goods 
and services, which has stirred up opposition among some 
developing countries, especially Brazil, which insists on 
ethanol being treated as an environmental good while 
developed countries consider it an agricultural product. 
The Negotiating Group on Services held an informal 
meeting during the mini-ministerial held in July at which 
countries presented the commitments they would be willing 
to assume in the services sector. Although the results were 
not translated into concrete proposals, both the developed 
and the developing countries viewed the stated intentions 
positively (Bridges Daily Update, 2008).
As far as antidumping measures are concerned, the text 
proposal presented by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on 
Rules in November 2007 provoked strong reactions because 
it was held to reflect the suggestions made by the United 
States on the subject, especially with regard to zeroing.9 
In the document presented on 28 May 2008, prior to the 
mini-ministerial in July, the Chair basically compiled the 
proposals that have been made by WTO members on the 
topic and the comments of members to the text proposal. 
Similar situations arose regarding subsidies in general and 
fisheries subsidies in particular.10
9 See Inside U.S. Trade (2007a). Zeroing in simple terms consists of 
excluding negative numbers in the dumping margin, which means that 
the margin increases. Antidumping duties therefore also increase. 
10 See Negotiating Group on Rules, Working document from the 
Chairman (TN/RL/W/232), 28 May 2008. 
The mini-ministerial held 21-29 July 2008 did not 
manage to capitalize on the informal progress made 
in various areas of the negotiations or to generate new 
political momentum to resolve the more sensitive issues 
involved in agricultural and non-agricultural trade talks. 
The meeting in fact failed to meet its objectives even 
though only 3 of the 13 WTO members (counting the 
European Union as one) were present. This outcome is 
particularly poignant given that in 18 of the 20 subjects 
addressed, significant progress had been made, and 
the negotiations failed owing to differences among the 
trading partners in two main areas: the commitments to 
participate in the sectoral talks and the special agricultural 
safeguards for developing countries. This is troubling 
because, by concentrating on solving the problem of 
market access for goods, other topics (such as services, 
rules on antidumping rights and fishing subsidies, the 
environment, and the link between intellectual property, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and development) 
were never addressed in any depth. In other words, the 
talks did not fail in all areas. The lack of agreement 
surrounds one subset of highly relevant subjects. There 
were even concrete signs of willingness to advance 
with the services negotiations once the problems in 
the agricultural talks and NAMA had been resolved. 
It was hoped that an agreement would be reached on 
modalities, in other words on the terms of reference for 
the next stage of the negotiations. The goal was to lay 
the foundations to move ahead with the agenda of the 
negotiations, not to conclude them.
The conclusion of the mini-ministerial sent out three 
worrying messages to the multilateral trade system. 
The first is that the capacity of those handling the 
negotiations (and even of those who benefit from the 
globalization process) to make the system governable 
is now in doubt. The second is that it may not be 
possible for the WTO and its members to further a 
gradual and inclusive multilateral trade opening process 
that can accommodate the policies being adopted at 
the regional level. These policies are increasing the 
fragmentation of the multilateral trade system by 
discriminating in favor of their participants at a time 
when the complementary nature of multilateralism and 
regionalism seems to be weaker than it was in the past. 
The third negative message is that the Doha process 
and its development programme will be on hold for as 
long as other difficulties (such as the worsening of the 
international economic situation, the food and energy 
crisis and the problem of climate change) corner the 
attention of the international community. The situation 
is further complicated by the widely differing opinions 
of the WTO held by important political figures on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
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The confirmed end of the North-South dichotomy could 
be seen to be another source of concern. After the mini-
ministerial, some participants were even speaking of the 
emergence of a new world order. Opposition to the special 
agricultural safeguards had come not only from the United 
States, but from developing countries that export agricultural 
goods, such as Paraguay and Uruguay. The differences in 
the interests at stake, in the current international context, 
were also apparent in the Caribbean countries’ opposition 
to the agreement reached between the European Union 
and the banana-exporting countries of Latin America. 
Opinion among developing countries regarding the NAMA 
negotiations also varied considerably, and the hopes of some 
African countries for a definitive decision on distortions in 
the cotton trade were consequently thwarted.
Given the organization’s inability to resolve 
traditional trade issues, doubts have once more been 
raised about the capacity of the WTO to tackle the issues 
that the international community will need to address in 
the future, such as the relations between trade and the 
measures taken to lessen the impact of climate change. 
Multilateral trade rules have not kept up with regional 
ones, and this is threatening to render the multilateral 
system irrelevant and to make it increasingly difficult 
for the WTO to handle the challenges posed by the 
deepening integration of its members. The option of 
negotiating substantive aspects of trade-related issues in 
other forums is already under discussion. The Group of 
Eight, for example, declared the negotiation of different 
mechanisms for enforcing intellectual property rights 
to be a priority this year, and the non-binding SECURE 
initiative (Standards to be Employed by Customs for 
Uniform Rights Enforcement) is currently being negotiated 
within the WCO with a view to preventing the violation 
of intellectual property rights.11
In September 2008, consultations were held and contact 
was made among WTO members with a view to breaking 
the impasse in which the talks had ended in July. Members 
have stated their interest in not losing the ground gained so 
far in the negotiations, especially during the first semester 
of 2008, which attests to the importance of the progress 
made. The talks still have a long way to go, however, even 
once the modalities have been agreed to. The legal scrub 
of the final text will have to be performed, and then there 
will be additional negotiations. Moreover, there are some 
areas, such as rules and services, in which concrete progress 
has yet to be made. Finally, the results of the Doha Round 
will have to be approved by the legislative branches of the 
WTO member countries within an increasingly uncertain 
international context.
11 See [online ] http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1117.
Box II.2
THE BIOFUELS RACE
Biofuels have emerged as an option for 
addressing climate change and expanding 
agricultural development, especially in 
developing countries. Controversy has 
arisen, however, about the economic viability 
of biofuel programmes, and concerns have 
been voiced about their impact in terms of 
deforestation, the technological developments 
needed for their implementation, again 
especially in developing countries, and how 
these programmes could drive up food prices 
and, consequently, poverty rates (World 
Bank, 2007).
The biomass energy potential of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, based on the 
use of surplus farm land, could account for 
between 17% and 26% of total world energy 
by 2050. These figures are higher than for any 
other region in the world, with the exception 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (depending on the 
type of production system used). According to 
production potential and demand estimates, 
100% of global demand for transportation 
fuel by 2050 could be covered by biofuels 
if all the land considered apt or available for 
biomass plantations were used to produce 
transportation fuels. Bioenergy (not just liquid 
fuels) in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
particular is projected to have the potential 
to cover between 120% and 580% of energy 
demand (Razo and others, 2007a). 
It is important to weigh not just the 
technical potential of biofuels but also their 
real economic potential. In 2000, the cost 
of producing biofuels was between 10 and 
20 United States dollars per gigajoule (GJ) 
of energy. It has been estimated that under 
certain circumstances, by 2050, over 25% 
of the world’s energy needs could be met at 
a cost of less than 12 dollars per GJ. 
Given the large sugar cane surpluses in 
the region, sugar cane is the main potential 
source of bioethanol in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Ethanol production based 
on corn, wheat and sorghum is largely 
concentrated in Argentina, however, which 
has competitive advantages in these sectors 
as a major grain producer. Together, on 
the basis of their exportable surpluses, the 
countries of the region could produce almost 
20 billion litres of bioethanol a year, of which 
58% would be obtained from sugar cane, 
22% from corn and 18% from wheat. This is 
approximately equivalent to 26% of average 
regional gasoline consumption (Razo and 
others, 2007b). 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
definitely has the potential to be a biofuel-
producing region. Some countries, such as 
Brazil, whose ethanol industry has become 
highly efficient, are considering expanding 
their biofuel exports. The possibility of doing 
so will depend on the policies applied 
by their trading partners, especially the 
United States and Europe. In the case 
of the United States, some 200 domestic 
support measures for biofuel production 
costing between US$ 5 billion and US$ 7 
billion have been introduced (World Bank, 
2007). The biofuel sector has been able to 
expand in developed countries largely thanks 
to significant tariff barriers and subsidy 
schemes. In the European Union, import 
duties on ethanol range from 40% to 100%. 
Import duties are far lower in the case of 
biodiesel (6.5%), which distorts the market. 
Ethanol and other biofuels can be imported 
duty-free from least developed countries 
and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific or under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). 
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Box II.2 (concluded)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of C. Razo and others, “Producción de biomasa para biocombustibles líquidos: el 
potencial de América Latina y el Caribe”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 181, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2007; C. Razo and others, “Biocombustibles y su impacto potencial en la estructura agraria, precios y empleo en América Latina”, Desarrollo productivo series, No. 178 
(LC/L.2768-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007; World Bank, World Development Report, 2008: Agriculture 
for Development, Washington, D.C., 2007; and Inside US Trade, vol.26, No. 24, 13 June 2008. 
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Evades Collapse, As Lamy Finds ‘Way Forward’”, 
No. 6, 26 July.
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The most-favoured-nation tariff for 
ethanol imports in the United States is 
2.5%, but imports are subject to a mark-up 
of 54 cents on the gallon (14.27 cents per 
litre), except in the case of imports from the 
member countries of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. This mark-up is due to expire on 
31 December 2008 but will probably be 
extended given the protection it grants 
corn growers and ethanol producers in the 
United States. Even when subject to duties, 
ethanol imported from Brazil reaches the 
United States market at US$ 2.18 per gallon 
compared with US$ 2.55 per domestically-
produced gallon.
Discrepancies are beginning to emerge 
within the WTO regarding biofuels, especially 
within the framework of the Doha Development 
Round, in which some biofuels form part of 
the agricultural negotiations (bioethanol) and 
others do not (biodiesel is classified under 
industrial chemicals HS 382490). Biofuels have 
not been included in the list of environmental 
goods, as Brazil has proposed, because of 
opposition from developed countries, which 
means they cannot benefit from the proposed 
tariff cuts for environmental goods. Meanwhile, 
on 13 June 2008, the European Union initiated 
anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigations 
into imports of biodiesel from the United States. 
If these lead to the application of anti-dumping 
measures or countervailing duties, the case 
will probably be transferred to the WTO. 
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Chapter III
Globalization and new trends in 
international trade
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, profound changes have been underway in the 
international economy, brought about most noticeably by the advance of globalization, sweeping 
technological changes and the emergence of new and powerful competitors, such as China, 
India and, more generally, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. 
The implications of these changes are both varied and 
complex. The globalization of the financial market, for 
example, is far outstripping that of the real economy, 
making real-time operations a more common feature in 
the world of finance than in production or foreign trade. 
The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and its 
repercussions in the global financial system have revealed 
the extreme volatility of the world’s financial markets 
and exposed how vulnerable developing economies are 
even when sound and prudent macroeconomic policies 
have been implemented. Although the real economy is 
evolving at a different pace, the changes under way in 
production and trade are also significant.
In the production sphere, the latest advances in information 
and communications technologies, telecommunications and 
transportation are constantly redrawing the border between 
tradable and non-tradable goods and between manufacturing 
and services. This favours the creation of global value chains, 
which have become the archetype for the organization of 
production in the twenty-first century. Not that the vast 
majority of the world’s enterprises are structured along these 
lines at the moment. In fact, according to the experts, only 
20% of existing companies match this prototype of industrial 
organization (Castells, 2004). This group, however, includes 
the world’s leading corporations, which are the standard-
setters in international business, and at least some of the 
standards they establish become inserted into the rules of 
international trade itself. 
Barcodes, online connections with suppliers and 
distributors and innovative online information-sharing 
and working arrangements, together with processes such 
as outsourcing, offshoring and insourcing, have made it 
possible to achieve the flexibility needed to keep up with 
demand. Logistics have become an integral aspect of 
production, and the value chain now includes research and 
development, design, distribution, marketing, post-sales 
services and the recycling or elimination of the product 
in addition to production per se (Friedman, 2005).
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In order to participate in global value chains, companies 
need to attain high levels of quality and be backed by 
modern business services that can ensure timely responses 
and connectivity. The gradual incorporation of the Internet 
into management is changing business models, improving 
productivity and profitability in traditional sectors and 
generating new businesses, such as the online sale of 
services, or new business models, such as Google or the 
free delivery of music over the Internet.
At the same time, the impact of economic growth 
on the environment and on world climate has become 
an increasingly prominent feature of national and global 
debate. Awareness of the issue has grown, and several 
summit meetings have been devoted to the topic, such as 
those held in relation to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Environmental groups 
and consumer organizations are gaining political weight, 
particularly in Europe where their influence ultimately 
shapes consumer behaviour, and this is having an indirect 
effect on international trade. The importance of saving 
energy and protecting the environment is now beginning to 
crop up more frequently in corporate debates on innovation 
and competitiveness, and markets in the industrialized 
countries are demanding greater traceability and higher 
safety standards in the production and international trade 
of foodstuffs.
Nobody nowadays disputes the link between energy 
efficiency, environmental conservation and climate change. 
The differences arise regarding how to tackle the problem. 
As a global activity, international trade cannot remain on 
the sidelines of the issue. A mixed bag of initiatives and 
theories has begun to take shape although no multilateral 
rules on the subject have been solidified as yet. This is 
an unusual moment in history inasmuch as, although the 
countries of the world acknowledge the magnitude of the 
problem before them, there is no multilateral framework 
for providing governance, and it is still unclear whether 
such a structure could be set up without modifying 
the current multilateral arrangement for managing the 
traditional topics of trade and finance. 
The international (multilateral) trade system 
seems to have fallen behind in regard to both the pace 
of technological progress and the unilateral initiatives 
taking shape within the new structure that is emerging 
in the corporate world, which is often more relevant 
or influential, as far as trade is concerned, than the 
governments of industrialized countries themselves. The 
interaction between these two elements, which can be 
summed up as technological and business development, 
on the one hand, and the emergence of new issues and 
institutions, on the other, is highly complex, inasmuch 
as it brings the requirements arising from technological 
change itself, such as quality certification, up against 
business models that take advantage of technological 
progress to limit competition and protect private business 
interests, as occurs in the case of the requirement to obtain 
certification from certain laboratories or companies, 
for example.
The line between technological progress, the creation 
of new agencies and institutions and protectionism is 
a very fine one, and it is easily crossed, particularly 
if developing countries lack the technical capacity to 
distinguish between the changes inherent to progress and 
modernity (to which they will have to adjust) and those 
that are merely novel ways of doing business that can limit 
competition or increase the level of protectionism. 
This chapter looks at several of these new issues, 
which have arisen with the advance of globalization and 
technological and organizational change or in response to 
the new threats to international harmony, such as terrorism. 
The first section examines the rules governing trade 
security, which have gained prominence since the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2003 in the United States. This 
is followed by a discussion of the application of private-
sector standards in trade, which, though voluntary, can 
affect a country’s competitiveness. These include good 
agricultural practices, safety certifications, International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and 
quality certificates. The last section documents the public-
policy debates in the United States and the European 
Union on the link between trade and labour and on the 
link between trade and climate change. The analysis is 
by no means an exhaustive one and focuses mainly on 
the aspects that could impact the foreign trade of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
The trade security norms that are being unilaterally 
promoted by some countries or recommended by multilateral 
agencies, such as the World Customs Organization, are 
creating strong pressure for institutional and operational 
improvements to be introduced along the whole length 
of the trade chain. At the same time, the regulatory role 
that is being played by leading private corporations 
as regards product quality and the public policies that 
may be adopted in the main industrialized economies 
regarding the link between trade and labour and the link 
between trade and climate change are further straining 
the competitiveness of the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and could effectively turn into new 
barriers to trade that are not covered by any international 
rules. The region therefore needs to follow events in this 
arena closely and develop the necessary technical and 
negotiating capacity both to capitalize on the openings 
that globalization and technological change offer for 
enhancing innovation and competitiveness and to avoid 
the threats posed by the new form of protectionism that 
is arising in the twenty-first century.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 69
A. Security in international trade
Security and, more specifically, being able to guarantee 
security as an exporter or a transportation agent has gained 
considerable importance in recent years thanks to two 
unrelated phenomena that have been linked together by 
the force of current international circumstances. 
The first is the growing concern regarding food safety 
and the possible accidental contamination of food supplies. 
In addition to the number of serious food contamination 
incidents that have occurred since the 1990s,1 two factors are 
now fuelling this concern: in objective terms, the incidence 
of foodborne diseases has increased in many countries; 
and in subjective terms, many foodborne pathogens are 
relatively unknown because the micro-organisms involved 
or the role that food plays in their transmission was only 
recently discovered (WHO, 2002).
“The food chain has undergone considerable and 
rapid changes over the last 50 years, becoming 
highly sophisticated and international. Although 
the safety of food has dramatically improved 
overall, progress is uneven and foodborne 
outbreaks from microbial contamination, 
chemicals and toxins are common in many 
countries. The trading of contaminated food 
between countries increases the potential that 
outbreaks will spread. In addition, the emergence 
of new foodborne diseases creates considerable 
concern, such as the recognition of the new variant 
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) associated 
with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).” 
(WHO, 2007b).
The second phenomenon arose in the wake of the 
attacks of 11 September 2001, which decisively changed 
the course of foreign policy in many countries, not just 
the United States. The attacks on the Twin Towers and 
the Pentagon moved “terrorism” (no agreement has 
been reached as yet on how to define the term) from the 
sidelines of international relations to the centre stage, 
and the regulatory framework for international trade was 
consequently altered as well.
1
 The global incidence of foodborne disease is difficult to estimate, but 
it has been reported that in 2005 alone 1.8 million people died from 
diarrhoeal diseases. A great proportion of these cases can be attributed to 
the contamination of food and drinking water. In industrialized countries, 
the percentage of the population suffering from foodborne diseases 
each year has been reported to be up to 30%. (WHO, 2007a).
When foreign policy changes, the trade variables 
affected by foreign policy change as well, and measures 
to prevent the international supply chain from being used 
for terrorism purposes suddenly become a top priority. In 
response to this new situation, the United States set up the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
in 2002, the World Customs Organization established 
the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programme 
in 2005,2 and the Canadian Government developed its 
Partners in Protection (PIP) process. These and other 
initiatives around the world all pursue one goal: to protect 
the supply chain.
One tricky issue that affects both the C-TPAT and the 
AEO scheme is that they are not wholly compatible with 
one another. The C-TPAT is a unilateral arrangement in 
which private companies ask the United States Government 
to be allowed to join the programme and, by meeting the 
requirements it imposes, they receive the corresponding 
benefits. The AEO programme is a multilateral scheme, 
its implementation depends on the States’ wishes, and 
it is the States that decide the requirements that private 
operators are subject to and the benefits they receive. So 
far, the United States has not managed to get C-TPAT 
members recognized as authorized economic operators by 
the European Union. The fact that two of the most important 
trading partners of Latin America and the Caribbean are 
implementing different security schemes calls for the public 
sector in the region’s countries to assume a guiding role in 
this area. Latin American and Caribbean businesses and 
small and medium-sized exporters in particular will need 
orientation and support, which will mean providing sound 
information and coordinating public-private initiatives to 
make prudent decisions regarding which steps to take and 
what kind of mutual-recognition agreements to pursue.
The international situation has been such that measures 
to guarantee the security of international cargo have been 
introduced far and wide over the past six years. These aim 
to prevent cargo shipments from accidentally transmitting 
diseases or from unwittingly transporting conventional 
weapons or biological, chemical or radioactive agents 
that could be used to destroy the peace and security of 
States and their citizens.
2
 The AEO programme has been implemented in Australia, China, 
Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region), Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore and the European Union.
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These two increasingly important trade factors, food 
safety and cargo security, are different in kind and have 
traditionally been tackled with different measures. The new 
trade security programmes, however, tend to be broader in 
scope and to address the issue of security along the whole 
length of the supply chain. They now aim to guarantee 
not only the integrity of international cargo, but also its 
correct handling and traceability. This new approach 
stems from the supposition that “the security of a transport 
chain depends upon its weakest link.” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2003). 
For simplicity’s sake, this analysis will limit itself 
to examining the AEO programme implemented in the 
European Union and the C-TPAT established by the 
United States as these two markets together absorbed 
over 60% of goods exports from Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 2005-2007.
1. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
3
 For further details on these programmes, see Alvarez (2008).
The C-TPAT began functioning in mid-2002 as a partnership 
between customs authorities and import businesses. It 
offered expedited entry for goods into the United States in 
return for protection of cargo containers against terrorist 
acts. Under this mechanism, C-TPAT importers aim to 
guarantee the security of goods from the moment they leave 
the factory floor to their arrival at their final destination. 
C-TPAT was given a solid legal basis by the passing of 
the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (or 
SAFE Port Act) in October 2006. The United States thus 
unilaterally grants certification within a scheme that is 
backed by its own national legislation and offers various 
benefits for importers, such as fewer controls and simpler 
procedures for clearing merchandise.
Initially, the programme had only seven members 
(CBP, 2004), but it expanded to cover around 40% 
of imports to the United States by mid-2005, and an 
estimated 60% or more by mid-2007. It is hoped that 
the mechanism will curtail the threat of terrorists using 
cargo containers to transport bombs, weapons of mass 
destruction, biological or chemical weapons, or arms 
components (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 
2005; BancoMext, 2007).
C-TPAT has four goals, which are intended to improve 
border safety and efficiency: (i) ensure that C-TPAT members 
improve their supply-chain security; (ii) provide incentives 
and benefits to expedite the movement of merchandise 
within the system; (iii) introduce the programme’s 
principles into the international community on the basis 
of cooperation and coordination; and (iv) support other 
initiatives and programmes of the United States Customs 
and Border Protection service.
Operators have to meet several requirements to 
become a member of the C-TPAT programme according 
to the activity they engage in. These generally fall into 
the categories set out in table III.1.
Table III.1
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM a
Procedures Infrastructure Staff
(1) Appropriate procedures for protection 
against unmanifested cargo
(2) Procedures for denying access to 
installations
() Written procedures for assessing business 
partners
(4)  Submission of complete, legible and 
accurate manifests to Customs prior to 
arrival by a secure means
(5)  Physical integrity of the means of transport
(6)  Railway buildings and yards built with 
materials that resist unlawful entry
(7)  Information systems with duly controlled 
access, protected by individually assigned 
passwords that are periodically changed 
(8)  Interviews, employment screening and 
background checks
(9)  Training in security and to recognize internal 
conspiracies 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of M. Alvarez, “C-TPAT and AEO: new channels for world trade”, FAL Bulletin, No. 258, 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), February 2008.
a
 This list is not exhaustive; it summarizes the general requirements of the C-TPAT.
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Applicants for participation in the scheme are 
classified into one of three possible tiers that confer 
different benefits:
Tier 1 (attestation only): five to eight times fewer 
inspections than non-members;
Tier 2 (validation): even fewer inspections, and 
when one is required, the container is moved to 
the front of the line;
Tier 3: no regular security inspections, and infrequent 
random checks.
The United States Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) service conducted a survey of C-TPAT members 
in 2007. One question asked members to indicate the 
potential benefits that influenced their decision to join the 
programme. “Reducing the time and cost of a shipment 
being released by the CBP” was considered to be the most 
important benefit members obtain from their participation 





POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM PARTICIPATION
IN THE C-TPAT SCHEME
(Maximum 4 points)
Source: United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Cost/Benefit Survey” 
[online] www.cbp.gov, August 2007.
2. The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programme
The World Customs Organization created the AEO 
programme in 2005 within the regulatory framework 
to guarantee and facilitate world trade (SAFE). The 
programme consists of a series of requirements that 
customs authorities must impose on economic operators. 
These measures are aimed at improving security in the 
supply chain and lowering the risk of accident or deliberate 
mishandling endangering cargo of any kind. Although the 
initiative is being promoted by an international agency, 
its implementation is completely voluntary and financed 
by the States that choose to adopt it. The requirements 
and benefits granted under the programme are defined 
by each State within certain parameters. The final goal 
is to facilitate international trade through the mutual 
recognition of authorized economic operators so that 
operators that are certified by the customs service of one 
country can have smooth access to a third market that 
recognizes that certification. 
Companies have been able to request AEO certification 
in the European Union since January 2008. This procedure 
is intended to be one of the pillars of the new community-
wide customs policy and to supersede traditional controls 
by increasing the role of customs in security matters.4 
The establishment of the AEO programme within 
the European Union is set out in Authorised Economic 
Operators: Guidelines. This document defines which 
4
 As explained by Juan José Blanco, Director of Customs and Special 
Taxes of KPMG (Expansión, 2007).
entities are considered operators in the international 
supply chain and what their responsibilities are (European 
Commission, 2007).5
Applicants are awarded one of the three possible AEO 
certificates and the benefits that go with them:
Customs simplification certificate: (a) easier 
admittance to customs simplifications;6 (b) fewer 
physical and document-based controls; (c) priority 
treatment if selected for control; (d) possibility to 
request a specific place for such control.
Security and safety certificate: (a) possibility of 
prior notification; (b) reduced data requirements set 
for summary entry and exit declarations; (c) fewer 
physical and document-based controls; (d) priority 
treatment if selected for control; (e) possibility to 
request a specific place for such control.
Customs simplifications and security and safety 
certificate: combines the benefits of the other two 
certificates.
There are specific requirements for each type of agent 
in each certification category as set out in part 3 of the 
document (see table III.2).
5
 These are: manufacturers, exporters, forwarding agents, bailees, 
customs brokers, shippers and importers.
6
 Article 14b (1) of the Community Customs Code as amended (CCIP): 
“If the holder of an AEO certificate referred to in point (a) or (c) of 
Article 14a(1) applies for one or more of the authorisations […], 
the customs authorities shall not re-examine those conditions which 














Reduction of time and costs in CBP
Reduction of time in inspection lines
Greater predictability in moving goods
Fewer penalties
Opportunities for cost avoidance
Improved security for workforce
Less cargo theft and pilferage
Access to the FAST programme
Better asset utilization
Lower insurance costs
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Table III.2
REQUIREMENTS MADE OF AUTHORIZED ECONOMIC OPERATORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Procedures Infrastructure Company
(1) Customs procedures
(2) Procedures as regards backup recovery 
and fall-back archival options
() Accounting system
(4) Internal control system
(5) Information security-protection of computer 
systems and documentation security
(6) Logistics
(7) Volume of business
(8) Flow of goods




(1) Storage of goods
(14) Production of goods
(15) Loading of goods









Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of European Commission, Authorised Economic Operators: Guidelines (TAXUD/2006/1450), 
Brussels, 2007.
The AEO programme has certain advantages over 
the C-TPAT and other similar initiatives. First, the AEO 
scheme was designed by World Customs Organization, and 
is therefore universal in kind and not geared just towards the 
European Union (or any of the States that have implemented 
it). States are free to implement the programme in different 
ways within the framework established by the World 
Customs Organization. Second, countries are urged to 
mutually recognize each other’s national programmes. This 
means that each programme can be adapted to the needs of 
each country and facilitate access for its operators to other 
markets while ultimately increasing the level of security in 
the international supply chain. However, although the AEO 
programme is intended to foster mutual recognition of other 
security programmes, problems have arisen regarding the 
compatibility of AEO and C-TPAT certificates as certain 
requirements that are determining factors for obtaining one 
are not included in the other. This is the case of the “fiscal 
solvency” requirement for AEO certification, for example 
(Inside U.S. Trade, 2007b).
3. Cost and policy implications
Complying with new trade rules incurs new costs: production 
processes and procedures have to be constantly adjusted and 
updated to meet certification requirements, and operators have 
to spend in order to obtain and maintain accreditation. 
Calculating these costs is not easy because they vary 
according to the level of certification sought and the 
company’s conditions beforehand. The AEO programme 
of the European Union is fairly new, but C-TPAT has 
been operating for over five years, and the United States 
Customs and Border Protection service has conducted a 
survey of how C-TPAT members view the programme 
(see table III.3). 
Table III.
AVERAGE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS OF THE CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP 
AGAINST TERRORISM PROGRAMME
Specific aspect of C-TPAT
Implementation Maintenance
Companies that incurred 
expenses
Average expenses in 
United States dollars
Companies that incurred 
expenses
Average expenses in 
United States dollars
Physical security 57.2% 8 471 47.5% 1 141
Internal knowledge and training 52.% 9 192 45.0% 4 945
Payroll 45.2% 2 986 6.% 28 454
Cargo security 4.7% 18 44 41.4% 7 110
Staff security procedures 4.2% 11 64 .1% 5 47
Identification system 41.7% 9 681 5.8% 6 241
Staff monitoring procedures 5.8% 7 079 .1%  72
Electronic communication  
and database systems .7% 24 0 4.4% 8 752
Staff security 19.7% 5 682 22.4% 40 441
Total average annual expenditure US$ 187 480 US$ 118 244
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of M. Alvarez, “C-TPAT and AEO: new channels for world trade”, FAL Bulletin, No. 258, 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), February 2008.
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Table III.3 shows that over half the companies (in 
seven of nine areas) did not incur any implementation 
expenses, except in the most sensitive areas of the 
programme (physical security and internal knowledge 
of the programme). These kinds of initiatives can have a 
negative impact on small and medium-sized producers, 
however, because if they fail to meet the programme 
requirements, they run the risk of losing markets by 
being unable to compete with those that do benefit 
from the programme and are therefore able to get their 
goods through not only faster, but with greater security 
guarantees. Competitiveness is now no longer just a 
matter of product quality and prices: the security factor 
is becoming increasingly important too. 
4. Impact on Latin America and the Caribbean
Security costs have increased considerably with the 
implementation of these programmes. This new variable 
should be considered as a fixed cost by companies, however, 
and not as a one-off expense in the ordinary course of 
business. Supply-chain security is probably here to stay, 
and its importance for gaining access to sophisticated 
markets could be growing. 
Authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean now 
face a new public-policy decision. Even if the security 
programmes discussed here are implemented, they do not 
impose any obligatory requirements on operators, and it 
is up to each country to decide what role the public and 
the private sector should play in their use. They could 
decide, for example, that it is up to private enterprises 
to choose whether to meet the requirements or not and 
that the public sector should only concern itself with 
activities at State-run ports. Helping operators obtain 
security certifications, however, not only improves the 
stability of exports (thanks to improved security), but also 
significantly increases the competitiveness of local goods, 
which in turn generates more growth in the domestic 
production sector.
Although these programmes establish requirements 
that must basically be met by the private sector, the 
public sector also plays an important part in lowering the 
costs of regulation, coordinating the process and keeping 
operators informed and hence in facilitating trade. The 
proliferation of information, programmes and standards 
can complicate the decision-making process in small 
and medium-sized firms. In addition to coordinating 
efforts, the public sector can therefore help by processing 
information and issuing clear guidelines that exporters 
can readily understand.
There are some unregulated aspects of international 
trade in which public policy can make a real difference. 
By drafting suitable legislation to fill these gaps, resolving 
information asymmetries and improving coordination 
among the country’s economic operators, the public 
sector can strengthen national competitiveness. This is a 
suitable area for concerting regional efforts to increase 
trade facilitation and set up trade support initiatives. 
Synergies can be established between governments and 
business organizations in the region, and information on 
third markets and the steps being taken in each country can 
be shared to consolidate more coordinated positions. The 
region faces both a huge challenge and a huge opportunity 
as far as cooperation is concerned. The mutual recognition 
agreements with the main trading partners can be entered 
into individually or in a more coordinated manner. If the 
region of Latin America and the Caribbean manages to 
harmonize standards and set up a network of agreements 
on the subject within the region itself, it could be in a 
much stronger position to negotiate with its main training 
partners and to boost its own intraregional trade.
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B. Private-sector standards and their legal status
1. The regulatory role of the private sector 7
7
 For further details, see Salles de Almeida (2008).
In an attempt to ensure product safety, as well as ethical 
corporate behaviour as regards the protection of the 
environment, labour rights and other issues, both the number 
and level of voluntary quality standards have increased.8
Economic operators know that in order to participate in 
global value chains they need to meet international quality 
standards and, in order to do that, they need modern business 
services that can guarantee them connectivity, opportunities 
and productivity gains. Complying with voluntary private-
sector standards can be a passport to the more profitable 
segments of those chains. On occasions, however, quality 
certification can turn into an attractive business in itself that 
has relatively little to do with its initial purpose of ensuring 
quality along the length of the value chain. The proliferation 
of private-sector norms, particularly in the food industry, and 
the growing demand for food quality standards in markets 
around the world is in fact making it difficult for exporters 
to meet all the new requirements. This is creating demand 
for international consultancy services in a market that lacks 
transparency and has high entry barriers and is consequently 
dominated by uncompetitive quality-certification services. 
Worryingly, standards that may have started out as private 
voluntary initiatives in large international consortiums are 
tending to become the norm in international markets either 
through gradual de facto multilateralization or through 
their strong influence on key markets. In either case, the 
competitiveness of exporters suffers because another factor 
that unlevels the international playing field comes into play
8
 The World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade distinguishes between technical regulations whose application 
is obligatory and those drawn up by public or private entities whose 
application is voluntary. This work refers to the norms agreed to 
by private entities whose application is voluntary and makes no 
distinction between norms and standards. The WTO Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures makes no 
distinction between measures whose application is mandatory and 
those whose application is voluntary. This has generated speculation 
about whether measures adopted by private entities are covered by 
this agreement, and the issue has yet to be resolved.
when they run into safety or traceability standards that 
are, for example, financed by public policy or some form 
of agricultural protectionism in the destination market.
In some cases, the quality requirements of the private 
sector are incorporated into government initiatives to 
standardize quality. This not only encourages the government 
to assume a regulatory role in the issue, it also affects the 
voluntary nature of what are private-sector requirements. In 
practice, through repeated use, these voluntary requirements 
end up as de facto obligations, and it becomes necessary for 
food production, for example, to take them into account. The 
agricultural sector and the agro-export sector in particular 
then find themselves forced to meet a large number of public- 
and private-sector requirements (table III.4).
The need for professional oversight of the food chain 
(from the farm to the table) and the dominant presence of 
multinationals are two of the factors that are most notably 
shaping the regulatory role of the private sector. The large 
multinationals in the food business have, jointly or severally, 
invested increasingly in good agricultural practices and safety 
certification. The handling of quality in the food sector is also 
being influenced by the concentration of distribution channels 
in import markets and the establishment of retailer associations 
and organizations or alliances that bring together companies 
operating either within a specific subsector or at similar 
stages in the food chain. When standards and certifications 
are recommended by such associations, it is much easier to 
coordinate their adoption en masse by suppliers.
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Table III.4
EXAMPLES OF THE STANDARDS AFFECTING THE REGION’S MAIN EXPORTS a
Product Private-sector standards (voluntary) Public-sector standards (obligatory)
Meats EUREP-GAP
Safe Quality Food standards (SQF) QF 1000/2000  
of the British Retail Consortium (BRC)
ISO 9000, ISO 14000 (environmental standards)
ISO 22000 (food safety)
Appellation of origin
Geographical identification





Fish/seafood Good agricultural practices (for example, Best Aquaculture Practices 
standards, Codes of Practice for Responsible Shrimp Farming, both 
of the Aquaculture Certification Council)





United States Department of Agriculture  






International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), 
ISO 65, others (organic farming)
ISO 9000, ISO 14000 (environmental standards)










Bioterrorism Protocol of the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) of the United States
USDA standards for organic products
Cereals and oilseeds IFOAM, ISO 65, others (organic farming)
ISO 9000, ISO 14000 (environmental standards)




Genetically modified organisms (GMO)
Traceability
Good agricultural practices (residues)
Good manufacturing practices
Sanitary certification
FDA Bioterrorism Protocol (United States)
USDA standards for organic products
Processed foods Fair Trade
Organic farming
ISO 9000, ISO 14000 (environmental standards)
ISO 22000 (food safety)








FDA Bioterrorism Protocol (United States)
HACCP
Source: Juliana Salles de Almeida, “Normas privadas: el nuevo desafío de las exportaciones de los países en desarrollo”, Comercio internacional series, No. 85 (LC/L.2861-P), 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.08.II.G.06
a
  Norms demanded in the United States and Europe.
2. The role of the private sector in the most important safety and 
 quality systems in place today
Concerns regarding food safety and the sustainability of food 
production have led several private and public institutions, 
in collaboration with the various actors in the food chain, 
to promote and implement good agricultural practices 
and good manufacturing practices in the production and 
management of food. Good agricultural practices refer to 
the production, processing and transportation of products 
of agricultural origin and aim to ensure the safety of food 
items and protect the environment, as well as the persons 
working in their production. In the case of animal products, 
good agricultural practices also cover animal welfare.9
9
 The FAO has drawn up a definition that states that “the concept of 
Good Agricultural Practices is the application of available knowledge 
to the use of the natural resource base in a sustainable way for the
Table III.5 presents an illustrative list of the topics 
covered by the main codes of good practice. The use of 
good agricultural practices is being increasingly promoted 
by the private sector through the implementation of formal 
codes of practice and indicators that have been drawn up 
by food manufacturers and retailers in response to new 
consumer demands for healthy food products that are 
obtained through sustainable farming practices. The Euro-
Retailer Produce Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP), 
which was created by the European retail sector, is the 
most widely applied code of practice today.
 production of safe, healthy food and non-food agricultural products, 
in a humane manner, while achieving economic viability and social 
stability” (FAO, 2006).
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Table III.5
THE MAIN TOPICS COVERED BY CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE
Good agricultural practices Good manufacturing practices





Water use and management
Responsible handling of agrochemicals and fertilizers
Use of organic fertilizers
Vector and pest control
Personnel issues (working conditions and welfare  
and health conditions of agricultural workers)
Harvest activities 
Waste and garbage handling
Environmental protection measures
Traceability
Documentation and record keeping
Transportation
Buildings and installations
Water use and management
Waste and garbage handling
Hygiene during processing
Personnel (training, education, hygiene)
Equipment and utensils (cleanliness and hygiene)
Cooling, washing and disinfection processes
Production process control (sanitary control)
Reception, treatment and packaging 
Pest control in packaging
Storage conditions
Labelling
Documentation and record keeping
Distribution (reception operations, transportation)
Source:  Juliana Salles de Almeida, “Normas privadas: el nuevo desafío de las exportaciones de los países en desarrollo”, Comercio internacional series, No. 85 (LC/L.2861-P), 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.08.II.G.06
The EurepGAP chapter on fruit and vegetables 
is one of the most extensively implemented codes of 
practice in Argentina and Chile. This private set of 
standards has become an important international point 
of reference for guaranteeing the safety of farm produce 
and high-quality fruits and vegetables and has replaced 
or assimilated various regional standards for certain 
groups of products and for fruit and vegetable retailers. 
The EurepGAP protocol has also incorporated rules 
regarding the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) system, maximum residue levels 
and traceability. 
There are other codes of practice in addition to EurepGAP, 
such as USGAP, JapanGAP and ChinaGAP. Private 
organizations have also created codes of good aquaculture 
practices. These codes all contain directives aimed at 
promoting practices that are environmentally, economically 
and socially sustainable and ensure the safety, quality and 
traceability of food products.10 Large multinationals have 
also adopted codes of good practices, such as the Sustainable 
Agriculture Initiative, co-founded by Groupe Danone, Nestlé 
and Unilever in 2001. This initiative aims to ensure decent 
living conditions for farmers, respect for the environment 
and socially responsible labour practices.
 environmental compatibility of aquaculture; (4) efforts to ensure 
local communities benefit by promoting the diversification of the 
local economy, job creation, contributions to the tax base and tax 
infrastructure, and respect for small artisanal fishing, forestry and 
agricultural operations, among others.
3. Good practices in Latin America
Chambers of commerce, together with associations of 
agricultural producers and exporters, have joined forces in 
several countries in the region to launch good agricultural 
practice initiatives in diverse sectors. These initiatives 
have progressed most in the countries in which fruit and 
food exports are not only significant, but also can compete 
with the highest international standards. In Argentina, 
over 40 entities came together to create the Forum of the 
Agroindustrial Chain Argentina, which publishes a manual 
on good agricultural practices.11 In Chile, private entities 
constituted a National Commission for Good Agricultural 
Practices, which advises the Ministry of Agriculture on 
the formulation of agricultural policies that promote 
the incorporation of good agricultural practices.12 The 
Commission has created its own code on the basis of the 
recommendations laid down in the EurepGAP.
11
 Available online at http://www.foroagroindustrial.org.ar.
12
 More details are published on the website of the National Commission 
for Good Agricultural Practices http://www.buenaspracticas.cl/.
10
 The principles underlying these codes of good practices include: 
(1) operating practices that are sustainable in the long term and have 
acceptable ecological effects that avoid the unnecessary destruction 
of mangroves and other environmentally significant flora and fauna; 
(2) installation, design and management practices that conserve water 
resources, including subterranean sources of fresh water, and minimise 
the effects of waste on the quality of surface and subterranean water; 
(3) cooperation in research and educational activities to improve the
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Chile is one of the countries that has made the greatest 
headway in this regard and, through its interesting public-
private sector dynamic, has developed more good practice 
codes than any other country in the region.13 One of its 
major trade initiatives, ChileGAP, was developed by the 
Fruit Growers Federation of Chile (FEDEFRUTA) and, 
after a lengthy accreditation process involving a series 
of analyses and audits by foreign agencies, has been 
approved as equivalent to the EurepGAP.14
Mexico has taken steps to implement MexicoGAP, 
while Uruguay is starting to bring its practices in the 
beef-cattle and sheep farming sectors into line with 
the Integrated Farm Assurance protocol of EurepGAP 
through its Certified Natural Meat Program. In Argentina, 
producers already have a lengthy experience with good 
agricultural practices in terms of phytosanitary controls 
and efficient and rational fertilizer use, direct seeding 
and rational soil use (Foro de la Cadena Agroindustrial 
Argentina, 2005).
Three important pieces of legislation on good 
agricultural practices have been passed in Argentina: 
resolution 71/99 of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, 
Fisheries and Food, and resolutions 530/01 and 510/02 
of the National Agrifood Health and Quality Service on 
aromatics and fruit, respectively. The content of these
13
 The National Commission for Good Agricultural Practices of Chile 
has developed technical good agricultural practice regulations 
for the following farming sectors: beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, 
goats, laying hens, broiler chickens, pigs, potatoes, wheat, corn, 
rice, fruit, vegetables and berries. The manuals can be consulted 
at www.buenaspracticas.cl.
14
 For further details, consult http://www.chilegap.com/.
resolutions and those adopted in other countries in the 
region is similar to the stipulations of the EurepGAP 
code. Two more sets of regulations that will tend to make 
good agricultural practices obligatory in Argentina have 
been put forward. One is a proposal submitted by the 
National Food Institute for the implementation of good 
agricultural practices for fruit, vegetables and aromatics, 
and the other is a proposal to include good agricultural 
practices for beekeeping in the Argentine Food Code.15 
These initiatives reflect the pressure that governments 
are under to adopt private-sector standards.
The Brazilian Agricultural Research Enterprise, which 
is connected to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply in Brazil, has played a central role in 
spreading information and providing training on good 
agricultural practice techniques in different segments 
of agriculture. This organization has drafted a series of 
concrete technical guidelines for melons, mangoes, fruit 
and vegetables and farm, dairy, beef, pork and poultry 
products on the basis of good agricultural practices that have 
been tried and tested by small-, medium- and large-scale 
farmers. It has also given courses on the most important 
products in the Brazilian export basket, including training 
in good agricultural practices for beef farming and the 
safe production of fruit and vegetables.
15
 For further details, consult http://www.foroagroindustrial.org.ar.
4. Standards of practice regarding social responsibility
Several organizations promoting the concept of fair 
trade have sprung up in the last few years. Among 
other initiatives, this has led to the issue of private 
certificates (in the form of labels) guaranteeing that 
a product was produced according to the criteria that 
these organizations advocate. There are currently 
twenty such fair trade labelling initiatives operating 
around the world, most of them in Europe and North 
America. Their aim is to regulate the use of certification 
marks in their respective countries. Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International (FLO) is the umbrella 
organization for these initiatives. Its role is to provide 
direct support to certified producers and to define 
the criteria for fair trade.16 Currently, the FLO, in 
compliance with the international ISO standard for 
certification agencies, inspects and certifies around 
508 producer associations in over fifty African, Latin 
American and Asian countries.
16
 The FLO has two operations units: FLO-CERT GMBH and FLO 
e.V. FLO-CERT GMBH ensures that producers, wholesalers and 
retailers comply with the FAIRTRADE Standards. FLO e.V. defines 
the International FAIRTRADE Standards, facilitates and develops 
the organization’s commercial activities and promotes fair trade. 
Futher details are available at http://www.fairtrade.net.
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5. The impact of private-sector standards on trade
For the countries of the region, the adoption of private-
sector standards, as well as obligatory official ones, 
poses both a challenge and an opportunity, as compliance 
with such norms has become a de facto requirement for 
selling agricultural products in markets in which both 
environmental awareness and the demand for quality are 
rising. Fulfilling private-sector standards can open doors to 
numerous markets and thus create new trade opportunities. 
The same standards can pose a barrier to trade, however, 
especially for developing country suppliers, because 
meeting them means incurring additional costs. They can 
also conceal an unjustified attempt to protect domestic 
producers when they go beyond the scientifically sustainable 
requirement established in the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In general terms, 
the proliferation of private-sector standards has raised 
concern among agricultural exporters in developing 
countries and the least advanced countries. WTO draws 
a distinction between the content- and the compliance-
related concerns about private-sector standards, which 
are summarized in table III.6.
Table III.6
CONCERNS REGARDING PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS
Content-related concerns Compliance-related concerns
Multiplication of private standards systems in and  
among markets
Costs of third-party certification, especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises and farmers in developing countries
Fuzzy line between official sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and private standards 
Some private systems demand certification by specific certification 
agencies
The relationship between private standards and the international 
standardization institutions mentioned in the WTO Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The lack of equivalence among systems results in certification 
inspections having to be repeated
Scientific justification for some of the limitations placed on 
production processes and methods
The certificates are not recognized or accredited certification agencies 
do not operate in developing countries
Source:  World Trade Organization (WTO), “Private standards and the SPS Agreement” (G/SPS/GEN/746), Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 24 January 2007.
Although quality systems are included on both the 
public and the private sectors’ agendas in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, small and medium-sized farmers have 
serious difficulties applying the sanitary and phytosanitary 
quality systems that export markets demand. These 
difficulties are related to: (i) the high costs of certification 
(table III.7); (ii) the lack of infrastructure; (iii) the lack of 
technology or inadequate technology; (iv) unawareness of, or 
insufficient training in, the requirements that need to be met; 
(v) inadequate legal frameworks; (vi) sociocultural factors; 
(vii) the failure of small producers to organize themselves 
and link up with production chains; (viii) inadequate training 
and information for small-scale farmers; (ix) the minimal 
implementation of systems to guarantee safety and quality; 
and (x) insufficient access to credit, which hampers the 
implementation of innovation and technology transfer 
programmes (Salles de Almeida, 2008).
Developing countries face three major challenges as far 
as good agricultural practices in particular are concerned. 
The first is how to guarantee that the more widespread 
use of good agricultural practices to ensure food safety 
and the sustainability of domestic production does not 
run counter to the interests of small-scale farmers. The 
second is how to handle the risk of farmers becoming 
overburdened by the growing number of disperse good 
agricultural practice initiatives and the multiple codes and 
regulations, which, though not legally binding, in practice 
determine whether goods gain access to markets. The 
third is related to the increase in production, certification 
(see table III.7), processing and marketing costs that 
informed consumers may be willing to absorb, but which 
consumers in developing countries and the least advanced 
countries may not.17
17
 Other problems stem from the lack of procedures for tackling: (a) the 
need for adequate inspection of processes; (b) the certification of 
exports or the assurance of the integrity and phytosanitary safety 
of shipments between certification and shipment; (c) the lack of 
operations manuals (on quality management, process safety, etc.); 
(d) the absence of internal auditing systems to ensure service quality; 
and (e) the inadequacy of laboratory facilities and equipment.
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Table III.7
COSTS OF PRIVATE CERTIFICATION THROUGH THE AQUACULTURE CERTIFICATION COUNCIL
(United States dollars)
Certification Application fee Initial inspection fee Value of the certificate Annual renewal of the certificate
Processing Plant 
Certification
500 5 000 2 000 – 12 000




2 000 – 12 000
(2 000 per metric ton exported)
Shrimp Farm 
Certification
500  000 500 – 4 000
(depending on production volumes)
 000 (inspection)
+
500 – 4 000
(depending on production volumes)
Shrimp Hatchery 
Certification
500  000 500  000 (inspection)
+
500 (certificate)
Total 1 500 11 000  000 – 16 500 14 000 – 27 500
Source:  Juliana Salles de Almeida, “Normas privadas: el nuevo desafío de las exportaciones de los países en desarrollo”, Comercio internacional series, No. 85 (LC/L.2861-P), 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.08.II.G.06
Studies show that producers would be willing to raise 
quality standards even if this entails higher costs provided 
that the requirements are incorporated into national 
legislation and the certification process is simplified (Díaz, 
2005). This would mean increasing the requirements 
both for exports and for goods sold on the domestic 
market, and thus eliminating the export bias. National 
standards are usually less demanding, however, because 
international agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures require standards to be based on scientific proof, 
which requires investment in research. To avoid having to 
do this, governments can adopt the standards set by the 
three international agencies that specialize in this task: the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Health 
Organization Codex Alimentarius Commission, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health and the FAO Commission 
on Phytosanitary Measures. These organizations draw
up the most demanding scientifically-based standards. 
Adhering to these standards not only raises the quality of 
goods traded internally but also reduces the risk of running 
up against barriers to entering third markets. In order to 
encourage the adoption of these standards, countries receive 
support from the corresponding organizations, as well 
as help from other countries, such as in the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Initiative of the Americas.18 
In all the topics discussed so far (security, good 
practices and private-sector quality standards), it is possible 
to find protectionist distortions or at least opportunities 
for them. It is therefore important for Latin America 
and the Caribbean to handle these matters through its 
regional institutions and to increase its technical and 
institutional readiness to put forward common positions 
on issues that are becoming increasingly relevant in 
international trade.
18
 This initiative was developed by the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture and the United States Department of 
Agriculture and with the collaboration of six countries that serve as a 
steering committee (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, United States and 
Mexico). Thirty-four countries participate in the initiative: 6 providers 
of cooperation and 28 direct beneficiaries (Alvarez, 2008).
6. The debate in international organizations
The main international forums to address this topic are 
the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (the “SPS Committee”) and the UNCTAD 
Consultative Task Force on Environmental Requirements 
and Market Access for Developing Countries. At the 
regional level, FAO has conducted studies and seminars 
on the impact of some specific regulations, such as the 
EurepGAP and the certification of organic products, 
among others.
The impact of private-sector standards on trade was 
first broached in June 2005 in the SPS Committee when 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines complained that the 
private-sector standards applied to bananas were more 
rigid than the international ones, which was creating 
difficulties for small-scale farmers. The complaint was 
backed by several other developing countries, mainly 
from Latin America and the Caribbean.19
19
 The countries that backed this complaint were: Argentina, Belize, 
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Mexico, Peru and South Africa.
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The European Commission alleged that it was not in a 
position to intervene because the EurepGAP requirements, 
though more rigid than international standards, were in 
keeping with community legislation on food safety. It 
maintained that private-sector organizations responded to 
consumer demands and suggested that the countries that 
felt that their interests were being affected should bring 
their concerns to the attention of the non-governmental 
organization in question. This was the first occasion on 
which the SPS Committee discussed how governments 
should proceed when the standards imposed by the private 
sector were stricter than those prescribed by the State. 
The main trade-related issues raised within the WTO 
framework refer to the relationship between private and 
international standardization agencies (private-sector 
standards are generally more rigid than international 
ones). Discussions have also been held on the nature of the 
unnecessary trade restrictions private standards can impose, 
especially on small-scale farmers, as well as on the measures 
governments could take to ensure private organizations 
comply with the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and the implications for other WTO areas, such 
as technical barriers to trade. The possibility of authorities 
accepting different measures that offer the same level of 
protection in terms of food safety, animal health and plant 
preservation is under consideration, with a view to helping 
developing countries with less advanced technology protect 
the health and safety of farm produce. In other words, the 
use of “equivalent” measures is under study. The need 
to clarify aspects of article 13 on the application of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
the activities undertaken by institutions not affiliated with 
the central government or by non-governmental entities 
operating within a territory has been analysed. Finally, 
concerns have been voiced about the lack of transparency 
of private-sector rules as there is no requirement for WTO 
to be notified of their application. 
Another point of discussion is the role of the State in the 
certifications market. Increasingly, people are asking whether 
the public sector should oversee the certification systems 
used by private agents. Some maintain that governments 
should indeed intervene in the matter and should both audit 
private certification processes and sanction errors or fraud. 
The technical and financial complexity of this task, however, 
is beyond the capacity of many governments in the region. 
Controlling the certification processes through autonomous 
technical entities specifically created for this purpose in the 
form of accreditation agencies, for example, would therefore 
seem to be a more viable option. Public policy needs to define 
the rules of the game, boost competition and transparency 
and ensure that the recognized independent certification 
agencies perform their function and eventually draw up 
and propose new standards for incorporation into national 
legislation according to the needs of each country, sector 
or administration (Salles de Almeida, 2008).
This is another potential area for cooperation among 
the region’s governments. They could share information on 
the main restrictions their products face in the industrialized 
markets as a result of private-sector standards that undermine 
their competitiveness. Collective action could be taken 
towards entering into joint negotiations with the governments 
or private associations of industrialized countries or to 
carry out subregional trade-facilitation projects that would 
enable the countries of the region to keep up with the most 
important trends underway in the various aspects of quality 
certification at the international level.
C. Trade and labour
The relationship between trade and labour rights has 
been gaining importance, in tandem with the relationship 
between trade and the environment, since the end of the 
1980s. Both topics have been on the international agenda 
for far longer, however. This section will focus mainly 
on the links between trade and labour. Even prior to the 
creation of the International Labour Organization, there 
had been concern about the problems that some industrial 
sectors could face as a result of the adoption of certain 
labour standards in developed countries. Attempts have 
been made to include the issue in the international trade 
agenda since as far back as the 1950s. At the end of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), the United States and France unsuccessfully 
proposed the insertion of labour standards in the WTO 
agenda.20 To date this has not happened.
20
 Labour standards are understood to refer to the protection of the 
following: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize 
and to collective bargaining; (c) the prohibition of any form of 
forced or compulsory labour; (d) the minimum age for admission 
to employment and the elimination of the worst forms of child 
labour; and (e) acceptable working conditions regarding minimum 
wages, working hours and occupational health and safety.
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In November 1971, the GATT Council of Representatives 
agreed to set up a Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade (also known as the “EMIT” group). 
This group never functioned owing to the other topics 
on the GATT agenda at the time, but served as a basis 
for the creation of the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment in 1991, which has been examining the links 
between the two issues. The current mandate of the Doha 
Round contemplates holding talks on the relationship 
between the WTO rules in force and the specific trade 
obligations established in multilateral agreements on the 
environment.
The generalized systems of preferences offered by 
the developed countries to the developing ones have 
contemplated the inclusion of conditionality clauses 
regarding compliance with certain labour, environmental 
and intellectual property standards. The incorporation of 
these issues into trade agreements to force compliance with 
environmental and labour standards by applying the trade 
sanctions established in dispute settlement mechanisms 
has always been a highly complex and polemic issue and 
is currently not feasible at the multilateral level.21
At the bilateral level and in the free trade agreements 
promoted by the United States, however, obligations 
regarding trade, environmental and labour standards have 
been established within the framework of the approval 
process for the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The United States proposed the negotiation of 
two parallel agreements, one on the environment22 and 
another on labour issues, each with their own provisions 
and dispute settlement mechanism. Subsequently in 1997, 
Canada and Chile negotiated relatively similar cooperation 
agreements based on the same model.
Owing to objections from environmental and labour 
groups to the outcome of the NAFTA model, the labour 
and environmental provisions incorporated into subsequent 
trade agreements were made subject to a single dispute 
settlement mechanism. The free trade agreement between 
the United States and Jordan, which was concluded in 
2000 and entered into effect in 2001, was the first to use 
this new model. The Trade Promotion Authority that the 
United States Congress granted President George W. Bush 
in 2002 contemplated labour provisions and identical 
dispute settlement systems as well as countervailing 
measures in case of non-compliance.23 These were 
21
 See a general discussion in Hoekman and Kostecki (2001). 
22
 The agreement on environmental cooperation recognizes that it 
is up to the countries to determine their level of environmental 
protection and their environmental policies, as well as to draw 
up environmental legislation. The main (but not sole) substantial 
commitment is to ensure compliance with that legislation.
23
 See a discussion on recent developments in this area in Elliot 
(2004). 
incorporated into the free trade agreements signed with 
Chile and Singapore and reproduced in the Dominican 
Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR).
The evidence on the impact of trade liberalization 
on labour markets is mixed, with the empirical literature 
often finding difficulty in capturing the relationship 
between liberalization and labour market dynamics 
(wages, elasticities, employment), as well as sometimes 
finding unexpected results that lead to new theoretical 
frameworks.
Recent reviews of the literature on the topic reveal that 
existing studies support the view that trade liberalization 
on average increases employment and income. They also 
point, however, to reallocation and other adjustment costs 
that have to be addressed with social policy instruments. 
Greater trade liberalization has mixed effects on wage 
inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, 
while providing an incentive for greater productivity 
across all sectors. The empirical evidence also shows that 
the impact of lower barriers to trade differs significantly 
across countries as an appreciation of domestic policy 
structure is key to understanding the relationship between 
liberalization and labour markets.
As indicated in the work of Reina and Zuluaga (2008) 
and in keeping with theory-based expectations, studies 
have found that trade liberalization tends to shift labour 
demand to labour-abundant countries, which can reduce 
wage inequalities in the developing world. The authors 
also point out that this is only a minor effect, however, 
because technological changes play a more significant role 
in this process. Jensen and Lee (2007) present evidence 
to show that, while salary premiums in Asia have indeed 
declined in line with the expectations mentioned above, 
Latin America has seen an increase in the spread between 
high-skilled and low-skilled wages. Possible explanations 
include: China winning the lower-skilled segment of 
the production market while the advantage of Latin 
America and the Caribbean shifts towards the medium-
skilled segment; the abundance of natural resources in 
Latin America and the Caribbean; greater foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows that have resulted in more demand 
for high-skilled labour; pre-liberalization tariff schedules 
that protected industries employing lower-skilled labour; 
and the dynamics of competition at the product level. 
In addition, the fact that higher-income countries trade 
mainly among themselves limits the effect of any shifts 
in labour demand.
There are strong concerns that the rise of Asia, and 
of China in particular, and its impact on labour markets 
will result in lower employment growth in other regions. 
The empirical evidence over the last couple of decades 
shows, however, that, despite growth in trade and FDI, 
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no drastic change in the aggregate employment situation 
has been recorded. These concerns are possibly justified 
on the basis that relatively rapid improvements in China 
and India should in theory imply a deterioration in other 
regions (including Latin America and the Caribbean), but 
there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between 
liberalization and the long-term employment situation. 
Macroeconomic events and labour legislation are found 
to have a greater impact on employment.
An analysis of the impact of trade on the distribution 
of economic activity also produces interesting results. 
According to the survey conducted by Jansen and Lee 
(2007), empirical studies find that greater trade openness 
promotes the reallocation of economic activity from 
less-productive to more-productive companies across all 
sectors, while unemployment levels are not found to be 
correlated with trade openness. There is also evidence that 
salaries in export-oriented industries decline following 
liberalization. The findings of studies looking for a link 
between trade liberalization and either labour market 
turbulence or increases in the own-price elasticity of 
labour demand, however, have been inconclusive.
Trade liberalization has been shown to have a positive 
impact on income and growth in the long run, at the 
same time that short-term negative effects were found 
to be weaker than expected. In the case of liberalization 
in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, only 
modest changes in the composition of employment and 
in labour displacement were detected. According to 
Reina and Zuluaga (2008), the evidence suggests that the 
short-term impact of trade liberalization on employment 
depends largely on the structure of labour markets and 
the regulatory framework in place. It is also important 
to mention that while the literature is not able to answer 
whether short-term effects occur via employment or 
salary channels, the studies agree that the overall impact 
is slight. These same models also reveal that FDI is highly 
positive for incomes in both the short and the long run 
(Reina and Zuluaga, 2008).
Surveys show that openness is found to be generally 
beneficial, but the best mix of trade and domestic-oriented 
policies designed to counter negative short-term effects has 
yet to be identified (Reina and Zuluaga, 2008; Jensen and 
Lee, 2007). In particular, policies are needed to facilitate 
the transition of workers between industries, create a safety 
net for affected sectors, redistribute income as needed, 
provide education opportunities and address bottlenecks 
in the response on the supply side, such as in investment 
in infrastructure and the availability of financing.
In terms of the impact on individual sectors, there is 
evidence that specific sectors gain from trade liberalization. 
In a study of the impact of different liberalization proposals, 
Polaski (2006) shows that lowering of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers by 36% in developed countries and by 24% in 
emerging economies benefits the rural sector.24 
The new political configuration in the United States is 
awarding greater importance to labour (and environmental) 
issues in the legislature’s discussions of free trade. This 
became patently clear in the debates on the agreements with 
Colombia, Peru and Panama, in which changes had to be 
introduced to incorporate stricter environmental and labour 
standards. This trend is likely to continue given the economic 
slowdown that is expected in the wake of the financial 
crisis. The growing presence of China as a competitor is 
moreover fuelling initiatives to link trade to labour standards. 
The region needs to fine-tune its technical and its political 
position regarding these issues because the links between 
trade and labour, as well as the links between trade and the 
environment, rightly or wrongly, will be taking up more and 
more of the international agenda from now on.
24
 This is the so-called “Hong Kong scenario” which arose as a result 
of the ministerial talks on Hong Kong (Special Administrative 
Region of China) in December 2005. The proposal also established 
that the least developed countries would not lower their tariffs. All 
agricultural and industrial export subsidies would be eliminated.
D. Climate change, trade and the multilateral 
 trading system
The recent debate on the repercussions of climate change is 
beginning to permeate multiple facets of economic affairs. 
In the realm of international trade, the situation is being 
diagnosed and positions are beginning to be assumed, 
more noticeably in Europe and the United States than 
anywhere else at the moment. The talks to review the 
Kyoto Protocol meanwhile are highlighting the need for 
countries to implement tax and trade policies that combat 
the effects of climate change. This section presents and 
comments upon some of the initiatives that are under 
discussion in the United States Congress and the European 
Union, paying special attention to how they might come 
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into conflict with the multilateral WTO trade rules. The 
conclusions stress how important it is for the Latin America 
and the Caribbean to address these issues and establish a 
regional standpoint that will enable the region to act in a 
coordinated manner at international forums. 
Climate change has become one of the most important 
challenges that the international community will have to 
address in the coming years. The trading system is the main 
focus of attention due to possible tensions arising from 
the conflict between trade-related proposals for tackling 
climate change and the core principles of international 
trade (non-discrimination, elimination of quantitative 
restrictions and non-arbitrary discrimination). Unlike 
other international instruments that address environmental 
issues, the Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated under 
the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate 
Change, does not contain specific trade-related measures 
to ensure implementation even though the commitments 
may impact countries’ competitiveness and their access 
to markets.25
Governments around the globe are drafting climate-
change-related legislation in order to fulfil their international 
obligations, in particular in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. 
If enacted legislation does not take into account the core 
WTO principles, WTO members will probably be forced 
to resolve their differences in the context of the dispute 
settlement mechanism, which would increase the cost of 
cooperation and intensify opposition to the functioning of 
the rules-based multilateral system (Hufbauer, 2008).
Climate change concerns will influence domestic 
and international agendas, creating new challenges 
for cooperation among countries and greater tension if 
conflicting views on how to address its impact are not 
resolved. Initiatives to tackle trade-related climate change 
using “border adjustments measures” are emerging in 
developed countries (Brewer, 2007).
25
 With the exception of the emission-trading system. For instance, 
the Montreal Protocol does contain trade-related measures to ensure 
implementation (Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007). 
During 2007 and early 2008, domestic legislative 
initiatives were put forward in the United States and the 
European Union to address climate change problems 
and to improve the implementation of international 
commitments. These proposals may affect international trade 
by introducing measures to preserve the competitiveness 
of domestic industries vis-à-vis imports.
An examination of these proposals reveals an interesting 
paradox. Those under consideration in the United States, 
which has not signed the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to 
being unilateral, tend to be more restrictive than those 
of the European Union, where priority is awarded to 
environmental subsidies and adjusting the regulatory 
framework of the World Trade Organization to meet 
the challenges posed by climate change. The unilateral 
measures the United States is contemplating, moreover, 
could conflict with WTO rules and impose high costs on 
exports from Latin America and the Caribbean to the United 
States market. This would be particularly unfair given 
that, in addition to being bound by the Kyoto Protocol, the 
region only accounts for 6% of global carbon emissions. 
If the region fails to gear up properly for this debate and 
the subsequent negotiations, it will probably find itself 
once again arriving too late to do anything and in a few 
years’ time hence having to comply with global standards 
that take neither its interests, nor its particularities nor its 
viewpoint into account. It is therefore essential for Latin 
America and the Caribbean to start discussing the topic 
within the region and to exchange experiences, technical 
analyses and information with a view to agreeing on a 
regional position on the matter. If the region fails to rise 
to this challenge in a timely fashion, the playing field of 
international trade may become even more uneven and 
adverse to the interests of developing countries, who will 
be saddled with energy and environmental standards that 
will stunt the development of their competitiveness.
1. The handling of climate change in the United States and 
 the European Union
(a)  Impact of United States climate change legislation 
on the trade prospects of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
In the United States, climate-change-related legislation 
will most likely impact commerce by imposing an additional 
cost on certain imports. The most advanced legislation in 
this regard is the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act 
of 2007 (S. 2191), or ACSA. It proposes a cap-and-trade 
system for firms in the electrical, industrial, and fuel and 
non-fuel chemicals sectors in the United States that surpass 
a stipulated level of greenhouse gas emissions. While the 
legislation is aimed primarily at domestic producers, there is 
great concern on the part of both industrial representatives 
and labour unions that the additional abatement costs will 
result in United States firms losing competitiveness in the 
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face of imports from countries that do not have similar 
environmental constraints. In order to placate these fears, the 
ACSA bill includes a section that requires products entering 
the United States after 2020 to meet certain environmental 
requirements. This has the potential to impact trade flows 
from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Under the proposed legislation, when certain conditions 
are met —trading in products associated with greenhouse 
gas emissions (primary products or pollution-equivalent 
manufactured products) that originate in countries that are 
not least-developed, that emit a certain amount of global 
greenhouse gas emissions and whose manufacturers have not 
yet taken sufficient action to reduce emissions— companies 
importing into the United States market must purchase 
International Reserve Allowances before the product is 
allowed entry. This extra cost, which is the equivalent 
of a tariff on certain imports, would diminish both the 
profitability of Latin American and Caribbean exports and 
the demand for these products in the United States. The 
International Reserve Allowance captures the value of the 
tariff within the United States, partly offsetting the losses 
to United States consumers, but without providing any 
such relief to international firms. If Latin American and 
Caribbean firms are not well prepared to either avoid or 
absorb these additional costs, regional commercial activity 
will lose competitiveness both relative to United States 
producers and to other suppliers around the world.
(i) The impact on trade
It is difficult to estimate the potential impact of this 
legislation on the region since many of the important details 
are left to be developed by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and by the Executive Branch. 
The methodology, price, rules, banking and other details 
of the International Reserve Allowance mechanism 
are to be established by the EPA in the future. The list 
of products subject to this legislation is only partially 
known (some specific primary goods are mentioned), 
while the Executive Office of the President is responsible 
for devising the methodology to determine which other 
products will be covered. The proposal aims to include 
goods whose manufacturing generates a substantial quantity 
of greenhouse gas emissions and goods that are closely 
related to another good whose cost of production in the 
United States is affected by the ACSA. In this regard, the 
Executive Office’s interpretation of “substantial”, “closely 
related”, and the calculation of the impact of the ACSA 
on each industry in the United States will determine the 
list of products covered. In addition, the Executive Office 
is required to certify that a country has taken comparable 
steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to 
determine the country’s status as a least developed country 
and whether it emits at least 0.5% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.26
Since a number of very important variables are left to 
be determined in the future, any analysis of the potential 
impact of this legislation on Latin America and the Caribbean 
must rely on some bold assumptions. Recognizing this 
limitation, this analysis assumes that only imports of 
the products explicitly mentioned in the legislation are 
subject to the ACSA requirements, namely: iron, steel, 
aluminium, cement, bulk glass and paper. This sets a lower 
boundary for this variable. It is also assumed that none 
of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are 
able to take “comparable steps” and that each country’s 
global share of greenhouse gas emissions in 2006 will 
remain the same through 2020.
Table III.8
PROJECTED SHARE OF GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 











Source:  United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory Forecast and calculations of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
A quick calculation of exports to the United States of 
goods originating from the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries that are expected to be subject to the legislation 
(those that produce over 0.5% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, are not least developed countries and export the 
products mentioned above) shows that over US$ 9.1 billion 
or 3.4% of their trade with the United States in 2006 would 
be subject to the additional cost.27 Excluding the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (due to its concentration on oil exports), 
the proportion jumps to 3.8% of the total exports of Brazil, 
Mexico, and Argentina to the United States.
26
 See “S.2191—110: America’s Climate Security Act of 2007”, 
[online] http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2191, 
[date of reference: 23 April 2008].
27
 This number is the total for the broad product categories mentioned 
above since the precise list of affected product codes is not available. 
Only four countries emit more than 0.5% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. No countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(except Haiti) are considered least developed countries by the 
United Nations.
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Table III.9 illustrates the potential impact of the 
legislation on affected industries in the 33 countries of 
the region. Over 30% of these industries’ exports to the 
United States market are likely to be subject to the proposed 
measures.
Table III.9
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES OF PRODUCTS SUBJECT TO
ACSA REQUIREMENTS, 2006
(Millions of United States dollars, and percentages)
Iron+Steel Aluminium Cement Glass Paper Total
Mexico 2 285 845 98 1 160 1 10 5 491
Brazil 2 589 507 12 2 242  7
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 0  0 0 1 4
Argentina 72 175 0 8 17 27
Total 




( countries) 16 898 6 01 452 1 996 4 680 0 056
Four countries 
relative to Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean: total 
exports to the 
United States 29.% 25.4% 24.2% 59.7% 29.1% 0.4%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Another potential impact is the additional leverage that 
such legislation would give to United States negotiators. It 
is easy to envision a case whereby the threat of inclusion 
in a list of non-compliant products or countries could be 
used to strengthen a negotiating position.
(ii)  United States policy trends
The ACSA bill is not the only bill introduced in 
2007 that proposes greenhouse gas emission controls 
(via cap and trade schemes) and includes an offsetting 
international trade component. The United States’ Senate 
bill 1766 (S. 1766) introduced by Senators Bingaman 
and Specter is very similar to the ACSA bill discussed 
above in that it proposes that foreign importers must 
purchase greenhouse gas emission allowances as an 
alternative to offsetting tariffs. The S. 1766 bill targets 
the United States’ top five sources of imports, which 
currently include Mexico.
Generally, the topic of climate change has intersected 
with international trade issues, and this combination 
in United States policy is likely to lead to a significant 
number of agreements over the medium term that will 
impact international trade in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
(b)  Emerging proposals in the European Union 
(i)  The European Parliament
On 29 November 2007, the European Parliament issued 
a resolution on trade and climate change calling on the 
European Council and the Commission of the European 
Communities to work towards building a consensus on a 
post-2012 framework through broader engagement and 
the inclusion of key parties currently outside of the Kyoto 
Protocol, notably the United States and Australia.28
According to the European Parliament, increasing 
trade should be regarded as a positive factor for economic 
growth and citizens’ well-being once the problems relating 
to climate change have been taken into account. At the 
same time, there are concerns, however, regarding the 
substantial contribution that increased trade is making to 
climate change, and general considerations are that trade 
policy must therefore provide part of the solution.
As far as WTO is concerned, the European Parliament 
seeks to ensure that the Dispute Settlement Body acts in 
accordance with Article XX of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, “which allows its members to take 
measures, including protectionist measures, necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. Also, 
the resolution suggests amending the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in order to 
reintroduce a clause providing for the non-action ability of 
certain environmental subsidies. The European Parliament 
proposes to examine WTO-compatible mechanisms and 
climate-friendly trade policies in order to address the 
issue of third countries which are not bound by the Kyoto 
Protocol and to make more explicit provision for such 
possibilities in future versions of the Protocol. According 
to the resolution, trade protection measures should be taken 
only when alternative measures would be ineffective in 
achieving a given environmental objective. Finally, when 
trade remedies are revised, they should take into account the 
feasibility of introducing environmental factors in order to 
avoid environmental dumping of products originating from 
countries that do not ratify the post-Kyoto protocol.
It has been proposed that commitments to the social 
and environmental aspects of trade and sustainable 
development and to the effective implementation of 
multilateral environmental agreements be included in the 
European Union’s negotiations of trade agreements with 
partners in Asia and Latin America.
28
 European Parliament non-legislative resolution of 29 November 
2007 on trade and climate change (2007/2003(INI)) [online] http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procn
um=INI/2007/2003. Australia has since ratified the Protocol.
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(ii)  The European Council and the Commission of the 
European Communities
In March 2007, the European Council set precise 
and legally binding targets on greenhouse gas emissions 
and energy consumption. Among them are two targets 
worth mentioning:
A reduction of at least 20% of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2020 compared with 1990. This 
figure may even rise to 30% if an international 
agreement for the period beyond 2012 is put into 
place that commits other developed countries to 
“comparable emission reductions and economically 
more advanced developing countries to contributing 
adequately according to their responsibilities and 
respective capabilities”.
20% of European Union energy consumption by 
2020 covered by renewable energies.
According to these objectives, the Commission 
of the European Communities, on 23 January 2008, 
proposed a decision addressing specific measures that will 
strengthen and implement new policies in the European 
Union member States (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008).
The proposal is based on the following principles: 
The targets must be met, and proposals must be 
effective and credible and have mechanisms for 
monitoring and compliance;
The efforts required from different member States 
must be fair and take into account financial abilities 
to address the necessary investments, and proposals 
must be flexible to take into account different 
starting points and circumstances;
The costs must be minimized, using a tailor-made 
design for keeping the costs of change, as well 






employment and social cohesion, at the forefront 
of efforts in this regard;
Member States must look beyond 2020 to make 
deeper cuts in greenhouse gases to meet the 
target of halving global emissions by 2050 by 
stimulating technological development and using 
available tools to encourage innovation and create 
a competitive edge in clean energy and industrial 
technologies; and
A comprehensive international agreement to cut 
greenhouse emissions must be sought.
According to the Commission of the European 
Communities, an international agreement is needed 
in order to address the concerns of energy-intensive 
industries, such as ferrous and non-ferrous metal, pulp 
and paper, and mineral-based industries, and the impact 
of increased electricity prices on certain sectors. In the 
absence of such an agreement or of significant unilateral 
action by competitors in energy-intensive sectors, the 
European Union will take action to ensure a level playing 
field. Such action will be taken when certain criteria are 
met “to show that the extra costs could not be passed on 
without a significant loss of market share to less carbon-
efficient competitors outside the European Union. Sectors 
meeting these criteria would be given some or all of their 
Emission Trading System allowances free of charge. This 
would be followed up by a review looking at the impact of 
international negotiations, which could lead to proposals 
such as adjusting the proportion of free allowances or 
requiring importers to enter Emission Trading System 
auctions to purchase allowances alongside European 
competitors, as long as such a system was compatible 
with WTO commitments” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008).
According to the Commission of the European 
Communities, the overall cost to the European economy 
of reaching all the goals considered is estimated “at just 
under 0.5% of GDP by 2020”.
•
•
2. Domestic policies and potential problems in the context 
 of WTO rules
The WTO rules system addresses a number of issues that may 
conflict with certain measures contemplated by international 
climate change instruments. For instance, two key rules 
are most-favoured-nation (Article I) and national treatment 
(Article III) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) that provide for non-discrimination among WTO 
members and between imported and national products and 
may be in conflict with certain climate-change-related 
policies that provide for differentiation among countries 
and products. Related to these provisions is the principle 
of non-discrimination of like products. Also the general 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions, except in specific 
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circumstances (Article XI), may conflict somewhat with 
carbon-content-related measures. Measures that are not 
consistent with GATT provisions may be adopted under 
Article XX on General Exceptions.
Although in recent findings both the WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body have handed down recommendations 
that were welcomed by the environmental community, a 
number of untested issues have also arisen as potential 
areas of conflict (Green, 2005). Furthermore, some 
important WTO agreements have not been interpreted 
in the context of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
raising new concern of potential conflict stemming, 
for example, from the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and its relationship with the treatment 
of emission reductions and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.
Another area of potential conflict is related to the key 
concepts and definitions used in relation to the principle 
of non-discrimination: “like product”, “like services” 
and “like services providers”. Like-product analysis is 
directly related to the assessment of the treatment of a 
product. If products are “like”, they shall be treated no 
less favourably than any other like product. In order to 
determine the “likeness” of two products, panels have 
adopted a non-closed list of four criteria: (a) the properties, 
nature and quality of the products; (b) the end-uses of 
the products; (c) consumers tastes and habits: and (d) the 
tariff classification of the products (Green, 2005). These 
criteria raise a number of questions about their practical 
application in the context of climate change. For example, 
whether two products that differ in terms of efficient 
energy consumption or the emission of greenhouse gases 
can be considered “like” (Green, 2005). Also, there is the 
more general question of whether two goods produced 
by different processes that have different environmental 
impacts can be considered “like”.
Once likeness is determined, the question is whether 
the treatment accorded is “less favourable”. In order to 
assess this, the panel must test if the measure changes 
the conditions of competition in favour of the domestic 
producer. Another question that has arisen is whether 
any less favourable treatment will be covered by GATT 
or only measures that have protectionist intents. The 
analysis of the measure will presumably require a form 
of discretionary balancing and, explicitly or implicitly, 
will examine the measure’s regulatory purpose, which 
will limit the choice governments have to implement 
climate change initiatives (Green, 2005).
3. International agreements and WTO rules
Exploring the linkages between the Kyoto Protocol and 
WTO agreements is a complex issue. Although the Protocol 
does not contain specific trade-related provisions, there 
is a potential problem in the relationship between parties 
and non-parties to this agreement. Annex I of the Protocol 
lists the countries that are subject to Kyoto commitments 
and whose industrial and energy sectors will be subject 
to expensive adjustments. These obviously suffer a 
competitive disadvantage relative to the same sectors of 
non-parties, but trade measures to offset this competitive 
disadvantage in trade with non-parties and non-Annex I 
parties may raise concerns regarding their compatibility 
with WTO rules. This problem has not emerged yet, 
however. (Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007).
Emissions trading serves as a way to hold countries 
with high emissions accountable for the damage they 
cause. Under the trading scheme, industrialized countries 
are set emissions targets. Those countries that stay under 
their limits can sell their remaining capacity to countries 
that are over their limits —this mechanism creates the 
so-called “carbon market”.
The cost of these “excess capacities” is high in order to 
put pressure on countries to comply with their targets and to 
promote alternative sources of energy with lower emissions. 
One of the major problems of this emissions ‘stock-market’ 
is the difficulty of monitoring countries’ actual emissions 
and of setting up accounting procedures and expert review 
teams to keep track of their development.
In general, experts consider that tradable emissions 
allowances are neither goods nor services and are therefore 
not directly covered by WTO rules. However, if emissions 
were to be considered “goods” by WTO definition, then 
the exclusive right to trade them among Annex I parties 
(those parties who have committed to cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions) may violate the most-favoured nation 
principle of WTO by discriminating against non-Annex 
I trading partners.
On the other hand, emissions allowances inevitably have 
a financial value and could be considered to be negotiable 
instruments under GATS and specific financial services 
commitments, in which case they might be subject to WTO 
rules (Green, 2005; Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007).
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Nevertheless, there are aspects of the emissions 
trading regime that may be in conflict with some WTO 
rules. For example, the allocation of emissions permits 
that do not reflect their market value may be considered 
subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement (Cosbey and 
Tarasofsky, 2007).
If goods do not face the same domestic taxes in all 
countries, then a unilateral carbon tax may only have 
the effect of giving away market share of domestic 
business to foreign competitors, and, in the end, global 
carbon emissions may be unaffected. A solution would 
be to team up carbon taxes with a border-tax adjustment 
—imported goods pay the same taxes as domestic goods, 
and exported domestic goods are refunded the taxes they 
paid. Border-tax adjustments for these sorts of taxes are 
permitted under GATT, but the extent to which they can 
apply to energy inputs is unclear and raises debates as to 
whether WTO permits distinctions based on the method 
by which a good is produced, rather than just the product 
as such (Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007).29
Efficiency standards that are constructed with the 
aim of favouring domestic industries might run afoul 
of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
Although this agreement, unlike the SPS agreement, 
does not mandate a scientific basis for decisions, Article 
2.2 states that when assessing risks “relevant elements 
of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and 
technical information related processing technology or 
intended end-uses of products”. This aspect raises concern 
among environmentalists regarding the cost associated 
with regulation in the sphere of climate change, where 
scientific evidence is subject to strong debate. In the 
context of the European Commission-asbestos case, the 
Appellate Body stated in its finding that a “Member is 
not obliged, in setting health policy, automatically to 
follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority 
scientific opinion” (Green, 2005). This conclusion has 
provided some comfort to WTO critics.
29
 A comprehensive analysis can be found in Pauwelyn (2007).
Domestic regulation dealing with product characteristics 
will fall under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade. For example, mandatory requirements relating to fuel 
efficiency or greenhouse gas emissions, as well as labelling 
requirements, will fall within the scope of the Agreement. 
This means that they must be non-discriminatory and not be 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect 
of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
Another issue that has arisen among experts is the 
extent to which non-product-related process and production 
methods are covered by GATT and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade. Process and production method 
requirements based on energy efficiency or emissions will not 
be found to comply with GATT. Nevertheless, it is possible, 
though still under debate and a matter of interpretation, that 
they will be considered legitimate measures to differentiate 
among like products (Green, 2005).30
It is obvious that, as far as climate change and trade 
obligations are concerned, the international rules have yet 
to be clearly defined. The debate has already started in the 
United States and the European Union, and initiatives that 
could clash with the current multilateral trade framework 
are beginning to take shape. At the same time, openings for 
international and regional cooperation are also emerging. 
Latin America and the Caribbean cannot afford to remain 
a bystander in this debate. The region may not be a major 
producer of greenhouse gas emissions, but it is a significant 
repository of the world’s biodiversity and should pay 
attention to the international forums where trends originate 
among academia before being picked up on by the media 
and eventually enshrined in unilateral or multilateral legal 
instruments. This is one area in which coordinated regional 
efforts could level the global playing field more by making 
sure that the needs of developing countries are taken into 
account and that the cooperation mechanisms set up to 
help countries gradually adjust to any new requirements 
are compatible with the overarching goals of sustainable 
development and do not have a negative impact on trade.
30
 Another aspect is whether, when assessing “likeness”, difference 
in consumers’ perceptions should be taken into account.
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E. Conclusions
The situation described in this chapter poses both 
enormous challenges and opportunities for the region. 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean need to 
work together as effectively as possible to identify regional 
and global support mechanisms that will enable them to 
find constructive ways to handle the changes that the new 
international scenario is demanding with regard to trade 
security, quality standards and certification, private-sector 
standards and the links between trade and labour, trade 
and the environment and trade and climate change. 
The challenge facing the region is huge. New 
requirements in any of the aforementioned areas could 
seriously hamper the competitiveness of the region’s exports 
if they become obligatory or if protectionist elements are 
incorporated into their design for the supposed purpose of 
“equalizing conditions for competition” with local production 
in industrialized countries, as sometimes occurs in the area of 
labour rights, environmental protection and, more recently, 
climate change. In the case of climate change, the arsenal 
of initiatives is so vast that it ranges from tariff surcharges 
(or their equivalent through the requirement to acquire 
international emissions rights), to new types of subsidies, 
trade remedies (safeguards and antidumping measures) or 
even, in regard to emission requirements, “equal conditions” 
regardless of each region’s relative contribution to global 
greenhouse emissions. It is a shame that the argument for 
creating “equal conditions for competition” is not applied 
more enthusiastically to the export subsidies and domestic 
support measures currently distorting world trade in 
agriculture. The region must start preparing itself for the 
debates that lie ahead. These issues are going to find their 
way into international negotiations sooner than expected, 
and it is absolutely imperative that the region comes to 
the table with a clear idea of the objectives, the lines of 
defence and the main alliances involved. Multilateral 
organizations also face a significant challenge in this 
respect inasmuch as they will have to perform on-going 
diagnoses of the situation and put forward informed and 
up-to-date proposals that will both safeguard the interests 
of the developing countries and defend multilateral forums 
as the best-positioned instances for providing governance 
in these complex globalization issues.
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Chapter IV
Integration and trade initiatives
Introduction
The international agenda calls for more cooperation among the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean if they are to improve their position in the global economy. This cooperation is 
needed not only in terms of competitiveness and innovation, but also regarding issues related 
to trade and security, climate change and energy efficiency. New reforms, investments and 
management approaches will be needed, as well as coordination among customs, ports and 
the many external trade agencies, in order to satisfy the requirements of the main markets. In 
all such areas, the governments of the region need to agree on positions and speak with one 
voice in international negotiation forums, while at the same time making the necessary efforts 
at home to tie this in with new business opportunities and increased competitiveness. All of 
these tasks would benefit from broad and unified markets and gradual convergence in a series 
of related public policies. The region needs to raise the degree and quality of integration in 
order to implement those national strategies for international integration that have the greatest 
impact on the challenges of growth and equity.
With considerable uncertainty dogging the international 
context, and especially exports to the United States, strenuous 
efforts are being made within integration schemes to move 
forward with community commitments on trade facilitation. 
One example is the adoption of a unified customs document 
and the harmonization of customs regimes within the 
Andean Community. Similarly, the Council of Ministers for 
Economic Integration (COMIECO) of the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) approved and updated a series 
of technical regulations on standardization measures, 
metrology and authorization procedures, as well as sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and procedures.
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Efforts have also been made to boost trade strategies 
aimed at increasing regional interdependencies. Examples 
include the promotion of the South American Community 
of Nations (UNASUR), the Mesoamerican Integration and 
Development Project (Mesoamerica Project), formerly the 
Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), as well as efforts by countries 
that make up the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative 
to generate synergies in trade relations with countries 
of the Asia-Pacific region (especially China, India and 
countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)). Lastly, countries of the Caribbean (in 2007) 
and of Central America and the Andean Community (in 
2008) have been involved in trade negotiations with the 
European Union (see chapter V). 
The failure of the Doha Round means there is now 
more political time available for regional integration. 
The Government of Mexico is seeking to unify its trade 
agreements with Central American countries to allow 
accumulation of origin. Mexico and Central America 
are in turn requesting accumulation of origin in their 
agreements with European Union partners, which will 
promote business partnerships that can take advantage of 
Mesoamerican and European markets. Brazil is promoting 
negotiations between MERCOSUR and Central America, 
and is organizing a Latin American Summit on Integration 
in December. The 11 economies that make up the Latin 
American Pacific Basin Initiative (Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru) are preparing a joint proposal 
for the governments of the Asia-Pacific region to include 
accumulation of origin in agreements between them. These 
good tidings would have even greater repercussions if 
Brazil’s prominent role in the Doha negotiations and the 
international recognition of Mexico and Brazil as members 
of G5 (along with China, India and South Africa) were 
to boost integration, strengthen links between Mexico 
and Central America and South America and facilitate 
convergence on the basis of realistic foundations that 
are compatible with the global economy’s demands for 
innovation and competitiveness.
A. Current situation and recent progress
Intraregional trade flows are still small compared to total 
exports in Latin America and the Caribbean, standing at 
around 18% in 2006-2007. However, the situation varies 
greatly among countries. In some cases, such as Mexico, 
around 5% of exports go to the region, while in countries 
such as Bolivia and El Salvador the figure is over 60%.1 
Furthermore, trade density within integration schemes in the 
last five years amounts to no more than 15% in MERCOSUR 
and 10% in the Andean Community, while in the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) the figure is about 
30% if maquila is included and 18% otherwise.2
In 2007, intraregional trade again registered double-
digit growth, although the rise was lower than in previous 
years. This was nonetheless sufficient to push up the ratio 
of intraregional exports to 19%. In the first quarter of 
2008, intraregional exports continued to expand, offsetting 
to some extent the contraction in exports to the United 
States. All groups show an upward trend in comparison 
with the first quarter of 2007 (see table IV.1).
1 ECLAC (2008c), table 2.2.2.45.
2 Estimates from ECLAC.
The low ratios of intraregional trade show that its 
potential is underused, especially in certain subregional 
schemes. Progress has also been limited in the formation 
of intraregional production chains linked to integration 
schemes, which could take advantage of preferential 
access to markets outside the region as provided in trade 
agreements. Deeper integration would be a key factor in 
attracting investment in such production chains, especially 
for smaller countries. However, the persistence of non-tariff 
restrictions, the absence of clear rules and the corresponding 
lack of legal certainty do little to boost investment.
In recent years, the international expansion of certain 
companies has resulted in an increase in foreign investment, 
especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Latin 
American investment abroad stood at US$ 40 billion in 2006 
and US$ 20.6 billion in 2007.3 Trans-Latins have become an 
increasingly significant phenomenon, and currently account 
for around 8% of inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to Latin America and the Caribbean,4 especially in the sectors 
3 The difference is due to a specific operation by Brazil in 2006 
(ECLAC, 2008b).
4 Given the problems with data, the information provided reflects 
magnitudes and trends (rather than precise figures).
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of natural resources and natural-resource-based manufactures, 
food and beverages and commerce and services (with this 
last sector representing approximately half of the total). 
However, for Central America and the Dominican Republic, 
trans-Latins represent 20% of total FDI, or almost 40% if 
United States investment is removed from the equation. It 
is interesting to note that, in the case of services, FDI is the 
principal means for suppliers to offer services abroad. The 
Mexico telecoms company América Movil, Telmex and 
retailer Cencosud of Chile offer examples of this.
Table IV.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPORTS BY SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEME, 1990–2007
(Millions of current dollars and percentages)





Total exports (1) 112 694 204 170 251 345 319 807 346 145 427 835 506 557 602 803 675 139 154 001 189 416
Exports to LAIA (2) 13 589 35 471 43 118 36 164 40 872 56 777 72 979 91 757 107 586 22 664 29 678
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2:1) 12.1 17.4 17.2 11.3 11.8 13.3 14.4 15.2 15.9 14.7 15.7
Andean Community
Total exports (1) 31 751 39 134 38 896 52 177 54 716 74 140 100 089 126 112 139 102 29 596 44 213
Exports to Andean Community (2) 1 312 4 812 5 504 5 227 4 900 7 604 10 313 12 719 12 909 2 622 4 012
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2:1) 4.1 12.3 14.2  10.0 9.0 10.5 10.3 10.1 9.3 8.9 9.1
Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR)
Total exports (1) 46 403 70 129 80 227 89 500 106 674 134 196 162 512 188 188 221 498 46 749 56 718
Exports to MERCOSUR (2) 4 127 14 199 20 322 10 197 12 709 17 319 21 134 26 626 33 051 6 807 9 415
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2:1) 8.9 20.2 25.3 11.4 11.9 12.9 13.0 14.1 14.9 14.6 16.6
Central American Common Market  
(CACM)
Total exports b (1) 4 480 8 745 14 987 17 006 18 117 19 767 21 849 24 493 26 036 6 795 7 257
Exports to CACM (2)  624 1 451 2 754 2 871 3 110 3 506 3 912 4 429 5 217 1 218 1 305
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2:1) 13.9 16.6 18.4 16.9 17.2 17.7 17.9 18.1 20.0 17.9 18.0
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Total exports (1) 4 118 5 598 4 790 5 732 6 712 7 880 15 949 18 709 19 872 5 734.3 5 666.2
Exports to CARICOM (2) 509 843 1 031 1 220 1 419 1 810 2 091 2 427 2 793 693.9 775.2
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2:1) 10.3 14.2 18.6 17.2 16.5 17.4 13.1 13.0 14.1 12.1 13.7
Latin America and the Caribbean
Total exports c (1) 130 214 227 922 280 065 347 610 376 590 472 444 568 798 679 713 761 959 167 356 203 061
Exports to Latin America and  
the Caribbean d (2) 18 727 45 180 56 644 53 424 59 635 79 952 99 839 121 923 144 211 30 600 39 063
Percentage intraregional exports (2:1) 13.9 19.8 20.2 15.4 15,8 16.9 17.6 17.9 18.9 18.3 19.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the respective subregional groupings and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
a
  Preliminary figures.
b
  Figures include maquila trade.
c
  Includes LAIA, CACM, the CARICOM countries, Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
d
  Includes intrasubregional trade in the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, CACM, CARICOM and trade between Chile and Mexico and the rest of the region, as well as trade 
between groups, plus exports from Cuba, Panama and the Dominican Republic to other countries in the region.
Although this emerging process of internationalization 
is one of the most noteworthy features of regional 
economic events, unfortunately it is not linked with 
integration decisions. Any effort to deepen integration 
must seek to strengthen links with the regional actors of 
internationalization for the sake of both the expansion of 
companies involved and the relevance and effectiveness 
of the integration process (see section E). 
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Despite the significant conceptual and instrumental 
renewal —which ECLAC termed “open regionalism”— in 
the 1990s and a sharp rise in intraregional trade since the 
end of that decade, progress in integration processes has 
been uneven. Some schemes have maintained the drive for 
renewal, others have developed new initiatives to complement 
existing ones (such as UNASUR), while yet others have 
lost momentum following rapid initial progress.
In Central America, regional integration has received 
fresh impetus. One milestone in this process was the Plan 
of Action for Central American Economic Integration, 
signed in 2002 by the governments of the subregion as 
a mechanism for transitioning from CACM to a customs 
union. Other important measures have included the 
creation of a regional dispute settlement mechanism and 
the establishment of integrated customs houses to speed 
up the movement of merchandise. Lastly, in February 
2007 Central American countries signed the Protocol to 
the Treaty on Investment and Trade in Services, which 
is in the process of being ratified. The Protocol takes 
an ambitious approach to bringing trade in services and 
investment into Central American integration. 
In Central America, free trade agreements with 
partners outside the region (United States) and the possible 
association agreement with the European Union are all 
helping to modernize the subregion’s integration scheme 
and tackle the new issues within interregional as well as 
intraregional relations. 
Integration has intensified in the Caribbean as well, 
albeit not at the pace some of the countries had hoped. 
The Caribbean Common Market came into force with a 
membership of 12 countries and in mid–2007 the subgroup 
of Eastern Caribbean countries also agreed to set up an 
economic union. In December 2007, the Caribbean Forum 
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(CARIFORUM), which includes the Dominican Republic, 
concluded negotiations for an association agreement with 
the European Union, which is a significant step forward 
for this group of countries. 
A number of achievements have been made in South 
America, with the Andean Community’s social development 
programmes and the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence 
Fund, while efforts continue towards the development of 
single customs codes and the full implementation of the 
common external tariff. However, market constraints, problems 
stemming from asymmetries among certain members and 
the way in which bilateral differences have been handled 
bear witness to major ongoing institutional weaknesses. 
B.  Main initiatives in integration schemes
1.  Andean Community
Trade between the four member countries of the Andean 
Community expanded by 13% in 2007, giving an 
intraregional trade ratio of just 9.3%: the lowest out of 
all the subregional integration schemes. If the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela is considered part of the group, for 
the purposes of trade, intra-Andean trade rose by barely 
3% that year as a result of the huge decline in exports 
from Bolivia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
to the rest of the subregion. 
Advances were made in trade facilitation among 
members in the second half of 2007 and the first six 
months of 2008. In July 2007, the Andean Community 
adopted Decision 670 on the creation of a unified customs 
document, which will be implemented alongside the 
harmonization of customs regimes from 1 June 2009 (see 
Decisions 670 and 671 of the Gaceta judicial del Acuerdo 
de Cartagena, 2007). 
Other results have been achieved in terms of 
standardization, mutual recognition and conformity 
assessment and technical regulation activities. Measures 
have also been taken to harmonize formats and procedures 
for presentation and recognition of Compulsory Sanitary 
Notification in member countries. 
Talks are still under way on setting up the Andean 
services market. In July 2007, representatives of the 
countries examined several options for moving ahead with 
the liberalization of the market for professional services, 
financial services and television, among others. Some 
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progress has been made towards defining a regime to 
regulate the liberalization of financial services community-
wide. This regime should be completed by 30 September 
2008, according to Decision 659 of December 2006, 
which was formulated to govern these proceedings. In 
addition, following intensive joint technical and diplomatic 
lobbying, the Andean countries persuaded the world’s top 
telecommunications body to extend by three years the 
time frame for the launch of the Andean Community’s 
satellite network. The deadline for the satellite network 
is now 18 September 2010, thereby removing the risk of 
losing the satellite position for the time being.
In conjunction with experts from the Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Secretary General of the 
Andean Community, the statistical offices of the countries’ 
Ministries of Health are carrying out a study on harmonizing 
health indicators, in order to ensure proper follow-up for 
projects implemented under the Community’s Integrated 
Plan for Social Development.
The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
set up the Consultative Council for the Indigenous Peoples 
of the Andean Community to replace the Roundtable on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in an attempt to increase 
the participation of indigenous peoples in the subregional 
integration process.
The statistical institutes of member countries will extend 
the harmonization programme beyond economic indicators 
to include social, environmental and security indicators.
The United States extended the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) until 
December 2008. As a condition of approval of its free 
trade agreement with the United States, the Government 
of Peru had to amend the previously negotiated chapters 
on labour and the environment to take account of the 
May 2007 legislative agreement of the United States 
Congress on trade agreements (ECLAC, 2007a, p. 117), 
incorporating commitments that are more binding on 
domestic legislation and relate to the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998. It was also made 
obligatory to sign seven agreements on the environment 
and undertake to implement any multilateral agreements 
signed. These amendments were approved by the Peruvian 
Congress. At the request of the Government of Peru, 
the Andean Community reformulated Decision 486 on 
intellectual property to adopt a more flexible approach to 
the matter and combine protection of intellectual property 
rights with multilateral requirements and standards. 
In its new form, Decision 486 enables Peru to comply 
with commitments undertaken as part of the free trade 
agreement with the United States. Colombia will need to 
implement similar reforms if the United States Congress 
gives the green light to the free trade agreement with 
the country. Bolivia did not give its support to this new 
community legislation and indeed continues to reject it. 
The Bolivian authorities have, in fact, stated their intention 
of seeking to derogate and annul the decision by legal 
means before the Andean Court of Justice. All this has 
eroded Bolivia’s already deteriorated relations with its 
Andean Community partners. 
The Government of Bolivia trusts that the country can 
become a full member of MERCOSUR without having 
to relinquish full membership of the Andean Community, 
and can thus act as a bridge between the two integration 
schemes. This is another situation that the authorities of 
the Andean Community must consider.
Negotiations to admit Panama as an associate member 
of the Andean Community are ongoing. Such a step would 
be expected to raise the profile of logistics and business 
services on the Andean agenda, given Panama’s interesting 
achievements in those areas. 
2.  Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Although the governments of the CARICOM member countries 
formally declared their interest in advancing towards the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) in 2006, 
the formation of a single economy remains delayed. 
 As some of the group’s main members, including 
Jamaica, are not in a position to meet these requirements, 
monetary union remains a distant proposition. For the 
moment, monetary integration is suspended owing to a 
lack of economic convergence.
The single market implies the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and skilled workers in 
the region; the right to set up businesses without 
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restriction; and the implementation of a common 
tariff 5 and single trade policy. The aim of CSME is 
therefore to supplement the existing free trade area 
by suspending all quantitative restrictions and other 
trade barriers between member countries. Preparations 
are also under way for a common regional investment 
programme to facilitate the transition towards the free 
movement of capital. 
The single economy also refers to deeper integration 
requiring macroeconomic coordination, harmonization of 
policies, laws and regulations in various economic areas, 
and the development of regional sectoral programmes in 
agriculture, industry and transport. CSME is expected to 
be implemented in two phases. 
The first phase (2008-2010) will focus on consolidating 
the single market and preparing for the single economy. The 
main pillars will include a broadening of the categories of 
professionals allowed to move freely, full implementation 
of the free movement of service providers, approval of the 
CARICOM investment regime, setting up of a regional 
stock market, preparation of a regional development 
strategy and creation of a regional development fund. 
This phase is also expected to see agreement among the 
central banks on the unit of common currency. 
In the second phase (2011-2015), the partners will 
seek to complete the single economy by harmonizing tax 
systems, the financial climate and fiscal and monetary 
policies; setting up the CARICOM monetary union; 
and implementing the regional competition policy, 
intellectual property regime and common sectoral policies 
in agriculture, energy, transport, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and tourism.
Some of the major regional institutions to have 
been set up under the umbrella of CARICOM include 
the Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) for 
extraregional negotiations, the Caribbean Court of 
Justice for the settlement of disputes relating to the 
application of the CARICOM treaty, the Caribbean 
Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) and 
the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 
(CDERA). In January 2008, the CARICOM Competition 
Commission was established.
5 The common tariff was adopted in 1994, but its implementation 
has been extremely slow. Only 11 of the 15 countries involved 
apply the common tariff. As a result, the average external tariff 
dropped from 20% in the 1990s to 10% at present. However, there is 
considerable scope for exceptions at the national level that hamper 
the application of the common tariff. 
The group has also provided for macroeconomic 
coordination, with regular meetings of Ministers of 
Finance and Governors, as well as biannual publications 
of the Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies (CCMS) 
on performance and convergence of the Caribbean 
economies. 
Caribbean integration does not concern itself 
particularly with asymmetry among CARICOM members. 
However, the Economic Partnership Agreement recently 
concluded between CARIFORUM and the European 
Union contains elements of differentiated treatment. For 
instance, a distinction is made between less developed 
countries (LDCs) and more developed countries 
(MDCs), which affects the level of liberalization in 
service sectors. 
In July 2008, the twenty-ninth Annual Summit of 
the Caribbean Community concluded in Antigua and 
Barbuda. At the close of the meeting, major concerns 
were expressed over non-fulfilment of some important 
decisions. Qualified spokespersons have described the 
state of integration as being at a standstill, shackled by 
the failure to give legislative approval to the Caribbean 
Community Act, which was put forward in 1992 and 
which would make CARICOM decisions automatically 
effective in all member countries (Girvan, 2008). 
According to this author, countries need to surrender 
some of their sovereignty to the regional bloc, otherwise 
its cohesion will be weakened. In this respect, Guyana 
and Suriname recently joined UNASUR, while Dominica, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Antigua and 
Barbuda joined the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ALBA) and the Peoples’ 
Trade Treaty (TCP). 
In May 2008, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS)6 presented the draft of the new OECS 
treaty, which outlines the details of the drive for OECS 
to become an economic union. At the same time, focus 
groups were set up to raise public awareness about the 
content and scope of the initiative. During the 26 years 
OECS has been in existence, employment and labour 
migration have been included among the issues considered 
key for deepening integration (OECS, 2008).
6 The member countries of OECS are Antigua and Barbuda, 
Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 99
3.  Central American Common Market (CACM)
Intraregional trade continues to grow every year as a 
percentage of total trade, and in 2007 amounted to US$ 5.2 
billion or 20% of the total (the highest percentage of 
intraregional trade among all the integration schemes of 
Latin America and Caribbean). At the same time, CACM 
has successfully consolidated its exports to third markets, 
especially those with which the group —or individual 
countries within in— have concluded free trade agreements 
(United States, Mexico, Panama, Canada, Dominican 
Republic, Chile and CARICOM). As of December 2007, 
70% of the subregion’s exports enjoyed tariff preferences 
through such agreements, and this is expected to rise to 
over 80% when the Agreement of Association is concluded 
with the European Union. 
Costa Rica has ratified the Dominican Republic - 
Central America - United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR),7 but intellectual property legislation and 
a legal framework on competition matters still need to 
be approved in order for the public institutions to operate 
under a market regime. By mid-August 2008 the Costa 
Rican legislature had passed a dozen complementary laws 
and has until the end of the year to approve the remaining 
pieces of legislation. The process of legislative approval 
includes two plenary votes, signature by the executive 
body and publication in the official legal journal.
The countries of CACM have signed a framework 
agreement for the establishment of a customs union. 
Panama has stated its intention to join this union as well 
as the Central American Integration System (SICA). All 
the countries of Central America, except Costa Rica, 
have announced their decision to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with CARICOM.
Another relevant factor in Central America is 
the growing presence of China in the trade of Central 
American countries. In 2007, China was the fifth largest 
seller to Central America (4.9% of total imports), and 
its fourth largest buyer (5.3% of total exports) (SIECA, 
2008). Having established diplomatic relations with 
China, the government of Costa Rica is now exploring 
the possibility of trade negotiations with the Asian giant, 
7 CAFTA-DR was finalized by the United States in 2005. The 
Senate ratified the Agreement on 30 June and the Chamber of 
Representatives did so on 27 July. President George W. Bush signed 
the Agreement into law on 2 August 2005. The Central American 
countries completed the legislative process between December 2004 
and October 2005. The first country to legally adopt the Agreement 
was El Salvador (17 December 2004), followed by Honduras 
(3 March 2005), Guatemala (10 March 2005), the Dominican 
Republic (6 September 2005) and Nicaragua (10 October 2005).
which would pose a new long-term challenge to Central 
American countries in terms of their capacity to conduct 
joint negotiations with main trading partners. 
New trade-facilitation measures have been promoted 
in order to make the most of the buoyant internal market 
and strengthen export competitiveness. For instance, the 
Council of Ministers for Economic Integration (COMIECO) 
approved, udpated and amended a series of technical 
regulations on standardization measures, metrology 
and authorization procedures, as well as on sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and procedures. To make 
all these measures viable, the Council also amended the 
Uniform Central American Customs Code (CAUCA) and 
its regulations. Both instruments were approved in April 
2008 and will enter into force on 25 August 2008. 
In addition to the progress made so far in the 
establishment of a customs union and in the areas of trade 
liberalization and tariff harmonization, improvements have 
been made to customs administration in the subregion 
through the increasing application by government authorities 
of the CAUCA and its regulations (RECAUCA) and the 
use of the corresponding registries (for sanitary measures, 
pesticides, natural products, official national laboratories, 
etc.). Furthermore, merchandise clearance and valuation 
procedures have been streamlined. Integrated and peripheral 
customs have been set up within the customs territory to 
speed up the passage of merchandise and people in transit, 
and the costs and times involved in completing customs 
procedures have been reduced. Peripheral customs have 
been set up in El Salvador (the port of Acajutla and the port 
of Cutuco), in Guatemala (Tecún Umán, Puerto Quetzal, 
Santo Tomás de Castilla and Puerto Barrios), in Honduras 
(Puerto Cortés) and in Nicaragua (Peñas Blancas). A project 
is also underway to create a unified customs information 
system for Central America within the framework of 
European Union-Central American cooperation to make it 
possible to track merchandise circulating within the Central 
American customs territory and ensure the transparent 
handling and fair distribution of fiscal income. Steps are 
also being taken to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures as well as the institutional-juridical framework 
(Schatan and others, 2008).
At the thirty-second regular meeting of the Heads of 
State and Government of the Central American Integration 
System (SICA), held on 27 June 2008 in San Salvador, 
delegates discussed the social aspects of integration, food 
security and advances in the integration process. As far 
as social issues are concerned, participants reviewed and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)100
enhanced the Strategic Social Agenda of Central America. 
They also examined the impact of higher food prices on 
food security and social indicators in Central America, 
and arranged coordination measures to improve food and 
nutritional security for the most vulnerable groups. Some 
of these measures consist of plans to increase production 
and productivity of basic grains and a programme of 
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) to allocate funds to boost the subregion’s food 
production and storage capacity.
Some interesting advances have been made in terms of 
economic and trade integration: (i) entry into force of the 
Treaty on Investment and Trade in Services between Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; 
(ii) legislative approval by Guatemala of the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance and Technical Cooperation between 
Central American Tax and Customs Administrations and 
the Convention on the Reconciliation of Domestic Taxes 
Applicable to Trade in the Customs Union; and (iii) the 
ratification by El Salvador of the Framework Convention 
for the Establishment of the Central American Customs 
Union (INTAL, 2008). 
Following joint negotiations with the United States, the 
group of Central American countries is now in talks with 
the European Union, with a view to obtaining additional 
improvements to the existing Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP-Plus) (see chapter V).
Another development of note is the tightening 
of links between Mexico and Central America. In 
late June 2008, countries attending the tenth summit 
meeting of the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and 
Coordination renamed the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) as 
the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project 
(Mesoamerica Project). The main projects carried out 
so far have been in transportation infrastructure, energy, 
telecommunications and trade facilitation. In some cases, 
these were pre-existing initiatives that were reformulated 
for inclusion in the Mesoamerica Project. Transportation 
infrastructure projects have received the most backing 
and resources. 
In addition to awarding priority to improving the 
interconnections of road, electricity, telecommunications 
and biofuel infrastructure, the Mesoamerica Project aims 
to promote the public-private partnership mechanism and 
the creation of a Mesoamerican Fund for infrastructure 
pre-investment and investment preparation. Lastly, as 
another priority objective, countries also considered it a 
good time to begin negotiations on the convergence of 
existing trade agreements, with a view to moving towards 
a Mesoamerican association agreement.
4.  Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
The main progress made by this scheme was the launch 
of the Technical Unit of the MERCOSUR Structural 
Convergence Fund (FOCEM), which has been operational 
since 2007. Between that date and early July 2008, 
resources of up to US$ 130 million were allocated to 
areas the countries considered priorities (MERCOSUR 
secretariat, 2007; Chiaradía, 2008).
In the second half of 2007, the MERCOSUR 
strategy to combat desertification, land degradation 
and drought effects was made public. The strategy 
comes under the framework of the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (which has been 
in force since 1996), and in particular Annex III, the 
Regional Implementation Annex for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. According to data recently reported 
by MERCOSUR members and associates, aggregate 
estimates (not including Bolivia and Uruguay) of areas 
susceptible to or in the process of desertification and 
drought amount to almost 3.8 million square kilometers, 
which is just over 28% of the mainland territory of the 
subregion’s countries.
National assessments and other available data suggest 
that agricultural productivity is falling as a result of land 
degradation, at annual rates of between 3% and 7% of 
the sector’s gross output.8 The details on the scale of 
desertification and drought and their impact on GDP, and the 
estimated escalation of such phenomena, show that urgent 
action is required to tackle the issue comprehensively. 
On 1 July 2008, the Presidents of the MERCOSUR 
member and associate countries met at the thirty-fifth 
meeting of the Common Market Council in San Miguel 
de Tucumán. Delegates at the meeting approved five 
major road infrastructure projects in selected regions of 
Paraguay.9 As well as facilitating access to drinking water 
and sanitation services, these projects encourage SMEs 
to become involved in the development of production 
8 The document argues that the investment required to prevent 
degradation is less than the costs that would result from degradation, 
which confirms the findings of studies carried out in other areas. 
9 These projects have been given priority and were studied by the 
Technical Unit of FOCEM. They represent projected outlays of 
US$ 18.5 million on the part of FOCEM. 
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linkages and infrastructure works (Chiaradía, 2008; 
Alvarez, 2008). Participants also approved the Productive 
Integration Programme, which aims to link national agencies 
associated with business and production development, 
provide research and development support, and develop 
and transfer human resources.
In the social sphere, the multinational project on 
social economics for regional integration is taking shape. 
The aim of the project is to strengthen labour-market 
and social inclusion in MERCOSUR. In the area of 
mobility and migration, countries reached an agreement 
on travel documents of member and associated countries 
of MERCOSUR, which enables citizens to move around 
the subregion using one legal document that does away 
with the need for a passport. 
On the international stage, the Pro Tempore 
MERCOSUR secretariat is in contact with ASEAN 
countries, with a view to establishing a political dialogue 
between the two regions. MERCOSUR also maintains 
an active dialogue with the Russian Federation and, 
following several years of negotiation, concluded a Services 
Agreement with Chile (signed in Tucumán in July 2008) 
which, broadly speaking, establishes market access and 
national treatment conditions for professional services, 
business services, engineering, distribution, transport and 
tourism. This is the first extraregional services agreement 
concluded by MERCOSUR.
In December 2007, MERCOSUR signed a free trade 
agreement with Israel and hopes to conclude a similar 
agreement with the countries of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU). Despite joint coordination meetings with 
European Union representatives, talks on an association 
agreement with the European bloc remain at a standstill.
The Government of Brazil, in its capacity as holder of 
the Pro Tempore Presidency of MERCOSUR, is to host a 
Latin American Summit in Salvador, Bahía, in December 
2008. The aim is to assess the state of regional integration 
schemes and ways in which they might be strengthened. 
In September, technical staff of MERCOSUR and the 
Central American Integration System (SICA) will meet 
to explore the possibility of a trade agreement between 
MERCOSUR and Central America. The failure of WTO 
negotiations will probably add impetus to attempts to 
breathe new life into regional integration.
C.  Mexico: regional integration and trade initiatives
The Mexican authorities have been implementing an 
active trade policy aimed at concluding new bilateral and 
regional integration agreements. The country has signed 
12 free trade agreements that are currently in force, seven 
partial scope agreements and one framework agreement 
with MERCOSUR. The objective of this strategy is to 
diversify markets and forge deeper and better political 
and trade relations with various actors in the international 
arena. The main activities revolve around participation in 
the Group of Five (G5), the harmonization of rules with 
trading partners and promotion of the Puebla-Panama 
Plan (PPP), now called the Mesoamerica Project.
1.  Group of Five (G5)
Mexico plays an important role in the architecture 
of global international relations, which has been 
strengthened by its active participation in forums such 
as the Group of Five (G5). The other emerging nations 
that make up the G5 are Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa, and they have established a formal dialogue 
with the Group of Eight (G8) (which brings together 
the seven most industrialized countries plus the Russian 
Federation), in what is termed the “Heiligendamm 
Process”. The G5 thus seeks to present the concerns 
of developing countries to the developed economies 
that make up the G8.
Given that Mexico is the only country that is a member 
of both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and G5, it can play an important 
role as moderator between the two groups. This is partly 
why the European Union proposed a strategic association 
with Mexico. Mexico’s role may be particularly important 
in issues such as climate change, food security, energy 
security, development cooperation and migration.
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2.  Convergence of trade agreements between Mexico  
 and Central America
Another significant decision of the tenth summit 
meeting of the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and 
Coordination was to begin negotiations to achieve 
convergence between trade agreements in force with 
Central American countries, with a view to reaching a 
Mesoamerican association agreement. The aim of the 
agreement would be to untangle the “spaghetti bowl” of 
trade agreements involving Mexico and Central American 
countries. This decision goes beyond the negotiation 
of clauses on regional accumulation of origin, as it 
would result in the convergence and standardization 
of all agreement disciplines, thereby simplifying their 
administration and application.
However, the convergence of trade agreements is not 
only on the agenda of the Central American countries 
and Mexico. Convergence is also an issue for other 
regional forums, such as the Latin American Pacific 
Basin Initiative, which at its most recent meeting set 
up a group (coordinated by Mexico) to discuss the most 
appropriate means of forming an institutional structure 
that would respect its flexible nature as a forum for 
political dialogue and consultation.
3.  From the Puebla-Panama Plan to the Mesoamerica Project
Another regional integration process in which Mexico 
is actively involved is the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP). 
The Plan came into being in 2001 as a mechanism 
for coordinating integration and cooperation efforts 
between Mexico and the countries of the Central 
American isthmus. The agreement was extended to 
Colombia in 2006. 
In late 2006, the PPP member countries agreed to 
strengthen the Plan and began a restructuring process 
that concluded in the first half of 2008. Besides many 
changes to the organizational structure, the way of 
working has been changed from a model based on 
initiatives, to a scheme built around projects (with 
the portfolio streamlined from 102 to 22 projects and 
programmes). Following these structural changes, the 
Heads of State of member countries relaunched the Plan 
at the tenth summit meeting of the Tuxtla Mechanism 
for Dialogue and Coordination in June 2008, renaming it 
the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project, 
or Mesoamerica Project.
The Mesoamerica Project has made progress in several 
areas, especially transport, energy, telecommunications 
and trade facilitation. The most important transport 
projects include the construction of a Mesoamerican 
network of highways, known as RICAM, to improve 
over 13,000 kilometres of road between Mexico and 
Panama, and the modernization of customs and border 
crossings between the region’s countries. In the energy 
sector, there are three projects under way to integrate 
electricity transmission between Mexico and Colombia 
using over 2,500 kilometres of power lines. With respect 
to biofuel, three pilot biodiesel plants are being built in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, with the support 
of Colombia. In the sphere of telecommunications, 
there is a project to enhance digital connectivity in 
the Mesoamerican region by improving broadband 
infrastructure and harmonizing the regional regulatory 
framework in this area.
As for trade facilitation, the Mesoamerica Project 
includes measures to reduce transit time at borders and 
speed up the flow of merchandise. A pilot system at a 
border bridge between El Salvador and Honduras became 
operational this year. Steps have also been taken to modernize 
facilities at customs and border crossings between Mexico 
and Belize and Mexico and Guatemala, while there also 
plans to modernize the facilities at other crossings such 
as those between El Salvador and Honduras, El Salvador 
and Guatemala, and Costa Rica and Panama.
This new phase of Mesoamerican cooperation also 
seeks to provide impetus to issues such as the Mesoamerican 
public health system, a territorial information system for 
disaster risk reduction, as well as a Mesoamerican strategy 
on environmental sustainability, renewable energies and 
competitiveness. 
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D.  Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative
The Forum of the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative 
(ARCO) started out as an initiative to deepen trade 
agreements and trade facilitation in the Latin American 
countries of the Pacific Basin. The Forum aims to broaden 
economic cooperation and political dialogue among those 
countries, not only to build strength in the regional sphere 
but also to present a coordinated front to the Asia-Pacific 
region, in keeping with recommendations put forward by 
ECLAC (see ECLAC, 2007a, chapter II and chapter V of 
this report).
The representatives of countries participating in the 
Forum have agreed to consolidate the growing number of 
understandings based on common interests, by establishing 
a formal body for political dialogue and consultation. 
The member countries are Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Up to October 2008, four 
meetings had been held, and four working groups had 
been set up on the following subjects:
(i) Trade convergence and integration;
(ii) Trade facilitation, infrastructure and logistics;
(iii) Investment promotion and protection and; 
(iv) Economic and technical cooperation for 
competitiveness.
At its third meeting, the Forum recognized the work of 
the groups and issued them with further instructions. The 
working group on trade convergence and integration was 
tasked with identifying ways of moving towards common 
rules on accumulation of origin, which is a major issue for 
the region. That group was also asked to conduct a more 
detailed analysis of trade and integration agreements in 
force in the Latin American Pacific Basin, with an emphasis 
on issues concerning technical barriers to trade, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, customs procedures, trade 
facilitation, trade defence measures, dispute settlement, 
services, investment and government procurement.
The Working Group on Economic and Technical 
Cooperation for Competitiveness was tasked with encouraging 
the exchange of successful experiences of public-private 
partnerships to boost competitiveness and identify international 
best practices in terms of science, technology and innovation 
policies. Both topics are at the heart of ECLAC proposals 
for improving regional competitiveness (ECLAC, 2008a). 
This group is also responsible for assessing the best way 
of using technical cooperation offered by Asia-Pacific 
countries to improve production patterns, innovation, the 
incorporation of technology, education and the development 
of human resources.
The other two groups continue to work on technical 
cooperation between investment-promotion agencies; 
regulatory frameworks for investment, negotiations, dispute 
settlement between investors and the State and the fiscal 
treatment of investment; analyses of the regional situation in 
terms of infrastructure and logistics (including an inventory 
of alternative and renewable energy projects); transport 
and communications; and telecommunications. 
The dynamism of the Forum may give the region impetus 
in key areas for deepening intraregional trade. The possibility 
of establishing accumulation of origin among the agreements 
in effect between the Forum’s 11 Latin American countries 
could also provide a renewed impetus for regional integration 
efforts. Similarly, the Forum offers the ideal setting for joint 
initiatives aimed at forging closer links with the Asia-Pacific 
region (Rosales and Kuwayama, 2007).
E. UNASUR and the drive towards integration
In mid-2008, the Andean and MERCOSUR countries, 
plus Chile, Guyana and Suriname, concluded the 
Constitutive Treaty of the South American Union of Nations 
(UNASUR), an ambitious project for regional integration 
and union in the political, economic, financial, social, 
cultural, energy and infrastructure sectors. According to 
the preamble of the Treaty, UNASUR aims to eliminate 
socio-economic inequality, achieve social inclusion and 
civil-society participation, strengthen democracy and reduce 
asymmetries.10 UNASUR is the result of several years of 
work that began in Cuzco in December 2004 and continued 
at the summits of Brasilia (September 2005), Cochabamba 
(December 2006) and Margarita (April 2007). Leaders 
10 Article 3 of the South American Union of Nations Constitutive 
Treaty lists 21 specific objectives. 
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agreed to set up four bodies: (i) the Council of Heads of 
State and Government; (ii) the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs; (iii) the Council of Delegates; and (iv) the 
General Secretariat. Once the Constitutive Treaty has 
been signed, it must be ratified by the countries, which 
is expected to take some time.
It was agreed to establish the headquarters of the 
General Secretariat in Quito, and rotate the Pro Tempore 
Presidency among all the Member States for one-year 
periods, with the first year corresponding to Chile. The 
formation of the General Secretariat and the appointment 
of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat’s technical 
team remain pending. The former President of Ecuador, 
Rodrigo Borja, resigned as Secretary-General as a result of 
disagreement over the way the process is being conducted 
(CELARE, 2008).
Table IV.2
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE MATRIX, 2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Andean countries MERCOSUR Chile South America Intraregional 
exports (%)
Andean countries 12 812 4 752 2 991 20 582 14.4
Bolivia  427 2 171  58 2 656 54.9
Colombia 5 720  558  376 6 675 23.2
Ecuador 2 580  111  658 3 352 24.2
Peru 1 881 1 068 1 693 4 645 16.9
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2 204  844  206 3 254 4.8
MERCOSUR 14 074 33 065 8 763 55 989 24.9
Argentina 3 513 12 483 4 185 20 191 36.1
Brazil 10 221 17 353 4 264 31 902 19.9
Paraguay  233 1 983  206 2 422 71.8
Uruguay  107 1 247  108 1 474 32.8
Chile 3 374 4 401  0 7 778 11.4
Guyana  3  1  1  14 2.1
Suriname  47  30  0  96 8.6
South America 30 310 42 250 11 755 84 459 19.3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the respective subregional grouping and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
Exports to other South American countries are highly 
significant for small and medium-sized countries such as 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay, as 
well as for the larger ones including Argentina and Brazil. 
This explains efforts made to achieve convergence between 
the subregion’s two largest customs unions —the Andean 
Community and MERCOSUR— on the one hand, and 
Chile, Guyana and Suriname, on the other.11 Such a process 
would be based on liberalization agreements previously 
concluded by member countries (Economic Complementarity 
Agreements: ECA 23, ECA 35, ECA 36; ECA 58 and ECA 
59) (see Vaillant, 2007 and LAIA, undated).
11 This is the first time that Guyana and Suriname have been part of 
a South American integration scheme, as they have traditionally 
been part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
UNASUR may be a suitable forum for tackling sensitive 
issues that have not been resolved within the Andean 
Community or MERCOSUR. For instance, the issues of 
physical infrastructure and energy complementarity could 
more easily be accommodated within the wider geographical 
coverage corresponding to UNASUR, in which interests 
could be balanced more readily. The Regional Infrastructure 
Integration in South America (IIRSA) initiative could also 
benefit from a more subregional focus (Nogueira, 2008; 
Peña, 2008; LAIA, 2008).
A certain degree of frustration at South American 
experiences of integration is part of the legacy inherited 
by UNASUR, although its very creation reflects the 
political will to push ahead with integration. This will 
is manifested in a long list of objectives, although the 
general nature of the objectives poses a serious challenge 
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when it comes to defining the concrete actions needed 
to achieve them. Its limitations aside, the Economic 
Complementarity Agreements deposited with LAIA, 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community are probably 
the most suitable institutional basis on which UNASUR 
can build. It is telling, however, that the Treaty makes 
no reference to free trade areas, customs unions or 
convergence of existing trade agreements between South 
American countries.
In terms of institutional design, UNASUR is more 
deliberative than executive. The General Secretariat fulfills 
functions of administration and legal representation. The 
Union will operate by consensus and its rules will only 
be binding once they have been incorporated into the 
countries’ national legislations. Lastly, member countries 
may be indefinitely exempt from the partial or total 
application of some or all of the policies, institutions, 
organizations or programmes approved by the majority 
of other countries. This allows for flexible combinations 
of variable geometry and different speeds in designing 
and implementing commitments, which contributes 
to the overall effectiveness of the process. However, 
this modality may also dilute commitment to the most 
important initiatives.
The aims of UNASUR go beyond the combination of 
infrastructure and trade integration that has characterized 
South American schemes since 2000. The objectives 
this time are wider and considerably more ambitious, 
probably inspired by the European model: with emphasis 
on development issues such as equity and poverty 
reduction, as well as integration in terms of energy, 
finance, infrastructure and industry and convergence in 
social issues (such as access to social security and health 
services). One major challenge will be to balance these 
ambitious objectives with the limited coverage of the 
institutional structure, legal instruments and financial 
resources of UNASUR. In other words, the challenge 
is to reconcile the European model of solidarity-based 
integration (which reinforces social cohesion and seeks 
to gradually reduce asymmetries among members), 
with the lack of community institutions and structural 
financing that have made such achievements possible 
in the European context.
The main challenge facing the UNASUR authorities 
is probably to define a strategy for globalization and the 
integration of South America into the world economy that 
is accepted by all its members. The Union’s procedures 
will have to be harmonized with those of existing 
integration schemes (such as the Andean Community 
and MERCOSUR) that already have a broad range of 
legal and trade commitments. This task calls for political 
dialogue and tact, to avoid duplication of labour or conflict 
between the work of UNASUR and that carried out by 
the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and government 
agencies working on integration issues. In practical terms, 
this means competing with those organizations and with 
government agencies for scarce human, financial and 
logistical resources and political priority that the subregion 
assigns to integration (INTAL, 2008).
In order to reconcile the gradual and flexible approach 
taken by UNASUR with the need to satisfy expectations 
of integration it is necessary to concentrate on a small 
number of tasks that can yield short-term results. Such 
achievements would make it possible to scale up the 
list of objectives, engage private actors, strengthen 
coordination with other ongoing initiatives and win prestige 
as a pillar of coordination and governance for different 
integration efforts, even in terms of trade, infrastructure 
and cooperation.
Coordination between UNASUR and MERCOSUR 
(the main subregional actor) is crucial. Indeed, 
MERCOSUR cannot be the only trade integration forum in 
South America, given that the subregion has various tariff 
regimes that exist alongside each other (MERCOSUR, 
Andean Community, Chile and CARICOM), while 
issues of energy and financial integration involve all 
South American economies (La Nación, 2008). Given 
the importance of MERCOSUR (and its largest member, 
Brazil) within South America, the quality of the UNASUR-
MERCOSUR link will be decisive. Complementarity 
between the two will strengthen the integration process, 
while any overlap or dilution of efforts will undermine 
both (Peña, 2008).
Without such coordination, it will be difficult for 
UNASUR to influence actual integration processes. If 
MERCOSUR fails to motivate productive investment 
decisions to take advantage of the wider market, 
neither organization will have an impact on changing 
production patterns in its members. If, on the other hand, 
MERCOSUR were to opt for flexible institutions and 
predictable policies, including processes of variable 
geometry and multiple speeds (Peña, 2008), and were 
to work on achieving compatibility between its own and 
Chile’s extraregional trade agreements (Amadeo, 2008), 
this could enhance interaction and feedback between 
MERCOSUR and UNASUR. 
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F.  Latin American investment, trade in 
 services and internationalization
Unlike in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the bulk of 
FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean was destined 
for the manufacturing sector, since the mid-1990s and 
specifically in more recent years, growth in FDI in general 
and in intraregional FDI in particular has been fuelled 
by the boom in commercial services in the region and 
the increased transnationalization of a large number of 
companies. 
The empirical evidence reveals that a high level 
of integration has been attained in the business sector 
largely through the investment and commercial activities 
of the region’s main economic groups in both the goods 
and the services sectors. The region is witnessing a real 
de facto integration process that is being driven by the 
common need to transnationalize in order to generate 
the economies of scale required for success in today’s 
global markets.
The large network of free trade agreements and 
regional integration schemes in Latin America, which 
could be described as de jure integration, could benefit 
from this situation, which has received little attention at 
the subregional and regional levels. To date, there has been 
little discussion on the role of private agents in regional 
integration; indeed, they have been seen as secondary 
actors. A more effective integration drive depends on 
a stronger engagement of private agents and on closer 
public-private coordination in defining the next steps on 
the road to regional integration. 
1.  Importance of intraregional investment in services
A breakdown of intraregional FDI by origin and destination 
(when this can be obtained) shows that, in the case of 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (including 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), the bulk of 
this FDI is invested within the same group (52.1% and 
61.1%, respectively).12 The second largest proportion is 
invested in countries from the other group (MERCOSUR-
Andean Community) and accounts for 20% of the total 
FDI of both groups. If Chile and its reciprocal FDI with 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community are added to 
the equation, the subregional FDI accumulated among 
the countries of South America represents around 46% 
of total intraregional FDI in the region.13
Within Central America, intrasubregional FDI makes 
up 47% of the subregion’s total investments in Latin 
America (with Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador 
as the main origin and destination countries).
12 This section is based on a study now being developed on the link 
between investment and services at the regional level. It is based on 
official information from the balance of payments from 1990-2007 
and on secondary sources such as the financial press and official 
company information (Durán and Pellandra, 2008). 
13 This figure rises to 60% if Panama is excluded from the total. 
In South America, as well as among Central American 
countries and Panama, intraregional FDI has become 
an important means of increasing business integration, 
especially in sectors previously reserved for national 
capital (such as telecommunications, electricity, banking 
and finance). Greater integration has also been achieved in 
new or non-traditional sectors, such as electronics, tourism, 
manufacture of medical equipment, construction services 
for real-estate projects and commerce. Mexico and Chile 
have invested heavily in the region, especially in areas 
that are geographically close, with Chilean investment in 
Argentina and Peru and Mexican investment in Central 
America and the Caribbean (although Mexican businesses 
also have a strong presence in South America, especially 
in Brazil and Argentina).
About 61.4% of intraregional investment goes to 
services, which is thus the main destination by sector. 
Within services, slightly over 73% of those investments 
are in the categories of energy, telecommunications, 
banking and finance and retail commerce (Durán and 
Pellandra, 2008). 
The main investors in services are companies from 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Telmex, América 
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Móvil, Banco Itau, Banamex, Inverlat, Lan Airlines, 
Copa Airlines, Cencosud and Falabella, among others. 
For these, direct investment is an important way of 
increasing exports of services to other countries. There is 
also a second group of international players that are not 
necessarily directly involved in services but that obtain 
much of their revenues from operations abroad. Some 
of these are: Grupo Bimbo, GRUMA, CEMEX, Vitro, 
Petrobras, Techint, Arcor and Grupo Votorantim.
(a)	 Brazil
Brazil’s services exports represented US$ 23.744 billion 
in 2007, which accounted for more than 20% of the total 
exported by Latin America and the Caribbean, and over 
30% of the total exported by South America. The service 
exports of Brazil are the fastest-growing in the region, as 
they doubled between 2003 and 2007, at an annual average 
growth rate of 22.8% (the highest in the region). This 
performance reflects the dramatic surge in exports of “other 
services”, which in 2006 corresponded to 56.7% of total 
service exports (above the world average of 49.7%).
Some of the factors behind the impressive buoyancy 
of Brazilian service exports in recent years are set 
out below:
(i) The expansion of industrial exports to South America, 
which has led to a gradual rise in investment abroad 
and the setting up of services companies in other 
countries of the subregion. As Brazil’s export supply 
has diversified, companies have had to match their 
clients’ needs and offer after-sales services in other 
countries, thus boosting outward investment. Thus, 
the globalization of manufacturing companies 
generates incentives for the globalization of certain 
services, especially financial, ICT, logistics and 
professional services. Some enterprises, such as 
Banco Itaú, Unibanco, the São Paulo Stock Exchange 
(BOVESPA), the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures 
Exchange (BM&F), Datasul, Microsiga, CPM, 
TAM and Varilog, now have regionally integrated 
operations. In addition, Brazilian legal firms and 
consultancy and auditing services have built up a 
competitive presence in the subregion.
(ii) Brazil has a competitive edge in certain segments, 
arising from factors particular to its economy’s 
recent development, not necessarily connected to 
the internationalization of other sectors. This is 
true of various branches of information technology, 
engineering and construction. Three Brazilian 
construction companies figure among the world’s 
top 225 export constructors and the region’s largest 
firms: Norberto Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and 
Camargo Correa Construções e Comércio. 
(iii) Brazil has a competitive advantage over its industrialized 
rivals in certain service niches in terms of being able 
to detect and manage the political and economic risk 
of South American economies. Examples of this are 
found, among others, in infrastructure projects and 
construction services, air transport, software and 
financial services. 
(b)	 Uruguay	
In 2006, Uruguay’s exports of services totalled US$ 
1.285 billion, which represented 22.6% of the country’s 
total exports (the highest proportion among South American 
countries). Over the last 20 years, Uruguay has become a 
logistics platform where international enterprises centralize 
their merchandise inventories for regional distribution. 
The country has evolved from a mere transit point into a 
hub for other areas of logistics, incorporating value added 
through mini-manufacturing production units and building 
up genuine regional distribution centres that coordinate 
all stages of orders, from regional clients to suppliers 
within the region and beyond. 
Uruguay has a privileged geographical location at 
the ocean mouth of the Río de la Plata Basin, which 
places it on the region’s main cargo route, and its coastal 
conditions are ideal for ports. The country’s political 
stability and institutions, backed up by the quality of 
its human resources and advances in infrastructure, 
offer secure conditions for the development of services 
associated with the logistics industry. In this context, 
Uruguay began to develop logistics operations based on 
such legal regimes as the Free Zones Act and the Ports 
Act, which provided a framework for trade, industrial 
and service activities that has made Montevideo the first 
Atlantic-coast terminal in South America to offer free 
circulation of merchandise without the need for formal 
procedures or authorization. The surge in trade following 
the creation of MERCOSUR then increased the logistics 
requirements of export companies.
The most recent step taken to support the sector was 
the development of the logistics and transport cluster in the 
context of the Programme to Support the Competitiveness 
and Promote the Exports of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (PACPYMES) of the Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Mining, with the assistance of the European 
Union. The cluster includes maritime, road, rail and air 
transport services, terminal operators, logistics and warehouse 
operators and customs agents. The logistics cluster now 
encompasses almost 9,000 firms working with the various 
public agencies involved with the movement and storage 
of goods and related services. The sector represents around 
6% of GDP and has become a natural exporter of services, 
making intensive use of skilled and semi-skilled labour. 
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(c)	 Central	America
The main Central American enterprises with a 
subregional presence are from El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Costa Rica. Those three countries represented 80% of 
total intrasubregional capital stock as of December 2007. 
The main destinations of subregional investment flows 
are Honduras and Costa Rica. Economic groups and the 
major alliances between them have played an important 
part in the Central American integration process.
Central American economic groups tend to have 
highly diversified operations and activities in financial 
services, transport and tourism, construction, commerce 
and industry. The common denominator is that the largest 
investments are mainly in services and commerce. 
Increased foreign competition in the wake of trade 
liberalization increased pressure on local markets and 
opened up new opportunities for regional accumulation, 
thus fomenting a pro-liberalization business culture and 
facilitating the natural expansion of the main national 
groups into the regional market (Segovia, 2005). Some 
of the large groups engaging in intra-Central American 
operations are TACA and Poma in El Salvador and La 
Fragua, Pantaleón, Gutierrez-Bosch (owners of the Pollos 
Campero company) and Castillo in Guatemala. The large 
players in Costa Rica are the Uribe family (owners of the 
Corporación de Supermercados Unidos), Grupo Durman 
Esquivel and la Nación. Other equally important regional 
investors are the Pellas and Zamora families, who own 
companies in banking and financial services, as well as 
assets in other sectors.14
CAFTA-DR has sped up the processes of 
internationalization by promoting business alliances 
and company mergers aimed at taking advantage of the 
expanded subregional market and increased access to the 
North American market, while also scaling up business 
in preparation for competition from North American and 
European companies that may set up in Central America. 
14 A number of studies provide a detailed picture of intraregional FDI 
and the main economic groups in Central America. See Segovia 
(2005), Pérez and Berrios (2001) and Rosenthal (2005, 2006).
G.  Proposals for the future
It is an established fact that the challenges of integration are 
not confined to trade and market expansion. There is also a 
broad agenda of infrastructure, energy and logistics issues, 
as well as cooperation in areas including macroeconomics, 
migration, social cohesion and the environment. This 
agenda needs the engagement of the private sector, which 
should be treated as an important actor in the integration 
process. Increasing coordination between the public and 
business sectors is a fundamental pillar of the integration 
process and a task that remains pending.
Generally speaking, recent developments as regards 
foreign investment and international positioning by Latin 
American enterprises have not resulted from specific 
public policies or measures arising from integration 
commitments. This vital process could be strengthened by 
integration initiatives in the framework of trade agreements 
and trade facilitation measures. As well as increasing 
the credibility of dispute settlement mechanisms, trade 
agreements promote convergence of regulatory frameworks 
in the services sector and may even be updated to include 
chapters on trade in services. Trade facilitation measures 
include investment in logistics and infrastructure and the 
harmonization of regulations, as well as mobility of technical 
and professional workers and the gradual harmonization 
of tax and financial procedures (CNI, 2007).
In many countries, the current integration process 
coincides with more ambitious, broader and deeper 
approaches to liberalization than in the past. This is reflected 
in aspects of trade that either featured only partially in 
previous integration models (as with investment) or not 
at all (as in the case of services). One of the most radical 
changes in approaches to integration is that several 
Latin American and Caribbean countries have sought to 
conclude trade agreements with their main trading partners 
(especially the United States, the European Union and, 
more recently, Asia). 
The past three decades have seen rapid changes in 
technology and in the world economy, as well as the 
emergence of new competitors and markets (China and 
India, along with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region). 
This has dramatically altered the world map of trade, 
comparative advantages and investment location, and 
will continue to do so.
It is in this global context of new opportunities and 
challenges that the state of integration falls short of the 
mark. Indeed, integration schemes do not figure in major 
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business decisions and integration is not at the heart of 
political agendas; when it does appear, it amounts to little 
more than statements of intention. Against that backdrop, 
it should come as no surprise that the possible ways of 
integrating into the world economy are increasing. The 
sharp structural and policy differences among the countries 
of the region are well known. Structural differences refer to 
size, production structures, export capacities, comparative 
advantages, structure of main destination markets and 
degree of complementarity or substitution with the main 
agricultural products of industrialized economies that 
heavily subsidize exports or support domestic producers. 
Policy differences relate to the role that each country 
aspires to play in the regional and world economy, the 
strength of its economy and institutions and, hence, its 
bargaining power and alliance structure —all of which is 
reflected in trade policy and trade negotiations. 
It is therefore vital to acknowledge and reconcile the 
different visions that have emerged, so as to preserve the aim 
of integration. Integration has to be built up from diverse 
realities, with a view to achieving new schemes that can 
make an expanded regional market more attractive. The 
time is ripe to update the notion of “open regionalism” 
by reinforcing the complementarity between integration 
into the world economy and subregional or regional 
integration schemes. This would not only broaden access 
to the main markets for products intensive in natural 
resources and cheap labour, but would also encourage 
the development of technology- and knowledge-intensive 
activities, including the incorporation of value added in 
natural-resource-based products. 
Integration schemes urgently need to be endowed with 
elements of development and policy coordination that do 
not form part of free trade agreements concluded with 
partners from outside the region. Although the preferability 
of integration depends precisely on this endowment, the 
serious political and technical efforts it would require 
have thus far not materialized. Of course, integration is 
about more than trade, and more attention must indeed 
be paid to the social dimension (especially in a continent 
blighted by social inequality). However, this cannot be at 
the cost of delaying or compromising the economic and 
trade aspects of integration, but should rather reinforce 
the complementary nature of the commercial and social 
dimensions. With this in mind, efforts should be redoubled 
to build subregional value chains that enable members 
to export to third markets, with measures to encourage 
the inclusion of less developed countries in those chains. 
This appears a suitable form of “open regionalism” that 
combines growth, the quest for third markets and social 
cohesion and in which structural support for reducing 
asymmetries among member countries promotes the 
development of a competitive export supply in less 
developed members. Otherwise, the social dimension is 
seen merely as a compensatory mechanism, rather than 
one that offers access to growth opportunities, which 
would amount to expecting integration to make up for 
national inequalities —which no country has been able 
to achieve within its own borders. 
The current phase of globalization demands 
competitiveness and innovation in exchange for a place on 
the new world map of production, trade and comparative 
advantages. To gain ground in international value chains, 
competitiveness and innovation must be combined with 
wide and unified markets built upon a convergence of rules, 
disciplines and regulations, as well as the legal certainty to 
facilitate long-term decisions and international alliances. 
To ensure that this open regionalism provides a more solid 
link between competitiveness and social cohesion, public 
policy must make greater efforts to encourage more SMEs 
to venture into export activities. 
In South America, trade issues tend to be controversial. 
But this should not be an obstacle to progress in 
other, perhaps more urgent, areas. A joint approach to 
strengthening ties with the Asia-Pacific region (through 
multinational ministerial and business missions) would 
help to promote project portfolios in infrastructure, energy, 
banking, tourism and logistics, with mutual advantages 
for both regions. Coordinating the strategies of trans-
Latins to promote subregional and regional value chains 
would link integration with the international expansion 
decisions of the main regional economic actors. Partnership 
for innovation and competitiveness also needs to be 
strengthened as a matter of urgency. Technology centres 
in joint business and research activities can be linked to 
generate synergies and build up a critical mass from the 
limited human resources that the region assigns to these 
matters that are so crucial for the future. There is also 
a great opportunity for regional cooperation in trade 
facilitation measures involving several countries, such 
as the modernization of customs, ports, infrastructure, 
logistics and ICT interoperability and connectivity. In 
all of these areas, unilateral courses of action are a poor 
second best, as they ignore the possibilities offered by 
coordinated action among countries, the advantages of 
expanded markets and policy convergence.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)110
Bibliography
Álvarez, Carlos (2008), “Quinto informe de actividades 
del Presidente de la Comisión de Representantes 
Permanentes del MERCOSUR” [online] http://
www.mercosurpresidencia.org/pdf_es/cumbre_ 
tucuman_2008/Informe_trabajo_CRPM.pdf.
(2007), “Cuarto informe de actividades del Presidente 




Amadeo, Eduardo (2008), “¿Quo vadis, Mercosur?”, La 
Nación, 20 May.
Andean Community (2007), “Decisions 669-671. Year 
XXIV”, No. 1520, Lima, 16 July.
Calderón, Álvaro (2007), “Chile: direct investment 
abroad and internalization of conglomerates”, Global 
Players from Emerging Markets: Strengthening 
Enterprise Competitiveness through Outward 
Investment (UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2006/9), Geneva, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).
(2006), “The expansion model of the major Chilean 
retail chains”, CEPAL Review, No. 90 (LC/G.2323-
P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December.
CELARE (Latin American Centre for Relations with Europe) 
(2008), Newsletter, No. 208, 27 June-3 July.
Chiaradía, Alfredo (2008), “Resultados de la Presidencia 
Pro Tempore Argentina. I semestre 2008”, Informe de 
la Presidencia Pro Tempore Mercosur (MERCOSUR/
XXXV CMC/DI), No. 01/08, Tucuman, 30 June.
CNI (National Confederation of Industry) (2007), “Os 
intereses empresariais brasileiros na América del Sul. 
Informe de la Confederação Nacional da Indústria”, 
unpublished.
Durán, J.E and A. Pellandra (2008), “Perfil exportador 
y competitividad de los servicios comerciales en 
América Latina y el Caribe”, unpublished.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean) (2008a), Structural Change and 
Productivity Growth, 20 Years Later. Old problems, 
new opportunities (LC/G.2367(SES.32/3)), Santiago, 
Chile, May.
(2008b), Foreign Investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 2007 (LC/G.2360-P), Santiago, 
Chile, March.
(2008c), Statistical Yearbook of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2007 (LC/G.2356-P/B), Santiago, Chile. 
United Nations publication, Sales No.E/S.08.II.G.1.
(2007a), Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
World Economy, 2006. Trends 2007	(LC/G.2341-P), 
Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.07.II.G.85.
(2007b), Foreign Investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 2006 (LC/G.2336-P), Santiago, Chile. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.II.G.32.
(2006), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2005 (LC/G.2309-P), Santiago, Chile. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.G.44.
El Periódico (2008), “Los ‘súper’ se unen para competir 
con Wal-Mart”, 12 May.
Foro del Arco del Pacífico Latinoamericano (2008), 
“Declaración de Cancún”, Cancun, 13-14 April.
(2007a), “Declaración de Cali”, Santiago de Cali, 
30 January.
(2007b), “Declaración de Lima”, Lima, 20- 21 August.
Girvan, Norman (2008), Towards a Single Development 
Vision and the Role of The Single Economy, University 
of the West Indies (UWI).
INTAL (Institute for the Integration of Latin America and 
the Caribbean) (2008), INTAL Monthly Newsletter, 
No. 144, July.
La Nación (2008), “Entrevista a M. Aurelio García”, 
20 May. 
LAIA (Latin American Integration Association) (n/d) 
official website [online] http://www.aladi.org/
(2008), “Seguimiento de las actividades en el marco 
de la Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura 
Regional Sudamericana (IIRSA), el Plan Puebla-
Panamá (PPP), la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas 
(UNASUR) y la Iniciativa de Transporte del Hemisferio 
Occidental (ITHO)”, Informe del primer semestre 
(ALADI/SEC/di 2160), 15 June.
MERCOSUR Secretariat (2007), Informe anual de 
actividades de la Secretaría del MERCOSUR, 
Montevideo, December.
Nogueira, Uziel (2008), “Union of South American 
Nations: challenges and opportunities”, INTAL 
Monthly Newsletter, No. 142, May.
OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) (2008), 
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States: Draft 
of the New Treaty.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 111
OEI (Organization of Ibero-American States for 
Education, Science and Culture) (2008), “Acta de la 
trigésimo quinta reunión del Consejo del Mercado 
Común (MERCOSUR)”, San Miguel de Tucumán, 
1 July [online] http://www.oei.es/noticias/spip.
php?article2981—.
Peña, Felix (2008), “¿En que se diferenciaría UNASUR de 
un Mercosur ampliado?” [online] http://www.felixpena.
com.ar/index.php?contenido=negociaciones&neagno
=informes/2008-06-unasur-mercosur-ampliado.
Pérez, Felipe and Luisa Nelly Berrios (2001), Características 
e impacto de la inversión costarricense en Nicaragua 
durante el período 1990-2001, Central American 
Institute of Business Administration (INCAE)/Latin 
American Centre for Competitiveness and Sustainable 
Development (CLACDS), August.
PACPYMES (Programme to support the competitiveness 
and promote the exports of small and medium-sized 
enterprises), Informe de transporte y logística, 
Montevideo.
Rosales, Osvaldo and Mikio Kuwayama (2007), “Latin 
America meets China and India: prospects and 
challenges for trade and investment”, CEPAL Review, 
No. 93 (LC/G.2347-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC).
Rosenthal, Gert (2006), “La inversión extranjera directa 
en Centroamérica, 1990-2004: un bosquejo”, Inversión 
extranjera en Centroamérica, Grettel López C. and 
Carlos E. Umaña A. (eds.), San José, Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI).
(2005), “Logros y límites de la integración regional: 
Centroamérica”, document presented at the seminar 
Integration Perspectives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean at the Beginning of the 21st Century 
40 years since the creation of INTAL, Buenos Aires, 
24 August.
Schatan, Claudia and others (2008), “Integración regional 
e integración con Estados Unidos. El rumbo de las 
exportaciones centroamericanas y de República 
Dominicana”, Estudios y perspectivas series, No. 93 
(LC/MEX/L.831/Rev.1), Mexico City, ECLAC 
subregional headquarters in Mexico. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. S.08.II.G.7.
Segovia, Alexander (2006), “Integración real y grupos 
centroamericanos de poder económico. Implicaciones 
para la democracia y el desarrollo regional”, ECA: 
estudios centroamericanos, No. 691-692.
SGCAN (General Secretariat of Andean Community) (2008), 
“Informe de labores junio 2007 a mayo 2008. Informe 
de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina ante 
el XXX Consejo Andino de Ministros de Relaciones 
Exteriores en Reunión ampliada con la Comisión”, 
documento informativo (SG/di 889), 16 June.
SIECA (Secretariat for Central American Economic 
Integration) (2008), Estado de situación de la integración 
económica centroamericana, Guatemala, July.
Summit of Heads of State and Government of the countries 
members of the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and 
Coordination (2008a), “Declaración de Villahermosa”, 
Villahermosa, Tabasco, 28 June.
(2008b), “El PPP: avances, retos y perspectivas. Informe 
ejecutivo”, Villahermosa, Tabasco, 28 June.
Tavares, Marcia (2006), “Trans-latins. Trends and issues”, 
document presented at the meeeting Emerging 
multinationals: who are they, what do they do, what 
does it mean?, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 27 March.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) (2007), Global Players from Emerging 
Markets: Strengthening Enterprise Competitiveness 
through Outward Investment (UNCTAD/ITE/
TEB/2006/9), Geneva.
Vaillant, Marcel (2008), “Oportunidades de una economía 
pequeña y remota en el mundo global: Uruguay como 
exportador de servicios”, Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), unpublished.
(2007), “Heterogénea evolución de la integración 
económica en América del Sur: entre la complementariedad 
y el conflicto”, Comercio internacional series, No. 83 
(LC/L.2777-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), August. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.113.
Valls Pereira, Sennes (2008), “Diversifying and upgrading 
services trade in Brazil”, Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), unpublished.

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 113
Chapter V
The European Union and Latin America 
and the Caribbean: from preferences to 
reciprocity
Introduction
Forging stronger economic and commercial ties with the European Union is an important item 
on the regional trade agenda. At the end of 2007, talks between the European Union and the 
Caribbean concluded with the signing of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), while 
around the same time negotiations were launched for a similar agreement with the countries 
of Central America and of the Andean Community. After eight years, the negotiations with 
MERCOSUR are still ongoing even though little significant progress has been made. In mid-
2008, the European Commission announced its intention to negotiate a Strategic Partnership 
agreement with Mexico, which will upgrade relations between the parties. If all these negotiation 
processes are brought to a successful conclusion by the end of 2010, 13 economies of Latin 
America will have Association Agreements with the European Union (19 if MERCOSUR 
concludes its talks and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela becomes a member of MERCOSUR). 
Regional integration efforts therefore need to adjust to a new reality: if all this goes ahead, the 
countries of the Caribbean, Central America, Andean Community and MERCOSUR, as well 
as Mexico and Chile, will be covered by agreements with the European Union, which all share 
a similar framework.
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The year 2007 marked a fundamental shift in the relationship 
between the European Union and the Caribbean countries 
and brought important advances in the consolidation of 
European-Latin American relations. The European Union 
launched trade negotiations with Central America and the 
Andean countries and concluded the negotiation of an EPA 
with the CARICOM countries, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, i.e., with the so-called Caribbean Forum of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM). 
The EPA paves the way for a progressive and reciprocal 
expansion of market access in goods, as well as the 
liberalization of services and investment, which poses 
serious challenges for the CARIFORUM countries but 
also offers opportunities for diversifying exports to reduce 
their dependency on the United States as their principal 
market. The intensification of trade relations between 
the two regions is in part driven by the fact that the 
preferential treatment traditionally given to many of the 
region’s countries is not sustainable in the long run as it 
contradicts the principles of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The negotiation, implementation and adjustment 
to a reciprocal agreement is not an easy process for 
the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, in 
particular the smaller and less developed ones, since the 
disappearance of the one-sided preferences and adaptation 
to the new trading environment require them to boost their 
productive capacities and lower trading costs in order to 
be able to compete globally. 
Although the European Union is still the Latin American 
and Caribbean region’s second most important trading partner 
after the United States, since 1990 it has been gradually 
losing ground (see figure V.1). Imports from the European 
Union as a share of total Latin American and Caribbean 
imports declined from 20% in 1990 to approximately 14% 
in 2006. In the same period exports to the European Union 
declined from 25% to 13%. Meanwhile, Asia-Pacific has 
been gaining momentum as the region’s trading partner. In 
particular, since 2001 more Latin American and Caribbean 
imports have originated in the Asia-Pacific region rather 
than in the European Union, and the share of Asia-Pacific 
imports is rising steadily (for further details, see ECLAC, 
2007, chapter V). If the current trend continues, by 2010, 
as much as 30% of Latin American and Caribbean imports 
could come from the Asia-Pacific region. 
Figure V.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
IN THE REGION’S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS




























































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a
 Projection.
Intensification of economic relations between the 
European Union and its partners in Latin America and the 
Caribbean region through trade liberalization is a chance 
for the European Union to regain some of the ground it 
has been losing. For Latin America and the Caribbean 
expansion of trade in goods with the European Union 
would mean capitalizing on the comparative advantages 
that the region already possesses, although additional 
negotiations will be needed for sensitive products such 
as bananas. Table V.1 lists the principal export products 
from the region to the European Union by bloc and shows 
that exports are still highly concentrated in commodities, 
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such as bananas, bovine meat, coffee, copper, gas and 
coal, iron and steel, petroleum and soybeans. On the 
other hand, as trade barriers come down, agreements 
with the European Union could provide opportunities 
for diversifying region’s export base and developing 
services exports, an issue of particular importance for 
the Caribbean countries.
All the ongoing and recently completed negotiations 
between the European Union and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries pursue the conclusion of an agreement 
based on three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and 
the reciprocal liberalization of trade in goods and services. 
The first two pillars may prove to be just as important 
for growth and development of the Latin American and 
Caribbean region as trade, since an association with the 
European Union would provide an important political 
support to the integration process within the region’s 
blocs and financial assistance for carrying out important 
reforms and measures complementary to trade policy, 
in particular in the area of trade facilitation. Faced with 
substantial differences in levels of development and 
progress in regional integration among the economies 
involved, and considering its own strategic objectives in 
each subregion, the European Union essentially adopted 
a multi-speed approach, with different completion targets 
for the agreements in each case.
Table V.1
TOP EXPORTS FROM SUBREGIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (27 COUNTRIES), 2004-2006
Product Name % of total goods exports Product Name % of total goods exports
Central American isthmus a CARIFORUM
Parts and accessories for computers 19.1 Cruise ships, yachts and excursion boats 27.9
Bananas 18.3 Aluminium oxide 9.0
Electronic integrated circuits and 
microassemblies 17.7 Rum 8.8
Coffee 9.2 Natural gas and other petroleum gases 8.7
Cruise ships, yachts and excursion boats 8.0 Sugar 6.3
Pineapples 7.1 Petroleum oils 6.2
Crustaceans: fresh, frozen or prepared 2.2 Bananas 5.6
Fish: fresh, frozen or prepared 1.9 Ferro-alloys 3.3
Melons and watermelons 1.9 Acyclic alcohols 1.9
Other 14.6 Medical appliances 1.2
Total 100.0 Crustaceans: fresh, frozen or prepared 1.2
Other 19.9
Total 100.0
MERCOSUR Andean Community b
Soybean and soybean oil 20.1 Bananas 20.2
Iron and steel 12.7 Coal 15.9
Bovine meat 4.3 Copper 10.3
Coffee 3.5 Coffee 7.9
Wood pulp 3.2 Zinc 5.0
Fruit juices 2.7 Fish: fresh, frozen or prepared 4.4
Motor vehicles and their parts 2.6 Ferro-alloys 4.0
Aluminium 2.5 Crustaceans: fresh, frozen or prepared 3.3
Petroleum oils 2.3 Cut flowers 2.3
Copper 1.8 Tin 1.5
Tobacco 1.5 Other 25.2
Other 42.9 Total 100.0
Total 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a
  Includes Panama.
b
  Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
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A. Patterns of inter-regional trade
Exports to the European Union, the second largest trading 
partner of CARIFORUM, make up 21% of all exports 
from the subregion. These exports grew faster between 
2000 and 2006 than exports to the United States. At 
the same time, the share of exports to the new member 
States in Central and Eastern Europe expanded from a 
mere 0.1% to approximately 2% in 2004 and onwards. 
In particular, high growth was recorded in exports to 
Poland, which in 2006 became the fifth-largest market 
for the CARIFORUM States in the European Union1. The 
breakdown by product reveals that cruise ship tourism and 
yachting account for a large proportion of the subregion’s 
exports to the European Union: 27.9% of total exports in 
the period 2004-2006. Other important products are rum, 
sugar and bananas, which together accounted for 20.7% 
in the same period, as well as alumina (9%), natural gas 
(8.7%) and petroleum oils (6.2%) (see table V.1). The 
composition of exports changed substantially over time: 
the proportion of primary goods in CARICOM exports to 
both the European Union and the world expanded from 
slightly over 20% in 2000 to over 40% in 2006. The bulk of 
this increase may be attributed to the expansion of natural 
gas exports from Trinidad and Tobago, which represented 
28% of all CARICOM exports to the European Union in 
2006, up from only 8% in 2000.
The European Union is also the second most important 
trade and investment partner of Central America, after 
the United States. According to the Statistical Office of 
the European Communities EUROSTAT, the inflow of 
European Union foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
the Central American countries amounted to 28.9 billion 
euros (€) in 2006. Almost 20% of Central American goods 
exports went to the European market in 2006. Although 
this subregion exports twice as much to the United States 
market as to Europe and imports three times more from 
the United States, between 2000 and 2006 its trade flows 
with the European Union grew more rapidly than with 
the United States. Exports to Europe almost doubled 
over that period, from US$ 3.6 billion to US$ 7.2 billion, 
while exports to the United States grew by a modest 
20%. On the other hand, the share of imports from the 
European Union in the total imports of Central America 
has been stable for the past six years at approximately 
10% of total. Central America’s exports to the European 
Union consist predominantly of agricultural products 
1
 After Spain, United Kingdom, Germany and France.
and other commodities. Primary goods accounted for 
70% of all exports from the Central American Common 
Market to the European Union in 2006 (see table V.2). 
Although this represents a substantial change since 1990, 
when primary goods constituted 92% of all merchandise 
exports to European Union, the proportion of these goods 
in Central American exports to the European Union was 
still much higher than their share of total exports from 
the subregion, which was only one third in 2006. Coffee 
and bananas constitute the bulk of agricultural exports 
from Central America to the European Union. These 
two products accounted for 27.5% of total exports to the 
European Union in the period 2004-2006 (see table V.1). 
Computer parts and accessories represented 19.2% of 
exports and electronic integrated circuits accounted for 
17.6%. Central American imports from European Union 
are concentrated in machinery, chemicals, ships, boats, 
vehicles and fuels.
The European Union accounts for approximately 16% 
of the Andean Community trade with the world and as such 
is this Community’s second largest trading partner after 
the United States. In 2006, 18% of Andean exports went 
to Europe and 13% of imports came from the European 
Union. As in the case with Central America, Andean 
countries export twice as much to the United States as to 
European Union; however exports to the European market 
grew faster during the period 2000-2006 than those to the 
United States. Andean Community exports predominantly 
agricultural and mining products to the European market. 
Bananas accounted for 20% of all exports to Europe 
between 2004 and 2006 (see table V.1). Coal represented 
16% (exported only by Colombia), while zinc and copper 
(both exported predominantly by Peru) accounted for 10% 
and 5%, respectively. Coffee (68% of it from Colombia) 
constituted 8% of subregional exports to the European 
Union. Together, these five products accounted for over 
half of European imports from the Andean Community. 
Although primary goods constitute the bulk of Andean 
exports to the world and to the European Union (73% and 
67% of total exports in 2006, respectively), the share of 
industrial products in the group’s exports to European Union 
has been increasing over time: it grew from 28% in 1990 
to 34% in 2006. On the other hand, the Andean countries 
import mostly manufactured goods from European Union, 
in particular machinery and chemicals.
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Trade flows between the European Union and 
MERCOSUR are double those between the European 
Union and the Caribbean, Central American and Andean 
countries put together. The potential implications of 
a trade deal between the two blocs for the economies 
involved are therefore stronger than in the other cases. 
Unlike the other Latin-American blocs, MERCOSUR 
trades more with the European Union than with the 
United States: about a quarter of total MERCOSUR 
exports are destined for the European Union and a quarter 
of its imports come from that source. At the same time, 
MERCOSUR also trades more than other subregions with 
the rest of the world: in 2006 59% of its exports went 
to countries outside the European Union and the United 
States. Approximately half of that amount went to other 
Latin American countries. MERCOSUR exports to the 
European Union are concentrated in traditional products in 
agriculture and the mining sector. In agriculture, exports 
are dominated by soybean (20%), followed by bovine 
meat (4.3%) and coffee (3.5%) (see table V.1). The five 
most important products accounted for 44% of European 
imports from MERCOSUR. In 2006, primary products 
represented almost one third of the products exported 
by MERCOSUR to the European Union, a much higher 
share than their share of exports to the world, which was 
24% (see table V.2).
Table V.2
STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BY DESTINATION AND CATEGORY
(Percentages)
European Union World
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
Latin America and the Caribbean
Primary products 44.1 36.2 39.2 42.9 24.3 32.3
Manufactures 55.7 63.6 60.6 56.5 75.1 66.6
Other goods 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Central American Common Market
Primary products 92.4 63.7 70.2 56.6 36.1 33.1
Manufactures 6.6 36.2 29.8 39.9 63.7 66.8
Other goods 1.1 0.1 0.1 3.5 0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
CARICOM
Primary products 23.4 21.2 43.7 27.8 23.4 42.6
Manufactures 72.8 78.5 56.2 72.0 76.5 57.2
Other goods 3.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MERCOSUR
Primary products 30.5 29.8 32.6 23.1 22.4 23.9
Manufactures 69.5 70.0 67.2 76.1 75.7 74.2
Other goods 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.9 1.9 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Andean Community
Primary products 72.1 65.0 66.5 73.1 56.7 72.9
Manufactures 27.7 35.0 33.5 26.7 43.3 27.0
Other goods 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official country data.
Note:  Following ECLAC’s definition of primary and manufactured goods, primary products include unprocessed agricultural output, crude oil, gas, coal, minerals and metal ores. 
Manufactures include processed resource-based products (agricultural, metals and fuels).
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B. CARIFORUM: the sealed deal?
Working on a tight schedule to meet the deadline of 
1 January 2008, the negotiations of the EPA and the 
agreement was eventually signed on 15 October 2008 
between the European Commission and CARIFORUM 
concluded formally on 16 December 2007 and the 
agreement was eventually signed on 15 October 2008. 
The new agreement replaced the system of preferences 
granted under several Lomé agreements and the 2001 
Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The 
urgency to conclude the negotiations before 2008 was 
dictated by the temporary status of this non-reciprocal 
trade regime (the corresponding WTO waiver that was 
set to expire on 31 December 2007). Since under the 
Cotonou agreement most exports from CARIFORUM 
entered the European Union duty-free, the main advantage 
of the EPA for CARIFORUM lies in making preferential 
market access permanent and WTO compatible, rather 
than in securing additional market access.
Consistent with the European Union’s comprehensive 
approach to partnerships with developing countries, the 
EPA covers all relevant areas of trade and trade-related 
cooperation and goes beyond market access to include customs 
and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, investments, competition, 
innovation and intellectual property, public procurement 
and environment and social aspects of trade, among others. 
As such, the EPA sets up a new reciprocal trading system 
between the European Union and the CARIFORUM countries, 
while the other two dimensions —political dialogue and 
cooperation in a broader sense— continue, for the time 
being, to be covered by the Cotonou agreement.2
The implementation of a comprehensive trade 
agreement with the European Union poses serious 
challenges for the CARIFORUM states. Except for the 
Dominican Republic, which is signatory to the CAFTA-
DR agreement with the United States, this is the first 
time that the countries are engaged in a reciprocal trade 
liberalization scheme vis-à-vis a major and economically 
superior partner. The major asymmetries in size, level 
of development and economic power that exist between 
the European Union and the CARIFORUM countries 
2
 As such, the EPA covers one of the five pillars covered by the Cotonou 
Agreement: The political dimension, participatory approach, development 
strategies (a strengthened focus on poverty reduction), the new trade 
framework and financial cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement was 
concluded for a twenty-year period from 2000 to 2020.
imply that the costs of adjustment to the new trading 
environment borne by the CARIFORUM economies will 
be much higher than those of the European Union. The 
EPA addresses this issue with two sets of instruments: 
(i) asymmetric liberalization of investments as well 
as trade in goods and services and (ii) development 
cooperation and technical assistance, as will be discussed 
further in the chapter.
Asymmetric liberalization is embedded in the European 
Union’s commitment to remove tariffs and quotas on all 
goods starting 1 January 2008, with the exception of rice 
and sugar, which have phase-out periods until 2010 and 
2015, respectively. In addition, the agreement commits 
the European Union to eliminating export subsidies on 
all agricultural products for which CARIFORUM has 
agreed to eliminate tariffs.
The trade barriers to goods imports in CARIFORUM are 
to be dismantled gradually, with tariffs being liberalized in 
phases of 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years. A three-year moratorium 
has been established for tariff reductions in all categories of 
items coming into the subregion,3 meaning that liberalization 
will actually commence on 1 January 2011. CARIFORUM 
countries agreed to slash the tariffs on a total of 61.1% 
of their imports (by value) over 10 years, 82.7% over 15 
years and 86.9 % over 25 years (European Commission, 
2008). In the agricultural sector, most products have either 
been excluded from liberalization or are subject to long 
transition periods (20 or 25 years). The main exclusions 
apart from agricultural products (meat, poultry, dairy, certain 
fruits and vegetables and some prepared foods) are certain 
chemicals, furniture and other manufactured products. A 
special “infant industry clause” has also been agreed to, 
which allows CARIFORUM countries to apply safeguard 
measures to protect a growing industry for a limited period 
of time. Under the EPA, CARICOM States will grant the 
Dominican Republic the same treatment they give the 
European Union, and vice versa.
The EPA contains specific provisions on sugar and 
bananas, which together constituted 14% of the total value 
of exports to the European Union from the subregion 
in 2006. The EPA specifies that on top of the existing 
410,000 tons Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) allocation for 
sugar, CARIFORUM will receive an additional quota 
of 60,000 tons: the Dominican Republic 30,000 tons, 
and the CARICOM sugar-producing countries 30,000 
3
 With the exception of motor vehicles, spare parts and gasoline.
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tons to be shared among them, for the period up to the 
end of September 2009.4 Additionally, the two sides 
agreed that any quota shortfalls can be reallocated among 
the Caribbean States. On the downside, a number of 
manufactured products that contain sugar are excluded 
from the “cumulation” clause of the rules of origin.5 The 
European Union has committed to reviewing and reducing 
the list of the products exempted from the clause within 
three years. Bananas gain full duty-free and quota-free 
access to the European Union market from the moment 
the agreement enters into force. The preferential market 
access for Caribbean producers is thus now granted 
under a WTO-compatible regional trade agreement (see
4
 The expansion of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) is intended to partly 
offset the negative effect of the reform of the European Union’s 
sugar regime, which gave ACP sugar growers higher prices than 
other exporters. Following the gradual dismantling of the minimum 
price granted to the ACP countries by the Sugar Protocol, only a 
few countries in the subregion will remain competitive in the world 
market. In the Caribbean, the countries that will continue to produce 
and export sugar are Guyana, Jamaica and Belize, and those are the 
countries that will benefit from higher export quotas as of 2009.
5
 The cumulation clause allows exporters to obtain preferential 
market access for products that incorporate inputs originating in 
other Caribbean states as well as other ACP countries.
box V.1). The EPA also contains a comprehensive joint 
declaration on bananas, which commits the European 
Union to providing funding to assist the industry during 
the adjustment period. In the case of rice, duty-free and 
quota-free access will be granted by the European Union in 
2010. In the meantime, CARIFORUM countries will receive 
quotas of 187,000 tons in 2008 and 250,000 tons in 2009, 
which can be exported under a zero tariff (compared to the 
€ 65/ton duty currently paid). The current quota allocated to 
Guyana and Suriname is 145,000 tons. This is a significant 
achievement in particular for Guyana, whose rice exports 
accounted for 15% of the total value of its exports to the 
European Union between 2004 and 2006.
Box V.1
THE END OF THE BANANA WAR?
The preferential access granted by the 
European Union to its former colonies 
in the ACP region through a system of 
quotas and tariffs has been the source 
of a bitter argument between Europe and 
Latin American exporters for over a decade. 
Despite various reforms to the European 
Union’s import regime for bananas, 
complaints have been filed by both Latin 
American nations (most notably Ecuador) 
and the United States since 1996, claiming 
that that the regime violates WTO rules. 
The WTO has repeatedly ruled against 
the European Union’s MFN import tariffs 
(the latest was set at € 176 per ton in 2006) 
and the preferential quotas given to ACP 
producers. In the most recent case, Ecuador, 
the principal exporter of bananas to the 
European Union and the world’s largest 
producer, claimed to have lost US$ 131 
million in the first 15 months of the tariff’s 
existence. On 7 April 2008, a WTO Panel 
report concluded that “The preference 
granted by the European Communities to 
an annual duty-free tariff quota of 775,000 
tons of imported bananas originating in 
ACP countries constitutes an advantage 
for this category of bananas, which is not 
accorded to like bananas originating in 
non-ACP WTO Members, and is therefore 
inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994” 
(WT/DS27/RW2/ECU). On 19 May 2008, 
WTO again ruled against the European 
Union in a similar case initiated by the 
United States. The European Union’s 
reaction was to argue that since 1 January 
2008, following the expiration of the WTO 
waiver for the Cotonou preferences, the 
preferences granted by the European Union 
to the ACP have been covered by new trade 
arrangements, including the full regional 
EPA with CARIFORUM and a number of 
interim agreements with certain countries 
or regions in Africa and the Pacific.
In the latest round of multilateral 
negotiations, a group of Latin American 
countries attempted to link the banana 
issue to the negotiations on tropical 
products within the Doha round with a 
view to obtaining a substantial cut in the 
current tariff of € 176 per ton. Negotiating 
banana tariffs as part of tropical products 
would result in faster, steeper multilateral 
tariff cuts. This proposal was met with a 
resistance from the ACP members, which 
are pushing for bananas to be classified 
as so-called preference products that are 
subject to longer implementation periods. 
Such a move would help to soften the 
blow ACP countries could face from the 
erosion of the current preferences. During 
the last round of multilateral talks in July 
2008 the European Union had agreed to 
cut its most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs 
on bananas to € 114 by 2016, with an 
initial cut to € 148 in 2009. In exchange, the 
Latin American countries were expected 
to agree not to challenge the European 
Union’s preferential access to banana 
imports from ACP countries and to drop 
existing lawsuits. However, since the round 
collapsed once again, failing to deliver a 
Doha breakthrough, this offer was taken 
off the table. On the other hand, there is 
some hope that a stand-alone agreement on 
bananas will be achieved. In the meanwhile, 
on August 28 the European Union filed an 
appeal in an attempt to overturn the recent 
WTO rulings on discrimination against Latin 
American countries.
Between 2004 and 2006, 22% of 
European banana imports came from 
Ecuador and an additional 42% came from 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama, while 
6% came from the CARIFORUM countries. 
Bananas accounted for 18% and 20% of 
total exports by value from Central America 
and the Andean countries, respectively. In 
CARIFORUM, the share of bananas in total 
exports to the European Union was 5.6%. 
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Box. V.1 (concluded)















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
The Caribbean region is the only ACP region that is 
a net exporter of services. Services constitute the bulk of 
exports in most Caribbean countries, generating US$ 8.7 
billion in export revenues in 2005,6 which corresponded 
to 24.8% of the subregion’s GDP. The most important 
services sectors are tourism, which accounts for two thirds 
of services exports, followed by transportation (10.4%) 
and business services (6.3%).7 According to the World 
Tourism Organization, in 2005, the tourism sector generated 
US$ 5.9 billion in receipts in CARICOM member countries 
and US$ 3.5 billion in the Dominican Republic. Gaining 
better access to the European services market was therefore 
a priority for the CARIFORUM countries.
The EPA handles the services trade through sets of 
provisions covering three subjects: commercial presence, 
the cross-border supply of services and the temporary 
presence of natural persons. Public services, utilities 
and other sensitive sectors have been excluded from 
liberalization. Although there is certain asymmetry in 
the scope of the liberalization of services between the 
European Union and CARIFORUM, the obligations 
assumed by the CARIFORUM countries under the EPA 
go well beyond the commitments of the developing 
countries in the WTO.8 One potential problem in this 
6
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of Payment 
Statistics Database (BOP) [online] http://www.imfstatistics.
org/BOP/logon.aspx.
7
 United Nations Service Trade Statistics Database [online] http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/servicetrade.
8
 According to the initial press releases (for example, “The EPA: fact 
vs. fiction” [online] http://www.crnm.org/epa_fact_fiction1.htm), 
the European Union has made liberalization commitments in 94% 
of the sectors, while the corresponding figures for CARIFORUM 
are 75% for the so-called “more developed countries” and 65% 
for the “lesser developed” CARIFORUM countries, although at
is that, by giving national treatment to European Union 
service providers, CARIFORUM has limited the scope 
of its regulatory capacity in the services sector, which 
could hamper its ability to deploy policies to protect or 
encourage local service suppliers as part of a broader 
development strategy. 
The EPA has been hailed by the European Union as 
a major achievement for CARIFORUM States regarding 
temporary employment possibilities for Caribbean 
professionals in Europe. Some 29 European sectors 
have been opened up to allow professional employees 
of CARIFORUM firms not established in Europe or 
contractual service suppliers to temporarily supply services 
in the European Union. In addition, 11 sectors have 
been opened up to allow self-employed CARIFORUM 
professionals to enter the European Union for temporary 
work. However, by and large, these commitments remain 
within the scope of the European Union’s schedule under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or 
its services offer within the Doha Agenda (South Centre 
2008). Moreover, in the absence of established mutual 
recognition procedures for the technical qualifications of 
professionals,9 the de facto barriers to the movement of 
persons could prevail. The EPA mentions requirements 
regarding professional qualifications and university 
 this point it is not clear how these percentages are calculated. 
The current commitments of CARICOM countries in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) affect only 8.4% of all 
services sectors on average.
9
 The EPA provides for the encouragement of the relevant professional 
bodies in their respective territories to start negotiations no later 
than three years after the entry into force of the EPA and to jointly 
develop and provide recommendations on mutual recognition, 
among others, in the following disciplines: accounting, architecture, 
engineering and tourism.
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education as prerequisites for work permits. In addition, 
in various sectors, economic needs tests apply. The real 
value of these commitments to the professionals from 
the CARIFORUM countries will therefore become 
apparent only when the EPA is fully operational. In sum, 
the net benefits of the EPA for CARIFORUM services 
providers will depend on whether the EPA provisions 
go beyond the access that will be granted to developing 
countries once the European Union GATS offer locks in, 
although it appears that the differences are minimal.10 
This additional access has to be weighed against the costs 
of compliance with the obligations imposed by the EPA 
on the CARIFORUM economies.11 It should be noted 
that the ACP countries are not required to negotiate a 
services agreement with the European Union to achieve 
WTO compatibility.
The EPA does contain other instruments that have 
the potential to contribute to its declared development 
objectives. The commitments in the area of competition 
include prohibition of anti-competitive business 
practices, including the commitment to establish 
appropriate legislation, which is currently either 
weak or nonexistent in most Caribbean countries. In 
the area of trade facilitation, the private sector in the 
CARIFORUM countries will benefit from transparency, 
predictability and less red tape as the countries adopt a 
single administrative document (SAD) or its electronic 
equivalent, which will replace the numerous documents 
currently needed to process imports and exports. In 
the area of cooperation, the development cooperation 
agreement contains clauses on promoting private-sector 
and enterprise development, enhancing technological 
and research capabilities in the CARIFORUM States 
and developing CARIFORUM innovation systems. To 
support these initiatives and to help CARIFORUM to 
export successfully to European Union markets, the 
European Union has pledged financial and non-financial 
support in a number of priority areas, such as customs 
modernization and infrastructure development.
The process of implementation and adjustment to the 
EPA in CARIFORUM will require substantial efforts in 
trade facilitation in order to benefit fully from expanded 
10
 A further analysis of the implications of the commitments regarding 
the movement of natural persons, as well as other services provisions, 
for the CARIFORUM countries requires a comparison of the 
annexes to the EPA and the European Union’s updated schedule 
of commitments in the GATS. Services negotiations in the context 
of the Doha round are currently in progress and no official revised 
offers from the European Union are yet available. 
11
 Apart from services liberalization, the EPA establishes a set of 
obligations in the areas of investment, competition, government 
procurement, trade facilitation and intellectual property rights, as 
well as sector-specific regulations in the services sectors, such as 
tourism, financial services and telecommunications.
market access. The success of the EPA in achieving its 
declared development objectives by repositioning the 
export base of CARIFORUM away from primary products 
towards goods with greater value-added as well as services 
hinges critically on those countries’ ability to address the 
challenges of improving the efficiency of revenue collection, 
restructuring vulnerable sectors, harnessing the business 
climate to attract capital and boost competitiveness, 
strengthening domestic and regional institutions and 
enhancing regional integration. In particular, developing 
the services sector, for which market access opportunities 
are expanding, is a major priority.
The countries will need significant resources to bolster 
their internal capacities to face these challenges. The 
European Union has pledged to increase its trade-related 
assistance, although this is not something that is an inherent 
part of the EPA. Financing pertaining to development 
cooperation and specifically to the implementation of the 
EPA is subject to the rules of the Cotonou Agreement, in 
particular the programming procedures of the European 
Development Fund (EDF).12 Under the tenth EDF for 
the period 2008-2013, an estimated € 165 million will 
be allocated to the Regional Indicative Program for the 
Caribbean, which will be used to fund strengthening of 
regional cooperation and integration, with implementation 
of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy as a major 
priority as well as to address vulnerabilities and social 
issues and EPA implementation. 
In order to channel these resources, in the EPA, the 
parties commit to establish a regional development fund 
two years from the date of signature of the agreement. 
Thus, the distribution of this pledged support among 
the countries and the specific programmes are yet to be 
determined. In addition, the European Union’s national 
indicative programmes for the Caribbean countries are 
also oriented towards activities linked to trade: five 
programmes will target competitiveness, three programmes 
will contribute to governance and public administration 
reforms and three others will focus on infrastructure. 
These amount to € 454 million or 75% of the sum of 
approximately € 600 million set aside for the national 
programmes (European Commission, 2008). The EPA also 
contains a declaration stating the link with the expansion 
of the Aid-for-Trade funding. Under the European Union’s 
Aid-for-Trade Strategy, European Union Member States 
are committed to reach an annual amount of € 1 billion 
by 2010 in trade-related assistance, with a range of 
50%, of which 22% is available for ACP countries. In 
the EPA the European Union states its intention “to 
ensure that an equitable share of Member States’ Aid 
12
 p. 22 of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
CARIFORUM states and the European Community.
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for Trade commitments will benefit the Caribbean ACP 
States, including for funding programs related to the 
implementation of this Agreement”.13
Nevertheless, the basic premise of the EPA is that 
trade is the primary vehicle for stimulating development. 
The European Union maintains that the EPA will spur 
development by expanding trade, strengthening regional 
integration and attracting investment: “The Caribbean 
EPA aims at achieving development objectives through 
the establishment of a trade partnership based on the 
promotion of regional integration, the gradual integration 
of CARIFORUM countries into the world economy, 
capacity building in trade policy and trade related issues, 
supporting the conditions for increased investment and 
economic growth.” (European Commission, 2008). Critics 
of the EPA argue, on the other hand, that development 
orientation of the EPA is too weak, since trade and 
investment liberalization by itself is not sufficient to deliver 
development, and that the provisions regarding delivery 
of assistance are too vague. Moreover, the EPA does not 
go far enough to address the differences in economic
13
 p. 397 of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
CARIFORUM states and the European Community.
power and levels of development among CARIFORUM 
States through special and differential treatment for less 
developed countries (see for example Girvan, 2008).
The EPA was signed on 15 October 2008 by the 
European Union and all CARIFORUM member states 
except Guyana and Haiti. Guyana has raised its concerns 
about the agreement, citing as the main reasons insufficient 
market access in the European Union for its vital products: 
sugar, rum and rice, and the potential impact of the EPA 
on its trade balance and balance of payments as the main 
reasons. Guyana also indicated that it was considering 
signing a “goods and services agreement” only, leaving 
out the so-called Singapore issues, such as government 
procurement, investments and competition. The opposition 
to the deal was reaffirmed by Guyana’s President, Bharrat 
Jagdeo, in his address to the United Nations General 
Assembly (sixty-third session) on 23 September 2008. 
Nevertheless, Guyana finally signed the agreement, while 
Haiti requested more time to analyse the terms, since its 
current priority is to recover from the natural disasters 
it has suffered.
C. Central America: the fast track
The negotiations of the Association Agreement between 
the European Union and Central America (Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) were 
formally launched in October 2007. The principal objectives 
of the negotiations are to enhance the political dialogue 
between the blocs, to intensify and improve cooperation 
in a vast variety of areas and to enhance and facilitate 
bi-regional trade and investment. At this stage, Panama 
participates as an observer only since it is not a member of 
the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration 
(SIECA).14 The talks have been dynamic: four rounds of 
negotiations have already been held, progress has been 
made in establishing certain cooperation agreements, 
and proposals on trade in goods and services have been 
exchanged and discussed. As regards political dialogue,
14
 Panama has concluded bilateral free-trade agreements with El 
Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica and is currently negotiating 
with Nicaragua and Guatemala. Panama can participate fully in 
the negotiations with the European Union only after it signs the 
protocol of accession to SIECA and becomes part of the Central 
American customs union, since the European Union approach is 
to negotiate agreements with country blocs.
agreements on democracy, good governance, human rights 
and the information society have already been reached.
The parties have agreed that tariff dismantling will 
take place in the following phases: immediately and 
then 3, 5, 7 and 10 years after the agreement enters into 
force. A special category for products without a defined 
liberalization schedule and products subject to tariff-rate 
quotas applies. It was agreed that trade liberalization will 
cover both goods and services and that liberalization of 
investments will also be negotiated. In addition, the usual 
trade-related areas will be covered: trade facilitation, 
competition rules and public procurement. The parties 
have exchanged the initial liberalization offers on trade 
in goods and are in the process of negotiating them. The 
current offer by Central America affects 80% of the 
tariff lines. The European Union is asking for 90% of the 
Central American market to be liberalized in exchange for 
consolidation of the preferences granted by the European 
Union under the GSP-plus arrangement.15 The European 
Union offer currently on the table includes duty-free 
15
 On 1 January 2006, GSP-plus replaced the ‘drugs regime’ of the GSP, 
providing special incentives to the countries of the Central American 
isthmus to promote sustainable development and good governance.
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access for all products that enter with zero tariff under the 
GSP-plus arrangement, with the exception of 30 products. 
The exceptions include ethanol and frozen shrimp, both 
of importance to Central America. From the viewpoint of 
Central America, GSP-plus should be the starting point 
for further liberalization rather than an end.
The most intense period in terms of negotiating the 
core commitments of the future agreement will be 2008 
and 2009. Several important trade issues still need to be 
settled, including access to the European Union market 
for sensitive products such as sugar, bananas, ethanol 
and shrimps and Central American tariffs on European 
cars, electronics and pharmaceutical products. These 
issues were to be addressed during the fifth round of 
negotiations, which was scheduled to take place early in 
October in Guatemala. The European Union is concerned 
with what it considers to be an insufficient offer from 
Central America regarding investments and market access 
in telecommunications. Moreover it has signalled that it 
would be flexible in the definition of the rules of origin 
for certain goods produced in Central America, such as 
textiles and plastics.
The parties agreed that the negotiations should be 
concluded during 2009. It may, however, become difficult 
to achieve that goal, given the typical complications 
associated with the asymmetry principle of the negotiations 
and the sensitivity of agriculture in both the European 
Union and Central America.
D. The Andean Community: pausing to rethink 
 the process
Similar to the Central American case, European Union-
Andean trade relations are currently dominated by GSP 
preferences: first through the ‘drugs regime’ and, since 
2006, through GSP-plus arrangements. The negotiations 
of the Association Agreement commenced in September 
2007, with the standard objective “to enhance the political 
dialogue between both regions, to intensify and improve 
their co-operation in a vast variety of areas and to enhance 
and facilitate bi-regional trade and investments”.16 
In the area of cooperation, the parties have agreed to 
place emphasis on economic and social development, in 
particular poverty reduction, social cohesion and the welfare 
of underprivileged groups. In trade, the parties have so far 
only exchanged views on the structure of the trade part 
of the agreement and discussed the general objectives, as 
well as directives and guidelines for trade subgroups. The 
initial tariff offers were made during the third round in 
April 2008. During these talks, the parties barely touched 
upon trade, however, and postponed negotiations of the 
tariff schedules until the fourth round.
A temporary boost to the process was provided by 
the Summit of Heads of State and Government from 
Latin America and the Caribbean and from the European 
Union, hosted by Peru in May 2008. Apart from the 
formal outcomes that focused on collaborative efforts 
16
 European Union, “EU and the Andean Community launch negotiations 
for Association Agreement”, Press release (IP/07/834), Brussels, 
14 June 2007.
in poverty reduction and sustainable development, the 
talks involved a discussion on three topics more closely 
related to bi-regional negotiations: investment, rule of 
law and flexibility of the negotiations. Flexibility is 
particularly important in the Andean case, where the 
countries are characterized not only by different levels of 
development, but also by different degrees of readiness 
to move forward with the negotiations. The idea of a 
flexible framework that would let the Andean countries 
negotiate with the European Union along independent 
tracks was put forward by the Governments of Peru and 
Colombia, the countries that are most eager to conclude 
the Association Agreement. Ecuador and Bolivia, on the 
other hand, have expressed their reservations with regard 
to the trade talks. Bolivia has in fact indicated that it will 
opt out of the negotiations on a number of topics: trade in 
services, right of establishment and movement of capital, 
public procurement and intellectual property.
These differences in attitude among the members 
of the Andean Community make the establishment 
of a common position vis-à-vis the European Union 
extremely difficult and have seriously hampered the 
negotiating process. In particular, there is still an ongoing 
debate within the bloc on issues such as the extent of 
trade liberalization, intellectual property rights, public 
procurement and sustainable development. As a result, 
in July the European Union, citing the lack of a common 
Andean position in presenting offers on trade in goods 
as cause, announced the suspension of the fourth round 
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of negotiations, and effectively placed the talks on hold. 
In September, frustrated with the lack of progress, the 
Governments of Colombia and Peru formally asked 
Brussels to pursue bilateral negotiations with them. 
Referring to “different visions” within the Andean 
region, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe urged the 
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso 
to advance simultaneously with the negotiation of 
bilateral trade agreements between each of the Andean 
countries and the European Union and expressed the 
hope that the negotiations could be concluded in the 
first half of 2009.17
In a final attempt to resolve their differences, the Andean 
countries convened in mid-October at an extraordinary 
summit meeting in Guayaquil, Ecuador, at which they 
agreed to ask the European Union for fresh talks to 
restart the negotiations and to consider the possibility of 
negotiating jointly, but at different speeds.
17
 Colombia Reports, “Europe too slow on trade deals, say Colombia 




Eight years have passed since the formal launch of the 
negotiations between MERCOSUR and the European 
Union. Progress has been painstakingly slow, leaving 
various pledges to complete the negotiations by a certain 
date unfulfilled. Following a pause of almost a year, 
the negotiations were resumed at a ministerial meeting 
in 2005 in the hope that the Association Agreement 
would be completed by 2006. However, another 
series of meetings made little progress in achieving 
consensus in critical areas. Once again the negotiations 
stalled, and the prospects of concluding them in the 
near term seem bleak as the principal concerns remain 
unsolved. The talks have been hampered by some of 
the same issues impeding the Doha round: reforms of 
the European Union’s farm support system and access 
for European manufacturing goods and services to the 
Southern Cone markets. Moreover, the current approach 
pursued by the European Union Commission in bilateral 
agreements, which pushes for commitments beyond 
those negotiated in the WTO in the areas of public 
procurement, investments and intellectual property 
rights, does not go down well with the MERCOSUR 
countries and poses additional obstacles. On the other 
hand, as the Doha round may be revived in 2008, the 
European Union and MERCOSUR have both signalled 
their willingness to press ahead and to make another 
attempt at reaching an agreement on trade. At the end 
of 2007, the parties announced that they would resume 
talks in May 2008. They have recently pushed the date 
towards the second half of the year, however. Much 
work remains to be done, and in light of previous 
complications it seems unlikely that the negotiations 
will be concluded before 2010.
It is also possible that the European Union will 
focus on developing a special relationship with Brazil, 
parallel to the negotiations with MERCOSUR. Brazil 
could become an important hub for the European Union’s 
economic relations with Latin America and could act as 
an engine for deeper regional integration in MERCOSUR. 
In May 2007, the European Union Commission proposed 
a strategic partnership to strengthen its ties with Brazil, 
focusing on trade and investment as issues of particular 
bilateral relevance. Other areas for proposed joint action 
included strengthening multilateralism and cooperation on 
global challenges such as tackling poverty and inequality, 
environmental issues (particularly climate change), 
energy, regional stability in Latin America and integration 
within MERCOSUR. These topics were discussed at the 
first European Union-Brazil Summit, held in Lisbon in 
July 2007.
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F. A strategic partnership with Mexico
and political position in the Americas. The strategic 
partnership would expand upon the trade commitments 
already established within the FTA and the cooperation 
agreements signed between Mexico and the European 
Union regarding other topics. Under the new partnership 
arrangement, both parties would commit to pursuing 
decisions regarding the main issues on the international 
agenda, including political, security, environmental, 
energy, economic and social matters.
Figure V.2
MEXICO: TRADE FLOWS AND FDI INFLOWS FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, 1999-2007
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Source: Secretariat of Economic Affairs of Mexico.
Figure V.3
MEXICO: GROWTH IN TRADE FLOWS AND FDI INFLOWS FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, 1999-2007
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Source: Secretariat of Economic Affairs of Mexico.
Mexico and the European Union are heading towards 
a strategic partnership, in other words, a relationship 
that goes beyond the bounds of the bilateral free trade, 
cooperation and political agreements that make up the 
European Union-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political 
Coordination and Cooperation Agreement that has been 
in effect since 2000. The parties agreed to pursue the 
proposed strategic partnership at the Summit of Heads 
of State and Government from Latin America and the 
Caribbean and from the European Union held in Lima 
in May 2008. In July 2008, the European Commission 
submitted the proposal to the European Parliament under 
the title “Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership”. 
It must now be presented to the Council of Ministers of 
the European Union, and the process is expected to be 
concluded by the end of the year. 
In the eight years since the entry into force of the 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European 
Union and Mexico, Mexican exports to the European 
Union have risen 170%, from US$ 5,157 million in 1999 
to US$ 13,943 million in 2007. Imports meanwhile rose 
162% from US$ 12,928 million in 1999 to US$ 33,839 
million in 2007. Mexico’s trade deficit with the European 
Union remains high even though exports have expanded 
more than imports. This deficit is expected to shrink as 
cooperation efforts within the framework of the association 
agreement begin to bear fruit. These currently consist of 
measures aimed at strengthening small and medium-sized 
Mexican companies through the Mexico-EU Comprehensive 
Support Programme for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(PIAPYME by its Spanish acronym) and activities conducted 
as part of the capacity building project of the Mexico-
European Union Free Trade Agreement (PROTLCUEM 
by its Spanish acronym), which covers topics such as 
treaty administration, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, 
and customs. 
European investment in Mexico grew 105% between 
1999 and 2007 and mostly went to the manufacturing 
and financial services sectors. Flows came mainly from 
Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany 
(see figures V.2 and V.3). The European Union has thus 
become Mexico’s second largest trade and investment 
partner, after the United States.
The European Union hopes Mexico will become its 
fifth strategic trading partner after the United States, China, 
the Russian Federation and Brazil. Its interest in Mexico 
stems largely from the country’s strategic geographical 
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The scope of the negotiations between Mexico and 
the European Union may extend even further given that 
partnership negotiations are simultaneously under way with 
other subregions, and additional synergies to those originally 
proposed in each agreement are now being sought. One 
notable example of this is the request submitted by Mexico 
and Central America to the European Union via the Tuxtla 
Dialogue and Agreement Mechanism for origin cumulation 
among the countries of the subregion in the case of certain 
products. If this proposal is accepted, new clauses would be 
inserted into the two agreements with the European Union 
in order to allow Central American inputs to be incorporated 
into Mexican products without these losing the preferences 
they benefit from in the European Union. The same would 
apply to Central American exports to the European Union 
that contain Mexican inputs (tenth Summit of Heads of State 
and Government of the Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement 
Mechanism, Villahermosa, 28 June 2008).
The possibility of cumulation of origin was already 
contemplated in the Economic Partnership Agreement 
between Mexico and the European Union of 2000 but was 
never formalized. In this agreement, both parties committed 
to encourage cooperation with Central America and the 
Caribbean and to award priority to initiatives promoting 
intraregional trade. The possibility of origin cumulation 
between Central America and Mexico would strengthen 
intraregional trade and production linkages and improve 
regional value chains.
G. The principal issues affecting European Union-Latin 
 American negotiations
Progress in negotiations with the European Union has been 
uneven across the subregions because in each case, both the 
benefits of a potential agreement and the obstacles on the 
path towards it are different. The economic implications of 
a potential agreement depend on the specific characteristics 
of the economies, the political landscape and the trade 
patterns of each bloc, in particular on the sectors that are 
considered to be “sensitive”. One of the thorniest issues 
in the negotiations with Central American and Andean 
countries is the trade in bananas. The battle in the WTO 
over the European most-favoured-nation (MFN) banana 
tariffs, one of the longest-running trade disputes in 
history, created a rift between the European Union and 
some of the major exporters (see box V.1), a problem 
that will need to be addressed. In the Central American 
case, banana exports are currently being negotiated as a 
separate issue, and this will most likely happen in future 
negotiations with CAN.
Textiles and apparel is another trade sector that is 
of great importance to both Central America and the 
Andean countries. Market access for this sector to the 
European Union will be one of the major issues during 
the negotiations on trade in goods. When the European 
Union textile quotas were eliminated in 2005 as the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) expired, 
the textile industry in Latin American counties suffered 
heavily from the fierce competition posed by China 
and other Asian countries, which have an enormous 
advantage over Latin America in terms of manufacturing 
costs. Chinese textile exports to the European Union 
soared, squeezing the garment industry in Mexico 
and Central America. Adjustment to quota expiration 
is a serious concern for Central American producers, 
as well as for Colombia and Peru, which will push 
for maximum preferences for the textile and apparel 
industry and possibly for investments and assistance to 
boost the competitiveness of the sector. Fully duty-free 
and quota-free market access, such as that granted to 
the Dominican Republic under the CARIFORUM EPA, 
would help the countries in the region to retain some of 
their competitive edge vis-à-vis China.
Another issue that the Andean and Central American 
textile industry will have to cope with is rules of origin. If 
these are set too stringent, they could preclude preferential 
exports of a large proportion of the textiles produced in 
these countries, since typically the content of United States 
inputs is very high, in particular in the export processing 
zones of Central America.
Furthermore, in Central America, the European 
requirement for ratification of the Statutes of Rome of the 
International Criminal Court in Central America could 
constitute a possible political impediment to advancement 
in the negotiations. So far only Panama, Costa Rica and 
Honduras have ratified the Statutes intended to prosecute 
and judge human rights violations and crimes against 
humanity. The other Central American countries do not 
acknowledge the Court. 
In the Andean region, there are major differences 
in the countries’ readiness to negotiate and to open up 
their markets. Peru and Colombia are very active and are 
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pushing for a quick conclusion of the negotiations, while 
Bolivia and Ecuador are exerting more caution. Bolivia 
has already put limits on the scope of the agreement it 
would be willing to accept. It has indicated that it would 
keep its natural-resource-based sectors (agriculture, mining 
and gas) outside the reach of the agreement, as well as 
public procurement and intellectual property. According 
to the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, Ecuador is 
not ready to negotiate a comprehensive agreement either 
and would instead proceed “sector by sector, product 
by product and with mutual benefits”.18 An additional 
hurdle to the completion of the talks was indirectly posed 
by the recent tightening of immigration regulations by 
the European Union.19 Colombia and Peru in particular 
have therefore suggested allowing greater flexibility in 
the negotiations so that Bolivia and Ecuador can opt out 
of certain provisions and the talks can move ahead. Faced 
with the indeterminate postponement of the negotiations, 
Peru is insisting on talks proceeding on a country-by-
country basis. It will be attempted to reach a final outcome 
to the negotiations at a forthcoming meeting between the 
Andean Community and the European Union, further to
18
 Diario La Hora, Guatemala, 14 May 2008 [online] http://www.
lahora.com.gt/notas.php?key=30501&fch=2008-05-14.
19
 On 18 June 2008, the European Parliament adopted a so-called 
“return directive” that allows illegal migrants to be detained for up 
to 18 months and face a five-year travel ban after being deported. 
The new directive was widely criticized by the governments in the 
region as a violation of human rights. Ecuador, which has a large 
pool of immigrants in the European Union, was particularly critical 
and threatened to suspend the trade talks.
agreements adopted at the recent summit of Presidents 
held in Guayaquil.
In the case of MERCOSUR, the prolonged standstill 
in the negotiations is in part due to the European Union’s 
insistence on MERCOSUR becoming a “real common 
market”, a requirement that has proven to be difficult to 
fulfil. The integration process in MERCOSUR has been 
uneven at best owing to continued trade disputes among 
the MERCOSUR members. But an even larger problem 
is the failure of the European Union and MERCOSUR 
to agree on market access in agriculture, a sector where 
MERCOSUR is highly competitive. Sugar has been a 
point of disagreement between the European Union and 
Brazil in the past. However, given the major reform of 
the European Union’s sugar policy and the resulting 
reduction of both production and exports, it should no 
longer pose a serious obstacle. Furthermore, the Brazilian 
ethanol industry will benefit from the European policies 
that encourage the use of biofuels.20 The future European 
Union-MERCOSUR agreement could include a scheme 
for managing European ethanol imports from Brazil 
through a TRQ system.
20
 A 2003 European Commission directive established the replacement 
of 2% of petrol or diesel by substitute fuels in 2005 and of 5.75% 
in 2010 as an indicative objective for the European Union. Several 
car makers have recently announced the launch of ethanol-powered 
vehicles. To encourage the development of lower-carbon fuels and 
biofuels, in 2007 the European Union Commission proposed new 
standards that will oblige suppliers to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions caused by the production, transport and use of their fuels 
by 10% between 2011 and 2020.
H. Prospects for 2008 and 2009
The region is entering into a qualitatively new phase of 
economic and trade relations with the European Union, 
its second most important trading partner. Expansion of 
commercial ties with the European Union will be crucial 
for reducing dependency on the United States market, in 
particular for Central America and the Caribbean, now 
that the slowdown in the United States economy is likely 
to have a negative effect on the region. Latin American 
and Caribbean countries should therefore prioritize the 
negotiations with the European Union and push for a 
reasonable timeframe for concluding them.
During the Summit of Heads of State and Government 
from Latin America and the Caribbean and from the 
European Union in May 2008 it was reaffirmed that 
the countries will “actively pursue” the negotiations of 
association agreements, and that the target for concluding 
them with Central America and the Andean countries 
is 2009. This seems like a plausible deadline for the 
negotiations with Central America. In the case of the 
Andean community, however, various issues that could 
complicate the talks have surfaced during 2008. The 
Central American Common Market is far more advanced 
than Andean Community in its own integration process, in 
particular in the establishment of a customs union, and the 
Central American countries are acting with a unified voice 
vis-à-vis the European Union. By contrast, the progress 
in the negotiations with the Andean Community will 
continue to be hampered by the ideological differences 
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and conflicts within the bloc itself, slow progress in the 
implementation of the integration agenda and the various 
degrees of preparedness to negotiate. The situation with 
MERCOSUR is also complicated, but for pragmatic, 
rather than political reasons, and the talks hinge on the 
progress made in the Doha round. The Summit declaration 
states that the negotiations with MERCOSUR will be 
completed “as soon as the conditions allow”. As such, a 
breakthrough before 2010 is unlikely. 
Still, the prospects for negotiations in 2008 and 2009 
offer some interesting opportunities for the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean to shape the future of 
economic relations with Europe, provided sufficient progress 
is made in regional integration and assuming that each 
bloc manages to come up with coherent positions on the 
most critical topics. Alternatively, a far greater flexibility 
should be allowed in the negotiations, permitting countries 
to opt out of certain areas of negotiations or to adjust the 
degree of liberalization. One possibility would be to let 
countries opt out of some of the provisions initially and 
join the full agreement at a later stage. The application 
of the variable geometry and flexibility principles that 
allow the asymmetries within blocs to be addressed would 
speed up the negotiation process for those countries that 
are ready to enter into an agreement. 
The prospects of an association agreement with the 
European Union play a catalytic role in consolidating 
and deepening the integration process within the region 
itself. First, the European Union has made it clear that it 
will only negotiate bloc to bloc, even if some degree of 
flexibility in the negotiations is introduced. Second, an 
association agreement would go beyond market access 
in goods and services. The European Union has always 
emphasized economic cooperation as an integral part 
of an association process and has consistently provided 
political and financial support to further integration 
in the region. The strategic partnerships embedded in 
the association agreements are typically supported by 
cooperation programmes in specific areas and technical 
assistance with a strong focus on regional integration, 
especially in the areas of trade facilitation, the convergence 
of rules and the strengthening of regional institutional 
capacity.21 The availability of financial and political 
support for regional economic integration from the 
European Union would provide an important external 
boost to regional integration. However, to truly succeed, 
the impetus needs to come from the region itself. In order 
to compete successfully in the European Union market, as 
well as globally, the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean need to make a greater effort to enhance the 
systemic competitiveness of the region through greater 
cooperation in key trade-related areas. The convergence 
of rules and procedures at the regional level, collaborative 
efforts to facilitate trade and the development of regional 
institutional and physical infrastructure are important 
instruments of regional economic integration that will 
help the region to adjust to, and benefit from rapid shifts 
in global trading rules.
Another issue is that once the agreements with the 
European Union enter into force, the countries within 
each subregional integration scheme will automatically 
assume similar liberalization commitments towards each 
other as they do towards the European Union, as happened 
in the case of CARIFORUM. The provisions of such an 
agreement would almost certainly go well beyond those 
contained in today’s regional integration schemes in Latin 
America, as they would cover liberalization of services and 
investments and contain important regulatory commitments, 
for example, regarding intellectual property rights and 
competition policy. This means that it may become easier 
for the countries of Latin America, to incorporate these 
critical issues into their regional integration processes.
21
 Thus, the current Regional Strategy for Central America focuses 
on strengthening the institutional system for the process of Central 
American integration; reinforcement of the regional economic integration 
process and strengthening regional security. In the Caribbean region, 
the European Union’s assistance programme has the implementation 
of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy as one of its main 
objectives. The Regional Strategy for the Andean Community 
highlights establishment of a fully functioning Andean Common 
Market and facilitation of European Union-Andean Community 
negotiations for an association agreement. Finally, in December 2007 
the EU approved an assistance packaged for € 50 million providing 
support in order to strengthen MERCOSUR institutions. 
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Chapter VI
Latin America and the Caribbean and  
Asia-Pacific in search of closer  
trade and investment relations
Introduction
Although trade and investment between Latin America and the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific 
region have recovered since the Asian crisis and are continuing to expand, thanks especially to 
the recent upsurge in trade flows with China, biregional economic links generally remain weak 
and show little diversification. For most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Asia-Pacific region is still a largely unexploited market despite its impressive record in 
areas such as growth, international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology upgrading 
and innovation capacities, as well as its continuously expanding foreign reserves. The present 
dynamic aggregate demand of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, especially China, offers 
Latin America and the Caribbean unprecedented production and export opportunities, both in 
commodities and in manufactures. The Latin American and Caribbean region’s authorities should 
thus redouble their efforts to identify and capitalize on such new opportunities to enhance their 
countries’ potential complementarities with the Asia-Pacific region.
A number of important events have been organized in 
recent years to address the nature and scope of cooperation 
between the two regions. However, these initiatives have 
stopped short of institutionalizing high-level political 
talks or implementing plans and programmes aimed 
at strengthening economic, political and cultural ties. 
There is a lack of awareness about the importance of 
biregional trade and investment, and there have been 
few coordinated strategies between countries or regional 
groupings for seeking closer trade and investment links 
with the Asia-Pacific region. Approaches to that region 
by Latin America and the Caribbean have thus far been 
sporadic and piecemeal, and have chiefly been confined 
to the conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements.
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Until recently, Asia-Pacific regional integration has 
centred around its burgeoning intraregional trade flows, 
which are being driven by the increasing production 
and trade complementarities of the different countries’ 
manufacturing sectors. Intra-industry trade (IIT) (i.e., 
cases where a country both imports and exports similar 
but not identical products) has expanded significantly 
as the specific advantages of production and marketing 
chains are exploited more effectively. This de facto 
(market-led) integration process in the Asia-Pacific region 
is now being reinforced by de jure (government-led) 
integration, and strong production and trade relations are 
being complemented by free trade agreements of various 
types aimed at consolidating such links.
To take full advantage of Asia’s trade and investment 
dynamic, Latin America and the Caribbean must, as a 
matter of urgency, reorient and realign its relations with 
the Asia-Pacific region in order to sustain its commodity 
exports while producing more value added and more 
technologically complex manufactures for that market. The 
strategy in this regard should be to: (i) promote the Latin 
American and Caribbean region’s participation in Asian 
supply chains with a view to boosting the value added and 
technology/knowledge content of its exports (including 
its exports of natural-resource-based products (the de facto 
approach); and (ii) implement instruments such as free trade 
agreements in order to address market-access problems 
(the de jure approach). The public and private sectors must 
both be prepared to allow their companies to build ties 
with successful Asian firms by forming part of the supply 
chains for their production and distribution units, including 
those of the natural-resource-based manufactures that are 
currently being exported to the Asia-Pacific region.
The call for greater biregional business alliances 
also applies to Asia-Pacific countries, which are global 
players in the market for technology-intensive goods and 
other sectors such as footwear, textiles and apparel, and 
electronics. Asia-Pacific competes directly with North 
American, European and Latin American firms in the Latin 
American market. The strategic position of the Asia-Pacific 
region in relation to other suppliers suggests that, in order 
to secure an even larger share of the Latin American and 
Caribbean market, Asia-Pacific countries need to strengthen 
their links with Latin American and Caribbean economies 
by building up alliances and promoting various forms of 
mutually beneficial business cooperation. Achieving this 
goal will require a deeper knowledge, on their part, of 
Latin American and Caribbean markets.
A.  Latin America and the Caribbean and  
 Asia-Pacific in the world economy
The regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-
Pacific encompass widely diverse countries in terms of 
population, economic scale, geographical location, stage 
of development, and cultural backgrounds, although the 
more densely populated and highly developed countries 
are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. According 
to estimates for 2007, these regions together account 
for more than 2.5 billion inhabitants, or 60% of world 
population: 51% in Asia-Pacific and 9% in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. China alone accounts for 21% of the 
world total, while India’s share is about 18%.
Total Asia-Pacific GDP in current prices is estimated 
at US$ 11,134 billion for 2007, or more than 20% of 
world GDP, while Latin America and the Caribbean 
contributes approximately 6%. Measured in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP), these region’s relative 
share of world output is even greater at close to 28% 
and 8%, respectively. Moreover, in terms of PPP, the 
GDP of Asia-Pacific surpasses that of the United 
States or the European Union (see table VI.1).1 In sum, 
regardless of the measure considered, Asia-Pacific, 
especially developing Asia, is already a formidable 
regional grouping worldwide.
Asia-Pacific’s share of world GDP has increased at 
an impressive rate. Among the countries in that region, 
China stands out; despite the downscaling of the PPP by 
IMF in 2008, that economy still accounts for almost 11% 
of world output. The rest of developing Asia represents 
another 10% of world output when measured in PPP. 
Asia-Pacific as a whole is projected to sustain high 
growth rates and to increase its share of world total in 
the near future.
1 Asia-Pacific includes both developed and developing countries of 
vastly different economic strengths, and as a result, the region’s 
combined GDP is unequally distributed; four countries, Japan, 
China, Republic of Korea and Australia each accounted for slightly 
more than 18% and 20% of world output in 2007, as measured in 
nominal dollars or purchasing power parity, respectively.
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Table VI.1
SHARE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND ASIA-PACIFIC IN WORLD GDP
(Percentages of world total in current dollars and purchasing power parity)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2010 (projections)
Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP Nominal PPP
European Union 24.5 28.0 31.4 27.3 31.0 26.2 26.7 25.3 30.6 23.4 31.0 22.7 30.0 21.4
United States 32.7 23.1 25.4 22.8 25.0 23.1 30.8 23.6 27.7 22.3 25.5 21.3 22.6 19.7
Asia-Pacific a 18.4 18.5 19.8 20.4 25.4 23.6 23.3 24.3 20.9 26.7 20.5 28.0 22.0 30.2
Japan 10.6 8.5 13.3 9.1 17.9 8.8 14.7 7.7 10.2 7.0 8.1 6.6 7.7 6.2
Australia 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Developing Asia b 6.4 8.6 4.8 10.0 6.1 13.4 7.3 15.1 8.9 18.4 10.5 20.0 12.3 22.8
Newly industrialized 
Asian economies c 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.7 3.1 3.7 3.1 3.8
Republic of Korea 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.9
China 2.4 2.9 1.7 3.6 2.5 5.7 3.8 7.2 5.0 9.6 6.0 10.8 7.4 12.7
India 1.7 2.5 1.4 2.8 1.2 3.2 1.5 3.7 1.7 4.2 2.0 4.6 2.2 5.2
Latin America and the  
Caribbean 5.8 9.0 5.0 8.3 5.9 8.8 6.3 8.6 5.6 8.2 6.4 8.3 6.8 8.3
Africa 2.2 3.1 1.8 2.9 1.4 2.7 1.4 2.7 1.8 3.0 2.0 3.1 2.3 3.3
Central and Eastern Europe 3.0 4.7 2.4 4.3 1.9 3.8 2.1 3.7 2.9 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.5 4.1
Commonwealth of Independent 
States 6.8 7.7 6.9 7.6 1.4 4.0 1.1 3.6 2.2 4.2 3.1 4.5 4.5 4.8
Middle East 2.8 3.6 1.9 3.2 1.6 3.4 2.0 3.5 2.3 3.7 2.6 3.8 3.1 4.0
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database [online], 
April 2008.
a  Asia-Pacific consists of developing Asia plus Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
b  For the definition of developing Asia, see International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, 2008, Washington, D.C., April 2008. 
c  Newly industrialized Asian economies consist of Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.
The importance of Asia-Pacific is becoming abundantly 
clear, not only with regard to production and world trade, 
but also in terms of global finance. The countries in this 
region are the main economies sustaining the increasing 
current account deficits of the United States (US$ 740 billion 
in 2007) and the European Union (US$ 220 billion) (see 
figure VI.1). The current account surplus of Japan, China 
and the Asian newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong 
SAR, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province 
of China) in 2007 was US$ 213 billion, US$ 361 billion 
and US$ 102 billion, respectively. The sum of the surpluses 
recorded by Japan, China, Asian newly industrialized 
economies and ASEAN (5), US$ 727 billion, was practically 
enough to cover the current account deficit of the United 
States in that year. China’s surplus alone was greater than 
that of the Middle East, which stood at US$ 275 billion. 
Latin America and the Caribbean reported a surplus of 
US$ 16 billion in that year.
The countries of developing Asia, including the 
newly industrialized economies, are also significant net 
capital importers from a wide cross-section of sources 
worldwide. In 2007, this region was the largest importer 
of capital as a group among the developing countries and 
the economies in transition. In 2007, net capital inflows 
into emerging Asia totalled US$ 194 billion. This figure 
includes net private direct investment of US$ 91 billion, 
net private portfolio investment of US$ 18 billion and 
other private capital flows of US$ 85 billion. Official 
outflows amounted to US$ 38 billion and the variation 
(reduction) in reserves was US$ 669 billion. 
Not only China and Japan but also the newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs), and to a lesser extent, ASEAN, provide 
the United States with cheap savings, keep interest rates 
low and accumulate international reserves through the 
purchase of Treasury bonds, thus helping to finance its 
current account deficit. As at February 2008, Japan and China 
held US$ 587 billion and US$ 487 billion, respectively, in 
United States Treasury bonds, (see figure VI.2). Nine of the 
top 27 holders of United States Treasury securities (mainly 
T-bonds and notes) are of Asian origin. Not only Japan 
and China but also Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand, appear 
among the top 20. The major holders in Latin America are 
Brazil and Mexico, the former being the fourth largest, with 
a sum of US$ 147 billion. The Caribbean financial centres, 
as a group, hold just over US$ 100 billion.
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Figure VI.1
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1 500
United States European Union
Japan China
Newly industrialized Asian economies ASEAN (5)
Africa Central and Eastern Europe
Commonwealth of Independent States Middle East
Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 
Database [online] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/ 
WEOApr2008all.xls.
Note: ASEAN (5) includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam 
and excludes Singapore, which is included among the newly industrialized 
Asian economies (Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
Province of China).
Figure VI.2
TOP 27 FOREIGN HOLDERS OF UNITED STATES  



























































Source: United States Department of the Treasury [online] www.ustreas.gov.
a  Include Algeria, Bahrain, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates.
Asian countries are also the major holders of foreign 
reserves worldwide: Asia, including Japan, accounts for 
60% of world reserves minus gold. The share of China alone 
was roughly 24% at the end of 2007, at US$ 1.53 trillion 
(see table VI.2). The seven Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) accounted for 9% 
of the world stock of foreign reserves. The amount in the 
hands of Chinese authorities is continuing to rise: as of 
March 2008, Chinese reserves exceeded US$ 1.682 trillion, 
surpassing those of Japan (US$1.016 trillion). While capital 
inflows to Asia, particularly portfolio inflows, have often 
been seen as temporary, current account surpluses tend to 
endure and have a lasting effect on the exchange rate.
Table VI.2
STOCK OF FOREIGN RESERVES (MINUS GOLD),  
DECEMBER 2007 a
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
 Stock Percentage 
world share
Asia 2 917 45.2
China 1 530 23.7
India  267 4.1
Republic of Korea 262 4.1
Taiwan Province of China 270 4.2
Other Asia b 587 9.1
Latin America c 400 6.2
Central Europe d 121 1.9
Russian Federation 464 7.2
Middle East e 149 2.3
Total emerging 
markets (8) 4 051 62.8
Japan 953 14.8
Total world 6 446 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
calculations on the basis of information from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Financial Statistics.
a Cumulative sum for 2007, in billions of United States dollars. Aggregates are the 
sum of the economies’ reserves.
b Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
c Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru.
d The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
e Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Countries in both regions are highly integrated into 
the international trading system. Asia-Pacific accounted 
for 28% of world merchandise exports and 23% of world 
services exports in 2007, respectively (see figure VI.3 and 
table VI.3). Meanwhile, the corresponding shares for Latin 
America and the Caribbean were approximately 6% and 
3%, respectively, in that year. At present, Asia-Pacific 
trade is almost four and a half times as great as that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean.2 As analysed later, this 
dynamic growth has resulted in strong intra-Asia-Pacific 
2 World merchandise exports and imports stood at US$ 13.57 trillion 
and US$ 13.94 trillion in 2007, respectively, an increase in value 
of approximately 15% over 2006. With respect to services, which 
represent almost 20% of world trade in goods and services, the Asian 
shares are also high although their share of exports of services is 
slightly lower than their share of total exports. 
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trade, which accounted for 11.0% of world exports and 
12.8% of world imports in 2006. 
In 2007, China became the world’s second largest 
exporter of goods, surpassing the United States. The four 
newly industrialized Asian economies contributed 7% of 
world exports and imports, while the ASEAN group’s total 
exports and imports amounted to US$ 863 billion and 
US$ 773 billion, respectively, exceeding the total of Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a group. The share of Latin 
America and the Caribbean still remains below 6%. 
Figure VI.3
SHARE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND ASIA-PACIFIC IN WORLD MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 2007
(a) Merchandise exports (b) Services exports
World goods 
exports in 2007
(US$ 13.57 trillion) 
Asia 
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Latin America and 
the Caribbean
3.3% 
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), “World Trade 2007, Prospects for 2008”, Press Release (Press/520/rev.2), 17 April 2008.
(a) Merchandise exports
Countries/regions Value (billions 
of dollars)
Share in total 





Asia 3 798 83.2 28.0
Japan 713 15.6 5.3
China 1 218 26.7 9.0
Republic of Korea 372 8.1 2.7
Taiwan Province of China 246 5.4 1.8
Singapore (domestic 
exports) 156 3.4 1.1
India 145 3.2 1.1
Other Asia 1 194 26.1 8.8
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 768 16.8 5.7
Brazil 161 3.5 1.2
Mexico 272 6.0 2.0
Other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries 335 7.3 2.5
Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean 4 566 100.0 33.6
World 13 570 ... 100.0
Table VI.3
SHARE OF ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE, 2007
(b) Services exports
Countries/regions Value (billions 
of dollars)
Share in total 





Asia 745 87.3 22.9
Japan 136 15.9 4.2
China 127 14.9 3.9
Newly industrialized 
economies a 243 28.5 7.5
India 86 10.1 2.6
Other Asia 153 17.9 4.7
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 108 12.7 3.3
Brazil 23 2.7 0.7
Mexico 17 2.0 0.5
Other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries 68 8.0 2.1
Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean 853 100.0 26.2
World 3 260 ... 100.0
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), “World Trade 2007, Prospects for 2008”, Press Release (Press/520/Rev.1), 17 April 2008.
a  Newly industrialized economies comprise Hong Kong SAR, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.
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The share of Asia-Pacific countries in world merchandise 
exports continued to increase in the past two decades, from 
18.0% in 1985-1990 on average to 20.6% in 1991-1995 
and 22.5% in 2001-2006. The share of Latin America and 
the Caribbean rose slightly, to stand at just over 5% in the 
present decade, with the most remarkable performance 
coming from Mexico. With respect to Asia-Pacific, China’s 
expansion has been the most noteworthy, while the shares 
of the three developed economies in the region, Australia, 
Japan and New Zealand, show a decline (see figure VI.4). 
Figure VI.4
CHANGES IN SHARE OF WORLD TRADE BETWEEN 1991-1995 AND 2001-2006
(a) Asia-Pacific (b) Latin America and the Caribbean






































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database].
The importance of trade development is illustrated 
by the recovery process from the sharp recessions 
experienced around the years 1997-1999 in both 
regions. Asia bounced back rapidly after the dot.com 
calamity in 2001 and maintained and increased both 
inter-and intraregional exports and imports; those of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, which recovered at 
a more moderate pace, stagnated in 2000. The Asian 
financial crisis had a significant impact on intraregional 
trade in Latin America.
Developing countries have been absorbing an increasing 
share of world FDI —about 35% of world totals, up from 
25% in 1990. In the 1970s, Latin America accounted 
for 40% of FDI inflows into developing countries. In 
the second half of the 1990s, when national firms were 
privatized, Latin America once again became one of 
the major choices for investors. Developing Asia has 
since taken over from Latin America as the destination 
of choice for foreign investors, and absorbed about half 
of the FDI flowing into developing countries in the first 
half of the 1990s and more than 40% in the second half 
of the decade. 
According to the UNCTAD database, inward FDI into 
Asia-Pacific (15) has increased steadily over the years, 
averaging US$ 110 billion per year during 2000 and 2006, 
almost twice the amount recorded during the 1990s. More 
than half of this total was invested in China. Meanwhile, 
Australia, Singapore and other ASEAN countries, together 
with the Republic of Korea, have emerged as important 
FDI recipients (see table VI.4). As of 2006, cumulative 
FDI in Asia-Pacific exceeded US$ 1.2 trillion, equivalent 
to 10% of world FDI stock. The corresponding figures 
for Latin America and the Caribbean are also impressive: 
an annual average inflow of about US$ 63 billion in the 
current decade. 
Inward FDI to Latin America and the Caribbean 
increased by 1.5% compared with 2005 to stand at US$ 72.4 
billion. Mexico, the leading recipient, attracted as much as 
US$ 19.0 billion, reflecting an increase of 20.8%, while 
investment in Brazil expanded by 24.7% to US$ 18.8 
billion. An interesting trend relating to Latin American FDI 
is that the sources of inward FDI have recently become 
more diversified, with investment from Spain, the major 
investor in the region, on the decline, while investment in 
resources-related industries and service-related operations, 
financed mainly by firms of the region itself, is on the 
rise, resulting in the emergence of trans-Latins. Their 
stock at the end of 2006, estimated at US$906 billion, 
represented 7.6% of the world total. In short, FDI flows 
into Asia-Pacific, especially to China and ASEAN, are 
continuing to increase. Latin America and the Caribbean’s 
share of total inflows to developing countries is gradually 
shrinking, with higher concentrations of that share being 
invested in Brazil, Mexico and Chile.
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Table VI.4
STOCK OF INWARD FDI TO ASIA-PACIFIC AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,  
1980, 1990, 2000 AND 2006
(Billions of dollars)
1980 1990 2000 2006 World (percentage)
Asia-Pacific (15) 51.7 180.5 681.1 1 200.5 10.0
Australia 24.8 73.6 111.1 246.2 2.1
Brunei Darussalam 0.0 0.0 3.9 9.9 0.1
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.0 0.0
China 1.1 20.7 193.3 292.6 2.4
Indonesia 4.7 8.9 24.8 19.1 0.2
Japan 3.3 9.9 50.3 107.6 0.9
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 0.0
Malaysia 5.2 10.3 52.7 53.6 0.4
Myanmar 0.0 0.3 3.9 5.0 0.0
New Zealand 2.4 7.9 24.9 63.1 0.5
Philippines 1.3 3.3 12.8 17.1 0.1
Republic of Korea 1.3 5.2 38.1 71.0 0.6
Singapore 5.4 30.5 112.6 210.1 1.8
Thailand 1.0 8.2 29.9 68.1 0.6
Viet Nam 1.4 1.6 20.6 33.5 0.3
Latin America and Caribbean 35.0 105.0 480.6 906.1 7.6
Argentina 5.3 8.8 67.6 58.6 0.5
Bolivia 0.4 1.0 5.2 4.8 0.0
Brazil 17.5 37.2 103.0 221.9 1.8
Chile 0.9 10.1 45.8 80.7 0.7
Colombia 1.1 3.5 11.0 44.8 0.4
Costa Rica 0.5 1.3 2.7 6.8 0.1
Cuba 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Dominican Republic 0.2 0.6 1.7 5.6 0.0
Ecuador 0.7 1.6 7.1 16.1 0.1
El Salvador 0.2 0.2 2.0 4.4 0.0
Guatemala 0.7 1.7 3.4 4.9 0.0
Honduras 0.0 0.3 1.4 3.0 0.0
Mexico -2.0 22.4 97.2 228.6 1.9
Nicaragua 0.1 0.1 1.4 2.7 0.0
Panama 2.5 2.3 6.7 12.8 0.1
Paraguay 0.2 0.4 1.3 1.6 0.0
Peru 0.9 1.3 11.1 19.4 0.2
Uruguay 0.4 0.7 2.1 4.4 0.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.6 3.9 35.5 45.4 0.4
Caribbean a 3.8 7.5 74.5 139.6 1.2
Developing countries 140.4 364.8 1 778.9 3 545.0 29.5
World 551.2 1 779.2 5 810.2 11 998.8 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the database of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD).
a  Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada.
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B.  Trade and investment links between Latin America 
 and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific
1.  An overview of biregional trade
Trade between Latin America and the Caribbean and 
the Asia-Pacific region has recovered after two years 
of stagnation (1998-1999) following the Asian crisis, 
and is expanding steadily. The Asia-Pacific region3 
has also become a very important trading partner for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in terms 
of the latter’s imports. In 2006, exports to the Asia-
Pacific region from Latin America and the Caribbean4 
amounted to US$ 58.2 billion, representing 8.9 % of 
the region’s total exports; while Asia-Pacific imports 
totalled US$ 126.9 billion with a 22.3% share. In the 
same year, the United States’ share of exports from Latin 
America was 48.6%, while the European Union (27 
member States) accounted for 13.4%. With respect to 
imports, the United States and the European Union (27) 
provided 34.3% and 13.3% respectively of the region’s 
imports. As a trading partner for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Asia-Pacific region is thus much more 
important as a source of imports than as a destination 
for exports, and this has generated a growing trade 
deficit with that region since 1992, amounting to US$ 
69 billion in 2006.
The importance of Asia-Pacific as an export 
market is not the same for all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. The MERCOSUR countries with 
the exception of Paraguay have relied heavily on that 
market since the beginning of the present decade. On 
the other hand, the Asia-Pacific share of trade with the 
Andean Community expanded in the mid 1990s, but 
has since declined, dropping to 5% or less in 2007. 
The exception, Peru, continues to export substantial 
3 Unless indicated otherwise, the Asia-Pacific region encompasses 
the group of 12 countries and territories consisting of Australia, 
China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of 
China, Singapore and Thailand. For statistical reasons, the figures 
cited here do not include the other members of ASEAN (Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar and Viet Nam).
4 Unless indicated otherwise, Latin America and the Caribbean 
consists of 33 of the countries in the region. 
volumes to that region. Exports from Central American 
countries to Asia-Pacific have been flat, accounting for 
less than 4% of their total shipments, except in the case 
of Costa Rica which ships more than 20% of its total 
exports to that market.
In contrast, following a sharp contraction in 1998 
as a consequence of the Asian crisis, Chile’s exports to 
the region have been picking up steadily and accounted 
for 40% of the country’s total in 2007. Brazil, the largest 
exporter to Asia-Pacific in absolute terms, saw its share 
rise to 16% in the same year. Interestingly, in the case of 
Mexico, the relative importance of Asia-Pacific remains 
low; the bulk of exports from Mexico and the Central 
American countries are sold to the United States, the 
main trading partner for these countries. The latter have, 
however, signed trade agreements with a number of 
Asia-Pacific countries, in an effort to diversify into this 
market. Asia-Pacific has not been a major destination for 
exports from the Caribbean countries, Jamaica being an 
important exception.
Behind this dynamic trade between the two regions, 
China is playing an increasing role in both exports and 
imports, rapidly displacing Japan as Asia-Pacific’s main 
trading partner with Latin America and the Caribbean 
since the start of the decade, notwithstanding Japan’s 
slight recovery in recent years on the export side (ECLAC, 
2007b). In addition, the ASEAN group (5) has gained a 
share similar to that of the Republic of Korea as a source 
of imports for Latin America and the Caribbean and as a 
destination for exports originating there.
An analysis by regions and sectors by technological 
intensity finds that almost half of all Asia-Pacific exports 
went to other countries within that same region in 2006, 
while other markets such as the United States, the 
European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean 
were secondary export destinations (see table VI.5). What 
is most striking is that, regardless of export destination, 
the Asia-Pacific export basket consists primarily of 
manufactures, especially products in the medium- and 
high-technology categories. Patterns of intra-Asia-Pacific 
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Table VI.5






























China Japan Others Total
Primary products 0.1 0.5 0.6 4.5 0.8 1.7 1.3 7.0 3.0 2.6 4.3 9.3 9.2 21.1 8.2 7.0
NRB manufactures 0.3 1.4 1.4 7.6 1.4 1.3 2.0 12.6 7.1 7.8 9.5 15.5 15.8 16.7 13.2 12.6
Low-technology 
manufactures 0.6 3.9 2.8 6.3 0.7 1.5 3.3 17.0 17.0 22.0 19.5 12.9 8.0 19.4 21.8 17.0
Medium-technology 
manufactures 1.6 6.2 4.3 12.3 2.7 1.3 6.1 30.6 45.1 34.7 29.9 25.3 30.5 16.4 39.8 30.6
High-technology 
manufactures 0.8 5.5 4.8 16.3 2.9 1.8 2.4 29.9 23.3 30.9 33.4 33.5 32.8 23.2 15.9 29.9
Other transactions 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.7 2.9 4.1 1.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 1.0 4.8 2.9
Total 3.6 17.9 14.5 48.7 8.7 7.9 15.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Latin America and the Caribbean
Primary products 3.5 12.6 5.8 5.6 2.2 1.7 7.3 34.8 20.9 26.5 46.1 58.5 61.8 73.0 54.5 34.8
NRB manufactures 4.0 5.7 3.6 2.3 0.8 0.4 2.5 18.1 23.7 12.0 28.9 23.8 22.8 17.8 18.7 18.1
Low-technology 
manufactures 1.9 5.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 8.4 11.5 10.7 5.2 3.5 3.7 1.0 2.7 8.4
Medium-technology 
manufactures 5.5 14.2 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.3 23.8 33.0 29.7 15.0 8.9 6.9 6.3 10.0 23.8
High-technology 
manufactures 1.6 9.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.6 12.5 9.8 19.3 4.4 5.1 4.8 1.8 4.5 12.5
Other transactions 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.4 1.2 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 9.6 2.4
Total 16.7 47.8 12.5 9.6 3.6 2.3 13.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a  Latin America and the Caribbean consists of 33 countries in the region. 
b  The European Union includes 15 countries.
c  Asia-Pacific includes Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong SAR.
trade show that “high” and “medium” technology 
products already account for roughly 60% of the total 
and are continuing to gain ground. These categories of 
products, together with other manufactures, also account 
for a significant (albeit lower) proportion of total exports 
traded intraregionally within Latin America and the 
Caribbean (approximately 43%). 
In contrast, trade between the two regions is 
typically inter-industrial, with Latin America and the 
Caribbean exporting basically primary products to 
Asia-Pacific, which, in turn, exports relatively high-
technology manufactures to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In general, the share of manufactures of 
differing technological intensity (low, medium or high) 
is very small and contrasts starkly with the structure of 
Latin American intraregional trade, which includes a 
high component of medium-technology products. This 
contrasting production and trade specialization by the 
two regions seems to be partially responsible for a low 
level of reciprocal foreign direct investment.
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2.  Country concentration
Exports by the Latin American and Caribbean region to 
Asia-Pacific, including India, are highly concentrated 
in just a few countries. During the period 2004-2006, 
on average, five countries accounted for almost 92% 
of all Latin American and Caribbean exports to Asia-
Pacific: Brazil (35%), Chile (28%), Argentina (14%), 
Mexico (9%) and Peru (7%). These shares have 
not changed substantially over the last two decades 
(Kuwayama, 2001). Within the region, Mexico and the 
MERCOSUR countries, particularly Brazil, are major 
importers from Asia-Pacific. The most striking feature 
of regional imports from the Asia-Pacific region is the 
rapidly increasing share of Mexico, which represented 
roughly 53% of total imports from that region during 
this period, compared with 25% at the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
Mexico has become the largest importer from all the 
Asian partners (i.e., Japan, China, Republic of Korea, 
ASEAN, combined share of Australia and New Zealand, 
and India). The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) is considered to be the major factor behind 
this dynamism. In fact, in terms of imports, China has 
become Mexico’s second trading partner after the United 
States. Meanwhile, the share of the rest of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries is very small. As a result, in 
geographical terms, regional imports from Asia-Pacific are 
even more concentrated than its exports: these countries, 
namely, Mexico and Brazil, account for nearly 70 % of 
the total. Chile and Peru play a much less substantial 
role as importers from Asia-Pacific than as exporters to 
that region.
As shown in figure VI.5, some countries of the region 
rely heavily on Asia-Pacific, including India, as a trading 
partner, especially for their imports. In general, China 
accounts for a significant share of both exports and imports, 
while Japan is more visible in imports. Nonetheless, the 
share of the Republic of Korea and that of the ASEAN 
group (5) are moderately high for some countries.
Figure VI.5
SHARE OF ASIA-PACIFIC, INCLUDING INDIA, IN TOTAL LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN  
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, AVERAGE 2004-2006
(Percentages)
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Japan China Rep. of Korea 
ASEAN Australia/New Zealand India 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a The figures for the Dominican Republic relate to 2001.
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From the Asia-Pacific perspective, however, Latin 
America and the Caribbean has not been a major trading 
partner: during 2004 and 2006, on average, only 2.3% 
of total Asia-Pacific exports were shipped to the region, 
while only 2.7% of imports originated here (see figure 
VI.6).5 Moreover, there has been no significant change 
in these shares over the last two decades (Kuwayama, 
2001). For all the geographical groupings (Japan, China, 
Republic of Korea and the ASEAN group (5)) for which 
data are available, the share of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in total exports and imports of Asia-Pacific 
does not usually exceed 4%. Significant differences exist 
between countries, however. In average terms, Latin 
America and the Caribbean’s imports from Republic of 
Korea represent 3.9% of that country’s exports, higher 
than its share in any other Asia-Pacific country’s export 
market. As a provider for Asia-Pacific import markets,
5 In this analysis, data are derived from official figures reported by 
Asia-Pacific countries. Therefore, the trade flows calculated from 
the Asia-Pacific side do not correspond to those shown in the earlier 
sections of this report, which are based on trade data in which the 
countries of Latin America are used as reporters.
Figure VI.6
THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN REGION’S SHARE IN TOTAL ASIA-PACIFIC 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, AVERAGE 2004-2006
(Percentages)
(a) Exports (b) Imports






Rep. of Korea 
Andean Community (5) b CACM MERCOSUR
Chile Mexico Dominican Rep.
Andean Community (5) b CACM MERCOSUR
Chile Mexico Dominican Rep.




Rep. of Korea 
Japan
China
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a ASEAN (5) consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
b For the purposes of the present study, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is included in the Andean Community.
Latin America and the Caribbean accounts for a higher 
proportion of China’s imports (4%) than its share of 
any other Asia-Pacific country’s import market. Latin 
America and the Caribbean account for an extremely 
small percentage of the total exports and imports of 
the smaller economies in Asia-Pacific, such as those 
of ASEAN. 
In sum, regional trade is becoming more balanced 
among Asian exporter countries. Whereas Japan was 
the main trading partner (both supplier and buyer) from 
the region in the 1980s and 1990s, in recent years, 
China, Japan, Republic of Korea and ASEAN have each 
accounted for a substantial share of Latin American and 
Caribbean trade. China is now the dominant partner for 
both exports and imports, although in terms of imports 
into Latin America and the Caribbean from Asia-Pacific, 
its penetration is unparalleled.
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3.  Product concentration
The principal regional exports to Asia-Pacific are 
primary commodities and natural resource-based 
manufactures. Of the products shipped by the region 
to ASEAN (5)+3 (Japan, China and the Republic 
of Korea), those with the highest export values in 
2006 are highly concentrated in natural resources 
and resource-based processed products (ECLAC, 
2008). However, whereas the region has such a high 
concentration in a just a handful of products, ASEAN 
(5)+3 has achieved a high level of diversification of 
supply sources, sufficient to prevent the countries 
of the region from having strong bargaining power 
with respect to these products. There is significant 
competition with several developed economies and 
with neighbouring developing Asia-Pacific countries 
in mining, agricultural, fishery and forestry products, 
in respect of which Latin America traditionally enjoys 
comparative advantages.
It is important to note, however, that the list 
includes a number of new products, such as fishery 
products and pig meat, along with high-technology 
manufactures, including electronic microcircuits and 
telecommunications equipment and data-processing 
machinery. The presence of these manufactures products 
indicates that Latin America is gradually beginning to 
gain a foothold in the supply-chain networks existing 
in the Asia-Pacific region.
In stark contrast with this trend, Asia-Pacific exports 
to the region consist mainly of manufactures. They 
range from labour-intensive products to motor vehicles 
and electronics. The top 30 products imported by Latin 
America and the Caribbean from ASEAN (5)+3 in 2006 
accounted for 54% of the value of total Latin American 
and Caribbean imports from Asia-Pacific in that year. 
Another interesting feature of these 30 products is the 
importance of Asia-Pacific and North American countries 
as exporters to the Latin American region. Despite the 
predominant role of the United States as the principal 
exporter of many products, Asia-Pacific has a strong 
market presence. Also noticeable is the presence of some 
Latin American countries, namely Mexico and Brazil, 
as alternative sources of imports for passenger motor 
vehicles and parts, and several electric and non-electronic 
products, which reflects the increasing importance of 
Latin America in intraregional trade and the relevance 
of intra-industry trade in manufactures.
The above confirms that Asia-Pacific countries are 
strong players in the market for technology-intensive 
goods. In several other sectors, such as footwear and 
textiles and apparel and electronics products, the region 
competes directly with Latin American countries in the 
Latin American market and third-country markets. The 
strategic position of Asia-Pacific in relation to other 
suppliers suggests that to secure an even higher share of 
the Latin American market, Asia- Pacific countries need 
to strengthen their links further with Latin American 
economies by building up alliances and promoting various 
types of business cooperation. Achieving this goal in 
turn requires a deeper knowledge of Latin American 
markets. Meanwhile, the strong position of the United 
States and several Latin American countries in many 
manufactured product groups underlines the challenges 
for Asia-Pacific countries in maintaining or expanding 
their market shares under existing free trade agreements 
with the United States or the European Union. In the 
absence of a similar international trade arrangement with 
Asia-Pacific countries, these agreements with the North 
could lead to a relative deterioration in market-access 
conditions for Asia-Pacific exports to Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
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C.  Divergent patterns of de facto integration in and 
 between the two regions
As many Asian experts point out (e.g., ADB, 2007; Kawai 
and Wignaraja, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Ando and Kimura, 
2005), trade ties between Asia-Pacific economies are 
increasingly characterized by burgeoning intra-industry 
trade (IIT), based on the increasingly complementary 
production and trade components of the different countries’ 
manufacturing sectors. This type of trade has expanded 
significantly as the specific advantages of productive and 
marketing chains have been exploited more effectively. 
The Asia-Pacific region thereby has become “factory Asia” 
for the rest of the world. IIT has entailed an increasingly 
broad and complementary group in which development is 
disseminated in concentric circles, thanks to intra-industry 
regional trade and intraregional foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In addition, this process of de facto (market-led) 
integration in Asia-Pacific is now being supported by de 
jure (government-led) integration, and strong production 
and trade relations are being complemented by free trade 
agreements of various types that aim to consolidate those 
links. In view of these trends, Latin America and the 
Caribbean needs to strengthen its trade links to make 
its production more complementary with that of Asia-
Pacific, and establish trade and investment partnerships, 
in addition to trade agreements, which would provide 
new access to these markets and help them integrate into 
Asian production and export chains.
1.  Limited but increasing Intra-Industry Trade (IIT)  
 between the two regions
A key element in the structuring of Asia-Pacific over 
the last decade relates to technological development 
and the possible fragmentation of the production 
chain, which triggered a sharp increase in Asian 
intraregional trade. The intra-Asian trade coefficient 
for the countries of ASEAN+3 plus Hong Kong SAR 
and Taiwan Province of China, grew from 43% in 
the early 1990s to 55% in 2006 (see table VI.6). This 
indicator surpasses the level of intraregional trade 
attained by the countries of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and is rapidly approaching 
that displayed by the European Union. Trade among 
members of ASEAN (10) has increased and surpasses 
the 16%, 9% and 11% attained by MERCOSUR, the 
Andean Community and the Central American Common 
Market (CACM), respectively, in 2006. This expansion 
of intra-Asian trade has been driven partly by the 
robust growth of intra-firm and intra-industry trade, 
thanks to the construction of a complex network of 
vertical supply chains by transnational corporations, 
in which China plays a fundamental role as both origin 
and destination. 
Intra-Asia-Pacific trade has been characterized by a 
strong and increasing presence of products categorized as 
being of “high” and “medium” technology-intensity and 
which account for more than 59% of the total (see table 
VI.5). However, this overall picture of the region as a world 
export platform of medium- and high-technology intensity 
manufactures masks the wide diversity that exists among 
Asia-Pacific countries (see table VI.7). Primary products 
and natural resource-based manufactures account for a 
significant proportion of exports from Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, New Zealand and Viet Nam. 
Countries such as China, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, and to a lesser degree, 
Thailand, determine the overall picture of Asia-Pacific as 
the world factory for manufactures worldwide. The low-
technology sector, which includes textiles and apparel, 
is still a significant segment of manufactures exports for 
several countries in that region.
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Table VI.6
ASIAN INTRAREGIONAL TRADE, BY GEOGRAPHICAL GROUPING a
(Percentages of the region’s total trade)
Region 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2006
Within ASEAN (10) 17.9 20.3 18.8 24.0 24.7 26.6 27.2
Within ASEAN+3 30.2 30.2 29.4 37.6 37.3 39.0 38.3
Within ASEAN+3+Hong Kong SAR+ 
Taiwan Province of China 34.1 37.1 43.1 51.9 52.1 55.4 54.5
Memo: European Union (27) 61.5 60.0 66.8 66.9 66.3 68.1 65.8
NAFTA 33.8 38.7 37.9 43.1 48.8 47.4 44.3
MERCOSUR 11.1 7.2 10.9 19.2 20.7 14.7 15.7
Andean Community (5) b ... 3.3 5.4 12.4 10.8 10.8 9.1
CACM ... n.a. 12.1 15.6 17.5 17.6 ...
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a  The share in intraregional trade is defined as the percentage of intraregional trade with respect to total trade of the region in question, based on export data. It is calculated as 
follows: Xii /{(Xiw + Xwi)/2}, where Xii refers to exports that originate and remain within region i, Xiw represents exports from region i to the world, and Xwi represents world 
exports to region i. A higher percentage indicates a higher level of dependency on intraregional trade.
b The Andean Community (5) includes the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
Table VI.7
ASIA-PACIFIC: EXPORT STRUCTURE BY TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITY, BY COUNTRY, 2006
(Percentages)










Australia 61.2 18.5 3.6 10.6 6.2 100.0
Brunei Darussalam a 96.6 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.5 100.0
Cambodia b 3.0 0.8 95.0 0.9 0.2 100.0
China 3.1 9.5 31.8 22.1 33.4 100.0
Indonesia 36.2 24.7 17.3 13.2 8.6 100.0
Japan 0.4 8.8 7.9 57.5 25.3 100.0
Malaysia 12.9 15.3 8.8 17.7 45.3 100.0
New Zealand 42.8 32.6 8.0 11.2 5.4 100.0
Philippines 3.8 9.8 9.2 12.0 65.1 100.0
Republic of Korea 0.6 13.2 11.0 39.7 35.5 100.0
Singapore 1.1 21.0 5.8 19.1 53.0 100.0
Thailand 11.4 17.8 15.6 28.7 26.5 100.0
Viet Nam b 45.0 6.6 36.8 6.1 5.5 100.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE)
a  The figures for Brunei Darussalam refer to 2006 only.
b  The figures for Cambodia and Viet Nam refer to 2004 only.
Equal to or greater than 25%.
Greater than 15%, but less than 25%.
The expansion and deepening of supply chain 
networks in Asia-Pacific is observed in a wide range of 
industrial sectors that include not only manufactures but 
also natural resource-based products. A detailed analysis 
of the structure of intraregional trade in this region shows 
that of the 20 main products exported to the world in 
2006,6 four product categories, namely, electric machinery, 
apparatus and appliances, office machinery and automatic 
data-processing equipment, road vehicles, and precision 
6 Products are classified at the two-digit level of the Standard 
International Trade Classification – SITC, Rev. 2).
machinery, figure among the most important products 
exported within the region (see table VI.8). For example, 
close to 45% of total exports in electrical machinery takes 
place within the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, this sector 
accounted for almost 18% of total intraregional trade in 
that year.7 These sectors have been particularly dynamic 
in China; but, in general, export growth in all East and 
South-East Asian groupings far outpaced that of world 
trade in these products.
7 This finding is consistent with conclusions of other studies on Asian 
intraregional trade. The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2007) 
shows that at the global level, and for certain Asian groupings, the 
four machinery sectors in the two-digit Harmonized System (HS 
84, 85, 86-89 and 90-91) all display high growth rates.
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Table VI.8
ASIA-PACIFIC INTRAREGIONAL TRADE a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Rank Product description
Value of intra-Asia-Pacific exports
(millions of dollars)
Share of intra-Asia-Pacific 
exports in total regional exports
(percentages)
Share in total of intraregional 
trade (percentages)
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
1 Electrical machinery, apparatus  
and appliances 17 283 101 690 178 240 31.7 42.1 44.5 9.3 20.4 17.5
2 Petroleum, petroleum products  
and related materials 22 634 37 556 84 938 71.5 68.6 71.4 12.2 7.5 8.3
3 Office machines and automatic  data-processing machines 5 638 42 623 72 760 14.1 29.3 27.7 3.0 8.5 7.1
4
Telecommunications 
and sound recording and 
reproducing apparatus
8 571 25 651 56 365 17.5 26.9 23.7 4.6 5.1 5.5
5 Iron and steel 9 136 15 730 43 760 49.1 53.5 50.8 4.9 3.2 4.3
6 Road vehicles (including 
air cushion vehicles) 10 002 18 422 40 319 13.5 15.7 17.5 5.4 3.7 4.0
7
General industrial machinery and 
equipment, n.e.s. and machine  
parts, n.e.s.
7 219 14 858 33 299 35.4 35.1 36.6 3.9 3.0 3.3
8 Non-ferrous metals 4 838 10 524 32 180 56.5 53.7 57.1 2.6 2.1 3.2
9 Organic chemicals 3 478 11 362 32 121 39.8 44.6 49.9 1.9 2.3 3.2
10 Machinery specialized for particular industries 7 482 15 513 30 433 39.1 41.0 40.4 4.0 3.1 3.0
11 Artificial resins, plastic materials  
and cellulose 2 908 11 394 27 072 42.4 48.2 50.6 1.6 2.3 2.7
12 Professional, scientific and 
controlling device instruments 1 842 6 975 26 705 24.6 31.0 40.0 1.0 1.4 2.6
13 Articles of apparel and clothing 5 066 18 054 26 685 19.1 30.0 22.9 2.7 3.6 2.6
14 Metalliferous ores 
and metal scrap 3 445 5 873 26 044 42.3 50.6 67.3 1.9 1.2 2.6
15 Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 3 923 13 367 25 822 19.0 26.1 26.3 2.1 2.7 2.5
16
Textile yarn, fabrics, 
made-up articles, n.e.s. 
and related products
6 267 16 575 23 677 27.1 36.7 31.2 3.4 3.3 2.3
17 Gas, natural and manufactured 5 914 10 295 20 207 93.1 78.2 77.6 3.2 2.1 2.0
18 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s. 3 078 7 278 18 839 31.3 32.6 31.5 1.7 1.5 1.9
19 Power generating machinery 
and equipment 3 623 9 074 17 979 29.3 33.0 37.6 2.0 1.8 1.8
20 Coal, coke and briquettes 3 466 5 138 15 286 59.6 54.8 51.4 1.9 1.0 1.5
Other 49 202 119 294 205 736 ... ... ... 26.7 20.2 18.1
Total 185 015 498 824 1 018 260 … … … 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev.2 (two-digit level).
East Asia, especially the ASEAN+3 economies and 
Taiwan Province of China, is one of the most important IIT 
hubs in the world. According to the most recent calculations 
made by the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2007), the 
last decade witnessed high and rising coefficients of IIT in 
natural-resource-related sectors and also among technology- 
and human-capital-intensive sectors. Roughly half of the 
growth in IIT seen in East Asia between 1990 and 2003 
is attributable to an expansion of trade in the components 
and machine parts sector (Ando and Kimura, 2005) which 
has registered the fastest growth. East and South-East Asia 
thus jointly assume the mantle of “Factory Asia”.
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At a greater level of detail, roughly 60% of trade 
in machinery and transport equipment and in parts and 
components in Asia-Pacific takes place intraregionally 
(see figure VI.7),8 following a significant increase since 
the early 1990s. Latin America and the Caribbean, 
however, has much less intraregional trade in parts and 
components, though trade in machinery and transport
8 Machinery and transport equipment is the largest and most buoyant 
segment of manufactures exports, accounting for 37% of world 
merchandise exports and 53% of world manufactures exports in 
2006. Notably, 24% of world exports in machinery and transport 
equipment originate in Asian countries (WTO, 2008).
equipment registered a slight increase. IIT performance 
in these sectors has been much poorer in the region, 
even for the NAFTA countries, which have seen a slight 
decline in intraregional trade in parts and components. To 
attract greater investment into the region, Latin American 
countries need to promote supply chain networks in 
these sectors.
Figure VI.7
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE IN MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND  
IN PARTS AND COMPONENTS,a 1990 AND 2006
(Percentages)
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Parts and components a
1990 2006
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a The sector of machinery and transport equipment is defined as those products belonging to SITC code 7 (Rev. 2), while the definition of parts and components (51 groups of 
products classified at the 3 to 5 digits) are those that are not finished goods of the same SITC code 7 product category.
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Despite their image as exporters of primary products 
and natural-resource-based manufactures, when examined 
at the national level, the Latin American export structure 
is quite diverse (ECLAC, 2006). In fact, manufactured 
goods, especially in the low- and medium-technology 
categories, account for significant proportions of exports by 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica and, 
to a lesser degree, El Salvador and Guatemala. Substantial 
intra-industry trade flows take place among the member 
countries of MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and 
the Central American Common Market countries.
The trade of Asia-Pacific is relatively similar to 
that of Latin America in terms of product composition, 
with road vehicles, petroleum, iron and steel and 
several machinery products figuring among the top 20 
products (see table VI.9). These 20 products accounted 
for over 76% of total intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific 
in 2006. The coincidence of major intraregional trade 
products in Asia-Pacific and Latin America might 
suggest that bi-regional trade opportunities exist in 
these products.
Table VI.9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Rank Product description
Value of intra-Latin 
American exports
(millions of dollars)
Share of intra-Latin 
American exports in 
total regional exports
(percentages)
Share in total 
intraregional trade
(percentages)
1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006 1990 2000 2006
1 Road vehicles (incl. air cushion vehicles)  838 5 416 14 314 16.9 15.4 25.1 5.2 10.6 14.1
2 Petroleum, petroleum products 
and related materials 2 530 8 530 12 448 8.6 15.3 9.7 15.8 16.6 12.3
3 Non-ferrous metals  539 1 698 5 186 6.6 15.2 14.7 3.4 3.3 5.1
4 Telecommunications and sound 
recording equipment  93  945 4 660 18.2 4.5 13.0 0.6 1.8 4.6
5 Iron and steel  771 1 659 4 593 13.2 21.9 25.6 4.8 3.2 4.5
6 Artificial resins, plastic materials, cellulose  462 1 852 3 659 37.1 56.8 51.7 2.9 3.6 3.6
7 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap  493  835 3 569 9.4 8.9 9.4 3.1 1.6 3.5
8 Gas, natural and manufactured  288  662 3 086 57.1 94.3 90.3 1.8 1.3 3.0
9 Cereals and cereal preparations  834 2 179 3 083 46.1 58.9 50.9 5.2 4.2 3.0
10 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances  367 1 426 3 018 27.4 5.0 8.9 2.3 2.8 3.0
11 Paper, paperboard, pulp and related articles  319 1 622 2 456 26.0 52.4 49.1 2.0 3.2 2.4
12 Machinery specialized for particular industries  289  657 2 350 28.1 24.9 28.6 1.8 1.3 2.3
13 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  175 1 465 2 146 50.4 67.6 65.4 1.1 2.9 2.1
14 General industrial machinery and equipment  406 1 142 2 136 27.5 16.3 16.1 2.5 2.2 2.1
15 Miscellaneous manufactured articles  371 1 319 2 065 30.2 20.0 22.0 2.3 2.6 2.0
16 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles  426 1 479 1 902 21.7 31.0 37.6 2.7 2.9 1.9
17 Essential oils and perfume; toilet 
and cleansing preparations  132  953 1 881 45.5 55.4 58.4 0.8 1.9 1.9
18 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s.  341 1 044 1 872 31.0 19.3 22.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
19 Organic chemicals  464  995 1 820 26.4 30.0 24.4 2.9 1.9 1.8
20 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.  290  917 1 508 49.5 58.9 57.4 1.8 1.8 1.5
Other 5 585 14 478 23 639 ... ... ... 34.9 28.3 23.5
Total 16 013 51 273 101 391 … … … 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev.2 (two-digit level).
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However, in the case of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, natural-resource-based products account for a 
larger proportion of the total intraregional trade basket; in 
addition to petroleum-related products, there are substantial 
amounts of non-ferrous metals, natural gas, cereals, paper 
and paper products, chemicals and essential oils. Almost 
half of these products are exported within the region. The 
coefficients for machinery products are generally low, 
while those for medicinal and pharmaceutical products, 
another high-technology item, are quite high at 65%. 
There is also a substantial amount of intraregional trade 
in textiles and apparel.
A brief analysis of trends in IIT between 1990 and 
2006 in Asia-Pacific and Latin American countries, 
both intraregionally and with other regions of the world, 
indicates that there have been substantive changes over 
the years, especially in Asia-Pacific. This conclusion 
was based on Grubel Lloyd Index (GLI) calculations,9 
which indicated that:
• IIT has expanded over the years in both regions, 
from 0.13 to 0.20 in Latin America and from 0.22 
to 0.36 in Asia Pacific; 
• The strongest hikes in IIT coefficients are observed 
in Asia-Pacific;
• The IIT coefficients for bi-regional trade, though 
increasing, remain very low, not surpassing 0.05 
and 0.07; and 
• Each region’s IIT coefficient with the European 
Union and, most strikingly, the United States, has 
increased substantially.
Of the four patterns of IIT (see table VI.10), in more 
than 93% of the sectors analysed, most trade flows between 
the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America are inter-industrial 
rather than intra-industrial in nature, i.e., trade consists of 
exchanging primary or natural-resource-based products 
for manufactures. However, this general pattern, which is 
based on regional averages, hides considerable variations 
in trade among the countries or groups of countries within 
each region and between countries from both regions. 
9 This analysis of intra-industry trade (IIT) between Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific is based on the methodology by Grubel 
and Lloyd, (1975) that measures the degree of trade flows in the same 















where Xit and Mit are exports and imports of the product in 
question in the year t. The coefficient can take a value between 0 
and 1. The coefficient moves closer to 1 as the proportion of IIT 
increases. In this exercise, in order to capture substantive changes 
and differentiate the depth of IIT, three levels of GLI are adopted: 
first level: GLI > 0.33; second: GLI > 0.10 <0.33; and third: GLL 
< 0.10. The calculations are performed at the 3-digit SITC level, 
disaggregated into 233 product groups.
Table VI.10
ASIA-PACIFIC AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE WITHIN EACH REGION AND  















Latin America 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.23
Asia-Pacific 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.30
1995
Latin America 0.22 0.04 0.10 0.37
Asia-Pacific 0.04 0.30 0.26 0.37
2000
Latin America 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.44
Asia-Pacific 0.07 0.36 0.27 0.39
2006
Latin America 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.39
Asia-Pacific 0.07 0.36 0.26 0.27
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
Among the four regional groupings (Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Asia-Pacific, the United States and the 
European Union) considered, Asia-Pacific’s intraregional 
IIT shows the highest GLI, while its IIT with Latin America 
is by far the lowest. Countries such as China, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand each maintain a high GLI with each of 
their major trade partners. Australia and New Zealand 
also show a relatively high GLI with each major trade 
bloc (ECLAC, 2008). The preliminary findings cited here 
support the existing literature on the role that China and 
other emerging Asian countries are beginning to play in 
Asian regional integration (Wakasugi, 2007; IMF, 2007;10 
Ando, 2005; Kinoshita, 2004; Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 2003; 
Durking and Kryegier, 2000). One of the explanations for 
this dynamic lies in the “fragmentation” or “slicing-up” 
of the production processes across national boundaries, 
promoted by various types of business associations (FDI, 
joint ventures and others) and intra-firm trade.
10 It should be noted that the findings of the recent IMF report Regional 
Perspectives for Asia Pacific countries 2007 provides GLIs that are 
much higher than the GLIs of the present report and other studies 
(0.35 in the IMF study). The difference between the two derives 
from the fact that the IMF study disaggregates at the 2 digit levels, 
while the present report adopts the production classification based 
on SITC at the 3 digit levels.
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What is striking is that the overall GLI for trade 
between the two regions in 2006 is quite low, not 
surpassing 0.07 (see table VI.10). When examined from 
the viewpoint of Asia-Pacific, in most cases the IIT matrix 
shows this type of trade as almost non-existent, with a 
GLI below 0.10. However, some bilateral flows are found, 
indicating emerging IIT, albeit at an incipient stage (see 
table VI.11). In general, Mexico’s trade with Asia-Pacific 
shows higher GLIs than that of other Latin American 
countries. Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and other Central 
American countries are beginning to show some degree 
of IIT, though not yet consistently among all the Asian 
trade partners. On the Asia-Pacific side, Singapore and 
Australia are moving into IIT with Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In sum, there has been a breakthrough from 
a complete inter-industry trade type to a trade structure 
that is a little more intra-industry oriented.
Moreover, the products driving IIT between 
the two regions are principally high-and medium-
technology goods involving electrical apparatus, parts 
and accessories, microcircuits, automatic data processing 
machines, measuring, checking, controlling instruments, 
pharmaceutical products, and others in which Asia-Pacific 
countries have made strong inroads at the global level. 
Products incorporating medium technology also include 
a variety of plastics products, motor vehicles and their 
parts and engines, as well as a number of products which 
fall under the category of general machinery. The low-
technology products include textiles, yarn and iron and 
steel products (ECLAC, 2008). 
The forgoing seems to indicate that several Latin 
American firms have begun to insert themselves in several 
Asian supply/value chains in recent years. The emergence of 
IIT across the two regions involving an increasing number 
of countries and sectors suggests that there are interesting 
opportunities and possibilities to expand such trade in 
the future. There are certain sectors in the manufacturing 
industry where bi-regional IIT can be promoted. However, 
in order to exploit these opportunities, closer entrepreneurial 
contacts are needed, including FDI and other types of 
business association, as well as the signing of free trade 
agreements among the countries in both regions.
Table VI.11



















































Argentina 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.01
Bolivia 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Brazil 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.06
Chile 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Colombia 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.06
Costa Rica 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.55 0.19 0.01 0.38 0.09 0.36 0.10 0.01
Dominican Republic 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.03 …
Ecuador 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.00
El Salvador 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Guatemala 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00
Honduras 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Mexico 0.15 0.27 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.56 0.37 0.02
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
Panama 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peru 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
Uruguay 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of) 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
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2.  Intraregional FDI, key to intraregional and intra-industry trade
In recent years, the Asian newly industrialized economies, 
namely the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of 
China and Hong Kong SAR and, to a lesser extent, the 
ASEAN countries have become significant investors 
in emerging Asian countries. For instance, in Thailand 
and Viet Nam, firms from Asian NIEs are the most 
dominant investors. Hong Kong SAR is by far the 
largest investor in China. FDI by firms in the Asian 
NIEs has become much more significant, representing 
29% of total FDI inflows to ASEAN (9) and 54% of 
total inflows to China. In addition, more recently, 
firms from the middle-income ASEAN countries, 
such as Malaysia and Thailand, have begun to invest 
in other ASEAN countries and in China (Kawai and 
Wignaraja, 2007).
(a)	 The	case	of	Japan
Japan’s external trade grew significantly in 2007 
in relation to the previous year’s levels, with exports 
expanding by 10.1% and imports by 7.2%. The country’s 
Asian neighbours continue to be key partners as both 
destinations and origins for its foreign trade (see figure 
VI.8), with a similar trade structure being maintained 
during the present decade (see table VI.12). Asia-Pacific 
countries (excluding India) supplied over 48% of Japan’s 
imports and absorbed an even larger proportion (almost 
50%) of its exports. Among neighbouring Asian countries, 
China and ASEAN (10) stand out, especially in terms 
of imports, since they account for over 20% and 14% 
of total imports, respectively. Japan’s imports from 
ASEAN (10) surpassed those coming from the either 
United States or the European Union. Latin America 
and the Caribbean remains a relatively minor market; 
representing 4.9% as an export destination and 3.9% as 
an origin for Japan’s imports. 
A large proportion of the goods that Japan imports 
from its Asian neighbours consists of electronic machinery 
and other manufactured products of general use. This 
characteristic is clearly visible not only in its imports from 
China and the Asian NIEs (4) (Hong Kong SAR, Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China), but 
also in its trade with the members of ASEAN (4). The 
only sector in which Latin America and the Caribbean has 
a strong presence in Japan’s imports is crude materials 
(see table VI.13).
Figure VI.8
JAPAN’S FOREIGN TRADE IN 2007, BY COUNTRY/REGION
(Percentages)
(a) Exports (b) Imports
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Africa
2.4% Other 2.9%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] http:// 
www.jetro.go.jp.
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Table VI.12




Cumulative OFDI end 2006
(based on balance of payments, net, 
in millions of dollars)
Share in exports 
(percentage)
Share in imports 
(percentage) Stock end of 2006 Share (percentage)
Asia 48.1 44.3 107 653 23.9
China 13.6 20.7 30 316 6.7
Asian NIEs a 24.0 9.9 39 042 8.7
Taiwan Province of China 7.2 3.6 6 328 1.4
Republic of Korea 7.8 4.8 10 669 2.4
Hong Kong SAR 6.0 0.3 7 776 1.7
Singapore 3.1 1.3 14 270 3.2
ASEAN (4) b 8.7 11.5 34 313 7.6
Thailand 3.6 3.0 14 839 3.3
Indonesia 1.4 4.1 7 457 1.7
Malaysia 2.1 2.9 7 763 1.7
Philippines 1.5 1.5 4 253 0.9
ASEAN (10) 12.4 14.2 49 837 11.1
India 0.6 0.6 2 315 0.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.3 3.2 39 291 8.7
Oceania 2.5 5.3 13 794 3.1
Middle East 2.8 16.7 2 038 0.5
Africa 1.4 2.1 2 701 0.6
United States 22.5 12.6 156 411 34.8
European Union (25) 15.0 11.4 118 852 26.4
Other 3.4 4.4 8 941 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 449 680 100.0
Total year average (millions of dollars) 582 734 494 750 ... ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] http:// 
www.jetro.go.jp. 
a The regional groupings are: Asian NIEs (Hong Kong SAR, Rep. of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, and Singapore).
b 
 ASEAN (4) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).
Japan’s role as an investor and as a recipient of 
worldwide OFDI is quite small: based on balance-
of-payments statistics, Japanese OFDI represented 
3.5% of total world OFDI in 2006 (US$ 50.2 billion), 
while its inward FDI experienced a slight contraction 
(net outflow of US$ 6.8 billion). However, East and 
South-East Asia are very important as destinations for 
this type of Japanese investment. In terms of Japan’s 
cumulative FDI stock at the end of 2006, Asia as a group 
accounted for 24% of the total, while the European 
Union (27) and the United States represented 35% and 
26%, respectively.
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Table VI.13
JAPAN’S IMPORTS, BY REGION AND SECTOR, AVERAGE FOR 2005-2007

















Total 11.8 10.7 9.5 11.3 20.7 3.5 32.5 573 005.2 100.0
Food and direct consumers 23.8 10.7 4.9 8.8 16.1 9.0 26.6 49 764.7 100.0
Industrial supplies 5.7 7.3 5.8 12.0 7.6 4.7 56.8 283 654.6 100.0
Crude materials 7.9 5.2 3.5 20.5 4.2 24.2 34.6 36 392.8 100.0
Mineral fuels 0.7 0.1 2.6 11.4 1.9 0.2 83.1 154 902.9 100.0
Industrial chemicals 20.5 33.9 11.9 5.9 12.9 4.2 10.6 40 895.2 100.0
Metals 5.3 7.3 15.1 4.2 14.6 7.5 46.1 25 508.9 100.0
Textiles 5.1 12.9 13.0 10.4 49.3 0.5 8.8 4 751.9 100.0
Capital equipment 21.4 12.8 19.0 12.8 29.7 1.1 3.3 144 328.6 100.0
Non-electrical machinery 20.0 14.6 13.6 10.5 37.2 1.0 3.0 53 908.3 100.0
Electric equipment 17.3 8.7 25.2 16.3 28.2 1.0 3.4 65 924.3 100.0
Transport equipment 46.9 21.0 6.3 9.3 11.2 1.1 4.1 11 417.7 100.0
Consumer non-durable goods 9.6 14.4 2.0 3.3 65.5 0.3 5.0 38 411.7 100.0
Textile products 1.1 6.9 1.8 3.3 81.3 0.3 5.4 24 562.2 100.0
Consumer durable goods 7.0 22.9 8.0 9.9 43.2 1.1 7.9 43 319.4 100.0
Household equipment 5.3 26.0 7.6 4.9 52.6 0.5 3.0 1 452.9 100.0
Domestic electrical equipment 1.6 3.7 4.2 26.1 63.2 0.4 0.7 7 209.5 100.0
Passenger cars 7.1 76.9 0.5 0.8 0.2 2.3 12.3 7 811.3 100.0
Motorcycles and bicycles 12.5 11.1 18.1 5.5 51.7 0.1 1.0 1 473.0 100.0
Toys and musical instruments 6.4 5.1 4.7 4.6 77.8 0.1 1.3 6 437.5 100.0
Others 16.9 10.0 28.9 16.4 15.8 1.1 10.9 13 526.2 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] http:// 
www.jetro.go.jp.
 greater than 20%.
 >10%<20%.
Among the Asian countries, ASEAN (10) as a group 
was the largest recipient with an 11% share. In 2006, over 
34% of Japan’s OFDI went to Asia, breaking down as 
follows: China (12.3%), Hong Kong SAR (7.8%), Malaysia 
(5.9%), Thailand (4.0%), Republic of Korea (3.0%), 
Taiwan Province of China (3.0%), Indonesia (1.5%) and 
India (1.0%). Asia’s combined share in Japanese OFDI in 
2006 outweighs that going to the United States (18.5%) 
and is closer to the level going to the European Union 
(35.7%). Latin America and the Caribbean received US$ 
2.5 billion of Japanese investment, a significant decline 
from the previous year (JETRO, 2007).
Considering investment by individual sectors, the 
electronics machinery (14.0%), transport equipment 
(17.1%), precision machines (2.8%), and chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (8.8%) segments were the most favoured 
in the manufacturing sector. In terms of the cumulative stock 
during the period 1989-2004, Japan’s OFDI in Asia was 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which accounted 
for 66% of investment projects and 59% of invested value. 
Meanwhile, non-manufacturing sectors absorbed less than 
40% in terms of both number of projects and invested value. 
The predominant sectors in manufacturing were electrical 
and transport equipment, which are characterized by high 
levels of intra-industry and intra-firm trade. The three services 
sectors (trade, finance and insurance, and services) were also 
important recipients. The natural-resource-related sectors 
(farming and forestry, fishery and mining) received roughly 
10% of the total. Asia’s predominance as a destination, on the 
one hand, and the importance of the manufacturing sector, on 
the other, points to the role played by that sector as the key 
economic integration hub for Japan in Asia-Pacific.
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Japan’s OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
contrasts starkly with the case of Asia noted above 
(ECLAC, 2008). Japanese OFDI in the manufacturing 
sector accounted for only 14% of its investment in the 
region, with the transport sector contributing almost 5% 
of the total invested value. The combined share of the two 
subsectors (i.e, electrical and electronics and transport 
equipment) that were the strongest in Asia amounted to 
only 7%. Across sectors, the largest recipient was the 
finance and insurance sector, which absorbed roughly 47% 
of total Japanese OFDI, followed by transportation with 
a share of 25%. Surprisingly, the natural-resource-based 
industries were not a significant recipient of FDI from 
Japan, with the exception of mining. In fact, in terms of 
investment value, Asia received more in each of the three 
natural-resource based subsectors than Latin America 
during the 15-year period in question.
The number of Japanese affiliates operating overseas 
reached some 16,000 worldwide in 2006, according to a 
recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) of Japan. These affiliates operated in 
a wide range of industries, and do not include those in the 
financial and insurance or real estate industries (see table 
VI.14). Roughly 58% of these (9174 firms) were located 
in Asia, 20% in China alone. Some 13% were operating 
in the three NIEs (Taiwan Province of China, Republic 
of Korea and Singapore), and another 17% in ASEAN 
(4). The corresponding figures for North America and the 
European Union were much lower, 18% and 14% of the 
total, respectively. At the same date, there were some 800 
affiliates of Japanese firms operating in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, representing 5% of the worldwide total, a 
smaller number than those in Singapore. Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina were the principal hosts for these firms.
Table VI.14









Brazil Mexico Asia China NIEs (3) a ASEAN (4) b
Total 15 850 2 623 2 258 823 194 140 9 174 3 139 2 044 2 715 
Manufacturing 8 048 1 221 835 251 107 81 5 449 2 156 959 1 761 
Foods 393 79 25 17 8 2 246 125 21 78 
Textiles 399 17 19 14 8 1 347 216 18 82 
Wood and pulp 144 11 10 5 3 ... 84 37 3 36 
Chemicals 1 089 180 151 23 7 6 704 237 194 216 
Petroleum and coal 35 6 3 2 2 ... 19 6 6 6 
Iron and steel 203 44 8 10 5 1 135 51 18 58 
Non-ferrous metals 221 28 10 3 3 ... 175 55 26 77 
General machinery 848 133 124 33 12 12 527 234 113 136 
Electric machinery 665 83 69 14 6 5 484 223 94 119 
Communication equipment 1 183 140 121 36 12 17 866 293 175 280 
Transport equipment 1 375 305 157 69 28 28 771 258 96 335 
Precision machinery 273 39 44 8 6 2 174 70 36 31 
Other manufacturing 1 220 156 94 17 7 7 917 351 159 307 
Non-manufacturing 7 802 1 402 1 423 572 87 59 3 725 983 1 085 954 
Farming and forestry 114 13 10 22 7 ... 37 9 4 18 
Mining 142 21 21 21 4 1 19 4 3 10 
Construction 269 28 14 7 5 1 205 33 35 117 
Communications 385 94 47 9 5 ... 218 107 48 39 
Transportation 1 006 100 155 190 9 8 496 148 119 149 
Wholesale 3 763 669 796 160 41 33 1 812 449 604 354 
Retail 503 91 125 11 2 3 229 52 86 50 
Services 939 187 142 49 9 6 494 136 130 152 
Other non-manufacturing 681 199 113 103 5 7 215 45 56 65 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan, 
“Kaigai jigyo katsudo kihon chosa” (Basic trend survey of overseas business activities) No. 36, 2007.
a NIEs (3) include Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.
b ASEAN (4) includes the Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
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By industry, roughly 50% of Japanese affiliates were 
engaged in activities related to the manufacturing sector. 
Chemicals, communications equipment and transport 
equipment were the top three sectors, followed by general 
and electric machinery, whose production bases have 
been primarily found in Asia. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, some 570 affiliates were operating in the 
non-manufacturing sector, mainly in transportation and 
wholesale activities, and some 250 in manufacturing, about 
70 of them in the production of transport equipment. The 
number of affiliates operating in natural-resource-related 
sectors was relatively small. Japan’s overwhelming presence 
in and around the machinery industry in Asia reflects the 
buoyant and complex supply chains networks that have 
been developing in that region.
Japan’s OFDI was concentrated in the ASEAN countries 
in the 1990s. It later shifted towards China and is now 
reverting to other Asian countries. The centre of gravity 
of Japanese OFDI continues to be the United States, Asia 
and the European Union. The performance of Japanese 
subsidiaries in Asia is especially notable in terms of the 
number of firms, sales, profits, and number of employees. 
Japanese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean yields 
exceptionally good profit rates, though it represents a 
small share of the world total in terms of number of firms, 
employees and sales. Almost 13% of total current profits 
of Japanese overseas subsidiaries originate from those 
operating in Latin America and the Caribbean. China has 
not necessarily been the hub for profits and sales of Japanese 
multinationals’ operations (ECLAC, 2008).
Another characteristic of the overseas operations 
of Japanese firms is their strong export orientation. This 
applies especially to manufacturing production bases in 
Asian countries. While more than 90% of total sales by 
the subsidiaries operating in the United States are made 
in local markets, in Europe, a high proportion is exported 
to third countries in addition to domestic sales. In the case 
of Asian countries, sales to third markets combined with 
sales to Japan (reverse-imports by Japan) account for about 
50% of total sales. Japanese companies in Asia typically 
seek profits by all three avenues; domestic sales, exports 
and reverse-imports. In contrast, the grouping of other 
non-Asian countries, which includes Latin America and the 
Caribbean, shows a very low export orientation. Substantially 
higher export-orientation figures are observed for the four 
industrial categories, namely industrial machinery, electrical 
machinery, transport equipment and precision instruments, 
especially in ASEAN and China, where there are high 
ratios of intra-industry and intra-firm trade.
In sum, Asia-Pacific has grown extremely important 
in the transnationalization of Japanese enterprises, since 
it has become their largest market in terms of trade and 
FDI, especially in the manufacturing sector. Asia-Pacific 
offers factor endowments that enable Japanese firms to be 
internationally competitive and profitable. These firms have 
adopted a different corporate strategy in Asia-Pacific than 
in other regions of the world. Asia-Pacific, including China, 
provides Japan with an efficient platform for export to third 
countries within and outside the Asia-Pacific region.
(b)	 The	case	of	China	
The FDI received by China from the three leading sources 
—Japan, ASEAN and the Republic of Korea— increased 
significantly, especially following China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Those three 
sources represented on average about 20% of total FDI 
during 2002 and 2007, a non-negligible figure given that: 
(i) the United States and the European Union accounted 
for about 6% and 7%, respectively, of total FDI during 
the period; (ii) the percentage corresponding to Taiwan 
Province of China was 4.5%; and (iii) almost 33% of 
FDI entering China comes from Hong Kong SAR in the 
form of triangulation. In fact, the ASEAN countries are an 
important source of FDI for China even though most of this 
originates in Singapore (between US$ 2 and US$ 3 billion 
per year). In short, the most important actors in China’s 
recent transformation into the world’s third-largest FDI 
recipient worldwide after the United States and Germany 
have been its Asian neighbours (see table VI.15). 
Latin America and the Caribbean is a very minor 
source of Chinese FDI, except for a huge amount of such 
investment coming from Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands. 
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2008), 
the share of the eight Latin American countries considered has 
accounted for less than 0.1% in recent years, with between 
US$ 70 and US$ 80 million each year. Among the countries 
of Latin America, Brazil and Argentina, Mexico and Chile 
are the largest investors in China. Peru, Colombia and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela also invest in China, but 
more sporadically and on a smaller scale.
Foreign-owned firms operating in China, or Foreign 
Invested Enterprises (FIEs), are major drivers of that country’s 
external trade, rapidly displacing the State enterprises and 
collectives (see figure VI.9). In 2007, such firms are reported 
to have exported US$ 696 billion, equivalent to 57% of total 
exports, and imported US$ 559 billion, close to 59% of total 
imports (Ministry of Commerce of China, n/d). Detailed 
information on 2006 indicates that the goods made by FIEs 
from 10 selected Asian countries accounted for 45% of 
China’s total FIE exports and 62% of its imports (see figure 
VI.10). In contrast, FIEs of United States or European origin 
accounted for 24% and 18% of total FIE exports, respectively. 
Firms originating in the Hong Kong SAR were by far the 
largest FIE exporters, accounting for 20% of China’s total 
FIE exports. Exports by firms of Japanese origin established 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 155
in China exceeded US$ 61 billion, and these were followed 
by exports worth US$ 25 billion by firms from the Republic 
of Korea and US$ 14 billion in exports by firms from Taiwan 
Province of China. Firms originating in the five countries of 
ASEAN (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand) accounted for US$ 37 billion in exports, equivalent 
to 6.5% of the total exported by FIEs operating in China. 
The contribution to Chinese exports made by United States 
or European firms is quite small compared to that of their 
Asian competitors.
Table VI.15
MATERIALIZED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA (NON-FINANCIAL SECTORS), AVERAGE 2002-2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Country/Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 2002-2007 Share
Total 52 742.9  53 504.7  60 630.0  60 324.7  65 821.0  74 767.8 61 298.50 100.0
10 Asian economies/ 
regions 32 411.2  33 889.8 37 271.2  35 336.3  36 279.4  41 383.4 36 095.21 58.9
Hong Kong SAR 17 860.9  17 700.1  18 998.3  17 948.8  21 307.2  27 703.4 20 253.12 33.0
Indonesia 121.6  150.1 104.5  86.8  106.9  134.4 117.39 0.2
Japan 4 190.1  5 054.2  5 451.6  6 529.8  4 759.4  3 589.2 4 929.04 8.0
Macao SAR 468.4  416.6 546.4  600.5  677.7  637.0 557.76 0.9
Malaysia 367.9  251.0  385.0  361.4  45.1  397.3 301.28 0.5
The Philippines 186.0  220.0  233.2  188.9  14.2  195.3 172.95 0.3
Singapore 2 337.2  2 058.4 2 008.1  2 204.3  2 463.0  3 184.6 2 375.94 3.9
Republic of Korea 2 720.7  4 488.5  6 247.9  5 168.3  3 993.2  3 678.3 4 382.83 7.1
Thailand 187.7  173.5  178.7  95.9  148.6  89.5 145.65 0.2
Taiwan Province of China 3 970.6  3 377.2 3 117.5  2 151.7  2 229.9  1 774.4 2 770.23 4.5
European Union  3 191.8  3 930.3 4 239.0  5 193.8  5 439.5  3 838.4 4 305.46 7.0
Germany 928.0  857.0 1 058.5  1 530.0  2 003.0  734.0 1 185.07 1.9
North America 6 011.9  4 762.0 4 554.8  3 515.4  3 441.7  3 012.8 4 216.44 6.9
United States 5 423.9  4 198.5 3 941.0  3 061.2  3 000.0  2 616.2 3 706.80 6.0
Selected free ports 8 176.4  7 628.7 9 901.7  13 237.8  16 534.3  22 625.6 13 017.43 21.2
Cayman Islands 1 179.5  866.0  042.6  1 947.5  2 131.8  2 570.8 1 789.71 2.9
Virgin Islands 6 117.4  5 777.0 6 730.3  9 021.7  11 677.3  16 552.4 9 312.67 15.2
Western Samoa 879.5  985.7  128.9  1 360.8  1 619.8  2 169.9 1 357.42 2.2
Others 8 963.5  8 055.9  9 218.0  6 556.8  7 567.9  6 920.5 7 880.40 12.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Ministry of Commerce of China, “Invest in China” [online] 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Ministry of Commerce of China, “Invest in China” [online] 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn.
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At the same time, the presence of Asian firms is 
highly influential in China’s import orientation. Firms 
from the 10 selected Asian countries imported US$ 291 
billion in 2006, accounting for 62% of China’s total FIE 
imports (see figure VI.10). Firms from the United States 
and the European Union represented just 7% and 10%, 
respectively. The predominant firms in China’s FIE imports 
are Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Malaysian, Singaporean, 
Philippine and Thai. These firms import large volumes 
of components and inputs from their parent companies 
in their countries of origin, reflecting the high level of 
intra-industry trade as mentioned above.
Figure VI.10
CHINESE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY FOREIGN-OWNED FIRMS, 2006
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
(a) Exports (b) Imports
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Ministry of Commerce of China, “Invest in China” [online] 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn.
While China has been a major net recipient of FDI over 
the past two decades, lately it has been investing abroad itself. 
In fact, among developing countries, it is now the world’s 
sixth-largest source of OFDI among developing countries. 
As of late 2006, non-financial Chinese companies held a 
stock of US$ 75 billion abroad, of which US$ 17 billion 
was invested in 2006 (see table VI.16). Notwithstanding 
its relatively small role, China is emerging as a leading 
investor among developed and developing countries, with 
investments comparable to those of the Republic of Korea 
(see figure VI.11). According to the Chinese authorities, 
overseas-invested enterprises realized an internal sales 
turnover of US$ 274.6 billion, registered total tax payment 
of US$ 2.82 billion abroad and employed 630,000 workers 
(including 268,000 foreign local staff).
Table VI.16
CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  
FLOWS AND STOCK, 2006
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Indicator
Outflows 2006 Stock as of 2006
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
Total 21.16 100 90.63 100
Non-financial outward 
direct investment 17.63 83.3 75.02 82.8
Financial outward 
direct investment 3.53 16.7 15.61 17.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Ministry of Commerce of China, 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
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Figure VI.11
CHINA’S OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STOCK 
COMPARED WITH THAT OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 2006
(Billions of dollars)













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Ministry of Commerce of China, 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
Regarding destination, close to 90% of non-financial 
OFDI has been directed towards the economies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Asia (see table VI.17). Of 
China’s non-financial OFDI flow in 2006, which is valued 
at US$ 17.6 billion, Latin America and the Caribbean 
received US$ 8.5 billion, or 48%, which went mainly to 
the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Asia 
received US$ 7.7 billion, or 43.4%, mainly in the Hong 
Kong SAR, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Mongolia, Iran, 
Indonesia, Laos, Kazakhstan, and Viet Nam. Measured 
by stock at the end of 2006, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
figure as the largest recipients of China’s OFDI, along 
with several Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia 
and the Republic of Korea.
Despite high expectations on the part of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, Chinese investments are slow 
to materialize, even though a significant number of large 
Chinese firms have begun to operate in several countries in 
the region (see table VI.18). These companies are present 
not only in the natural-resource-related sectors but also 
in manufacturing. Access to natural resources, expansion 
in overseas markets (market-seeking) and improvement 
of production and administration efficiency (efficiency-
seeking) are considered to be the three main stimuli 
for China’s OFDI in Latin America in recent decades. 
An increasing number of large State-owned companies 
operating in natural resources and manufacturing, ranked 
by MOFCOM in 2006 as the 30 largest Chinese companies 
in terms of OFDI stock, have invested in the region.
Table VI.17
DESTINATIONS OF CHINESE OUTWARD FOREIGN  
DIRECT INVESTMENT
(Billions of dollars)
Rank Country/Region Billions of dollars
1 Hong Kong SAR 42.27
2 Cayman Islands 14.09
3 British Virgin Islands 4.75
4 United States 1.24
5 Republic of Korea 0.95
6 Russian Federation 0.93
7 Australia 0.79






14 Saudi Arabia 0.27
15 Zambia 0.27





Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Ministry of Commerce of China, 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
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In the manufacturing sector, Chinese industries, 
including textiles, paper, automobile, electronics, IT, and 
telecommunications enterprises, have selected Mexico or 
member countries of MERCOSUR as their first production 
base in Latin America. On the one hand, Mexico, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Argentina are considered a stepping stone 
to enter and expand in the dynamic markets covered by 
trade agreements such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR. On 
the other hand, Mexico can provide an easier entrance 
not only to the United States but also Central American 
and Caribbean countries. In addition, production in 
MERCOSUR can facilitate the access to other Latin 
American countries.
By sector, Latin America has increasingly attracted 
Chinese OFDI in automobiles, electronics, and 
telecommunications. China’s automobile companies 
are establishing production bases in Latin America 
to reduce production costs and acquire new markets, 
faced with strong competition from foreign companies 
in domestic markets and the continuing appreciation 
of the Chinese currency. In electronics, there are three 
contributing factors: (i) domestic demand has been 
sluggish and domestic competition has decreased profits, 
hence, Chinese electronics companies are seeking new 
markets in Latin America where a large middle class is 
emerging; (ii) most of the antidumping cases brought 
against Chinese products in the region refer to white 
goods, so the establishment of a production base in the 
region can help Chinese companies attenuate such trade 
conflicts; and (iii) Chinese companies do not currently 
have the capacity to establish production bases in 
developed countries, so Latin America and Africa have 
become popular destinations for China’s OFDI.
(c)	 The	case	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	
After coming to a standstill in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis, the Republic of Korea’s outward 
FDI began to pick up and as of June 2007, the cumulative 
figure exceeded US$ 82 billion and was spread over 
more than 120,000 projects worldwide (www.koreaexim.
go.kr). Asia accounted for 72% in terms of the number 
of projects undertaken and 49% in terms of the value of 
executed FDI. This is substantially higher than the share 
corresponding to the United States or Europe. In Asia, 
in addition to China, the main recipients of FDI from the 
Republic of Korea are the ASEAN 10, including several 
developing countries such as Viet Nam and Indonesia, 
which have emerged as major recipients. Meanwhile, 
Japan and Taiwan Province of China have received a 
relatively smaller share of Korean FDI. Latin America and 
the Caribbean have received more than 7% of the stock 
(US$ 6.7 billion) with their share of projects amounting 
to 2.5% (more than 3,000 projects). 
Among destinations for outward FDI from the 
Republic of Korea, China occupies a predominant place 
both in terms of the number of projects and in terms of 
the volume of investments carried out. Official data for the 
country show that as of March 2008 China had absorbed 
roughly 65,000 projects (50% of the total), and that 
investment undertaken amounted to US$ 23 billion, 24% 
of the overall amount invested. The fact that the amount of 
Korean investment in China per firm is relatively small is 
a good indicator of the significant role played by Korean 
SME investors in China.
The Republic of Korea’s cumulative net outward FDI 
by industry as at March 2008, shows the manufacturing 
sector in a dominant position with 48% of the total, 
followed by wholesale and retail trade (17%), mining 
(9%) and other sectors including services (25%). The 
firms in the manufacturing sector have been the driving 
force behind Korean FDI overseas, the main objective 
of which is to support overseas production facilities and 
secure markets for sales (Yoon, 2007).
In terms of countries, the tax haven countries such 
as Bermuda, Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands 
have been major recipients of Korean outward FDI in the 
region accounting for almost half of Korean FDI stock 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Apart from these 
countries, Brazil (13%), Mexico (9%) and Peru (9%) have 
been major recipients of Korean FDI in the region (see 
table VI.19). As of March 2008, five Central American 
countries (Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, in that order) received almost 5% of total 
actual FDI inflows from the Republic of Korea into the 
region, amounting to US$ 300 million (Ex-Im Bank of 
Korea (n/d)).
In terms of sectors, Korean FDI inflows into Latin 
America and the Caribbean are concentrated in a few 
major industries: manufacturing (24%), mining (30%), 
agriculture and fisheries (2%) and services and commerce 
(44%). The initial focus on natural resources has 
gradually shifted to manufacturing activities, especially 
electronics (38% of investing firms), textiles and apparel 
(34%), iron and steel, and petroleum undertaken by large 
Korean firms, with Korean SMEs playing a relatively 
larger part in the textiles and apparel sectors (for some 
countries in the region, see table VI.19). Therefore, the 
scope of Korean investment in the region has still been 
limited to relatively simple functions such as securing 
supplies of natural resources, gaining access to markets 
or establishing imported-component-driven export 
platforms to supply the United States market with final 
products (ECLAC, 2007a).
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Table VI.19
KOREAN FDI RECEIVED BY SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BY SECTOR, 2004-2007 CUMULATIVE
(In 1 000 dollars)
 Manufacturing Wholesale and 
retail trade Natural resources Construction Other services Total
Argentina 771 500 7 109 0 0 8 380
Honduras 20 941 0 0 0 0 20 941
Colombia 247 26 725 0 0 0 26 972
Guatemala 17 676 0 0 17 059 0 34 735
Chile 5 927 35 895 0 508 0 42 330
Panama 2 000 86 975 0 4 173 700 262 679
Peru 950 17 000 254 422 235 0 272 607
Mexico 145 187 128 657 0 2 144 1 123 277 111
Brazil 290 679 33 567 210 015 2 450 33 184 569 895
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Export-Import Bank of Korea [online] http://www.koreaexim.go.kr.
Figure VI.12
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from Export-Import Bank of Korea [online] http://www.
koreaexim.go.kr.
Note: Data for 1980 is a cumulative figure from 1968 to 1980.
In general terms, the Korean FDI channelled into 
Latin America and the Caribbean seems to serve little 
as a transmission vehicle for bringing the industrial 
and technological successes of the Korean economy 
to the region. This concern has been expressed in one 
of the conclusions by the Mexico-Korea 21st Century 
Commission (2005), which states: “[…] Given the lack 
of integration in Mexico’s production chains, particularly 
in the maquiladora industry, Korea and Mexico should 
engage in a programme to develop the supporting industry 
in Mexico. There is no doubt that such a programme would 
offer benefits to both countries, since Mexican exports 
would have more domestic value added, and Korean 
investments in Mexico would benefit from the availability 
of timely, cheaper, world quality local inputs.” (ECLAC, 
2007a). In this regard, it is interesting that several chapters 
of Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
Mexico contemplates, the adoption of technical cooperation 
measures for improving Mexican industrial capacities 
and international competitiveness, objectives that do not 
usually appear in the typical free trade agreement with 
the United States.
In the 1990s, the main motivation for large Korean 
firms was to take advantage of the large size of the Chinese 
market and save on labour costs, which were beginning 
to rise in the home country. In the current decade, SMEs 
are accompanying large firms in seeking to exploit the 
potential offered by the Chinese market. The manufacturing 
sector is the largest recipient of Korean FDI, followed by 
construction. Given the current idle capacity in Korean 
industry, the suspicion is that the boom in FDI to China 
may be generating an industrial vacuum in the country 
of origin, as has been happening also in Japan. Also 
quite notable is the relatively high share of ASEAN (10) 
as Korean FDI destinations; close to 13% of Korean 
FDI stock abroad has been accumulated in these Asian 
countries, especially in Viet Nam and Indonesia, much 
more than the amount directed to Japan or Taiwan Province 
of China (Yoon, 2007).
(d)	 The	case	of	ASEAN
Total trade among ASEAN members in 2006 
—combined imports and exports of US$ 352 billion— was 
more than double the group’s trade with each of its two 
most important trading partners, the United States and 
Japan, (valued, in each case, at US$ 161 billion); these 
two partners shared second place, each accounting for 
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11.5% of total trade with ASEAN (see figure VI.13(a) 
and VI.13(b)). In the case of both imports and exports, 
these three entities (ASEAN, Japan and United States) 
were followed by the European Union, China, Republic of 
Korea, Australia, and India. Intra-ASEAN trade (exports 
as well as imports) accounted for as much as 25% of 
total flows in 2006, surpassing the figures registered by 
the various Latin American and Caribbean integration 
schemes (ASEAN Secretariat (n/d)).
The third main source of FDI for ASEAN (in terms 
of flows) are the other ASEAN countries. The cumulative 
stock of FDI entering the grouping in 2002-2006 was 
US$ 170 billion, of which 26% came from the European 
Union, 18% from Japan, 11% from ASEAN itself, and 8% 
from the United States. Apart from these countries, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and China, 
represented 2.0%, 1.4%, and 1.3%, respectively, of the total 
amount invested during the period. The Cayman Islands 
(1.8%) and unidentified countries of Central America and 
South America (2.3%) appear among the 10 leading foreign 
investors in ASEAN (see figure VI.13c and VI.13d). In 
addition, Australia and India accounted for an appreciable 
volume of FDI during this period, with amounts of US$1.4 
billion and US$ 295 million respectively. As in the case 
of China, FDI obtained both from neighbours (within 
ASEAN) and from Japan, China and the Republic of Korea 
is a major source of financing for business projects (see 
the ASEAN website). About a third of the Association’s 
FDI comes from within ASEAN+3.
Singapore and Thailand are the leading countries in 
terms of FDI flows among ASEAN members, followed 
at some distance by Malaysia and Indonesia. The first 
two of these countries accounted for about 65% of the 
total investment among ASEAN members in the period 
2004-2006. In the ASEAN countries, the main sectors 
targeted by investors have been communications equipment 
(23%), food and beverages (18%), and paper and paper 
products (Hiratsuka, 2006). 
Figure VI.13
ASEAN TRADE AND FDI BY SELECTED PARTNER (COUNTRY/TERRITORY/REGION), 2006
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from ASEAN Secretariat.
a  Identified on the basis of cumulative inflows from 2002-2006.
b Includes countries in Central America and South America other than Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Panama.
c Includes inflows from all other countries, including the Russian Federation, as well as total reinvested earnings in the Philippines (local banks only) for 2002-2006. 
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3.  China as an Asian export platform
Over the past two decades, the share of Asia-Pacific 
in China’s total imports has been increasing; in 2006 
roughly 62% of its imports originated in this region. 
Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports to China, 
consist mainly of primary products and resource-based 
manufactures, a similar export basket to that coming 
from Africa and the rest of the world. In this regard, 
Latin America and the Caribbean competes directly with 
other regions as a supplier of commodities and processed 
products (see box VI.1 for an analysis of the increasing 
competition between the region and Africa as exporters 
of commodities and recipients of Chinese investment 
abroad). In comparison, the United States and countries 
of the European Union export primarily medium- and 
high-technology manufactures to this destination. The 
most striking feature of China’s import structure is that 
Asia-Pacific, the leading source of Chinese imports, 
exports primarily manufactures. Its share of Chinese 
imports of manufactures exceeds those of the United 
States and the European Union.
Box VI.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND AFRICA COMPETE OPENLY AS COMMODITY SUPPLIERS TO CHINA  
AND RECIPIENTS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS ABROAD
In contrast to the early 1990s when official 
development assistance (ODA) dominated 
China’s relations with Africa, at present, trade 
and investment links play an increasingly 
important role in those relations. In fact, 
China has become a major market, financier, 
investor, contractor and builder for Africa 
in addition to being a donor.
Bilateral trade between China and 
Africa has been growing rapidly: in 2000 and 
2007, China’s exports to Africa soared from 
US$ 5.0 billion to US$ 37.2 billion, and its 
imports from that region from US$ 5.6 billion 
to US$ 36.3 billion. Meanwhile, China’s 
exports to and imports from Latin America 
and the Caribbean jumped from US$ 7.2 
billion to US$ 51.5 billion and from US$ 5.4 
billion to US$ 51.1 billion over the seven 
year period. In 2007, Africa’s share in total 
Chinese imports stood at 4%, while that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean was 6%. 
China has become Africa’s third largest 
trading partner after the United States 
and the European Union. Thanks to the 
commodity export boom, Africa’s terms of 
trade with China improved by 80% to 90% 
during the present decade. Although Latin 
America still retains its relative position as 
one of China’s major commodity suppliers, 
Africa is rapidly closing the gap.
China’s trading pattern with Africa is 
quite similar to that with Latin America and 
the Caribbean, although primary products 
weigh more heavily in Africa’s export basket 
to China than in that of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Africa’s principal export 
products to China are crude oil (71% of 
total China’s imports from Africa in 2006), 
iron ore and concentrates (3.2%), raw 
cotton (2.8%), diamonds (2.7%), saw logs 
and veneer logs (1.8%), platinum (1.7%), 
ore and concentrates of other non-ferrous 
metals (1.3%), copper ore and concentrates 
(1.0%) and copper and copper alloys 
(0.8%). These ten products accounted 
for roughly 89% of total Chinese imports 
from that region in 2006. As exporters of 
these products, Brazil, Chile and Peru are 
major competitors of African countries. 
As suppliers of these products to China, 
Latin America and the Caribbean compete 
directly with Africa. 
In services, Africa has become a 
key market for Chinese construction 
and engineering firms. According to 
official Chinese statistics, “contracted 
projects”, “labour cooperation” and “design 
consultation” in Africa were estimated to total 
US$ 2 billion in 2001. In 2006, the turnover 
on contract labour stood at US$ 9.5 billion, 
accounting for 31% of China’s offshore 
contracted projects. With the services 
sector, two-way traffic in tourism is growing 
rapidly. Latin America and the Caribbean 
has not been a major target for Chinese 
services companies.
Chinese investment (FDI and other 
financial flows), long awaited in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, is flowing increasingly 
to Africa. According to Chinese authorities, 
of Chinese non-financial overseas FDI 
stock, valued at US$ 75 billion in 2006, 
US$ 48 billion was directed towards Asia, 
while US$ 20 billion was channelled towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, 
the corresponding figure for Africa was 
US$ 2.6 billion accounting for 3.4 %, destined 
mainly for Sudan, Zambia, Algeria, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Egypt and Congo. Chinese 
FDI in Africa has increased sharply in recent 
years. In October 2007, for instance, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
agreed to purchase 20% of Standard Bank 
Group of South Africa for US$ 5.6 billion. 
China is also reported to have: (i) expanded 
the list of African exports which enter free 
of duty; (ii) provided preferential trade 
credits; and (iii) established a large fund 
to support Chinese FDI in Africa. The last 
two components of trade and investment 
promotion measures are being implemented 
by China Exim Bank, through which the 
Chinese government disburses all its foreign 
aid, and the China Development Bank. In 
September of 2007, the Exim Bank signed 
an agreement to finance 6.5 billion United 
States dollars’ worth of improvements on 
Congo’s infrastructure, and 2 billion dollars’ 
worth of construction and refurbishment of 
mines, using mineral reserves as collateral. 
The following month, a similar deal was 
signed with China Development Bank. In 
addition, China is reported to have provided 
debt relief on its own terms to African 
countries; in 2000-2002, it wrote off overdue 
obligations worth US$ 1.3 billion, and in 
2006, it announced its intention of cancelling 
debt of close to US$ 1 billion.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE); Ministry of Commerce 
of China, 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment; Jian-Ye Wang and Abdoulaye Bio-Tchané, “Africa’s burgeoning ties with China. 
Maximizing the benefits of China’s increasing economic engagement with Africa”, Finance and Development, Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
March 2008; The Economist, “A special report on China’s quest for resources”, 15 March 2008.
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Figure VI.14
CHINA’S IMPORTS, BY REGION AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITY, 2006
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the database of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD).
a Africa comprises 54 countries in the African continent. 
A major feature of intra-Asian trade and FDI 
dynamism has been China’s dramatic emergence as a 
key player and one of the hubs of the world economy, 
around which a major trade reorganization is unfolding in 
Asia. For many neighbouring countries in Asia, China is 
becoming a staging post for exports to the United States 
and European markets (ECLAC, 2007b).
Remarkably, the network of regional trade centered 
in China developed outside the ambit of regional trade 
agreements. The “Asia Factory” grew out of the unilateral 
liberalization of trade in parts and components together with 
FDI flows and appropriate investment climates, which have 
been the key elements of Asia-Pacific’s intraregional trade. 
This represented a major change in the Asian development 
model before China emerged as an economic power. An 
important element of the fragmentation of manufacturing 
processes in the region was Japan’s loss of comparative 
advantages in manufacturing production, which led Japanese 
firms to slice their production processes and outsource more 
labour-intensive stages to the neighbouring countries of 
East Asia. This “hollowing out” of the Japanese economy 
was replicated in Taiwan Province of China, Republic of 
Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, thereby deepening 
the process of creating the “Asia Factory.” Lastly, China’s 
entry on to the international economic stage further eroded 
the industrial comparative advantages enjoyed by the 
higher-income East Asian countries, making offshore 
production more attractive. Rising wage levels in China 
are now enticing other Asian countries to invest elsewhere 
inside and outside Asia (see box VI.2).
Box VI.2
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND THE IMPACT OF RISING LABOUR COSTS
China’s impressive and sustained economic 
growth in recent years has brought with it 
a series of consequences, which need to 
be taken into account when one looks at 
economic trends in the Asia-Pacific region 
and how they may impact Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
This sustained growth has improved the 
average income of the Chinese population, 
through higher incomes, allowing for more 
domestic consumption of goods and services. 
On the other hand, the comparative advantages 
enjoyed by China in world markets are 
increasingly being eroded by domestic factors 
such as increased labour costs, higher inflation, 
shortage of skilled labour, particularly in the 
medium- and high-technology manufacture 
and services sectors, and external pressures 
for higher prices of imported inputs, such as 
energy, mineral commodities and food, and 
the appreciation of the yuan.
In early 2008, the Chinese government 
implemented a new labour law, providing for 
increased social security, stronger unions 
and legal guarantees in contracts and 
dispute resolution, which will have an impact 
mainly on private SMEs whose activities are 
basically labour-intensive, and have low value 
added. At the same time, the government 
has decided to reduce export subsidies 
for commodity-exporting companies. The 
new labour law might reduce the low-cost 
labour advantage of China in the short term, 
in particular for private companies, but in 
the longer term should bring increased 
certainty in this area, promoting training 
within companies in order to retain personnel 
and reducing the current high turnover that 
exists within the different industries. All these 
factors are affecting China’s manufacturing 
industry, including those firms operating 
in the special economic zones in coastal 
provinces such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
Fujian. As a result, some changes in the 
current manufacturing industry in China 
are expected, in particular in relation to 
future capital investment and the global 
competitiveness of Chinese industry.
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Box VI.2 (concluded)
There are significant differences 
between average wages and gross 
domestic product between Chinese 
provinces, particularly between the 
coastal and inner lands. For example, 
while Henan Province ranked fifth in GDP 
across China in 2006, its average wage 
ranked second to last among 31 provinces. 
A comparison of labour costs in selected 
Asian countries and Ecuador (see figure 
below), shows that wages are significantly 
lower in Viet Nam, the Philippines, and 
India, while Indonesia and Ecuador have 
similar labour cost levels to those in the 
cheapest provinces in China. Thailand, on 
the other hand, shows higher wages than 
all the other places selected.
In conclusion, Viet Nam and India, 
in particular, might become a challenge 
for China by attracting foreign capital and 
providing cheap labour. However, China 
continues to have some provinces with 
low labour costs and a large production 
scale, which would compete with Ecuador 
and Indonesia.
4.  Latin American and Caribbean FDI
The Latin American and Caribbean region was able to 
double its average annual FDI inflows from US$ 38.3 
billion to US$ 74.3 billion between 1993-1997 and 
1998-2002 before seeing them fall to US$ 72.3 
billion during 2003-2007. During the last period, 
notwithstanding an absolute increase in the value of 
inward FDI, the region’s share of FDI from global 
sources and developing countries has shrunk. It has 
also decreased as a percentage of GDP (down from 4% 
in 2004 to 3% in 2006) whereas in other developing 
regions, FDI/GDP ratios have been rising (ECLAC, 
2007a). In addition, in stark contrast to the case of 
developing Asia, FDI flows to the region plummeted 
during the four years after the Asian crisis (1999-2003), 
with the sharpest falls occurring in MERCOSUR and 
the Andean Community. It took MERCOSUR more 
than four years to recover to the pre-crisis level, while 
inflows to the Andean Community’s countries have still 
not caught up (see figure VI.15).
Of the FDI host countries, historically the United 
States has been the most important source of FDI in Latin 
America (see figure VI.16). In the 1990s, Spain came to 
play a leading role, being the most important FDI source 
for a number of Latin American countries. In the present 
decade, the country’s weight in FDI inflows to the region 
declined from 23% in 1997-2001 to 10% in 2002-2006. 
Asia-Pacific as a region has been a very minor investor, 
accounting for only 2.8% in 1997-2001 and 3.5% in 2002-
2006 of total inward FDI, estimated at US$ 8.9 billion for 
each period. On the other hand, the share of intraregional 
FDI in total FDI inflows in Latin America doubled (from 
5% to 10%) during the same period. This was due to the 
emergence of a number of companies of Latin American 
origin, the so-called trans-Latins.
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE WAGES FOR SELECTED CHINESE PROVINCES









































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Bureau of Statistics of China for data for Chinese provinces and The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for data for other countries.
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Figure VI.15
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information.
Figure VI.16
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information.
The subregions of Latin America attract different kinds 
of FDI depending on the corporate strategies underlying 
the investment. Historically, natural-resource-seeking 
FDI, one of the predominant types, has been channelled 
into the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Argentina, 
and the Andean countries in the case of petroleum and 
natural gas, and Chile, Argentina and Peru in the case 
of minerals.11
11 The performance of natural resource-based FDI in the region in 
recent years reflects the tension between two forces: the sustained 
rise in commodity prices and changes in the legal conditions for 
natural-resource exploration and exploitation in some countries. 
These combined forces have led some foreign investors to abandon 
the region, to restructure their investments or to hold off on new 
investments, while others have announced new projects. Some trans-
Latin firms and foreign investors from other developing countries, 
especially China and India, have shown a growing interest in this 
type of FDI in Latin America.
Another type, market-seeking inward FDI, has 
been attracted primarily to the larger markets in the 
region, such as Brazil and Mexico. Chile has also been a 
major recipient of this type of investment. In the goods 
sector, the automotive, food and beverage and chemical 
industries have stood out, while in services the focus 
has been on financial services, telecommunications, 
retail trade, electricity and natural gas distribution. This 
type of investment is considered to promote new local 
economic activities and increase local content by creating 
and deepening of production linkages, strengthening local 
entrepreneurial development and improving local services 
and national systemic competitiveness. The drawback of 
this type of FDI is that in many cases it does not promote 
internationally-competitive goods and services, and it 
tends to crowd out local companies.
Efficiency-seeking inward FDI, geared towards 
exports to third markets, (especially that of the United 
States) has been directed primarily to Mexico in the 
electronics, automotive and apparel industries and to 
Central American countries for apparel and some light 
electronics. Factors conducive to this type of investment 
include the continued restructuring of these industries in 
the United States and opportunities associated with free 
trade agreements with the United States, particularly 
NAFTA and the Dominican Republic- Central America 
- United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). 
Factors that may dissuade investors from boosting this type 
of investment include increasing competition from China 
and other Asian countries and the expected withdrawal 
of fiscal incentives or subsidies for export processing 
zones under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules 
(ECLAC, 2007a).
In general terms, Mexico and Central American 
countries are typically recipients of a relatively large 
proportion of efficiency-seeking FDI, mainly from United 
States TNCs in the motor vehicle, electronics and apparel 
industries, while South America has received more 
market-seeking FDI, primarily from European TNCs 
in a few manufacturing industries (motor vehicles, food 
products, beverages and tobacco), a number of services 
(finance, telecommunications, retail commerce, electricity 
and gas distribution), and natural-resource-seeking FDI, 
mostly from Anglosaxon TNCs in petroleum, natural gas 
and mining. TNCs whose parent companies are based in 
developing Asia do not seem to have participated actively 
in any of the three categories mentioned above.
Efficiency-seeking inward FDI is usually considered 
to be conducive to exports of manufactures, to the 
conversion of an export platform into a manufacturing 
centre, improved international competitiveness, transfer 
and assimilation of foreign technology, training of human 
resources, creation and deepening of production linkages, 
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and local entrepreneurial development. However, this type 
of FDI also has several shortcomings; the low-value-added 
trap; a major focus on static rather than dynamic local 
comparative advantages, a heavy dependence on imported 
components, and a lack of industrial agglomeration, 
the risk of crowding out local companies, a race to the 
bottom in salaries, problems in labour and environmental 
standards, and a race to the top in TNC incentives. Many 
FDI projects in Latin America, regardless of their origin, 
share these shortcomings.
As the recent experience of Latin America’s 
automotive industry indicates, an increasing number of 
inward FDI projects combine both “market-seeking” and 
“efficiency-seeking” types (ECLAC, 2008). In general, 
the industry is becoming more “export-oriented” and the 
major players operating in Latin America are adopting a 
corporate strategy quite distinct from the previous one, 
which was based primarily on the exploitation of local 
markets. The companies are acting more as “regional” 
players, taking advantage of preferences that various 
regional trade agreements offer. This change of strategy 
has attracted a few motor vehicle makers from Asia to 
start producing in the FDI-recipient countries instead 
of importing finished vehicles. This transformation, 
however, has not yet resolved the persistent problems 
facing the Latin American automotive industry, namely 
high import contents and lack of backward and forward 
linkages, including deficient networks of local parts and 
components suppliers. 
An important feature of Latin American FDI is the huge 
increase of outward FDI channelled primarily to enterprises 
within the region itself. Thanks to the competitive advantages 
of the natural resources in their markets of origin, several 
trans-Latins have progressed from being exporters to being 
global producers. Many of the trans-Latins’ efficiency-
seeking investments in the manufacturing sector have been 
directed outside their home region. In the area of motor 
vehicles and parts, the main investments were motivated 
by proximity to customers, the benefits to be derived from 
the development of products and solutions and the need 
to avoid trade barriers. An interesting case in Asia is the 
case of Nemak (part of the Alfa group) which announced 
the construction of a new production plant in China. This 
company also purchased the operations of the high-technology 
aluminium-component manufacturer, Tk Aluminum, in China. 
The Brazilian company, Marcopolo, launched a project 
with Tata Motors to supply the Indian market. As a rule, 
however, the geographic scope of trans-Latins’ operations 
still does not go much beyond the region of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, with just a few cases extending to the 
United States or Europe. In Asia, these companies play a 
very insignificant role. (ECLAC, 2007a).12 
12 One exception is that in 2006 the food companies Bimbo and Gruma, 
which were already strong players in Latin America, the United 
States and Europe, began investing in Asia. Bimbo purchased the 
Chinese operations of the Spanish firm Pan Rico. Gumba bought 
Rositas Investments in Australia and invested in food production 
projects in China and Japan, investing an estimated US$ 100 million 
(ECLAC 2007a, p. 51).
5.  Impediments to biregional FDI
The low level of Asian FDI channelled to Latin America 
over the last two decades is linked to intra-industry 
corporate activity in East Asia and to the fact that Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have not been part 
of the interaction between trade and FDI, which serves 
to relocate production across national boundaries, thus 
creating a two-way, or even a triangular trade flow among 
participating countries. Latin American industrialization 
of the 1980s and 1990s brought about a clearly different 
trade and investment relationship: companies in Latin 
America continue to pursue an international strategy based 
on advantages in their respective home countries, whether 
arising from an abundance of natural resources, expertise 
in developing and processing these resources, or their 
capabilities and competitiveness in selling the processed 
resources or industrial commodities internationally. In 
services, large companies in the region have expanded 
their businesses on an international scale into two or 
more countries, in such fields as energy, communications, 
transportation, and financial services. Asian investors 
have rarely participated in the privatization process of 
these sectors.
In addition, market-seeking FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has been too “inward -looking” 
and has not contributed sufficiently to the building 
of local manufacturing capacities and international 
competitiveness. One of the major reasons for a low 
level of trade and investment flows between the two 
regions relates to the lack of the so-called “efficiency-
seeking” FDI, which is the type most common in Asia-
Pacific. Also, in those cases where they do exist in Latin 
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America, they suffer from the typical shortcomings of 
this type of FDI, namely, their “enclave” nature, low 
value-added trap and the lack of industrial clusters. 
One way of fostering trade and investment relations 
with Asia-Pacific would therefore be to promote 
this type of FDI on the Latin American side, and to 
address the problems that it usually engenders for the 
national economy. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) with Mexico contemplates, in several chapters 
of the agreement, numerous technical cooperation 
measures for improving Mexican industrial capacities 
and international competitiveness, points that are not 
common in typical free trade agreements with the 
United States (ECLAC, 2008).
The fact that FDI flows between the two regions 
have lagged far behind the dynamic trends of total FDI 
flows in both is due not only to the inter-industry nature 
of trade flows but also to other economic and social 
factors. Lack of knowledge of corporate strategies in the 
other region, due to cultural, geographic and historical 
factors, is one important consideration. The scarcity 
of information, especially about recent trends in trade 
and FDI, regional integration and existing business 
opportunities in the other region, is another important 
impediment to reciprocal trade and investment. The lack 
of a well-established network among companies, large 
companies and SMEs alike, is an obstacle to strategic 
alliances and corporate association. Despite profitable 
opportunities, the high sunk costs of ventures, and the 
risks involved for single investors may also continue to 
act as formidable barriers.
As the Asian experience attests, a country’s comparative 
advantage is strongly influenced by that of neighbouring 
countries. What matters more in today’s globalized 
international economy is the region’s market size, natural 
resource endowments, production cost structures, patterns 
of specialization, availability of skilled and unskilled 
labour, R&D capabilities and infrastructure as well as the 
harmonization of the “behind-the-border” measures and 
domestic regulations. In this context, regional integration 
has a lot to offer. In pursuit of the so-called “dynamic 
effects” of integration, most new regional integration goes 
beyond conventional arrangements addressing trade in 
goods and involves attempts at comprehensive disciplines 
and rules. Such schemes envisage liberalization of trade in 
services, factor movements, harmonization of regulatory 
regimes, environmental and labour standards as well as 
many domestic policies perceived as affecting international 
competitiveness. Cooperation in harmonization of norms 
as well as strengthening of infrastructure, physical and 
human alike, by way of regional integration, is also of 
growing importance. Despite substantial progress in these 
areas, by way of various initiatives through subregional 
and regional integration and free trade agreements signed 
with the United States, the European Union and several 
Asian countries, Latin America still lags behind Asia-
Pacific in this regard.
6.  Proliferation of trade agreements in Asia-Pacific:  
 consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean
As examined in the foregoing sections, until recently, 
Asian regional integration consisted of burgeoning 
intraregional trade, based on the increasingly complementary 
production and trade components of the different countries’ 
manufacturing sectors. Intra-industry trade (IIT) expanded 
significantly as the specific advantages of production and 
marketing chains were exploited more effectively. This 
process of de facto (market-led) integration in Asia-Pacific 
is now being supported by de jure (government-led) 
integration; and strong production and trade relations 
are being complemented by free trade agreements of 
various types that aim to consolidate those links. A clear 
characteristic of the process in Asia and the Pacific is the 
fact that several large regional economies, such as Japan, 
China, India, Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of 
China, are abandoning their traditional reluctance to sign 
preferential agreements and join trade blocs, and have 
decided to sign bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements 
with other economies both within and outside the Asia-
Pacific region. Asia-Pacific is consolidating its production 
integration through agreements that currently cover over 
60% of its total trade (for more details, see ECLAC, 
2007a; Rosales and Kuwayama, 2007).
The two approaches to integration, de facto and 
de jure routes, should be ultimately complementary. 
Integration of markets through use of formal trade 
agreements leads to greater legal certainty, clearer and 
more enhanced transparency of “ the rules of the game” 
among businesses and “lock-in” the results of de facto 
integration achieved so far. Meanwhile, integration by this 
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route may be unsuccessful if the underlying economic 
factors are not favourable or if countries and sectors 
share only a few production and trade complementarities. 
Given, on the one hand, the divergent patterns of regional 
integration between the two regions and, on the other, 
the proliferation of trade agreements in each (a definite 
trend that will orient future biregional trade debates and 
discussions), the important point is not necessarily to 
sequence the two approaches as Aminian et. al. (2008) 
suggests, but rather to seek ways of establishing synergies 
between them.
As discussed elsewhere (ECLAC, 2008), the de jure 
approach is needed to address the existing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers that impede greater trade flows between the two regions. 
Biregional cooperation and strategic business alliances are 
also called for in order to improve marketing/distribution and 
transport systems and other physical infrastructures, whose 
deficiency tends to increase transaction costs and thereby 
jeopardize future biregional business opportunities. The two 
regions should also work together to enhance international 
competitiveness and innovation capabilities not only for 
individual countries but also for each region as a whole. 
E.  Conclusions and recommendations
With imminent risks bearing down on the world economy 
and the emergence of a new geography of the world 
economy increasingly centered around Asia-Pacific, Latin 
American and Caribbean authorities should redouble 
their efforts to identify and capitalize upon the potential 
complementarities between the region and Asia-Pacific. 
Latin America and the Caribbean should take advantage 
of its current favourable position to lay the foundations 
for sustained trade and investment relations by creating 
biregional business alliances, enhancing cooperation in 
innovation and human capital in order to diversify trade, 
add greater value and knowledge to exports, and help 
create more stable conditions for growth.
One of the reasons for the limited biregional trade 
and investment flows is the lack of intra-industry trade 
between the two regions. Although there exists substantial 
intra-industry trade in each region, trade of this type 
across the two regions is still scarce. The fact that current 
intra-industry trade flows account for a relatively small 
proportion of biregional trade points not only to vast 
possibilities that may lie ahead, but also to enormous 
challenges that confront future biregional cooperation 
in trade and investment.
Inter-industry trade still accounts for the bulk of 
trade flows: exports from Asia-Pacific are manufactures, 
while Latin American and Caribbean exports are mainly 
primary commodities. Whereas the region’s exports as a 
whole contain a growing proportion of manufactures, the 
opposite is true for its exports to Asia-Pacific. Shipments 
of food items and minerals and metals represent an 
increased share of total exports to Asia-Pacific, reflecting 
the region’s comparative advantages and the potential 
of those markets. In contrast, the experiences of Central 
America and particularly Mexico point to an investment 
and trade strategy different from the one adopted in the rest 
of the region. Given the divergent pattern of international 
specialization between the two regions, the continued 
expansion and deepening process of international production 
chains of Asia-Pacific, together with the present strong 
demand for commodities, would offer the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean new production possibilities 
and export opportunities. 
The list of products exported by the region to Asia-
Pacific is becoming more diversified: it now includes a 
number of new products such as fishery products and 
pig meat, along with high-technology manufactures that 
include electronic microcircuits and telecommunications 
equipment and data-processing machinery. The presence 
of these manufactures indicates that Latin America 
is beginning to integrate, albeit sporadically, into the 
extensive supply-chain networks that are prevalent in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
It is also possible to detect some biregional trade flows 
that are of an intra-industrial nature and are increasing, 
though still at an incipient stage. In general, Mexico’s 
trade with Asia-Pacific shows higher Grubel Lloyd 
indices than those for other Latin American countries. 
Costa Rica and Brazil are beginning to show some degree 
of intra-industry trade with that region. On the side of 
Asia-Pacific, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand are 
moving into intra-industry trade with Latin America and 
the Caribbean. In short, there has been a breakthrough 
from a pure inter-industry trade type to a trade structure 
that is a little more intra-industry-oriented.
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Both intraregional FDI flows in Asia-Pacific and FDI 
inflows into emerging Asia have been a genuine promoter 
of de facto regional integration in this region; the FDI 
originating not only from the major developed countries 
but also from within emerging East and South-East Asia 
have been major investors for each Asian country over 
the years. In this region, there exists a clear “trade and 
investment” relationship, which promotes intra-industry 
and intra-firm trade and a greater “slicing-up” process 
of complex cross-border international supply chain 
networks. 
East and South-East Asia can be viewed as a highly 
integrated “factory”, in which the previous national 
production processes have been dismantled and dispersed 
to the lowest-cost locations across the region. An important 
element of the fragmentation of manufacturing processes 
in the region was Japan’s loss of comparative advantages 
in manufacturing production, which led Japanese firms 
to slice their productive processes and outsource more 
labour-intensive stages to the neighbouring countries of 
East Asia. This “hollowing out” of the Japanese economy 
was replicated in Taiwan Province of China, the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, thereby 
deepening the process of creating the “Asian Factory.” 
China’s later entry onto the international economic stage 
further eroded the industrial comparative advantages 
enjoyed by the higher-income East-Asian countries, 
making offshore production more attractive. Notably, this 
entire regional trade creation occurred outside the ambit 
of regional trade agreements but together with investment 
attraction policies. 
There is also growing concern at the assumption that the 
benefits of Asia’s buoyancy may not be fully exploited by 
non-Asian countries, owing to the formation of an informal 
(de facto) trade bloc, now supported by formal (de jure) 
integration in Asia-Pacific. Those countries make up an 
increasingly broad, widening and complementary group in 
which development is disseminated in concentric circles, 
thanks to intra-industry regional trade and intraregional 
FDI. In view of these trends, countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean need to strengthen their trade links to 
make their production more complementary with that of 
Asia-Pacific, and establish trade and investment partnerships, 
in addition to trade agreements, which would provide 
new access to these markets and help these countries to 
integrate into Asian production and export chains.
Apart from the natural-resource-based FDI, one 
predominant type of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
“market-seeking” FDI, has been too “inward-looking” and 
has not contributed sufficiently to the building of local 
manufacturing capacities and international competitiveness. 
One of the major reasons for the low level of trade and 
investment flows between the two regions is the lack of 
the so-called “efficiency-seeking” FDI, the type most 
common in Asia-Pacific. And when they exist in the 
region, they suffer from the typical shortcomings of this 
type of FDI, namely, their “enclave” nature and the low-
value-added trap as well as a lack of industrial clusters. 
In seeking to deepen trade and investment relations with 
Asia-Pacific, the region could therefore consider adopting 
a two-fold approach: promoting this type of FDI on the 
Latin American side, and addressing the drawbacks that 
usually affect national economies in general and the export 
sector in particular.
Concerning the more efficient and coordinated 
exploitation of comparative advantages, a number of recent 
experiences show that value can be added to commodity 
exports and knowledge can also be incorporated. Although 
more difficult than in manufacturing sectors, it is also 
possible to integrate commodities into production and 
marketing chains in Asia and the Pacific; this calls for 
a systemic approach that covers the production process, 
trade logistics, sea and air transport, and marketing and 
distribution in the final consumption market. To the extent 
that this is based on alliances with Asia-Pacific’s investors, 
the initial export of commodities will become a complex 
of activities involving goods, services, investments and 
financing. Strategic partnerships should be created to 
increase value added throughout the production and 
marketing chain, and mutually beneficial technological 
partnerships should be developed (to apply advances 
in biotechnology to agro-industry, mining, forestry and 
fisheries, for example).
The countries of the region also urgently need to 
make the most of the current dynamism in the Asia-Pacific 
region and develop new linkages to move forward in the 
area of innovation and competitiveness (a weak link in 
the Latin American regional experience), strengthen links 
between trade and investment, and consolidate production 
and technological linkages. The Asia-Pacific region 
offers investments that could provide complementary 
financing for major initiatives, especially in the areas 
of infrastructure and energy. An interesting challenge is 
to identify the infrastructure and energy projects where 
Asian investment might be most needed, to speed up the 
implementation of projects, which would make it possible 
not only to strengthen the trade facilitation and investments 
link with Asia-Pacific but also to generate externalities 
for Latin America’s own regional integration process. It 
would thus be advisable to link the strategic partnership 
with that region with an update of regional integration, 
to achieve unified markets, support increasingly common 
standards and provide more legal guarantees.
A number of market-access problems still exist. In 
Asia-Pacific, high ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) are applied 
to agricultural products and a number of natural-resource-
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based manufactures —precisely the product lines in which 
the Latin American and Caribbean region has major export 
interests and strong comparative advantages. The challenge 
facing the region is therefore to engage more actively in 
the Asian production and distribution chains with exports 
that face the highest levels of protection. In this regard, 
the countries of the region are encouraged to pursue better 
market access to that region, either on a bilateral basis or 
jointly, in a more coordinated manner. 
For a number of reasons (including the prospect 
of securing better market access) Japan, Republic of 
Korea, China, and Singapore have engaged in free 
trade agreements and strategic partnerships with Latin 
America. Such agreements include those signed by: 
(i) Japan with Mexico and with Chile, and the joint study 
carried out with Argentina (with a view to be expanded 
to MERCOSUR); (ii) China’s FTA with Chile and the 
almost finalized negotiations with Peru; (iii) Korea’s 
FTA with Chile, Korea’s preliminary negotiations with 
Mexico, and the joint study which supports an FTA 
between Korea and MERCOSUR; (iv) Singapore’s 
FTA with Panama and the strategic partnership with 
Chile (through the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement or P4), and Singapore’s attempts 
aimed at an FTA with Mexico (stand-by) and signing of 
an FTA with Peru in May 2008; (v) Thailand’s finalized 
negotiations for an FTA with Peru, and the discussions 
initiated with MERCOSUR and with Chile, both subject 
to the assessment of preliminary joint studies; and 
(vi) Malaysia’s negotiations (already at an advanced 
stage) with a view to a bilateral agreement with Chile. 
India, at the same time, has signed trade agreements with 
Chile and with MERCOSUR, and has, for some time, 
been engaged in preliminary talks with Colombia and 
Venezuela under a limited trade liberalization process 
aimed at securing the partial elimination of tariffs on a 
restricted number of goods.
On the plurilateral front, the divergent positions within 
the Andean Community make it improbable that this regional 
block will move forward with trade liberalization initiatives 
in the short term with economic blocs of Asia, despite the 
talks that have already taken place, especially with India. 
The most recent initiative and probably the one with most 
prospects so far is the upcoming meeting of trade ministers 
of ASEAN and MERCOSUR, which will be convened 
by Brazil for November. There are no concrete objectives 
in view at this point in terms of a process towards a free 
trade agreement, but this meeting is definitely aimed at 
forging closer economic ties between the two regions, 
given their respective comparative advantages and the 
mutual benefits to be derived.
Other options available to the region for achieving 
better market access to the Asia-Pacific market might 
include: (i) creation of a trade bloc with East Asia to 
promote further trade liberalization (whether within 
the framework of APEC (FTAAP) or otherwise), which 
might include more than the three Latin American 
members (Chile, Mexico and Peru); this would help 
to achieve greater uniformity and convergence of rules 
and disciplines between the FTAs signed by APEC 
member countries and those signed by Latin American 
and Caribbean countries; (ii) promotion of intra-APEC 
trade and investment, by way of simplification and 
harmonization of the rules of origin (ROO) present in 
the majority of FTAs signed by APEC members and 
much greater flexibility in accumulating ROO among 
the different integration schemes and the FTAs in the 
region; (iii) the possible enlargement of the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, or “P4” 
(EPA), extending its geographic coverage for future FTA 
negotiations, for example, to Peru, Mexico, Colombia and 
Thailand; (iv) coordinated support by the three current 
Latin American APEC member countries in seeking 
APEC membership for other countries of the region; 
and (v) the strengthening and more active participation 
of the countries of both regions in the Forum for East 
Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), the only 
forum of its kind which goes beyond the concept of the 
Pacific Rim. Chile, Mexico and Peru should play a critical 
role in coordinating positions and working together on 
different fronts in order to promote integration not only 
in APEC-related forums but also within and between 
other intraregional schemes.
The countries of these two regions could consider 
future action in other areas, in particular in improvement 
of infrastructure and energy. The public and private sectors 
of Latin America and the Caribbean should work together 
with Asian counterparts engaged in investment promotion 
to coordinate regional portfolios of projects in these two 
areas. One particular challenge for improving efficiency is 
the lack of information on the maritime and air transport 
system serving the two regions. In this regard, there is a 
need to analyse the available and planned transport channels 
between the two regions by: (i) studying the composition 
of commodity trade flows; (ii) looking at the maritime and 
air transport system, particularly its structure and vessel 
capacity and the export potential and import demand of 
both regions; and (iii) strengthening SME industry and 
trade associations to achieve scale economies for SME 
exporters through clusters or other forms of association, 
assisted by information dissemination using information 
and communications technologies (ICTs).
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Chapter VII
Prospective studies: a tool for enhancing 
international integration
Introduction
Just as matters relating to international conditions, multilateral negotiations, regional integration 
and trade relations among countries, regions or continents are important for the evolution of 
trade, competitiveness and innovation capacity are increasingly crucial for tackling the economic 
and social challenges that countries now face.
In an era of globalization, export development is an 
important source of growth. Statistics show year after 
year that growth in international trade far outstrips that of 
world output and is one of its main engines. Trade also has 
the ability to stimulate a culture of competition, obliging 
firms to increase productivity and seek new markets. 
Furthermore, it encourages investment and helps to diversify 
production and consumption. Above all, however, in today’s 
globalized, dynamic and changing world, global trade 
promotes knowledge, innovation, best practices and the 
incorporation of new technologies. In effect, as a result of 
globalization, firms have to deal with the reconfiguration 
of production systems and the continual emergence of 
new technologies. Witness the leading role now being 
played by information technologies, biotechnologies and 
the possibilities offered by nanotechnology. Firms are 
finding that they must adopt these new paradigms in order 
to participate now and in the future in the continual contest 
for markets, in which competitiveness and innovation are 
the keys to success. 
Some emerging economies (China, India and others) 
have locked into the advantages of globalization and the 
continual emergence of new technologies to excellent 
effect, displacing the industries of many Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. In some cases, firms from the 
region have found niches in which they are competitive, 
but others have been pushed out of markets, leading to 
higher unemployment and worsening poverty. Although 
these developments can be foreseen, there is rarely a 
long-term strategy in place to deal with them. With the 
competitiveness-innovation link growing ever closer, 
countries lacking this link are worse placed to scale up 
the value of exports, have less capacity to incorporate 
knowledge into the goods they produce, diversify their export 
structure or achieve dynamic export development, while 
their ability to defend local industry is weakened.
As noted in the ECLAC report Structural Change 
and Productivity Growth - 20 Years Later. Old problems, 
new opportunities (ECLAC, 2008), although major strides 
have been made in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
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region is losing ground in comparison with certain Asian 
and Eastern European countries. Two of the main obstacles 
to competitiveness are the limited diversification of export 
products and the slow incorporation of innovative know-
how into products and processes.
Some societies are better prepared to take advantage 
of future opportunities and to strengthen their position in 
global trade. Previous editions of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the World Economy have looked at a number 
of cases, including the innovation and export development 
strategy developed by countries such as Finland, Ireland, 
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Sweden. 
They have also analysed the cases of Australia and New 
Zealand, whose export structures are still heavily based 
on natural resources, but which have developed strategies 
and to develop new industries to add value and knowledge 
to the products they export.
A new study that includes Spain and the Czech 
Republic, as well as these countries, and which is 
summarized in chapter VI of the report mentioned above 
(ECLAC, 2008), underlines the fact that a feature shared 
by these countries —whose policies, culture and history 
are very different— is the concerted action of the State to 
promote export development and competitiveness based on 
a vision of the future. In these countries, such a vision is 
manifested in medium- and long-term export development 
strategies and their implementation through public-private 
partnerships that seek consensus or, at least, understanding 
with respect to basic strategic guidelines. 
In the effort to move ahead with consensus-seeking, 
prospective or foresight exercises have become an instrument 
used not so much for projecting an increasingly uncertain 
future, but for socializing information to create networks 
of different stakeholders and form expert analyses, all 
of which contributes to strategy definition and policy 
decision-making. 
Prospective exercises have no single definition, 
but they increasingly tend to draw on a broad range of

 See New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development (2005) and 
Backing Australia’s Ability (2004). 
stakeholders to help define probable future scenarios 
—building alternative futures— and seek effective ways 
to tackle them. Countries that have a shared vision of the 
future and are able to trace paths towards a stronger position 
at the international level may then use these scenarios to 
gain ground in terms of competitiveness and strategies for 
technological development and innovation. With a view to 
impacting on the future, foresight work includes participation, 
consensus-building and information stockpiling, thus 
contributing to decision-making and planning. 
Prospective studies tie in with national efforts to 
strengthen innovation and competitiveness in several 
ways. First, these studies can help identify technologies 
that may be crucial in building up a country’s future 
competitiveness. Prospective exercises help design 
science and technology projects that guide State budgets 
and private-sector activities. Second, these exercises 
facilitate linkages between technology and know-how 
and the market, meaning that they stimulate the practical 
application of scientific research findings. This is a matter 
of identifying innovation priorities as regards future 
scenarios in areas offering new medium- and long-term 
opportunities for firms. Prospective exercises can serve 
to identify such opportunities, anticipate obstacles and 
put forward policies for advancing along the path or paths 
that have been identified. Third, prospective exercises 
allow long-term partnerships to be strengthened among 
researchers, firms from different industrial sectors, the 
academic world, government and, in general, different 
areas of society.
The following section uses specific examples from 
different countries to describe how prospective exercises 
have been implemented and used to create strategies for 
export development and innovation. This process is not 
common in Latin America and the Caribbean, so the 
progress achieved in other countries and continents can 
help promote the use of such exercises in order to enhance 
the region’s international integration.
A. Foresight analysis, export development strategies 
 and international integration
Prospective or foresight analysis consists of a systematic 
and organized enquiry into long-term behaviour patterns 
regarding different issues. Numerous analytical approaches 
can be found in the literature on this area, which has aroused 
mounting interest at the international level.2 Over the last few 
decades, however, and for different reasons, understanding 
2
 Masini (2006), Cuhls (2003), Cuhls and Jaspers (2004), Cariola 
and Rolfo (2004).
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of the prospective process moved away from the simple 
exercise of projecting the future as an extrapolation of the past, 
giving way to a more complex vision that is oriented more 
towards decision-making in the present. The participation 
of a large number of stakeholders —including scientists, 
professionals, businesspeople and public authorities— helps 
pave the way for intelligent, systematic and participatory 
planning and creation of development strategies designed 
to improve a country’s long-term competitive position at 
the international level. 
The most systematic work carried out on the application 
of forward-looking analysis at the country level was 
undertaken during the 990s in countries such as Austria, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, although today such work has 
extended to most European countries, Australia and New 
Zealand, while Japan and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum have promoted the practice 
in Asian countries. These exercises have been carried out 
mostly at the national level, but have also been implemented 
at regional and sectoral level. As will be seen further on, 
they have been developed as a policy tool and play an 
important role in the strategic vision used to strengthen 
international integration.
One example among many that illustrate the 
relationship between foresight analysis and export 
development can be found in Germany, whose economy 
depends heavily on exports with a high knowledge 
content. Germany has recognized that its technological 
efficiency is one of its main advantages when competing 
in the world markets, and is aware that German firms 
will be able to remain highly competitive in the long 
term only to the extent that they continue to invest 
in research and development (R&D), develop new 
technologies, and quickly transform innovations into 
marketable goods. The country has used prospective 
studies to identify technologies that can play a decisive 
role to increase future competitiveness. The specific 
goal of its latest prospective exercise, entitled Futur 
(200-2005), was to investigate areas of research able 
to attract funding, and the way those studies were 
subsequently implemented and used was crucial. The 
knowledge obtained from the studies, later helped 
to establish priorities for technological research and 
technology policies applied to highly export-oriented 
sectors such as the automobile industry, nanotechnology, 
information and communications technologies (ICTs), 
and the health and energy sectors. 
1. Strategic areas of export development and prospective exercises
Strategy analysis in countries studied outside the region 
(ECLAC, 2008) found four strategic pillars supporting 
programmes and policies to strengthen international integration: 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), coordination and 
internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), export promotion, and innovation. These pillars are 
not equally important in all the countries (see table VII.), 
but together form a system of policies and programmes that 
are sustained in the medium term, and which represent the 
architecture of an export development strategy.
Table VII.1
FOUR STRATEGIC PILLARS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION a
Attracting foreign direct 
investment
Coordination and 
internationalization of SMEs Export promotion Innovation
Australia √ √
Czech Republic √ √ √
Finland √
Ireland √ √ √ √
Malaysia √ √ √ √
New Zealand √ √ √
Republic of Korea √ √ √
Singapore √ √ √ √
Spain b √ √ √
Sweden √
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official reports from the relevant countries.
a
 The √ sign indicates a strategy that has been formally established and implemented.
b
 Refers to the autonomous communities.
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Attracting foreign investment, for example, has played 
a key role in the strategies of small countries trying to make 
swift progress in the area of industrialization and export of 
high-technology products with value added, such as Ireland, 
Malaysia, Singapore and, lately, the Czech Republic. As a 
result of intense external competition, the current strategy 
in these countries is to maintain or improve the domestic 
business climate and be more selective in implementing 
investment attraction programmes, placing emphasis on 
higher-technology production and services sectors. 
The choice of policy to attract foreign investment 
is no small matter and foresight exercises provide the 
opportunity to form a consensus on which activities are 
to benefit from incentives. At present, priority is given to 
industries and services with a high knowledge and value 
content, and to investments in R&D. These exercises, which 
engage different private and public-sector stakeholders, 
have improved decision-making and increased policy 
efficiency. Ireland and Singapore and, to a certain extent, 
Malaysia offer interesting examples of such processes. In 
these countries, the search for strategies to deal with future 
challenges involves not only local stakeholders, but also 
international advisory panels. Every year, the Government 
of Singapore convenes a meeting at the highest political 
level, involving managing directors from large multinational 
firms and government representatives, to analyse global 
and Asian trends along with technological and strategic 
changes. As an instrument of future analysis, this meeting 
not only represents a forum to share information related 
to domestic strategies, but also fosters a network of 
contacts in the international market that helps identify 
opportunities for the country. 
The strategic pillar consisting of the internationalization 
of firms has a number of dimensions: (i) integration of 
local firms into international value and export chains; 
(ii) integration of firms as suppliers of transnational 
corporations with a local presence; (iii) technological 
upgrading, particularly for SMEs; and (iv) training in 
exporting and foreign investment, also mainly for SMEs. 
Prospective exercises have proven useful in selecting 
the activities and sectors on which to target human and 
financial efforts. In the case of the Republic of Korea, 
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) 
has conducted foresight analyses to build consensus on 
policies and identify the country’s strategic priorities up 
to 2030 (Choi, 2003; Seok-Ho and others, 2006).
Export promotion is another strategic pillar for improving 
information regarding possible foreign markets, helping to 
promote a country’s image, linking suppliers with buyers, 
and improving the quality of goods and services, along 
with market access. In some countries, these programmes 
and policies are developed within the framework of 
internationalization and innovation programmes.
As shown in table VII., the innovation pillar represents 
the strategy most often used for export development, 
which shows how important it is in steadily increasing the 
productivity and competitiveness of goods and services. 
Countries’ future international integration depends on the 
creation of new products and services, and the upgrading 
of productive processes. It is no surprise, therefore, that the 
number of foresight studies in Europe and Asia directly 
increases in relation to the innovation strategies they 
produce. In the case of Ireland, the main objective of the last 
prospective exercise was to ensure sustained competitive 
advantages and improve the country’s standard of living. 
Hence, the government attached particular importance to 
promoting society’s understanding of how science and 
technology could help the country tackle future needs. 
Specifically, it set about raising economic stakeholders’ 
awareness of how investment in research, science and 
technology would help Ireland to transition towards a 
knowledge society. The exercise also helped to establish 
networks linking firms with basic sciences, applied sciences 
and government policies and, lastly, it fostered a culture 
of reflection on markets, technological opportunities and 
the ongoing challenges faced by the country.
Following the examples of Germany, Japan and the 
United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea has carried out 
three technology futures exercises, which have involved 
a growing number of stakeholders working together in 
panels of experts, businesspeople, academics and even 
consumers, to assess potential areas of technological 
development for the country. Together with establishing 
networks to spread information and knowledge, later 
strengthened by government policies, the results of these 
exercises provided inputs for five-year plans in the areas 
of science and technology that have guided State budgets 
and private-sector activities.
The process has developed since the start of these 
prospective analysis exercises in respect of their direction 
and the methodologies used. The exercises carried out in 
Europe and, later, Asia initially focused on technology 
foresight, with which competitiveness was believed to 
be closely linked. Prospective exercises were seen as 
the key to resolving the dilemma between the need to 
establish priorities (because of the cost of upgrading, 
limited resources or the complexities of scientific decision-
making) and pressure to obtain value for money and 
socio-economic impact.
Given that methodologies are generic, however, and 
can be used with different goals, the process shifted towards 
a new approach to competitiveness-building, in which 
not only R&D were important, but also the articulation 
of technology and knowledge with the market. New 
scientific or technological know-how could not remain 
confined to laboratories or universities, but had to be 
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used to add value to products and processes through 
marketing, thus giving rise to innovation strategies. 
It was thus a matter not only of identifying research 
priorities based on scientific opinions, but of analysing 
future outcomes for firms in areas that offered new 
opportunities in the long term. Foresight analysis was 
used to identify such opportunities, possible obstacles 
and policies for advancing along the paths identified. This 
involved the participation not only of scientists in the 
exercise, but also of industry, consumers and government 
authorities working in the areas of production, marketing 
and technological dissemination.
Box VII. describes an example of foresight analysis 
focused on competitiveness-building in one of Norway’s 
main export areas: aquaculture. The example illustrates the 
way such analysis helped establish a public-private alliance to 
outline the industry’s future, through a discussion involving 
industry, scientists, other professionals and government 
authorities. Interestingly enough, although the goal of the 
exercise was to identify the future of a particular industry, 
the agency that initiated the exercise was the Research 
Council of Norway, demonstrating that in a country that 
uses state-of-the-art technology, the future is closely linked 
with R&D and the search for strategic solutions.
Box VII.1
A PROSPECTIVE STUDY IN NORWAY: AQUACULTURE 2020
In 2003, the Research Council of Norway 
invited representatives from the aquaculture 
industry, research communities and public 
authorities to take part in a discussion 
on the future of Norwegian aquaculture, 
entitled Aquaculture 2020. The initiative 
aroused considerable interest on the part 
of institutions and private individuals. Some 
150 basic and five more complex scenarios 
were drawn up, one of which was used as 
the basis for strategic recommendations 
and initiatives targeting stakeholders in 
the areas of research, government, trade 
and industry. The scenarios proposed 
within the framework of Aquaculture 
2020 were used to present a series of 
different outlooks regarding the potential 
of Norwegian aquaculture up to 2020, 
and to explain what had taken place up 
to that time.
The exercise found that research alone 
can not resolve all the problems encountered 
and that, to produce results, research 
investment should be coordinated with 
business and trade development strategies 
established by commerce and industry and 
by the State. Second, given that research 
in different areas should be connected and 
enriched transversally, it was concluded that 
joint action in technological and professional 
fields such as ICTs, materials technologies, 
biotechnology, along with social and market 
research, is fundamental for the development 
of new and important areas of knowledge 
and to identify strategic solutions for the 
development of aquaculture.
As a result of this process, the 
Research Council of Norway has been using 
prospective analysis as a tool to develop 
large-scale research programmes involving 
skilled professionals from different firms, 
and representatives of State, research and 
educational institutions, working together to 
provide long-term foresight analysis. This 
work identifies the central issue in each 
case and fosters discussion regarding the 
future, creating a productive collaboration 
effort that would not have been possible if 
the stakeholders involved were not meeting 
on a daily basis.
The Aquaculture 2020 report that 
resulted from this exercise does not purport 
to provide a comprehensive or scientific 
analysis. What it deals with is the future 
or, more specifically, a range of possible or 
alternative future scenarios. The report was 
issued with the aim of improving the basis 
for the sector’s development programme, 
as commended to the Research Council of 
Norway for the 2004-2005 period.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Research Council of Norway “Aquaculture 2020: Transcending the barriers - As 
long as…”, 2005 [online] http://www.forskningsradet.no /CSStorage/Flex_attachment/Aquaculture_2020_eng.pdf.
Today, foresight analysis is also applied to sectoral 
strategies and even to general development issues such 
as economic, social and sustainable development. In this 
context, the discipline has evolved through the convergence 
of trends in public policy analysis, strategic planning 
and future studies, and brings together the main agents 
of change in order to develop a strategic outlook based 
on advance intelligence. As shown by Masini (2002) 
the importance of foresight analysis lies not only in 
anticipating what the future holds, but also in deciding 
what path to follow.
The end results of prospective exercises —the outcome 
of the recommendations and policy decisions deriving 
from them— have yet to be measured. Some authors, 
however, have identified six functions that prospective 
analysis should fulfil; these represent intermediate results 
and feed into policy implementation. These functions are: 
(i) to provide the advance information or “intelligence” 
to which State authorities and other stakeholders have 
access during the exercise and which broadens the 
knowledge base used to take decisions; (ii) to facilitate 
policy implementation, by building a shared vision 
among all stakeholders regarding the present situation 
and future challenges, as well as establishing shared 
networks and viewpoints; (iii) to promote participation 
by different stakeholders —including civil society— in 
decision-making, so increasing the transparency and 
legitimacy of policies; (iv) to support policy definition, 
translating the results of the collective process into 
specific options for policy design and implementation; 
(v) to reshape the political system by introducing long-
term challenges; and (vi) to demonstrate to the public 
that policies are based on rational information (see Da 
Costa and others, 2006).
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Lastly, the body of experience in prospective analysis 
reveals certain keys to making the most of such exercises 
and ultimately producing policies that are truly effective 
for shaping long-term patterns. Based on the experience 
of a country such as Ireland, several recommendations 
may be made (Boyle, O’Donnell and O’Riordan). One 
of these is to link the long-term focus with current issues 
and policies in order to increase the stakeholders’ interest 
in such exercises and the likelihood of their success. In 
addition, although in prospective exercises learning is 
obtained mainly from other experiences, it always has 
to be adapted to specific circumstances, which calls for 
training and planning.
It has also been noted that for such exercises to 
be well focused, it is necessary to form some kind of 
steering committee made up of different stakeholders, 
to be responsible for (among other things) coordinating 
and overseeing the foresight exercise and facilitating the 
search for consensus or understanding. Since the members 
of such a committee must obviously be well informed, 
they should include experts in the different issues that 
need to be addressed and consult their own and other 
specialists’ research during the course of the exercise. 
Another recommendation is to use the process to establish 
networks of scientists, industry, consumers and experts, 
which should remain active in the long term. Multiple 
methodologies should be used for prospective analysis, 
including situation planning, workshops and Delphi or 
other methods in order to structure thinking over the long 
term. These methodologies can help identify strategies or 
implement policy recommendations related to the future. 
Lastly, Boyle, O’Donnell and O’Riordan found that the 
most successful exercises are those that translate into 
a plan of action as a mechanism for implementing the 
strategy. Given the current challenges for strengthening 
Latin American and Caribbean integration at international 
level, familiarity and use of these policy instruments may 
be extremely useful.
2. A broad array of methodologies and instruments
Between the late 940s, when future studies were first 
undertaken, and today, when foresight analysis has become 
a public policy instrument, the methodology used for such 
exercises has broadened enormously. Although different 
countries carry out prospective exercises in a large variety 
of ways, generally reflecting their own individual traits 
as well as the characteristics of each exercise, the set 
of methodologies available is common to all of them. 
Those methodologies include those corresponding to the 
preliminary study phase, which are generally conducted 
by specialized researchers. Multiple techniques are used 
at this stage, including the preparation of models and 
simulation, extrapolation of trends, expert panels, Delphi 
techniques (structured collection of knowledge from 
experts, from which conclusions are distilled), review 
of literature, retrospective analysis, and so forth. Other 
techniques are incorporated during the process in the 
interaction with different stakeholders, such as analysis 
of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(SWOT analysis), cross-impact analysis, brain storming 
and citizen panels, which are used to analyse trends and 
create scenarios.
(a)	 Engaging	stakeholders
In recent times, a key component of these exercises 
has been strong stakeholder engagement. Experience has 
shown that the more stakeholders are involved, the more 
effective the policy, and that this is just as important 
as the skills of those responsible for implementing 
the policy (see Havas, Schartinger and Weber, 2007). 
Exercises such as Futur 200-2005 in Germany, Future 
2020 in the United Kingdom, the latest Delphi study 
conducted in Japan and the exercise for the period 2003-
2004 in Sweden mobilized stakeholders from many 
different spheres, forming highly representative groups 
of corporate executives, representatives of industrial 
organizations, scientists, consumers, labour associations 
and government authorities.
The way the stakeholders participate depends on the 
type of exercise and the methodology used. A number of 
phases have been identified, however, each with different 
degrees of engagement and participation (see figure VII.). 
At the diagnostic or exploration phase of the exercise, the 
degree of participation can be limited by the specificity 
of the issues, but the number of stakeholders convened 
increases considerably at the decision-making phase, 
then narrows down again at the stages of implementation 
and coordination. 
The first stage, then, consists of establishing or 
choosing the issues or projects on which the exercises are 
to be carried out, and the second is to apply the particular 
methodology of the prospective exercise. The method used 
at the first stage may be an intensive workshop, in which 
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a select group of academics or experts chooses potential 
subjects for analysis. By the second stage, there should 
be a team qualified in foresight methodology behind 
each issue, supported by an expert advisory group This 
was the procedure employed in the last foresight exercise 
conducted in the United Kingdom.
Figure VII.1
PHASES OF STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN A FORESIGHT 
ANALYSIS PROCESS
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of O. Da Costa and others, “The impact of foresight on policy-making: 
Insights from the FORLEARN mutual learning process”, 2006.
The strategy of the exercise is different in each case 
and requires intensive use of the available tools. The 
strategy design is the most flexible point as regards possible 
techniques. Yet all strategies have a common feature: 
they are typically participatory and inclusive, with either 
intensive workshops or joint work by the participants 
over a longer period of time. One of this methodology’s 
peculiarities is that the exercise is coordinated by a team 
that is neutral, from outside the sector being discussed. 
This generates new combinations of stakeholders, leading 
to a more multi-disciplinary and cooperative vision of the 
issue, which would be difficult to achieve if the people 
directly involved were running the project. 
Lastly, the greatest successes of these exercises 
cited by the authorities coordinating them include, first, 
their capacity to generate consensus or, at the very least, 
understanding about the options and roads to strengthening 
the respective country’s international position and, second, 
their ability to create mechanisms to consolidate long-
term partnerships between researchers, firms in different 
sectors of industry, academia and governments and, in 
general, different walks of society. 
(b)	 Developing	future	scenarios
In recent times, foresight exercises have also drawn 
on future scenarios methodology (Berkhout and Hertin, 
2002 and DTI, 2002). This approach can be very useful 
in countries that need to set up medium- and long-term 
strategies, precisely because it is used to delineate the basic 
conditions or context on which the different scenarios are 
based, which helps to develop more effective strategies. This 
methodology enables analysis of the different dimensions of 
each of the scenarios, including trends in the global market, 
economic and sectoral trends in the country and employment 
and social trends, among others. The key to the exercise 
is to look beyond the horizons that are normally visible, 
in international trade, for example, in order to identify the 
potential and the opportunities arising from both the markets 
and developments in science and technology.
The United Kingdom Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) uses this methodology. In the last exercise 
conducted in 2002, the scenarios were based on two 
dimensions: social values, from the most individualistic 
to the most community-oriented (DTI, 2002), and the 
measurement of governance systems, which ties in with 
government structure and decision-making.
The first dimension affects social priorities, policies 
and patterns of economic activity. In Latin America, the 
community side of the social dimension could be equated 
with organized civil society, which lobbies and works for 
policies orientated towards social integration.
With regard to the second dimension, one extreme 
corresponds to autonomy —power remaining at the 
national level— and the other to interdependence —power 
shifting to supranational institutions, such as the European 
Union. An equivalent exercise for Latin America would 
be the development of scenarios of greater or lesser 
regional integration, which would have a key impact on 
infrastructure and, especially, energy. 
But scenarios can have multiple dimensions, which 
also depend on what direction countries are exploring. 
For example, scenarios could be developed around the 
Doha Round of trade talks, which would be particularly 
relevant for the MERCOSUR countries. Or around the 
future outcomes of negotiations on climate change, 
including the potential participation of Brazil, China 
and India in the Kyoto Protocol accords. But whatever 
dimensions are chosen for scenario-building, the key 
aspects of each must then be determined as a function of 
their possible impact on the domestic and international 
context in the future. 
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3. The leadership provided by governments
prospective processes in Canada, China, Hungary, New 
Zealand, South Africa and Thailand. In Austria various 
departments of the Austrian Academy of Sciences are 
still responsible for this area, and in Sweden foresight 
exercises are conducted by a consortium formed by the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences with 
representatives of industry and the public sector. 
The concept of competitiveness as being linked to 
innovation is generating concern about the market side, 
that is, how to market new process and products or business 
models. This has led to the inclusion of new actors and 
made it necessary to share the organization of exercises 
with other ministries. In the United States, for example, 
the Department of Commerce has been brought on board, 
as has the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Commerce and 
Industry in Japan. In Finland, what is now the Ministry of 
Employment and Economic Affairs (formerly the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry) and the Finnish Funding Agency 
for Technology and Innovation (TEKES) are the agencies 
responsible for foresight exercises (see box VII.2).
While there are academic bodies and research institutes 
devoted to futures analysis, the onus has been on 
governments to take the initiative as regards foresight 
exercises as such, that is, as a tool for decision-making 
and strategy-crafting. At the same time, since this 
discipline started up in the developed countries, where 
competitiveness has been closely linked to technological 
development, the greatest advances have occurred in 
science and technology. In the United States, foresight 
work has been spearheaded by the Department of 
Defense, while in Japan, the National Institute of Science 
and Technology Policy (NISTEP) conducts Delphi 
studies on a regular basis. In the Republic of Korea, 
the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) 
has a group working on futures analysis. In the United 
Kingdom, prospective exercises are part of the mandate 
of the Office of Science and Technology (OST), while 
the Australian Science and Technology Council was 
responsible for an exercise denominated “Matching science 
and technology to future needs”. Similar bodies steer 
Box VII.2
TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT IN FINLAND
Technological development and innovation 
have become key resources for growth and 
competitiveness in the Finnish economy and 
are expected to remain so in the future. In 
many organizations, prospective analysis 
in this area is now an essential part of 
strategy development in order to remain 
technologically competitive. 
Unlike many other countries, Finland 
does not have a formal national-level 
foresight process that could be used as 
background for setting R&D priorities. 
Nevertheless, technology foresight exercises 
are used, applied and developed in many 
forms and at various organizational levels 
in the innovation system. The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry set up a project to 
coordinate technology prospective activities 
in Finland in 2001 and that task has been 
carried on thereafter.
This project’s main purpose was to 
formulate scenarios and viewpoints for 
innovation policy, analyse different processes 
of evolution and develop new theoretical 
approaches, from long-term systematic 
research to public debate.
Several networks have been created 
under the project, including an expert 
network, a foresight network involving all 
the ministries and a high-level committee 
comprising representatives of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation 
(TEKES) and the Technical Research Centre 
of Finland (VTT), as the nucleus responsible 
for technology policy issues.
The main areas of technology foresight 
for the crafting of technology and innovation 
policy in Finland have been as follows:
(i) Essential changes and trends in the 
economic environment.
(ii) Key issues regarding globalization, 
internationalization, integration, 
regulation, information society 
development, development of the 
European Union and technological 
changes in society.
(iii) Sustained growth and development, 
ageing and other long-term changes 
in society.
(iv) Changes and trends in national 
innovation and production systems, 
such as the dynamics and long-term 
development of industrial clusters and 
the business environment. 
TEKES is the main public agency 
financing applied and industrial R&D in 
Finland. Its technology strategy is based on 
close and intensive interaction, discussion 
and continuous learning with firms, research 
institutes, industrial organizations and 
other technology-policy peer groups. 
This work also takes international trends 
into account by using the agency’s wide 
contact network. 
Technology foresight studies are often 
associated with technology evaluation 
programmes in the same field. This type 
of foresight study may be denominated 
embedded studies, which incorporate 
evaluation, technology foresight and 
technology assessment. These projects 
also provide a platform for the creation of 
development tools and methods of technology 
foresight for programmes in this area.
A number of studies have analysed 
Finland’s technology foresight activities and 
compared them with European practices, 
identifying a number of challenges for 
Finland. These include systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of the potential 
risks of technological development; balanced 
assessment of different R&D areas; sound, 
transparent and well-documented foresight 
processes; and all the aspects stakeholders 
must bear in mind in processes of foresight, 
estimation and evaluation.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Eija Ahola, “Technology Foresight within the Finnish Innovation System”, 
document presented at the Second International Conference on Technology Foresight, Tokyo, 27 and 28 February 2003.
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B. Foresight in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
 lessons from experiences in the rest of the world
decision-making and the provision of assistance, long-
term guidelines and guidance for stakeholder dialogue on 
research and innovation policies at the European level. 
APEC has the Center for Technology Foresight (CFT), 
which was set up in 998 as part of the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) in Bangkok. 
Its main aim is to develop and disseminate foresight 
capacity and planning tools to help APEC economies 
to face rapid changes and social challenges. With this 
in mind, APEC has adopted a fairly broad definition of 
foresight as a systematic attempt to glimpse the future 
of science, technology, society, the economy and their 
various interactions, for the purposes of social, economic 
and environmental benefits. To achieve this, APEC carries 
out: foresight projects (in the broadest sense of the term); 
regional, sectoral and organizational foresight studies; 
training in the latest generation of foresight studies; and 
regional and national strategic planning.4
As a region, Latin America and the Caribbean has no 
such agencies, despite the many challenges it faces and 
the ever-increasing demands of competitiveness. Given 
that the main competitors of the region’s countries have 
a long-term vision and have agreed upon a common 
strategy to strengthen their position in the world economy 
(resulting in a clearly defined course of action), it is 
obviously important for Latin America and the Caribbean 
to follow a course based on long-term strategic guidelines 
that translate into specific actions in the present. This is 
vital in order to coordinate and link effective policies.
4
 For more information on the OECD International Futures Programme, 
the European Union’s Foresight for the European Research Area 
(FORERA) and the APEC Center for Technology Foresight (CFT), 
see http://www.OECD.org, http://forera.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ and 
http://www.apecforesight.org/, respectively.
Although foresight analysis has been carried out in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, it has not been a systematic 
government practice at the sectoral, subnational or national 
levels (except in a few countries). In most cases, foresight 
exercises have been used sporadically, with the region’s 
countries lacking the capacity to adapt them creatively 
to their situations.3 
The experiences of European and Asian countries 
that use foresight show that these exercises can be 
extremely useful, not only for looking at and modelling 
the future, but also for harmonizing the visions of different 
stakeholders and reconciling these with opposing interests. 
Multilateral institutions including the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
European Union and APEC support such exercises and 
help countries to identify and study phenomena that 
may affect their future, also creating the conditions for 
the development of a common vision. For instance, the 
aim of the OECD International Futures Programme is 
to help countries tackle the complexity and uncertainty 
of today’s world, through the creation of a platform 
for policymakers and other stakeholders to compare 
visions and ideas, by taking account of the viewpoints of 
others and establishing a dialogue that leads to a greater 
understanding of the phenomena involved and guidelines 
for the future. The European Union has the Foresight for 
the European Research Area (FORERA), which aims to 
promote foresight activities in Europe as a basis for the 
open coordination of future visions, the facilitation of
3
 See Popper and Medina (2008).
1. The search for national vision on the road to competitiveness
Foresight exercises help to identify a national vision for 
facing the future in a consensual way. One highly illustrative 
example was implemented by the Australian Labour 
Prime Minister in April 2008.5 This involved convening 
,000 people grouped according to 0 issues, and their 
joint efforts served to define the country’s priorities for 
the future. The issues analysed in Australia are not toofar 
removed from the challenges facing Latin American
and the Caribbean countries: productivity, training and 
education, the future of the economy, future direction of 
rural industries, climate change and water (a key issue 
for Australia) and the long-term health strategy. 
5
 Australia 2020 Summit, Initial Summit Report, April 2008.
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In the initial stage of the exercise, the assembly of 
actors with different interests generated some contention 
but also facilitated an understanding of the challenges 
involved, put various possible solutions on the table, 
enabled stakeholders to make contact and get to know 
each other and eventually led to understandings and even 
consensus on key issues for the country’s development. 
Many Latin American and Caribbean countries could 
benefit from such an initiative. One positive aspect is that 
the dialogue leaves ideology and parties to one side, as 
participants look to the future to solve concrete problems 
and come up with viable options for strengthening national 
competitiveness in the long term. 
Between 2003 and 2004, Sweden carried out a 
similar exercise, the conclusions of which are presented
in “Inspiration for Innovation: Swedish Technology 
Foresight 2004”.6 In Sweden, the search to identify the 
course of the country’s future development was carried out 
in a shorter form. The country’s cutting-edge technology 
and the effects of the constant forces of globalization 
led the Swedish to the conclusion that the investment 
specialization should be deepened. Eleven sectors were 
selected, grouping 00 areas of knowledge and technological 
development, including interactive technology, functional 
materials, sustainable food production and health-care 
technology. As a means of strengthening collaboration 
among companies, academia and the government, these 
results were incorporated into Sweden’s innovation 
strategy, which guides the programmes and incentives 
for its implementation.
6
 Swedish Technology Foresight (2004) [online] www.tekniskfram 
syn.un.
2. Foresight in energy: a means of overcoming obstacles 
 to competitiveness
Foresight exercises help to identify ways of breaking down 
obstacles to competitiveness or to achieve consensus and 
establish strategic guidelines as a result. One example 
is energy policy. Although foresight exercises are not 
commonplace in Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have some 
experience in this area. 
In 2005, the State petroleum company of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
(PDVSA), carried out the first technological foresight study 
on fuels and advanced vehicles, with a view to defining 
future scenarios for its products over the next 0 or 20 
years (Paez, 2005). In terms of fuels, the exercise revealed 
a wide range of opportunities and threats, which in a global 
context could become major challenges and opportunities 
for the company. The policy recommendations that arose 
from the exercise included the creation of a corporate 
technology strategy to promote the search for new products 
and fossil fuels for future markets, timely investment in 
technology to produce high-quality fossil fuels and the 
need to explore new business opportunities in Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as socially and 
environmentally responsible energy diversification in all 
markets. The usefulness of the exercise clearly depends 
on its capacity to influence decision-making in enterprise 
and government.
In Brazil, a foresight exercise was carried out into the 
sustainability of the ethanol industry. Current oil prices, 
the higher cost of cereals and rapid technological change 
in the Brazilian ethanol industry made the product into 
the most competitive biofuel in the world. Added to this 
is the potential demand from the United States when the 
tariffs on ethanol are eliminated in 2009. Although the 
strong international position of ethanol bodes well for 
the industry, major challenges remain, as detailed by the 
foresight exercise.7 
The study concluded that, although rising world demand 
for ethanol would be a driving force of development in the 
industry, the negative externalities will also be considerable 
unless appropriate strategic planning is carried out. Public 
policy should be used to solve problems relating to 
ownership rights and land-use planning, and to react to the 
opportunities of a new regional development based on the 
deconcentration of the bioenergy industry. The study also 
highlighted the need to increase State support for R&D 
and technological transfer, motivate the private sector 
with mechanisms to promote best practices in corporate 
governance and social responsibility, and strengthen the 
response to the markets’ efficiency requirements and 
environmental pressures.8
7
 The exercise was carried out by the Institute for Agricultural 
Economics, as part of a project on the direction of public policies 
for the ethanol industry in the state of São Paulo and the public-
policy research programme of the Foundation to support research 
in the state. 
8
 In Brazil, the Center for Strategic Management and Studies (CGEE) 
carries out foresight studies in different areas. 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2007 • 2008 Trends 183
There are several countries in the region whose energy 
matrix will not cover future requirements. Carrying out 
national foresight exercises would enable countries to 
formulate alternative scenarios and, above all, achieve 
consensus among the various actors on the subject of 
viable options that may have opposing effects. At the 
regional level, these exercises would optimize the use 
of energy, with direct effects on competitiveness. With 
this in mind, the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE) carried out an energy foresight study of its 
26 member countries in 2006 (OLADE, 2006). The 
exercise was organized by countries and subregions 
—Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Andean 
countries and the Southern Cone— and covers the 
period up to 208. The study presents the ratio between 
supply and demand by country and subregion for the 
entire range of energy products, and compares this with 
what the ratios would be in scenarios of high and low 
levels of integration.
As with any study of this nature, some assumptions 
have been made about the world order, such as the strong 
surge in demand from China, the United States and India, 
which will particularly affect demand for petroleum in 
the transport sector. There has also been a mushrooming 
of searches for alternatives to conventional petroleum 
and its petroleum products. The study also uses regional 
assumptions. A scenario with low levels of integration 
(with only a few consolidated infrastructure projects, 
mainly in natural gas and electricity) would result in 
lower competitiveness and slower rates of growth and 
development. In a high-integration scenario, regional 
competitiveness, growth and development would all 
increase. An analysis of the results of the foresight study 
clearly shows the economic benefits of integration by 
subregion, given the energy-production capacity of some 
countries and the energy requirements of others. 
The problem with this type of exercise is that, rather 
than producing consensus on political decisions, it tends to 
represent more of an analysis of the future, with conclusions 
that do not result in a strategy to be implemented by the 
countries involved. This is illustrated by the different 
approach to foresight used in other regions, including 
in some Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden).9 These countries are making efforts 
to design and apply a strategic vision in the energy sector 
for the next 30 years. The exercise carried out involved 6 
agencies from the spheres of academia, industry, energy 
companies and associations from the five countries, 
plus a wide range of European experts from the areas 
of research, industry and government. The aim of the 
foresight exercise was to help the companies, research 
institutes and governments of the five countries to define 
priorities for the energy industry, especially in terms 
of introducing hydrogen energy. The exercise enabled 
these countries to develop collaborative projects, set up 
networks of scientists and investment companies and 
create a critical mass to lend weight to their projects in 
the international arena. In addition to the specific research 
findings, the exercise has made it possible for a group of 
small countries to join forces and combine their material 
resources, knowledge and determination to tackle the 
energy challenges of the future.
9
 Nordic H2 Energy Foresight, Building the Nordic Research and 
Innovation Area in Hydrogen, Summary Report, January 2005.
3. Foresight studies at the sectoral level
In Latin America, sectoral foresight exercises have been 
promoted by the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO). In 2005 a futures exercise was 
conducted for the South American fishing industry, covering 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. This exercise served to 
generate cooperation agreements to increase productivity 
and competitiveness in the export chain, define regional 
R&D programmes and propose technology upgrades in 
products and sectors related to the fishing industry. In 
addition, the project produced recommendations regarding 
follow-up to the exercise and the need to establish a regional 
fisheries policy; promoted investment in modernization 
and technological upgrading in the industry; proposed the 
creation of a regional training and technology alert centre 
and, lastly, established a quality of origin framework for 
products from the region (UNIDO, 2006).
If such exercises had been carried out in Chile’s salmon 
farming industry several years ago, the main stakeholders 
(industry representatives, workers, scientists, international 
experts and public authorities) might have reached an 
understanding to develop a sustainable growth strategy 
based on innovation and environmental stewardship. This 
might well have avoided the diseases that are now hurting 
the output of one of the country’s main export products. 
Conversely, the exercise carried out in the Norwegian 
fish-farming industry (see box VII.) generated joint 
action by scientists and professionals in ICTs, materials 
technologies and biotechnology and social and market 
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researchers, to contribute to the development of new and 
important know-how and strategic solutions to carry the 
industry forward in the long term.
Sectoral foresight exercises can be used to discover the 
potential existing in new sectors. In Ireland, for example, 
such exercises have been carried out to ascertain the 
social, economic and market trends that will prevail in 
the country up to 205. The exercises encompassed the 
following sectors: chemicals and pharmaceuticals (the 
sector with the largest share in exports); ICTs (seeking 
to increase exports of high-tech services); manufacturing 
processes and materials (especially in computing and 
medical equipment); health and life sciences; natural 
resources (agro-industrial and marine foods and forestry 
products); energy, transport and logistics; and construction 
and infrastructure. In each of these areas the exercise built 
consensus among government representatives, experts, 
scientists and industry members on the scientific research 
and technological progress needed to ensure competitiveness 
and better living standards in the future.0
Foresight exercises have been carried out in Latin 
America too, one example being those conducted in Uruguay 
(Ramos, 2002), which had some interesting features compared 
with those carried out in other countries of the region. The 
first is that the process was headed by the Office of the 
President of the Republic, which meant that the exercise was 
not isolated from the sphere of decision-making. Second, it 
involved 70 specialists, including business representatives, 
academics and government authorities, which conferred 
legitimacy upon its resolutions. The report on the exercise 
also mentioned its limitations: the actors’ difficulty in 
developing a vision of the future and in separating long-
term scenarios from the analysis of current conditions and 
the pressure on the State to correct them. It was decided to 
concentrate scientific and technological effort and policies 
and investment on the following areas:
Biotechnology in the agrifood system, with a panel 
steered by the National Institute of Agricultural 
Research (INIA)
0
 See ICSTI Ireland (999).
•
Energy, with a panel steered by the Faculty of 
Engineering of the University of the Republic 
Transport and logistics, with a panel steered by 
the Faculty of Engineering of the University of 
Montevideo
Prospective exercises are also useful in mapping out the 
future of an industry in crisis and looking for alternatives. 
One example is Dutch agriculture, which recently went 
through a crisis involving animal health, food safety and 
outbreaks of disease. The prospective exercise carried out 
by the National Council for Agricultural Research (NRLO) 
showed that new concepts would be needed to develop 
sustainable agriculture in the future. Prospective tools such 
as analysis of scenarios, in-depth interviews, specialist 
studies and trend analysis helped to set out the criteria 
for generating new concepts. One of the proposals, the 
idea of agroparks, consisted of grouping different farms 
in a single industrial estate, thus enabling the recycling 
of energy, minerals, water and carbon dioxide. 
The eco-industrial concept of agroparks represents, 
in many ways, a paradigm shift, with agricultural activity 
no longer confined to the countryside, but carried out also 
in semi-urban settings. Contrasting with the paradigm 
of specialization, different branches of agriculture come 
together to recycle materials (carbon dioxide, energy, 
water and minerals). Although the pilot projects are still 
under way, the experience and learning gained from 
the prospective exercise were so significant that NRLO 
was turned into an Innovation Network Rural Areas and 
Agricultural Systems, as it was considered that foresight 
activities are more effective when they are integrated into 
systems of innovative processes. In relation to agroindustry, 
the example of Uruguay mentioned earlier suggests that 
certain countries of the region have many advantages, 
but these are not well enough known nor has any strategy 
been developed to unlock all of their potential. Adding 
value through innovation is one of the major challenges 
in this regard, and foresight exercises offer a way to map 




Latin America and the Caribbean is lagging behind in 
certain areas of export development and competitiveness. 
Moving ahead in this regard involves a dual challenge: 
catching up with other countries, while avoiding the lag 
generated by continual technological development, which 
is even faster in the era of globalization. In the world of 
today, the effort to increase countries’ competitiveness 
and strengthen their international integration cannot be 
left to the invisible hand of the market, but calls for a 
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medium- and long-term strategy based on collaboration 
between the public and private sectors. This is borne out 
by the experience of economies that have leapfrogged in 
terms of export development and growth, closing the gap 
with higher-income countries. 
As discussed in this chapter, foresight exercises nourish 
this process. Experience shows that such tools are useful 
for developing consensus on how to build a desirable future 
that is also “achievable” in the long term, by compiling 
the information available from different stakeholders, 
analysing and evaluating it and jointly identifying priorities 
and strategic lines to be taken into consideration in the 
present. Generally speaking, foresight exercises help 
to build understanding and accords among the relevant 
stakeholders around strategic pillars of development. This 
might be in relation to a future vision of the country, to 
sustainable growth, or to more specific objectives such 
as innovation strategy.
Foresight exercises make use of multiple methodologies 
to achieve consensuses or agreements and translate them 
into policy proposals, and this feeds into decision-making 
on the part of the authorities. Experience suggests that the 
wider the engagement of the stakeholders and the more 
democratic the process, the more sustainable the long-term 
strategies deriving from it. But turning the exercise into 
a strategy and a plan of action also requires leadership 
and a coordinating body, resources, parameters and a 
system that promotes collaboration between the public 
and private sectors and in which policies and programmes 
can be put into practice. 
Although these exercises are quite new, historically 
speaking, their use is growing very rapidly at the international 
level. As noted earlier, however, foresight is an incipient 
discipline in Latin America and the Caribbean and there 
is still a great deal of room to make more comprehensive 
use of these tools to help create either national innovation 
programmes to build up technological capacities or, more 
broadly, export development strategies to compete in the 
world of tomorrow. The exercises carried out in the region 
have not yet reached the stage of impacting on policy. 
Government cycles also deprive the recommended actions 
of continuity. Nevertheless, the participants and stakeholders 
view prospective exercises as positive experiences. Building 
consensus about how to tackle obstacles to competitiveness 
or future challenges greatly strengthens support for policies 
and, especially, their sustainability over government cycles. 
Such exercises are thus useful for moving ahead with the 
development of long-term strategies.
The process of prospective analysis is a goal in itself, 
because it leads to broad participation, consensus-building 
and the creation of networks. It is also important to achieve 
effective or practical results, however, given the great 
potential of foresight work as a policy tool, whether in the 
area of FDI attraction, international expansion of SMEs 
or science and technology policies that can help make a 
country more competitive internationally. While foresight 
exercises obviously do not eliminate the incertitude of the 
future, they can help to lessen it by reducing the uncertainty 
that the lack of a national innovation and competitiveness 
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